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In the early 1980s of the twentieth century, which is now a little less than 40 years 
ago, and in response to the uproar that the introduction of Punctuated Equilibria 
theory had caused within evolutionary biology, John Maynard Smith invited pale-
ontologists to join what he called, the “high table” of evolutionary theory. In the 
1970s, Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould provided convincing theoretical argu-
ments as well as empirical data that the Modern Synthesis was incomplete because 
its founders had not adequately incorporated the study of life’s evolution above 
and beyond the differential distribution of genes across populations through time.
They defined macroevolutionary research by arguing that species are real bio-
logical individuals that have a clear beginning, lifespan, and ending in time, and 
furthermore proved that the fossil record evidences that species demonstrate long 
periods of stasis where no apparent morphological change occurs, which are inter-
spersed by rapid speciation events that follow a branching pattern. When the fossil 
record does not give proof for intermediate life forms, then instead of assuming 
the incompleteness of the fossil record as Darwin and Neodarwinians did, they 
suggested to understand the gaps as data, and to postulate that no intermediates 
existed when none are found. Because species are understood as real biological 
individuals, speciation and extinction events are also understood as real phenom-
ena that require scientific investigation.
Researching morphological stasis, species and above species phenomena such 
as (mass) extinctions and speciation events, large-scale evolutionary trends, and 
major transitions across all domains of life; or mapping the various units,  levels, 
and mechanisms whereby life evolves as well as the hierarchical nature there exists 
between these units, levels, and mechanisms; require an epistemic incorporation 
of fields such as developmental biology, ecology, systematics, and  biophysics. 
Most of all, it requires a change in scholarly research attitudes, a willingness to 
transcend classic field-specific disciplinary boundaries that remain focused on 
reductionist, gene-centered theoretical accounts, in favor of complexity-focused, 
holistic epistemic stances.
In recent years, the heated aura that surrounded these often polemic debates 




appears to have cooled down a bit. The explosive entrance of macroevolutionary 
areas of research has cleared room for what we can characterize as an almost silent 
integration of the major claims first put forth by macroevolutionary scholars into 
standard evolutionary research. One can safely say that evolutionary biologists in 
both micro- as well as macro-oriented fields today accept that species are real bio-
logical entities with an important evolutionary role to play, and research on the 
evolutionary and abiotic causes that underlie constraints, stasis, extinction, and 
speciation has never ranged so “high” at the “evolutionary table”. Indeed, these 
topics defined the talks of many of the lectures of the speakers that were invited 
to present their work at the Darwin 2009 bicentennial that was organized at the 
University of Chicago.
One of us, Nathalie Gontier, attended that conference as an audience participant. 
What amazed me was that the topics introduced by macroevolutionary scholars 
ranged so high, while at the same time, little attention and credit was given to where 
these ideas stemmed from and in which context they had originated. During that 
same period, and with a grant from the European Marie Curie fellowships, I held a 
one-year visiting research position at the American Museum of Natural History in 
New York, under the supervision of Niles Eldredge, with the goal to perform theo-
retical research on punctuated equilibria theory in particular, and how macroevolu-
tionary theory in general is applicable within the sociocultural sciences. For many 
years, the Museum has set a crucial scene for the development of evolutionary the-
ory, both in what regards its micro- as well as macroevolutionary stances, not in the 
least by employing scholars such as Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould as well as 
Ernst Mayr.
At that moment in time, by on the one hand reading these scholars’ important 
works that lie at the basis of micro- and macroevolutionary stances as well as on 
the other hand having the experience to attend the excellently organized Darwin 
commemoration where I had the chance to discuss many of these ideas with my 
contemporaries, I felt scholars from my generation had lost the roots of these 
significant ideas. From there grew the idea to edit a book on the matter, as well 
as to provide dissemination and outreach activities on the specificities of macro-
evolutionary research outside the classic paleontological and biogeographical 
disciplines where they were first introduced, and to highlight how macroevolu-
tionary-oriented scholars have contributed to a richer conceptualization as well as 
demonstration of life’s evolution.
To obtain these goals, and back in Belgium, I started with writing out these 
ideas in the form of a grant proposal which I submitted to the John Templeton 
Foundation. The proposal, that had as goal to investigate the importance of 
both macroevolution as well as reticulate evolution for the Extended Synthesis 
within the field of evolutionary biology, as well as the impact these new areas of 
research have on the growing sociocultural evolutionary sciences, was accepted 
by the Foundation and was successfully executed at the Applied Evolutionary 
Epistemology Lab (http://appeel.fc.ul.pt), at the Portuguese University of Lisbon 
in 2012–2013. I hereby want to thank again the staff of the Templeton founda-
tion and, in particular, Paul Wason as well as Kevin Arnold and Drew Rick-Miller, 
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This book on macroevolution is neither a handbook for beginning scholars for 
which there exist numerous excellent works written by paleontologists, nor a work 
aimed toward philosophers and historians of science to exclusively highlight the 
history and epistemology of macroevolutionary ideas. This book highlights some 
of the most important research topics that macroevolutionary scholars have intro-
duced into the evolutionary sciences, including debates on how microevolution 
differs from macroevolution; what the nature is of evolutionary stasis, extinction, 
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speciation; how we can define and measure evolutionary rates; how we can model 
biological hierarchies; how biophysics, ecology, evo-devo, genetics, and systemat-
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Macroevolutionary Issues and Approaches 
in Evolutionary Biology
Emanuele Serrelli and Nathalie Gontier
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 
E. Serrelli and N. Gontier (eds.), Macroevolution,  
Interdisciplinary Evolution Research 2, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15045-1_1
Abstract Many fields and approaches evidence, quantify, and analyze 
 macroevolution. From biogeography to paleontology, from ecology to phylo-
genetics, and from biophysics to philosophy of biology, macroevolution elicits 
definitions and theoretical problems related to concepts such as species, lineage, 
 ecology, niches, and extinction, which are relevant for general evolutionary biology. 
Macroevolutionary theories provide new epistemic frameworks to explain evolution 
in deep time, and macroevolution is also a phenomenon exemplified by  myriads of 
real life-history case studies. This volume Macroevolution: Interpretation, Evidence 
and Explanation samples the rich reservoir of macroevolutionary knowledge, and 
evidences the macroevolutionary phenomenon in various episodes in time.
Keywords Macroevolution · Evolutionary biology · Speciation · Extinction · Deep 
time · Fossil record
Outlining the table of contents and writing an introduction to the various chapters 
of a book volume always comes with a reflection on the sequence in which we 
present the topics discussed by the authors, a sequence that in turn associates with 
the reasons we invited the scholars to contribute. Macroevolution on the one hand 
associates with theory formation and the methodological means by which we can 
interpret and explain evolution in deep time and above the species level. On the 
other hand, macroevolution is itself a phenomenon that can be evidenced by actual 
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cases in life’s history. For that reason, we have divided the book into two parts, 
one that focuses on theory formation, and one that evidences macroevolution.
1  Introduction to Part 1: Macroevolutionary Explanations 
and Interpretations
For the first part, Macroevolutionary Explanations and Interpretations, we invited 
our contributors to focus on the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological 
aspects of macroevolution, defined as a scientific area of research that endorses 
specific scientific practices. Evolutionary scholars today continue to disagree on 
the nature and scope of evolutionary theory. Is there such a single field as “evo-
lutionary biology” or is evolution a phenomenon studied by a variety of scientific 
disciplines? How does the field of macroevolution relate to microevolutionary 
biological areas of research? Is the Modern Synthesis complete, and can it ade-
quately explain macroevolutionary problems above the population level such as 
speciation and extinction, evolutionary trends, major transitions, biological hier-
archies, or species sorting? Does macroevolution delineate one or multiple dis-
tinct area(s) of research, or does it merely complement microevolutionary theory 
and practice? Answers to these questions not only vary, but also they continue to 
raise significant debate between micro- as well as macroevolutionary scholars. We 
have sought out both the controversies and agreements, and we have invited our 
contributors to write on how they, from within their specific disciplines, under-
stand and define macroevolutionary epistemology, and how they see their theoreti-
cal frameworks fit or dissociate from the standard evolutionary paradigm both in 
theory and practice. We have favored quality over quantity and invited a selected 
group of scholars to provide extensive review chapters instead of aiming for 
shorter, more concise position papers.
For Douglas J. Futuyma, a leader in evolutionary biology (Futuyma 2013), 
macroevolutionary theory primarily associates with on the one hand ideas on 
developmental constraints as introduced by adherents of punctuated equilibria, and 
on the other hand, with the role speciation plays in bringing forth biodiversity at 
an ecological and biogeographical level. He opens the first part by asking “Can 
Modern Evolutionary Theory Explain Macroevolution?” As one of the scholars 
who has long recognized the importance of the issues raised by macroevolution-
ary scholars, and who in his career has focused on reconciling aspects of punctu-
ated equilibria theory with population genetics, he answers the question mostly in 
the affirmative. In his chapter, the author provides a rich contextualization of both 
the origin of the synthetic theory and how its architects tried to explain macro-
evolutionary above-population phenomena, as well as the challenges that evidence 
and hypotheses on developmental constraints and stasis, among others, pose to 
the synthetic theory. Futuyma provides historical insight into how post-synthetic 
evolutionary biologists have been reconciling these ideas into standard evolution-
ary theory, and he especially points toward the rising disciplines of evo-devo and 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
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evolutionary ecology as the means by which such reconciliation is possible. Eco-
evo-devo presents a more evolved and richer synthetic evolutionary view, and the 
continuously evolving and expanding framework therefore remains valid.
That evolutionary theory is valid and is undisputed by macroevolutionary 
scholars (Ridley 2003). Nonetheless, many macroevolutionary scholars are less 
optimistic about how well microevolutionary theory can explain macroevolution-
ary problems or predict evolutionary outcomes. How do macroevolutionary schol-
ars differentiate their research agenda from microevolutionary biology, and how 
do they define the microevolutionary fields they oppose? Macroevolutionary areas 
of research today associate with fields such as paleobiology, ecology, systematics, 
and biophysics, and scholars that form part of these fields in general think that 
microevolutionists place too much emphasis on genetic selection at the expense 
of other principles, such as physical and ecological ones, that equally contribute to 
our understanding of evolution.
Folmer Bokma tests some of the microevolutionary predictions on speciation, 
extinction as well as the mode and tempo of evolution in his chapter “Evolution 
as a Largely Autonomous Process.” He gives a series of examples wherein he 
demonstrates the means by which microevolutionary scholars provide explana-
tions and make predictions on the evolutionary fates of species as well as how 
they interact with other species (flowers and their pollinators, for example), and 
weighs them against the actual evolutionary history that those life forms undergo 
through time, which he in turn deduces from molecular phylogenetic analyses. 
His examples demonstrate an epistemic ambivalence and duality in the works of 
microevolutionists, which he characterizes as “ascribing change to natural selec-
tion when it occurs, but failing to account for the frequent cases where no evo-
lution is observed” though it is predicted. To explain periods of stasis as well as 
rapid speciation, he turns to punctuated equilibria theory and agrees with many 
of the founders of macroevolutionary thought that in real-life history events, natu-
ral selection, in and of itself, cannot account for speciation, extinction, or stasis. 
Again, he firmly grounds these conclusions upon the incoming results of molec-
ular phylogenetics, a rising field that today forms a bridge between fossils and 
genes, and where Bokma is a leading and pioneering expert. He furthermore turns 
to epigenetics and evo-devo to explain evolution as a largely autonomous process.
In his chapter “Visualizing Macroevolution: From Adaptive Landscapes to 
Compositions of Multiple Spaces,” Emanuele Serrelli details how macroevolu-
tionists have visualized life’s evolution. By taking classic models of evolutionary 
change as depicted in adaptive landscapes as point of departure, Serrelli demon-
strates that the original population geneticists understood evolutionary change 
mostly as the various distributions of genes within populations through time, while 
macroevolutionary schools of thought understand evolution as the outcomes of 
adaptations to environmental conditions, and thus favor a more spatial, ecological 
approach. He furthermore demonstrates how new visualizations of evolution con-
ceived as occurring in multiple spaces, such as morphospaces, geographical, and 
ecological spaces, as well as diversity diagrams and distribution maps provide new 
methodological tools to deduce the major patterns and trends of life’s evolution.
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
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Stanley Salthe, one of the architects of the macroevolutionary discipline, 
understands biological evolution as part of a larger, cosmic evolutionary pro-
cess that both transcends and influences the evolution of life. In his “Toward a 
Natural Philosophy of Macroevolution,” he explains how on a cosmic scale a 
distinction can be made between the physical, chemical, biological, and social 
realm. Besides by biological principles such as natural selection, life evolves 
according to thermodynamic and overall physical principles that act within life, 
both in what regard its development as well as its survival, expansion, and extinc-
tion in ecological settings. Salthe emphasizes that taking on a macroevolutionary 
perspective implies a return to natural history research as well as natural philoso-
phy. In such a framework, all the natural sciences, including physics and chemis-
try, are put to use in explaining just how it is that life originates, diversifies, and 
dies. He demonstrates how such a naturalistic, ecological approach to life neces-
sitates hierarchical thinking and explains how especially biophysics is able to 
account for life at a grander scale.
Hierarchy theory is also the topic of Ilya Tëmkin and Niles Eldredge’s chap-
ter, “Networks and Hierarchies: Approaching Complexity in Evolutionary 
Theory.” One of the claims made by macroevolutionary scholars is that species 
and higher taxa are real entities or biological systems that evolve in an equally real 
biotic and abiotic environment, respectively, by proximal evolutionary processes 
and abiotic drivers. Such a stance, for Tëmkin and Eldredge, requires an ontologi-
cal investigation into the multiple levels of the genealogical and economic (eco-
logical) hierarchy. By understanding biological entities as hierarchically nested, 
complex emerging systems that occupy an equally hierarchical and multilayered 
economy, they demonstrate how hierarchy thinking provides new means to deline-
ate and identify the underlying patterns and processes of evolution.
Ontological and epistemological hierarchy thinking also forms the topic of 
Nathalie Gontier’s chapter “Uniting Micro- with Macro- evolution into an 
Extended Synthesis: Reintegrating Life’s Natural History into Evolution 
Studies.” She demonstrates how the modern synthesis defined evolution at a 
meso-level, and details how microevolutionary and macroevolutionary research 
schools necessitate a reconceptualization of older hierarchical levels such as the 
inorganic, organic, and superorganic. She furthermore details how both the micro- 
as well as macroschools have evolved different scientific practices and epistemic 
frameworks to understand life’s evolution. Macroevolutionary scholars understand 
evolution as the outcome of natural history, while microevolutionary scholars 
understand evolution as the result of a causal mechanism (i.e., natural selection), 
and Gontier points out that the various epistemic stances underlie radically dif-
ferent concepts on matter, space, and most of all, time. Finally, she details how 
macroevolutionary thought currently extends the biological sciences and is suc-
cessfully applied within the sociocultural domain.
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
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2  Introduction to Part 2: Evidencing Macroevolution  
with Case Studies
Macroevolution does not merely define a specific scientific agenda; it also deline-
ates a phenomenon. In the second part of this volume, Evidencing Macroevolution 
with Case Studies, we invited scholars to contribute with specific topics and exam-
ples that explain the specificity of macroevolution as a phenomenon. In our selec-
tion, we have of course had to make choices, because not all case studies and 
examples can fit one book volume. We have therefore focused on some of the most 
important macroevolutionary phenomena typical of eukaryotic evolution, namely 
the origin of eukaryotic sex, the evolution of distinct body plans, hominid evolu-
tion, speciation and extinction, and biodiversity.
Lutz Becks and Yasaman Alavi contribute with a chapter “Using Micro-
evolution to Explain the Macroevolutionary Observations for the Evolution of 
Sex.” The origin and evolution of sex in eukaryotic organisms poses one of the big-
gest enigmas for evolutionary theory, and sex is rightfully characterized as one of the 
major transitions of life. Becks and Alavi understand the emergence of sex as a mac-
roevolutionary phenomenon, which they define as an observation, and explain how 
traditional microevolutionary theories can explain its evolutionary emergence. More 
specifically, they understand sexual reproduction as an evolutionary pattern that asso-
ciates with various geographic and phylogenetic distributions not found in asexual 
organisms and demonstrate how microevolutionary processes can explain the macro-
evolutionary observations.
Because species are considered real biological entities, macroevolutionary 
scholars also understand speciations as events resulting from processes often 
distinct from genetic selection. In the chapter titled “Speciation: Expanding 
the Role of Biogeography and Niche Breath in Macroevolutionary Theory,” 
Alycia Stigall discusses how a multiplicity of abiotic and biotic, external fac-
tors including, among others, climate change and plate tectonics as well as niche 
occupation and breath, and species invasions of ecological niches, underlies spe-
ciation events. She avers for understanding speciations as the outcome of multiple 
factors that often lead to speciation as combined factors that together bring forth 
evolutionary change. Stigall reviews some of the vicariant speciation events that 
occurred in bivalves and brachiopods (which are both shelled marine animals) that 
lived through the Late Devonian Biodiversity Crisis, a period that is designated as 
a crisis because the ecosystem underwent radical changes while the marine ani-
mals form an anomaly to these extinction events; as well as the Late Ordovician 
Richmondian Invasion, another crisis period characterized by fluctuating sea lev-
els and associated invasions of foreign species that before did not occupy these 
niches, where the marine benthos fared less well in comparison with the period 
before they had to share their habitat. She ends with detailing the speciation events 
of North American horses of the Neogene (the second period of the Cenozoic), 
this time during a radiation period associated with favorable climate change and 
subsequent abundant food availability (grasslands).
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
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Prokaryotes come in distinct shapes and sizes, and although they can form mor-
phologically complex colonies, and most certainly contribute to the anatomical 
form of eukaryotic beings, they are mostly unicellular organisms that often con-
tain organelle-like structures. The evolution and diversification of anatomically 
distinct body plans, organs, and organelles is typical of eukaryotic organisms. 
Macroevolutionary theory has played a significant role in reviving and reintegrat-
ing embryological and overall developmental biology into standard evolutionary 
theory.
In his chapter “Morphological Misfits and the Architecture of Development,” 
Alessandro Minelli examines morphological “misfits,” i.e., taxa whose morphol-
ogy diverges from the conventional structural body plan of the major clade they 
belong to. A correct phylogenetic positioning of morphological misfits is there-
fore the first obligate step toward a tentative interpretation of their evolution. Some 
misfits are “systemic”: homologies between them and their relatives are hard to 
find, while homologous structures are what enables morphological comparisons. 
Macroevolutionary research on body plan formation helps to make the degree of 
“evolutionary freedom” of a structure visible and enables insight into character 
evolvability. Divergent structures ‘behave as evolutionarily independent  modules,’ 
because their independence is structural, and often results from the largely inde-
pendent genetic control of their development, which is the case in arthropod seg-
ments for example. The neck of the giraffe, on the other hand, although very 
divergent in a phylogenetic context where necks are rather monotonous, is not a 
module, because it involves several body units. For Minelli, rapidly evolved  misfits 
deserve detailed studies to estimate the time of their divergence from “normal” 
relatives.
Macroevolutionary phenomena also impact our own history. Bernard Wood 
and Mark Grabowski document “Macroevolution In and Around the Hominin 
Clade.” The authors begin their work by delineating how paleontologists, 
informed by both micro- and macroevolutionary theory, classify fossil finds into 
species and genera to build taxonomies. They exemplify by listing the reasons 
why recent fossil finds such as Sahelanthropus tchadensis, Orrorin tugenensis, 
and the two Ardipithecus species (Ardipithecus kadabba and Ardipithecus rami-
dus) can, and for the authors cannot, be categorized as members of the hominin 
clade (which is a subclade of the hominids). Until more evidence is available, 
they suggest instead to designated them as “possible hominins.” They go on to 
demonstrate how a variety of morphological and developmental features, includ-
ing body growth, sexual maturation, and reduction in teeth size, so typical of the 
actual hominin clade, enable deductions on the tempo and mode of evolution. 
They exemplify how the evolution of Australopithecus afarensis and Paranthropus 
boisei is characterized by stasis, and they demonstrate how macroevolutionary 
morphological trends, such as increase in brain size and the overall morphological 
differences between Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens, can be explained 
by drift. Finally, the authors end their chapter with an account of the difficulties 
posed by homoplasies, morphological traits present in sister taxa but not in their 
most recent common ancestor.
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Finally, macroevolutionary theory not merely associates with the fossil 
record or the study of the dead, it also associates with the living and those who 
are  threatened with extinction. The final case study, written by Elena Casetta 
and Jorge Marques da Silva, therefore focusses on bioconservation efforts in a 
chapter titled “Facing the Big Sixth: From Prioritizing Species to Conserving 
Biodiversity.” Scholars in general distinguish between five large extinction events 
but Eldredge distinguishes a sixth that is imminent. Casetta and Marques da Silva 
first investigate the criteria by which species are declared extinct from an environ-
mental ethics point of view, and subsequently focus on how species can be prior-
itized for conservation. They provide a rich overview and analysis of the distinct 
means by which the United States of America and the European Union delineate 
their conservation policies and give suggestions on how they can be improved.
3  Alternative Ways to Read the Volume
The division of the book into two parts is only one way in which scholars can 
read the book. Macroevolutionary research is also characterized by a set of spe-
cific research questions, and these questions present alternative ways in which we 
suggest the reader to digest the various chapters.
3.1  Macroevolutionary Fields and Approaches
Macroevolutionary research fields and approaches to macroevolutionary phe-
nomena are remarkably many, and distinguishing between a research area or an 
approach is not always easy. Biogeography, for example, delineates a particular 
field of study, but in its approach it also demarcates a particular dimension that 
can be incorporated and put to use in other research fields. Consolidated areas 
of research that deal with macroevolutionary issues include paleontology, sys-
tematics, geology, ecology, phylogenetics, evolutionary developmental biology, 
population genetics, conservation biology, theoretical biology, biophysics, and 
philosophy of evolutionary sciences. Each field has developed a particular series 
of methodologies and theoretical frameworks, whereby macroevolution can be evi-
denced, quantified, and analyzed. This book samples and surveys a good deal of 
them.
Wood and Grabowski’s chapter is very informative of how macroevolutionary 
inferences are made in paleontology (Benton 2004; Foote and Miller 2006) and in 
particular in paleoanthropology (Wood 2011; Begun 2013) which is a subbranch 
of both anthropology as well as paleontology. The hominin features they focus on, 
such as teeth and brain size, are much more durable than any systematic classifica-
tion of our kind into genera and species which in many details remain unresolved 
due to the fragmentary nature of the fossil record. Because paleoanthropology sets 
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out to reconstruct our own evolutionary past, the authors also note that our demand 
for conclusive resolution is disproportionate, and instead highlight why evolution-
ary inferences of the fossil record are by necessity only one means in which we 
can approach the problem of phylogenetic reconstructions.
As evidenced by Bokma, molecular phylogenetics provides a complementary 
means to find answers on macroevolutionary issues of deep time, and our increas-
ing possibility to quantify, model, and simulate large-scale datasets, links fossils to 
genes (Prothero 2003). Bokma’s work on the temporal patterns and rates of evolu-
tionary change (the “tempo” of evolution) is based on pioneering work by Avise 
and Ayala (1975) where correlations between species richness and quantity of evo-
lutionary change across clades evidence a central thesis of punctuated equilibria, 
i.e., evolutionary change is concentrated in speciation events.
Taxonomies that are developed within the field of systematics are often taken 
for granted, but the amount of theorizing and quantitative research that precedes 
any systematic reconstruction cannot be underestimated. As Gontier points 
out, systematics started out as a logical and philosophical discipline, but today, 
the classification of natural phenomena that are bounded in space and time into 
various taxa, and their division into subspecies, species, genera, kingdoms, and 
domains, necessarily precedes any evolutionary investigation into a specific group. 
Systematic classification impacts all the evolutionary sciences, and systematic 
classification is in turn subject to advances made in molecular genetics, evo-devo, 
biogeography, paleontology, and ecology, work that often necessitates taxonomic 
revisions (Minelli 1993; Wilkins and Ebach 2013).
Even the intuitively clear-cut distinction between sexually and asexually repro-
ducing taxa turns out to be anything less than straightforward, as Becks and Alavi 
reveal. Minelli devotes some reflection on taxonomy in his exemplification of mor-
phological misfits, case study anomalies that can lead to the introduction of novel 
taxonomical units. Wood and Grabowski understand fossil genera as different 
from “neontological” genera: they are “grades.” A grade is an informal grouping 
united by a level of morphological or physiological complexity supposedly reflect-
ing adaptation, without the strict phylogenetic requirements implied by “clades” 
(i.e., monophyletic groups) that fossil hominins cannot meet. Furthermore, infer-
ences of function from morphology, such as the inference of bipedalism from a 
few skeletal characters, are, for Wood and Grabowski, particularly frail. Wood 
and Grabowski are “splitters” and think the “lumpers” underestimate the number 
of species there existed in the hominin clade, because morphological differences 
across the geographical range of a putative “species” may actually hide speciation 
events and many groups probably went extinct without fossilizing.
Biogeography is another fundamental macroevolutionary field. To understand 
the evolution of eukaryotic sex, Becks and Alavi compare the distributional range 
of asexuals and sexuals: asexuals tend to range to higher latitudes and altitudes, 
and they tend to colonize previously glaciated and devastated areas. Shallow 
waters can be coevolutionary “hot spots” for the evolution of sex.
In macroevolutionary time scales, biogeography inevitably flows into geology, 
paleogeography, and paleoecology. There is a very intimate relationship between 
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stratigraphy and living beings, dating back to the seventeenth century, as shown 
for example by the principle of faunal succession: Fossilized flora and fauna suc-
ceed each other vertically in a specific, reliable order that can be identified over 
wide horizontal distances, and they are used as time markers for rocks. In mac-
roevolutionary stratigraphy, geological layers are moreover tagged with the biotic 
evolutionary processes that are ongoing in the correspondent era at the appropriate 
time scale, normally spanning a few million years.
Stigall’s approach to paleontology combines biogeographic methods with 
phylogenetics, bringing to light the speciation patterns of single genera. It also 
integrates niche evolution analysis, to study the macroevolutionary dynamics of 
generalists and specialists (Peterson et al. 2011). Niche evolution in a taxon can 
be measured by extrapolating from geographical distribution the niche parameters 
at one time slice, then by extrapolating from niche parameters the expected geo-
graphical distribution at a second time slice, and then by comparing the expecta-
tions with the actual distribution found in the fossil record. The concept of niche 
is also explained by Serrelli and used by Salthe in his comprehensive view of 
Earth’s history.
Ecology is slowly but steadily entering the list of disciplines that are consid-
ered indispensable to understand macroevolution (Allmon and Bottjer 2001; 
Price 2003; Loreau 2010). Ecology is, as Salthe describes it, “the study of energy 
flow relations taking place on Earth between the influx of solar radiation and 
its reradiation into space,” a unifying science that studies the world in terms of 
thermodynamics and hierarchical structures. Becks and Alavi show that com-
munity ecology may combine the available theoretical and experimental knowl-
edge on the evolution of sex and accommodate pluralistic explanations combining 
the accumulation of deleterious mutations and Red Queen dynamics (Van Valen 
1973). Some branches of ecology seem well prepared to face the increasing com-
plexity revealed in macroevolution. For Tëmkin and Eldredge, ecology is not 
only a good half of the macroevolutionary story, but also the locus of the trigger-
ing causes of evolutionary change all the way through the biological hierarchies 
(Eldredge 1989, 1999).
Many essays in the book emphasize how phylogenetic methods are now able to 
process both morphological and molecular evidences and even take into account 
within-species diversity. The progress of phylogenetic techniques has greatly 
improved the inferential, predictive, and testing possibilities of evolutionary 
hypotheses (Wiley and Lieberman 2011).
Comparative disciplines such as morphology, physiology, cytology, and genet-
ics remain fundamental; indeed, they are boosted thanks to the “skeleton” of rela-
tionships provided by phylogeny. Evolutionary morphology, in particular, studies 
the existence of clusters of species sharing similar anatomies. Morphological clas-
sifications are often a useful first organization of knowledge, as Minelli argues in 
his chapter. The categorization of morphological misfits in three morphological 
kinds—divergent by reduction, by building blocks, or by synorganization—guides 
the search for specific developmental pathways and steps along which their devel-
opmental schedules may have evolved.
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“Steps” is correctly understood, like many other words in our book (e.g., “inter-
mediate” or “transitional” form), in the context of macroevolutionary trends, an 
extremely important concept. Trends are recognizable long-term, large-scale 
changes that involve great numbers of species, genera, and even higher taxa 
(Turner 2011). Wood and Grabowski need the demonstration of trends in cranial, 
dental, and postcranial morphology. They cannot rely on single diagnostic traits, 
because traits come and go in phylogenies, and what is diagnostic for one period 
is not automatically for another one. Not all the differences between H. sapiens 
and Panini (chimpanzees and bonobo) may be used to distinguish ancestral Panini 
from ancestral Homo. If, on the one hand, H. sapiens’ hypodontism came about 
as a reversion after million years of megadontism, on the other hand there are 
more reliable trends in the clade: An incipient Homo-like cranium will be diag-
nostic all the way back to stem hominins to tell basal hominins from basal Panini. 
Corroborated trends allow for back-tracing and provide criteria to distinguish taxa 
that lived close to their divergence time.
One of the most exciting fields approaching macroevolution today is evolu-
tionary developmental biology, abbreviated EDB by Futuyma, and evo-devo by 
Minelli (Arthur 2002, 2011; Minelli and Fusco 2008), while others link evo-devo 
to ecology under the heading eco-evo-devo (see Gilbert 2012 and Ledón-Retting 
and Pfennig 2011 for an overview). For Futuyma, evo-devo inspires an improved 
theory of variation. Minelli, following a classification by Arthur (2000, 2002), 
emphasizes how most macroevolutionary differences seem to consist in modifica-
tions of the temporal, positional, and quantitative (metric or meristic) aspects of 
the ontogenetic production of individual body parts, and how important develop-
mental trends are in macroevolution. Developmental modularity is evident in those 
misfits that are odd, not systemically, but only with respect to a few well-circum-
scribed body parts. Other misfits have uncommon life cycles, with oddly shaped 
stages or rearranged sequences of stages.
Knowledge and understanding of these macroevolutionary phenomena have 
exploded after the advent of developmental genetics. Molecular methods, for 
example, can now be used to determine that only some developmental modules 
are also structural modules, characterized by a more well-defined genetic con-
trol. Developmental genetics in macroevolutionary context is a fervent field, very 
rewarding but also very difficult for its struggle with “the intricacies of the geno-
type → phenotype map.” Bokma refers to the evo-devo schools to explain devel-
opmental constraints, selection plateaus and stasis and demonstrates how, partly 
because of developmental mechanisms, evolution is a largely autonomous process. 
Stigall also turns to eco-evo-devo to explain phenomena such as phenotypic plas-
ticity and niche construction as well as habitat tracking, migration, and niche inva-
sion, because all present behavioral and thus anatomically underlain responses to 
ecological settings.
Futuyma gives his own reconciliation of population genetics with punctuated 
equilibria. The claim of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge and Gould 1972, based 
on Mayr 1942) that rapid evolutionary change is coupled with bottlenecks, is, for 
Futuyma, “surely wrong” in the light of available evidence. Instead, the claim 
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that rapid evolutionary change is coupled with biological speciation is plausible. 
Futuyma’s solution focuses on the niche heterogeneity that is expected in wide-
spread species and highlights the role of reproductive isolation in protecting local 
adaptations from dissolution.
As Serrelli narrates in his chapter, population genetics is essentially a powerful 
mathematical theory of factors such as selection, mutation, drift, population size, 
and allele frequencies. The synthetic work of Sewall Wright in the 1930s already 
hinted to “the way in which both speciation and extinction can flow mechani-
cally from the processes of modulation of variation,” in the words of Lewontin 
(1980: 61). But today, macroevolution does not get forced into population genet-
ics models. Evolutionary quantitative genetics addresses the complex dynamics of 
phenotypes and their genetic underpinnings under different regimes of selection 
and other conditions (Falconer and Mackay 1996; Roff 1997). Selection can be 
detected in the covariation of character complexes, instead of being assumed as an 
ad hoc explanation for postulated adaptive traits.
The same holds for developmental correlations that present another crucial role 
in explaining morphological evolution. Wood and Grabowski are confident that 
quantitative genetics can now be applied to detect the relative weight of natural 
selection and drift even in hominin fossils. Becks and Alavi’s chapter illustrate 
how population biology and genetics (Hanski and Giaggiotti 2004; Hartl and 
Clark 2007) may be put to use to explain innovation or, at the opposite, persistence 
of macroevolutionary distributions. Why does sex evolve? And why are sexual 
populations or taxa not invaded and replaced by asexual taxa when sex seems to 
be a bad choice as it comes at high costs? The case of sex is particularly interest-
ing because the evolving trait is also one that shapes variance and, consequently, 
microevolutionary mechanisms. The “short- and long-term effects of sexual 
reproduction” need to be studied mathematically: It is assumed that sex always 
increases variation, but mathematical models demonstrate that it is not always 
the case and identify boundary conditions. Other questions may be asked, such as 
could sex accelerate adaptation to new environments?
Gontier approaches research on sex, so typical of microevolutionary fields, 
from within history and philosophy of science, which are also fields that can con-
tribute to macroevolutionary research. She details how epistemic approaches to the 
origin and evolution of eukaryotic sex as well as the asexual behavior characteris-
tic of prokaryotes relate to sociocultural and political ideas on the common goods 
of society as well as the rise of liberal as social thought in the nineteenth century. 
Is sex a social behavior or is it an adaptive outcome that enables the fit to survive 
and reproduce successfully?
Also from within philosophy of science, Serrelli hones in on the different 
kinds of modeling that map macroevolution as the realization of actual life forms 
in the huge domain of possible virtual alternatives. Many modeling approaches 
use biologically unrealistic exploration mechanisms to study general properties of 
low-dimensional “spaces of possibilities” that imitate the biological possibilities. 
High-dimensional spaces, which require a holistic, probabilistic kind of mathemat-
ics with a strong role of statistics, are used to understand how whole genomes or 
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sets of phenotypic traits should behave in macroevolution. Some models, such as 
sequence spaces of RNA and proteins for example, can even guide empirical work.
Although of course macroevolution is not liable to direct experimentation, 
experimental evolution is sometimes used in relation to macroevolution (Garland 
and Rose 2009). Becks and Alavi provide the example of the few experimen-
tal tests of mechanistic causes for the evolution of sex, limited by the use of 
model systems whose sexuals and asexuals do not actually coexist under natural 
conditions.
As Casetta and Marques da Silva demonstrate with their essay, conservation 
biology entered an age in which it needs to deal with macroevolutionary knowl-
edge and tools (Louys et al. 2012). Importantly, however, empirical knowledge 
will never be enough to settle issues such as how species should be prioritized, 
which conservation targets deserve focus, and how biodiversity conservation 
should be ethically justified; rather, the authors note that “Conventions and pro-
cedures have to be agreed upon and established … facing the Big Sixth is not a 
matter for biologists only.” Following Soulé the authors characterize conservation 
biology as a mission- or crisis-oriented discipline, and its relation to biology has 
been compared to that of surgery to physiology, or of war to political science. So, 
ethics—and philosophy of science more generally—joins the table of disciplines 
that deal with macroevolution.
Because macroevolutionary thought redefines the cosmic scale, hierarchy 
theory, an intrinsic topic of philosophy, plays a crucial role in theory formation. 
Hierarchy theory is discussed in the works of Salthe, Tëmkin and Eldredge, and 
Gontier. Gontier highlights how many macroevolutionary scholars define them-
selves as naturalists, because of the emphasis they put on historical narration of 
past events. Both Salthe and Gontier trace hierarchy theory and macroevolution-
ary thought back to natural philosophy as it developed in the nineteenth century, 
and as a naturalist, Salthe legitimizes the approach. For him, natural philosophy 
is “an attempt to construct a scientifically based ‘Big Picture’ understanding of the 
world” whose goal is to find the different realms of reality. His picture is ecologi-
cal and Salthe criticizes ‘idealistic’ interpretations of ecology that are based on an 
attempt to unify energy and information. Instead, he chooses a “materialist” posi-
tion that concentrates on energy connections and energy flows.
Hierarchy theory also presents scholars with a means to unify knowledge on 
macroevolution. Advised by Marjorie Grene, Eldredge (1985, 1986, 1989) first 
turned to Hierarchy Theory in the 1980s. Tëmkin and Eldredge present an up-to-
date version of hierarchy theory tightly integrated with network theory. Biological 
systems are arranged hierarchically, with smaller units forming the components 
of larger systems: trees in a forest, cells in a body, organisms in a population, 
trophic groups in ecosystems, genes within chromosomes, within cells, within 
organs, within organisms, within populations, within species, within ecosystems. 
Hierarchy theory of evolution is a theory of how biological systems are hierarchi-
cally organized, how they function, and how evolution takes place through them 
over time. “Hierarchies” is a plural term in hierarchy theory, not only because 
every system (organism, local ecosystem) is an instance thereof (a hierarchical 
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entity) but also because there are distinct kinds of hierarchies. The hierarchy the-
ory the authors present in their work identifies two main kinds that they delineate 
as the only two that are really important in evolution. One is named “economic” or 
“ecological,” and it is based on matter–energy transfers and ecological processes. 
The other is named “genealogical” or “evolutionary,” and it is based on informa-
tion and replication. The two hierarchies overlap at some point. For example, an 
organism is both an economic entity and a replicator, being part of ecological pro-
cesses and also a fundamental element of a lineage. At other points, the two hier-
archies are clearly distinct, for example a species is a genealogical entity that does 
not participate, as such, in any economic system. Even when the two hierarchies 
overlap, hierarchy theory sees them as ontologically distinct, they interact in com-
plex ways, and it is their interaction that brings about the patterns of evolution at 
all scales.
Finally, Salthe and Gontier point out the important role the rising field of 
biophysics has in contributing to a richer understanding of macroevolutionary 
phenomena. Salthe’s ecological perspective is very much inspired by thermody-
namics. And Gontier reviews how abiogenesis, traditionally a field associated 
with physics, exo- and astrobiology, can shed light on the origin of life, a theme 
that remains understudied from within classic Neodarwinian theory. Complex 
adaptive systems theory is relevant for understanding the spontaneous generation 
of catalytic and autocatalytic biochemical systems. She also points out that natu-
ralists adhere to a different notion of time that she associates with relativity theory 
and quantum physics which she distinguishes from Newtonian mechanical world-
views she sees as underlying research on cause and effect as well as the evolution 
of purposeful behavior in Neodarwinian frameworks.
3.2  Macroevolution Defined as Evolution at and Above  
the Species Level
Wood and Grabowski point out that macroevolution as a concept was first used 
in 1934, in the work of the Russian geneticist Filipčenko (see Sepkoski 2012). 
The authors further note that the most accepted technical definition of macro-
evolution is the one presented by Simpson (1944) and Hallam (1989) that define 
macroevolution as “evolution at and above the species level.” Such a characteri-
zation of macroevolution is also adhered to by Futuyma, Bokma, Casetta and 
Marques da Silva, and Gontier. Wood and Grabowski note that “if the species 
is the rubicon that divides macroevolution from microevolution, then the type of 
taxonomic hypothesis that is adopted will have profound implications for what is 
included.”
Defining macroevolution as evolution at and above the species level there-
fore first and foremost requires a good definition of species (Wilkins 2011), and 
such a definition impacts how scholars understand speciation and extinction 
events. Wood and Grabowski, following Smith (2009), consider five species 
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concepts and divide them into two classes: process-related and pattern-related 
species concepts. Process-related species concepts include the biological spe-
cies concept (BSC), the evolutionary species concept (ESC), and the species-
mate recognition species concept (RSC). Pattern-related species concepts are the 
phenetic species concept (PeSC) and the phylogenetic species concept (PySC). 
Paleoanthropologists often uses the PySC and tries to identify the smallest clusters 
of populations that are recognizable from the available set of characters. But the 
taxonomical and, most of all, classificatory controversies surrounding the hominin 
clade lead the authors to adopt a dataset-relative definition of macroevolution as 
“what you can learn from the fossil record.”
Gontier points out that Mayr’s BSC defines species based upon “sexual exclu-
sivity and geographical accessibility” and especially the former implies an annihi-
lation of the sexual individual in favor of a higher-order classification: the group 
or the species. Stigall, who endorses the BSC, considers species as “groups of 
organisms that maintain genetic continuity by interbreeding among members of 
the group but that are distinct from other reproductive groups” and underlines that 
in the fossil record this condition by necessity has to be inferred from morphol-
ogy. Stigall understands speciation as “the separation of a set of organisms into a 
newly isolated reproductive unit that is discrete from the ancestral species,” typi-
cally happening in “less than ten thousand years.” Stigall is interested in a geo-
graphical classification of speciation modes: most frequently speciation begins in 
allopatry, i.e., in geographical separation, although sympatric and parapatric spe-
ciation is considered possible, and, under an integrated view of macroevolution 
inclusive of the ecological environment; it is possible to say that modes of specia-
tion themselves shift in prevalence over evolutionary time (Coyne and Orr 2004). 
As Stigall explains, allopatric speciation comes in two kinds: vicariance and dis-
persal. In vicariance, the geographic separation is due to the formation of barriers. 
In dispersal, it is due to active migration. While speciation by vicariance appears 
predominant in modern taxa and in the fossil record (for example in trilobites), 
in the Devonian Stigall finds an opposite prevalence of speciation by dispersal, in 
other words, an anomalously low proportion of vicariant speciation.
In Tëmkin and Eldredge’s hierarchy theory, species are lineages demarcated 
by origin through lineage-splitting (or speciation) events and by eventual demise 
through extinction, although the temporal boundaries of species become less dis-
tinct at smaller time scales due to a gradual process of divergence that appears 
instantaneous at geological time scales. Casetta and Marques da Silva observe 
that when describing the Big Sixth, species concepts break down: several animals 
hybridize, either spontaneously or by human intervention, and hybridizing also 
becomes more likely as selective pressures increase. Casetta and Marques da 
Silva describe the ongoing mass extinction as partially caused by our own spe-
cies and its activities (Wilson 2002). A symbol of the Big Sixth is the Amur leop-
ard, which today, mainly due to habitat alterations caused by the exploitation of 
forests, only consists of about twenty individuals living in southwestern Russia. 
In the USA alone, the list of endangered species is huge, from the Grey Wolf to 
the Puget Sound Killer Whale. Casetta and Marques da Silva explain why a 
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species-based approach to conservation will not work and point out the necessity 
of integrating macroevolutionary mechanisms and logics into conservation biol-
ogy: “the aim is not just to save endangered species, but also to allow the contin-
ued production of novel diversity, i.e., to improve the conditions and mechanisms 
that help the diversity to be generated.”
If anthropogenic pressure depresses speciation rates, how can extinction be 
compensated? Salthe’s perspective embraces the recent socio-technological evo-
lution of H. sapiens, seen as a fervent cooperator to universal energy dissipation. 
Salthe’s interpretation of macroevolution leads him to affirm that we should not be 
surprised at all if “disorder threatens everywhere, and we must work harder than 
seems reasonable to achieve anything.” Salthe holds a more conventionalist view 
of species: Species do not have a role in macroevolution since they are not ecolog-
ical actors. The status of populations is not granted either, because although popu-
lations do play ecological roles, they actually do as aggregations of individuals. 
Yet, Salthe grants populations at least an indirect influence in regulating the abun-
dance of individuals through their reproduction network. For Salthe, speciation is 
a by-product of natural selection that rewards the ability to switch to new energy 
sources as those being utilized become locally depleted.
Tëmkin and Eldredge, whose hierarchy theory sees species as genealogi-
cal entities, focus on the reproductive aspect: Species replication is the process 
of speciation, or cladogenesis, that results from the perturbation and partitioning 
of demic networks. In fact, the hierarchical framework proposed by the authors 
fixes the upper bound of evolution at the level of the species. Even though supra-
specific entities (monophyletic taxa) do show patterns of differential survival, they 
lack the capacity to replicate: Evolution above the species level is an epiphenom-
enon that results from processes that occur at lower levels. Moreover, species are 
not interactors (Hull 1980, 1988). Interactors are those entities that interact with 
their environments in such a way as to make replication differential, and they 
belong in the economic hierarchy. The most extensive population-level interac-
tor corresponds to a metapopulation, which is a geographic and ecological mosaic 
of contemporaneous avatars and, as such, a synchronous subset of a species line-
age. Interactors are affected by physical perturbations. According to the sloshing 
bucket model (Eldredge 2003), the higher the level of perturbation, the higher the 
level in the economic hierarchy at which its effects will be expressed and, con-
sequently, the higher the level of the genealogical hierarchy at which the evolu-
tionary pattern of change in diversity and disparity will be recorded. Intermediate 
levels of environmental disturbance yield the maximum speciation rates, because 
they maintain a balance between population fragmentation and establishment of 
favorable conditions for isolate persistence.
Leaving aside the particular focus on levels and the species boundary, Serrelli, 
relying on current scientific practice, describes macroevolution as a simultane-
ous exploration of morphospaces, geographical spaces, ecological possibilities, 
and genealogical outgrowths. This exploration of multiple interrelated spaces may 
be represented by means of compositions of multiple graphical representations. 
Sometimes these visual representations take the form of landscapes: geographical 
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landscapes (based on spatial distribution), genealogical landscapes (based on relat-
edness), morphological landscapes (based on shared combinations characters), 
and ecological landscapes (based on the combinations of environmental variables 
that are suitable for the considered organisms). The spaces of possibilities are con-
nected in complex ways in macroevolution. For example, descent relationships 
may not go along with morphological resemblance, generating visualization con-
flicts. Knowledge of macroevolution must be creatively connected by means of 
composite pictures and, more importantly, composite and interdisciplinary studies.
Finally, several chapters approach macroevolution from the point of view of 
contemporary species. In particular, Bokma notices that with respect to fossil spe-
cies, contemporary species are interesting because they allow biologists to observe 
more characters, at a molecular level, with their respective evolutionary rates. But 
the present also poses specific problems: declaring extinction, measuring biodiver-
sity, quantifying and modifying our own impacts and effects for ethical reasons.
3.3  From Ediacara to the Grey Wolf:  
Embracing All of Life’s History
Macroevolution is evolution on a large scale. It is therefore natural for macroevo-
lution to span long periods of time and to embrace broad and diverse parts of the 
living world. In fact, not only the examples in this volume have such characteristic 
broad scope but they are also drawn from the actual history of life. Another way 
to read the volume is by following the geological age, the chronological order in 
which these phenomena first appeared.
In Serrelli’s chapter, we get to know the earliest known complex of multi-
cellular organisms: The worldwide Ediacaran biota, which existed from 575 to 
541 Mya (million years ago), just preceding the more famous Cambrian explo-
sion (Erwin and Valentine 2013). Most Ediacaran life forms left only indirect 
traces (“fossil traces”), but some of them had carbonate structures, and their fos-
sils are found in Australia, Canada and Namibia (although, when they lived, their 
locations had completely different geographical coordinates than today, in a com-
pletely different configuration of continents).
Several chapters in our book refer to the Big Five, the five largest mass extinc-
tions in the history of life on Earth: the Ordovician-Silurian, the Late Devonian, 
the Permian-Triassic, the End Triassic, and the Cretaceous-Tertiary (Raup 1991). 
But there is reason to believe that there are at least 7 major mass extinction events. 
The first major extinction event probably involves the mass extinction of prokary-
otic anaerobe life forms that must have followed the great oxygenation event, the 
other, often dubbed the sixth extinction event is the one that faces us now and that 
is discussed by Casetta and Marques da Silva. The authors remind us that 99 % 
of the species that have ever lived on Earth are now extinct. Besides these Big 
Seven, extinction events occur constantly during life’s evolution, on less grand 
scales, and the events are variable in intensity (Lawton and May 1995).
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Stigall’s chapter brings us back circa 450 Mya (Late Ordovician), in an area 
that today is near Cincinnati, Ohio. There, a cyclical pattern of sea level rise and 
fall determined periodical basin invasions by bivalves and other components of 
marine benthos. The author analyzes one of these invasions, the Richmondian, 
and studied how biodiversity and geographical differentiation fell down, specia-
tion rate was depressed, and broad ranging species, during a moment in time, had 
prevailed on species with narrower ranges. Many millions of years later, precisely 
375 Mya, the world went through the “Late Devonian biodiversity crisis.” Again, 
the geographical context is characterized by sea level rises that, by connecting 
previously separated water basins, facilitated geographical invasion and limited 
the uprise of new physical barriers. The fossil record of brachiopods, bivalves, 
and other shallow sea organisms shows relatively high extinction rates as well 
as relatively low speciation rates. Of the two anomalous rates, the most determi-
nant was the low speciation rate, because even clades with normal extinction rate 
had declined in number of species. There is a fundamental pattern connecting the 
Devonian biodiversity crisis with the Cincinnati invasions, granted some differ-
ences due to the global versus local scale: Physical events bring about invasions 
that destabilize ecological niches, generalists prevail, and speciation “by dispersal” 
overwhelms speciation by vicariance (see above).
Much more recently, between ca. 8 and ca. 5 Mya, in Africa, there lived the so 
far unidentified group that would become the common ancestor to both H. sapiens 
and chimpanzees/bonobos. Wood and Grabowski group this ancestor, along with 
all its descendants in a subfamily: Homininae. Later in the same continent, among 
Homininae, a tribe originated: the hominins (Hominini). This tribe would give birth 
to genera like Australopithecus and Homo. The current consensus, based mostly on 
molecular data, considers chimpanzees and bonobos as the “outgroup” for compar-
ing hominins to each other, but within the hominin clade the phylogenetic context 
is all but clear: Fossils are rare and incomplete, taxa lack obvious ancestors, and 
there are many sources of error (Wood 2011). One of the reasons why these prob-
lems arise right here is that scientists and outsiders are uncommonly curious and 
demanding toward the hominin clade, looking for levels of detail that we would 
never ask to analog fossils of animals that are more distantly related to us.
While the ancestors of hominins lived in Africa, in North America, between the 
Miocene and the Early Pliocene (ca. 5.3 Mya), horse species (subfamily Equinae) 
went through an event traditionally referred to as an “adaptive radiation.” Stigall 
demonstrates that in horses—which are vagile and migratory organisms—specia-
tion by dispersal normally prevails on vicariant speciation. On land, as opposed to 
what happens in water, climate change may have led to geographical fragmenta-
tion, increase of vicariant speciation, and radiation, not necessarily adaptive to var-
ying environmental conditions. From Serrelli’s chapter, we learn that this phase of 
the evolution of horses was also well studied by one of the founders of the Modern 
Synthesis: George Gaylord Simpson. We see how Simpson (1944) described the 
phases by which a lineage of browser mammals, Hyracotheriinae, split into brows-
ers and grazers under the effect of environmental change combined with correla-
tion among some of their characters.
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And Gontier demonstrates how macroevolutionary questions are today becom-
ing the dominant mode by which we can approach sociocultural and linguistic 
evolution. She notes that on a grand cosmic scale, Julian Huxley already charac-
terized evolution as going from the physical to the biological and psychosocial, 
and traces these ideas back to classic cosmic lineups that go from the inorganic 
to the organic and superorganic. Such classification has profoundly impacted our 
division of the sciences, that go from the physical and astronomical, to the natural 
and biological, and sociocultural sciences. Today, the sociocultural sciences and 
classic humanities are embracing an evolutionary approach to the study of human 
behavioral traits, languages, and cultures. And in these studies, a transition is tak-
ing place from studying isolated sociocultural and linguistic traits synchronically 
to understanding them diachronically, by tracing the genealogical origins of these 
traits across cultures in space and time. Such an approach by necessity takes on 
a macroevolutionary perspective, and she highlights how in particular the jargon 
associated with punctuated equilibria is finding its use in these new macrocultural 
fields.
3.4  A Rich Research Agenda
Many more fascinating topics are addressed in the dense chapters of this book. We 
end this introduction with listing some of the more open-ended research questions 
that are currently associated with macroevolutionary research fields.
What is the temporal pattern—the “tempo”—of macroevolution? Tëmkin and 
Eldredge, Stigall, and Bokma, all emphasize stability, and frame macroevolu-
tionary change as coincident with the achievement of new equilibria after distur-
bance. The roots of contemporary approaches to the tempo of evolution have to 
be traced back to the idea of punctuated equilibria (Eldredge and Gould 1972) and 
to the lively methodological debate that followed, and still goes on today (Gould 
and Eldredge 1977, 1993; Lieberman and Eldredge 2014). Wood and Grabowski 
notice how the quest for detecting punctuated equilibria is translated, in paleon-
tology, into four research questions on: (1) the relative importance of gradualist 
versus punctuated evolution, (2) the role of speciation events versus within-lineage 
evolution, (3) adaptive versus neutral processes, and (4) the operation and inci-
dence of ‘species selection.’ But the authors point out that none of these questions 
can be answered definitely for the hominin clade. Significant improvements will 
be enabled by new technologies and methodologies, much more than by the accu-
mulation of more and more fossils.
How is stasis explained? Stigall emphasizes geographical and ecological 
relationships; Bokma emphasizes the stability of development and the selec-
tion pressures exerted by traits on each other, while Futuyma concentrates on 
demic structure and interconnectedness. All these aspects, and many others, are 
 integrated into Tëmkin and Eldredge’s hierarchy theory of Evolution, for which 
“The overall stability of biological systems across levels of organization is not 
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surprising given the general tendency of complex systems to acquire complex net-
work architectures that ensure relative insensitivity to external perturbations.”
What’s the role of the environment in macroevolution? The biogeography of 
invasions and radiations demonstrates, for Stigall, environmental “control” over 
macroevolution, i.e., a direct causation of climatic and geologic events upon the 
periodic restructuring of biodiversity in the history of life. Mass extinctions, climate 
change, and continental drift all show the tremendous importance of physical fac-
tors in shaping the history of life. The environment has multiple causal roles also 
in hierarchy theory: “Environmental perturbations contribute to both generating 
variation at the molecular level and facilitate the expression of hidden phenotypic 
variance by compromising evolutionary capacitance. The spread and fixation of 
novel genotypes, ultimately responsible for producing taxic evolutionary patterns, 
are enabled by temporary removal of control over population dynamics brought 
about by environmentally triggered disruption or destabilization of ecological net-
works at the level of biocenosis.” On the other hand, “the stochasticity and non-lin-
ear dynamics characterizing the processes of the biocenosis in flux” for Stigall, are 
another important contribution “to the evolutionary contingency of life’s history.”
But does such importance of the environment mean that macroevolution is 
adaptive? As Serrelli notices, macroevolution and adaptation are peacefully 
decoupled epistemologically, although, of course, still related in complex ways. 
Macroevolutionary phenomena such as speciation, diversity, and disparity, with 
their peculiar patterns, do not necessarily constitute adaptive “peak climbing,” 
although, for instance, patterns of adaptation such as niche breadth are integral 
part of macroevolutionary explanations. Paleoenvironments were not a major fac-
tor controlling the extent of Ediacara morphospace. Futuyma addresses the issue 
of constraints: for him, constraints are demonstrated (e.g., by extinction) and 
relevant to evolution, although they do not explain stasis, nor do they jeopard-
ize optimality and adaptation. Minelli considers the possibility that morphologi-
cal uniqueness be a symptom of peculiar adaptations, which may in turn suggest 
adaptive dead ends. More radically, for Bokma, macroevolution is “a largely 
autonomous process.” Bokma does not downplay the most representative and fas-
cinating studies that historically convinced the scientific community of the agency 
and efficacy of natural selection, but Fisher’s idea that complex traits have additive 
genetic basis is at best inaccurate, and its persistence is due to theoretical inertia 
in face of theoretical alternatives and empirical issues, such as missing heritabil-
ity and the persistent abundant variation in ecology-related traits. The autonomy 
advocated by Bokma is not immediately in conflict with the environmental drive 
demonstrated by Stigall. In fact, Bokma focuses on the rate of adaptive change, 
which is autonomous from environmental change, whereas Stigall focuses on 
rates of speciation and extinction, which crucially depend on ecological events. 
Climatological influence does not necessarily mean adaptive drive, as shown in 
the case of horses, traditionally and hastily called an “adaptive radiation.”
Is macroevolutionary change essentially concentrated during speciation 
events? All authors seem to agree upon a positive answer to this question. Stigall 
relies on the many studies in evolutionary biology—from Ernst Mayr, to Eldredge 
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and Gould’s (1972) punctuated equilibria, to contemporary followers and revis-
ers—that have identified speciation as the fundamental locus of evolutionary 
change. In fact, in her framework, macroevolutionary “events” are defined as those 
critical periods in which evolution proceeded above the species level, with uncom-
mon rates of speciation and/or extinction. For Bokma, there is little doubt that the 
number of speciation events is much more predictive of evolutionary divergence 
than the amount of environmental change. For Futuyma, according to the avail-
able evidence, biological speciation is indeed plausibly the typical context where 
rapid evolutionary change takes place. But, in the available evidence, Futuyma 
sees that speciation does not require bottlenecking, as reproductive isolation can 
arise in a widespread species that spans across heterogeneous niches (protecting, 
in turn, adaptations from dissolving into the species).
Are there any exquisitely macroevolutionary processes? Stigall’s paleoenviron-
mental distribution data form the Late Devonian crisis demonstrate, for her, sort-
ing in favor of broadly distributed, generalist, invasive species versus narrowly 
distributed, ecologically specialized species. Natural selection is a sorting process 
that happens among individual organisms in a population. Species sorting would 
be another sorting process, not completely analogous, of course, to natural selec-
tion. The peculiarly cosmopolitan Late Devonian fauna might be a result of spe-
cies sorting, i.e., the preferential survival—in sustained large-scale environmental 
conditions—of invasive ecological generalists with low speciation rates. This 
hierarchical expansion of processes is one of the cores of hierarchy theory, pre-
sented orderly and carefully by Tëmkin and Eldredge. And if we think about the 
concept of evolutionary potential that for Casetta and Marques da Silva should 
inform conservation efforts, we may imagine conservation as a process of artificial 
deme or species selection, something that may or may not take place in nature, and 
that would yield trends of increasing evolutionary potential through time, visible at 
levels above the individual.
What is the relationship between micro- and macroevolution and how do both 
relate to evolutionary theory? Well, as Bokma tells us, the topic was considered 
an “old” question already by George Gaylord Simpson in 1944. Gontier con-
firms and explains how it relates to philosophical cosmologies, worldviews that 
delineate the cosmological hierarchy that have traditionally been brought to us 
in the form of Greek Chains of Beings, Medieval Scala Naturae and Far Eastern 
Wheels of Time. The question might be old, but the associated problems are all but 
resolved and all essays in this book demand for the composition of an articulate 
picture of micro- and macroevolution and how both define the field of evolutionary 
biology, as well as what the scope of evolutionary theory is in general.
What are the requirements on evolutionary theory with regard to prediction? 
Gontier discusses how especially Mayr, as one of the founders of the Modern 
Synthesis, was also involved in delineating a specific area of research for evolu-
tionary biologists within academia. Classic physics is traditionally conceived as 
the queen science because it enables predictions on the future, while biologists 
cannot predict the future path of life. It remains impossible to predict specia-
tion and extinction events. Nonetheless, the evolutionary sciences are on the rise 
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and have successfully incorporated the sociocultural sciences that increasingly 
approach their subject areas from within an overall evolutionary framework. She 
also points toward different scientific practices among micro- and macro- evolu-
tionary scholars. Microevolutionary scholars focus on the causal explanations of 
evolution and endorse uniformitarian epistemic stances that enable them to tackle 
questions on teleology and goal-directed behavior of living organisms, while mac-
roevolutionary scholars take on more relativistic stances that she associates with 
epistemic pluralism that does not require evolutionary scholars to predict the 
future, but rather to narrate the past from within a series of referential frameworks 
that necessitate a comparative approach. Futuyma also writes interesting lines on 
prediction. With respect to macroevolutionary diversification, he compares evolu-
tionary theory to meteorological theory that is able to provide explanation with-
out large-scale prediction. On the other hand, Futuyma points out the innumerable 
successful predictions of DNA sequences and adaptive associations between phe-
notypic traits and environmental conditions. Bokma agrees that the existing evolu-
tionary framework is not predictive over longer periods of time. In fact, he argues 
that the constant confirmation of the ubiquity of adaptation as a driver of evolution 
is largely an artifact of an epistemological bias. Other predictions, such as quan-
titative predictions about relationships between environmental change, genetic 
change, and speciation rates, can offer more sound evaluations and bring forward 
better evolutionary hypotheses.
How is human cultural evolution to be understood in macroevolutionary 
terms? Salthe mentions how cultural evolution—especially technological innova-
tion—has been a crucial continuation of the tendency of evolution toward entropy. 
Evolution—cosmic, biological, and technological—has produced systems that 
depend upon, and produce, energy flows of greater and greater intensity through 
them. Gontier goes into the fine-grained epistemological nuances of studying cul-
tures and languages as “beings” or biological individuals that blur the distinction 
between the “living” and the “dead” and shows the dance of ontological partition-
ing that has been going on for centuries in the definition of disciplines and their 
domains of study, a dynamic evolution that still goes on today with fascinating 
developments.
How does macroevolution relate to the Modern and Extended Synthesis? 
Macroevolution is the title of a collection in honor of Stephen Jay Gould (Vrba 
and Eldredge 2005). Gould, in his scientific testament, had written: “For some rea-
sons still unclear to me, I always found the theory of how evolution works more 
fascinating than the realized pageant of its paleontological results, and my major 
interest therefore always focused upon principles of macroevolution” (Gould 
2002, p. 38). Vrba, Stanley, Eldredge, and Gould were part of the paleobiological 
revolution that, in the seventies, brought forth theory and practice of macroevo-
lutionary research. Decades have passed, and macroevolution not only remained 
a sustained and growing field of research but it also became entangled with more 
and more fields of biology, demanding for their specific empirical and theoretical 
contributions.
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Several essays of the book address the relationship between macroevolution 
and the Modern Synthesis (MS). Although the MS, as a concept used to designate 
a shared theoretical framework, is itself a problematic object, Mayr and Provine 
(1980) describe the origin of the MS as an outcome of two distinct phases in time. 
The first phase, ranging from 1910–1920 to 1940 encompasses the reconciliation 
of Darwin’s theory of natural selection with Mendel’s theory of inheritance as 
well as with aspects of de Vries’ and others’ mutation theory. The ‘second syn-
thesis,’ that took place from 1930 to 1940, was characterized by the incorporation 
of previously independent fields, such as systematics and taxonomy, zoology and 
botany, paleontology and morphology, and embryology. The 1980 account edited 
by Mayr and Provine was paralleled and immediately followed by pleas for an 
extension of the modern synthesis. One of those pleas came from within the field 
of paleobiology, where in the 1970s a ‘revolution’ took place (Sepkoski and Ruse 
2009; Sepkoski 2012). Since Darwin, paleontology and its subject field, the fos-
sil record, had been occupying a paradoxical position: Fossils were, on the one 
hand, necessary evidence, and, on the other hand, a place of embarrassing failures 
of prediction. Work by Simpson (1944), Eldredge and Gould (1972), and Stanley 
(1979) proved that the fossil record can indeed exhibit law-like patterns and reg-
ularities of its own. Subsequently, macroevolutionary scholars started to develop 
field-specific methods, but scholars on both micro- and macro- fields continue to 
disagree on whether macroevolution in and of itself requires a radical reconceptu-
alization of Neodarwinism. Gontier, for example, points out that Eldredge repeat-
edly characterizes himself as a “knee-jerked Neodarwinian,” while she attributes 
more revolutionary élan to Gould.
In his magisterial chapter, Futuyma provides an informative background 
on the foundation of the MS, which he designates as the Evolutionary Synthesis 
and focusses on the contributions made by scholars from a variety of countries 
who, although well-known in evolutionary circles, are not routinely listed as 
‘architects’ of the discipline. Futuyma explains how founders of the evolutionary 
synthesis never really advocated that natural selection is the “sole cause” of evolu-
tion, and they merely provided evidence in favor of gradual evolution which they 
used to explain aspects of macroevolution. Scholars such as Bernhard Rensch, 
for example, provided macroevolutionary explanations for apparent orthogenetic 
trends. Futuyma exhorts critics to consider the particular challenges to which the 
Evolutionary Synthesis has responded successfully, and he downplays the idea of 
a ‘hardening’ of the late ES, emphasizing instead its flexibility. Bokma, on the 
other hand, in his focus on stasis and punctuations in macroevolution, points out 
that stasis was uncritically considered as fully compatible with basic evolution-
ary theory, and even denied as an observational fact. He agrees with Gould (1983, 
2002) that the MS went through a “hardening” during the twentieth century, per-
haps exacerbated by a defensive attitude.
Serrelli presents Ernst Mayr’s description of the MS as a process engaging 
separate fields of research by virtue of communication, reciprocal awareness and 
familiarity, producing a shared vocabulary that is still largely used today in mac-
roevolutionary studies. Serrelli explores how graphical representations may have 
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worked as a major bridge between fields that were mutually independent, some-
times suspicious of each other, and locked.
4  Conclusion
In this introduction, we have given spots and keys to reading this rich volume on 
the interpretation, evidence, and explanation of macroevolution. The reader will be 
able to find more threads and much more knowledge running through the pages by 
our excellent contributors and will get the feeling of an exciting field of research 
that is going to grow even more and surprise us in the next years. While this book 
is being published, the debate on extending the Modern Synthesis is carried over 
on major scientific journals (e.g., Laland et al. 2014), as well as by other media. 
The interested reader will follow these developments to see how this debate will 
be settled, at least temporarily, in the next years, and the contributors of this book 
as well as we at the Applied Evolutionary Epistemology Laboratory are happy to 
have contributed to the overall debate.
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Abstract Ever since the Evolutionary Synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, some 
biologists have expressed doubt that the Synthetic Theory, based principally on 
mutation, genetic variation, and natural selection, adequately accounts for macroevo-
lution, or evolution above the species level. Some questions pertain to the history of 
biological diversity, but the greatest argument has concerned the evolution of major 
changes in organisms’ form and function. Such changes have been the subject of 
debate on the nature and phenotypic effect of mutations (especially the role of “mac-
romutations” or saltations), the role of developmental mechanisms and processes, 
and the importance of internal constraints on adaptive evolution. Bridging the two 
major macroevolutionary themes, the hypothesis of punctuated equilibria invoked 
constraints on phenotypic evolution and the role of speciation in both diversifica-
tion and the evolution of form. This chapter describes the Evolutionary Synthesis 
and the challenges to it and addresses the extent to which the modern formulation of 
the Synthetic Theory (ST) adequately addresses the observations that have prompted 
skeptical challenge. I conclude that although several proposed extensions and seem-
ingly unorthodox ideas have some merit, the observations they purport to explain 
can mostly be interpreted within the framework of the Synthetic Theory.
Keywords Evolutionary synthesis · Punctuated equilibria · Evolutionary devel-
opmental Biology · Epigenetics · Genetic constraints · Adaptation
1  Introduction
From Darwin’s time to the present day, biologists have debated the question of 
whether or not the evolutionary theory of the time suffices to explain “macroevolu-
tion.” Before the Evolutionary Synthesis (ES), extending from about 1930 to 1950, few 
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biologists, and almost no paleontologists, thought it did. According to the architects 
of the Synthetic Theory (ST) that emerged during the ES from the union of ideas and 
evidence from genetics, systematics, natural history, and paleontology, the processes of 
evolution within species, accumulated over time, explain the origin and diversification 
of higher  taxa (Futuyma 1979, Mayr and Provine 1980). For about 20 years, rather 
little disagreement was audible, but challenges arose in the 1970s and 1980s that lay 
bare deep differences within evolutionary biology. For example, disagreements among 
some parties at a major conference on macroevolution in 1980 were so intense that 
proceedings of the conference were never published (Levinton and Futuyma 1982). 
Discontent at that time arose chiefly within paleontology and systematics, disciplines 
that have since achieved greater rapprochement with the Synthetic Theory, although 
the arguments raised by paleontologists have not been entirely settled. In the last dec-
ade or so, new calls for extension, reconsideration, or even repudiation of the ST have 
been issued, this time largely from developmental biology. In this essay, I will address 
several of the major challenges to the Synthetic Theory, ranging from the 1970s to the 
present. I will conclude that many of these challenges have had a positive impact on 
evolutionary biology, but that the fundamental principles of the ST remain valid, and 
can explain known evolutionary phenomena with only modest extension.
It would be useful to define “macroevolution,” but definitions vary. Simpson 
(1944, p. 97) wrote that “Micro-evolution involves mainly changes within potentially 
continuous populations…[whereas] Macro-evolution involves the rise and divergence 
of discontinuous groups.” In Evolution Above the Species Level, Rensch (1959, p. 
1) objected to the lack of a clear borderline between “larger” and “smaller” events 
(and to the hybridization of Greek and Latin roots) and referred instead to “infraspe-
cific” (referring to processes that occur within a species or lead to a new species) and 
“transspecific” evolution (referring to processes that “lead to new genera, families, 
and lesser divisions, and thus to new constructional types”). Rensch thus focuses on 
the evolution of characters of individual organisms that distinguish taxa above the 
species level. (Levinton (2001) is among modern authors who adhere to this usage.) 
For many authors, however, “evolution above the species level” also includes patterns 
and causes of diversification of higher taxa, such as variation in diversity, speciation 
rates, and extinction among clades or geographic regions or geological periods.
I must at this point emphasize that I am neither a historian nor a philosopher 
and cannot address many questions that arise in those contexts. For example, I 
am hesitant to say whether or not the ST explains macroevolution, because I do 
not know what “explain” means. By “explanation,” I usually mean consistency of 
explananda with a set of postulated, sufficient causal processes. Others may require 
that an explanation enables prediction of the explananda, such as prediction of 
macroevolutionary diversification from a theory of mutation and natural selection. 
Current evolutionary theory cannot provide so grand a prediction, but it often can 
predict patterns (e.g., that mitochondrial mutations are more harmful to males than 
females, on average Innocenti et al. 2011) or very short-term responses to selection. 
By way of analogy, all meteorological phenomena are manifestations of physical 
principles, but you will be disappointed if you expect physics to predict the weather 
in your location a month from now.
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1.1  Background: The Evolutionary Synthesis  
and Its Aftermath
In order to appreciate discussion of the sufficiency of today’s evolutionary the-
ory, we must be familiar with the Evolutionary Synthesis, which familiarity itself 
requires a glance further back. Many historians recognize three major stages in 
the development of evolutionary theory: Darwinism (from 1859 until about 1898) 
in which natural selection among “random” variations (meaning undirected with 
respect to need) was urged as the most important but not sole cause of evolution 
(for some, inheritance of acquired characters was allowed); neo-Darwinism (from 
about 1898), referring to August Weismann’s and Alfred Russel Wallace’s com-
plete rejection of Lamarckian inheritance in favor of selection as the sole cause 
of evolution; and the Synthetic Theory, which in my view extends from about 
1930 (with the publication of Fisher’s The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection) 
to about 1950 (with Stebbins’s Variation and Evolution in Plants). (The defini-
tion, temporal extent, major players, and content of the Evolutionary Synthesis, or 
Modern Synthesis are all debated by historians.)
The major elements of the ST, which remain major elements of evolutionary the-
ory today, include (1) the units of evolution are populations of organisms, not types 
or single organisms (“population thinking”); (2) evolution is based on mutations that 
are random with respect to the adaptive needs of the organism (but not necessarily 
random in other respects), resulting in inherited variation that may be amplified by 
recombination; (3) natural selection (at the level of individual organisms), acting 
on inherited variation, is the major cause of evolution of adaptive characteristics; 
(4) changes in the genetic composition of populations can also result from random 
genetic drift, especially in small populations; (5) new species are formed by diver-
gence between populations of an ancestral species, owing to factors that reduce or 
prevent gene flow between populations that undergo different evolutionary changes; 
(6) gradual accumulation of changes by these same factors results in character differ-
ences that distinguish higher taxa, i.e., macroevolution (Reif et al. 2000; Kutschera 
and Niklas 2004). In particular, as embodied in the equations of theoretical popula-
tion genetics, the theory was cast in very general terms. “Selection” is not identified 
with any specific mode or agent (and so could include ecological sources of selec-
tion, sexual selection, the “internal selection” stemming from functional interactions 
among characters Schmalhausen 1949, and genic selection owing to factors such as 
meiotic drive). “Mutations” are any kind of reasonably stable alternatives (“allelo-
morphs”) to a prevailing unit of heredity; the equations for the dynamics of mutations 
in populations apply equally to what we now identify as single-base pair substitutions 
(whether in structural or regulatory sequences), chromosome inversions, polyploids, 
and even epigenetic “mutations.” These broad concepts lack mechanistic content; 
empirical data are needed to describe real instances of evolution, such as the agents 
of selection and the molecular and developmental basis of phenotypic variants. Thus, 
the conception of causes of evolution embodied in the Synthetic Theory, i.e., gene 
frequency change, is quite different from the causes of differences in morphology, 
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physiology, or behavior that are commonly envisioned by mechanistic developmental 
biologists, physiologists, or neurobiologists (cf. Amundson 2005).
The Evolutionary Synthesis was both a synthesis (especially of genetics and 
natural selection) and a “constriction” (Provine 2001). The seeming exclusivity of 
the ES can be understood (and excused, if deemed necessary) only by appreciat-
ing the state of evolutionary discourse in the early twentieth century (see Simpson 
1944; Rensch 1959; Bowler 1983; Reif et al. 2000). Darwinism was in “eclipse” 
(Huxley 1942; Bowler 1983), in that almost no biologists accepted natural selection 
as a significant agent of evolution. (The exceptions were chiefly some of the natu-
ralists.) Almost nobody had attempted to measure selection in natural populations, 
so it simply had not been documented. Many biologists doubted that organisms’ 
characteristics are adaptive; Robson and Richards (1936), for instance, devoted 
much of their book to the thesis that differences between related species are nona-
daptive. Selection was thought of as a “random,” undirected process, so “orderly” 
phenomena such as trends and parallel or convergent evolution were thought to 
refute evolution by natural selection. After centuries of a theological world view 
that included divine design and purpose, many morphologists were “idealists” who 
held a Platonic interpretation of each species’ form as “an element in the overall 
pattern imposed by Mind upon the material world” (Bowler 1983, p. 47; Winsor 
2006; Amundson 2005; and others disagree). Moreover, to those who thought in 
terms of purpose, Darwinian selection was far less appealing than theories that did 
not include struggle for survival, and in which organisms could be viewed as active 
agents, directing their own evolution (Bowler 1983, p. 15). Among these was “neo-
Lamarckism,” especially popular and long lasting among paleontologists, even after 
geneticists had refuted and abandoned “soft inheritance.” Lamarckism, in which 
organisms direct their evolution by use and disuse of certain organs, was related to 
Haeckel’s recapitulation theory (for ontogeny displays “progress” toward the “goal” 
of the adult organism), and both of these to orthogenesis, the belief (again persis-
tent among paleontologists) that evolution is driven by irresistible internal factors 
in specific directions; in some versions, the drive is inexorable progress, while in 
others it involves momentum that carries the species into maladaptive degenera-
tion and extinction. One might imagine that the geneticists, having disposed of two 
arguments against the efficacy of Darwinian selection (Lamarckian inheritance and 
blending inheritance), would have been staunch Darwinians, but Hugo de Vries 
and Thomas Hunt Morgan, founders of genetics, instead interpreted mutations as a 
 sufficient cause of evolution. Early in his career, Morgan thought that species arise 
simply as mutations; natural selection simply eliminated mutations that were unfit. 
If selection explained anything, it was adaptation, not the origin of species—but he 
denied that most characteristics were adaptations (Bowler 1983, p. 198). A more 
extreme mutationism was voiced by some paleontologists, such as (Schindewolf 
1950; cited by Simpson 1953a, b), and most notoriously by the (otherwise 
respected) geneticist Richard Goldschmidt (1940), who considered gene mutations 
and selection instrumental within species, but argued that species and higher taxa 
originate by an entirely different process, involving a major reconfiguration of the 
genome. Such a “macromutation” would often, perhaps usually, yield a hopelessly 
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dysfunctional organism, but occasionally a coherent, adapted “hopeful monster” 
instead. Thus, Goldschmidt proposed evolution by saltation, i.e., a “large” discon-
tinuous change in one or more characteristics that arises in a single generation.
Those who today disparage the Evolutionary Synthesis as a constrained, dog-
matic assertion that evolution consists only of natural selection on random genetic 
mutations within species must recognize that the authors of the Synthesis were 
responding to an almost complete repudiation of natural selection, adaptation, 
and coherent connection of macroevolution to these processes. Macroevolution, 
in particular, was explained by Lamarckian modification, orthogenesis (for which 
no mechanism was ever articulated), and saltation (mutationism). It is instructive, 
then, to glance at some of the main arguments presented by the contributors to the 
Evolutionary Synthesis.
1.2  The Content and Authors of the Evolutionary Synthesis
The best known contributors to, or “architects” of, the Evolutionary Synthesis 
(sensu lato) are R.A. Fisher, J.B. Haldane, Sewall Wright, Theodosius 
Dobzhansky, Julian Huxley, Ernst Mayr, George Gaylord Simpson, and G. 
Ledyard Stebbins. Bernhard Rensch is rightfully placed in this company by 
those who know his work (see below), but that number is regrettably dwindling. 
A considerable number of other authors should be credited with major concep-
tual or empirical contributions, especially in Germany and Russia (Adams 1980; 
Reif et al. 2000). To mention only a few, in Russia, Sergei Chetverikov was a 
founder of population genetics, and I.I. Schmalhausen integrated natural selec-
tion with genetics and some aspects of development. Nikolai Timofeeff-Ressovsky 
did pioneering, insightful work on genetic variation in natural populations in 
Russia and later in Germany. Experimental population genetics was initiated by 
Georges Teissier and Philippe L’Héritier in France. To the well-known names in 
England should be added, at least, the cytogeneticist C.D. Darlington, author of 
The Evolution of Genetic Systems (1939), E.B. Ford, who with his students cre-
ated ecological genetics and applied Fisher’s theory to real genetic data, and Gavin 
de Beer, who in his many books (e.g., Embryos and Ancestors, 1940) used com-
parative embryology to dismantle Haeckel’s recapitulation theory (the “bioge-
netic law”) and interpret macroevolutionary changes in form. In the United States, 
major contributions to the genetic aspects of evolution came from Herman Muller 
and from the botanists Edgar Anderson (author of Introgressive Hybridization, 
1949), E.B. Babcock (Smocovitis 2010), and the famous trio of Clausen et al. 
(1948). Non-Darwinian views of evolution in Germany were countered by many 
adherents to Darwinism, informed by genetics (Reif et al. 2000). Erwin Baur, Max 
Hartmann, Wilhelm Ludwig, and Alfred Kühn, among others, developed argu-
ments for evolution by natural selection of genetic variants that conformed fully 
to the ST as it developed in England and the United States. As early as 1930, in 
Die Phylogenie der Pflanzen, ein Überblick über Tatsachen und Probleme, the 
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botanist Walter Zimmermann argued against idealistic morphology, typology, 
Lamarckism, and saltation, interpreted plant characters as adaptations formed by 
natural selection, and “single-handedly accomplished a synthesis years before 
other synthesists” (Reif et al. 2000). (Zimmermann had almost no impact, even 
during his lifetime, because of academic politics and because he embedded his 
arguments in scientific philosophy that Simpson (1949), for one, found hard to 
read.) The broadly trained zoologist Gerhard Heberer edited a book (Die Evolution 
der Organismen, 1943) in which he and most of the 18 other authors argued for 
the gradual evolution of higher taxa, and against saltation, Lamarckism, and 
orthogenesis.
Most of the well-known “architects” of the ES addressed aspects of macro-
evolution to at least some extent. Huxley (1942) sketched the newly forming 
theory most broadly in the book that gave the Evolutionary Synthesis its name; 
his most significant personal contribution was probably his formulation of allo-
metric growth (unequal growth rates of different features or dimensions), which 
was used, by Haldane among others (Haldane 1932b), to explain some appar-
ently nonadaptive characters—and which, incidentally, illustrates an awareness 
of the importance of development in evolution. Wright (1932) intended his quite 
abstract “shifting balance theory,” with the “adaptive landscape” as its metaphor, 
as a theory of long-term progressive evolution, and his landscape metaphor was 
adopted by Dobzhansky, Simpson, and subsequently many others. Dobzhansky 
(in Genetics and the Origin of Species, 1937) said almost nothing about mac-
roevolution, but drew attention to Wright’s and Fisher’s theoretical arguments, 
including the efficacy of even very weak selection. He marshaled most of the 
existing evidence of the operation of natural selection, and it is striking to read 
how few his examples were—and how many more he could cite 14 years later 
(Dobzhansky 1951). Among the major themes in Systematics and the Origin of 
Species (Mayr 1942) is geographic variation: its nature, adaptive significance, 
and the evidence it provides of the gradual evolution of species. Mayr empha-
sized the uncertain borders of many genera as evidence of continuity of diver-
gence and cited many examples of species that are clearly closely related but 
were assigned to different genera on the basis of one or a few character differ-
ences. In a final chapter on “The higher categories and evolution,” he listed seven 
factors that “deprive the macroevolutionary processes of much of their former 
mysteriousness,” including “the smallness and frequency of mutations,” pleiot-
ropy, the polygenic basis of traits, allometric growth, and the power of selection 
(citing Fisher). He closed the book by stating, “all the processes and phenomena 
of macroevolution and the origin of the higher categories can be traced back to 
intraspecific variation, even though the first steps of such processes are usually 
very minute.” Complementing Mayr’s book that was written “from the viewpoint 
of a zoologist,” Stebbins (in Variation and Evolution in Plants, 1950) described 
macroevolutionary patterns in plants (e.g., fusion of flower parts) and interpreted 
them both in terms of likely adaptive value and developmental mechanism, a dual 
approach that he revisited in Flowering Plants: Evolution Above the Species Level 
(1974). In the later book, he listed many instances in which a diagnostic feature 
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of a higher taxon is found as a difference between congeneric species in other 
plant families, illustrating that evolutionary changes at different taxonomic levels 
do not differ in kind.
The most widely known treatment of macroevolution during the Synthesis is 
Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944), by the vertebrate paleontologist George 
Gaylord Simpson. By interpreting patterns in the fossil record in terms of genet-
ics, Simpson achieved a remarkable union of widely disparate disciplines. He 
cited both genetic data (e.g., the adequacy of mutation rates to account for rates 
of phenotypic evolution in the fossil record, the polygenic basis of most pheno-
typic traits) and geological data to explain apparent saltations in fossil series, but 
agreed that the common absence of forms transitional to high-level taxa (e.g., 
orders, classes) requires a special explanation. He postulated “quantum evolu-
tion,” a forerunner of punctuated equilibria, in which new forms evolve very rap-
idly as they adapt to very different habitats or ways of life. Intermediate fossils 
would not be found “if the animals involved in the transitions were relatively few 
in number and if they were evolving at unusually high rates” (p. 117). This was 
not a saltationist hypothesis, for “in general the genetic processes involved do 
not permit making the step with a single leap” (p. 210). Having dispatched sal-
tationism, Simpson addresses “inertia, trend, and momentum” in a multifaceted 
attack on orthogenesis. Rectilinear evolution does occur, but is far from universal, 
for most clades show a pattern of branching, diversifying in different directions. 
Mutation can be biased in certain directions, but appears not to coincide “with the 
direction in which the group is really evolving.” Progressive, rectilinear change 
is most consistent with persistent natural selection (for example, increasing tooth 
height in grazing horses). Apparent momentum can be produced by selection in 
many ways, such as the effect of selection on two correlated characters that reach 
their optima at different times. Simpson does not claim to have demonstrated 
that particular evolutionary events had these causes, only that they are realistic 
possibilities, consistent with genetic data and theory, in contrast to Lamarckian 
inheritance or the undefined, almost mystical factors invoked by supporters of 
orthogenesis.
Bernhard Rensch, in my opinion, is the great unsung hero of the Evolutionary 
Synthesis; it is a great misfortune that he is so poorly known, especially in 
English-speaking countries. Although he was a Lamarckian early in his career, 
he soon became a neo-Darwinian, did extensive research on geographic varia-
tion in land snails, lizards, birds, and mammals, and formulated the well-known 
Bergmann’s, Gloger’s, and Allen’s “rules” that provided important evidence for 
adaptation and natural selection. Anticipating much later research, he experimen-
tally altered the color pattern of birds’ eggs, found that more markedly altered eggs 
elicited more frequent rejection by the parents, and interpreted the egg polymor-
phism of the brood-parasitic cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) as an adaptive response to 
egg rejection. He published major papers in 1939 on Typen der Artbildung (kinds 
of speciation) and in 1943 on Die paläontologischen Evolutionsregeln in zoolo-
gischer Betrachtung (paleontological rules of evolution from a zoological view-
point). He worked on his book, Neuere Probleme der Abstammungslehre (recent 
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problems of the theory of evolution), during World War II, but was unable to 
 publish it until 1947; only after correcting proofs did he see for the first time the 
books by Huxley (1942), Mayr (1942), and Simpson (1944). He took these into 
account in the second edition that was published in German in 1954 and finally 
appeared in English, as Evolution Above the Species Level, in 1959.
Rensch’s treatment of macroevolution is, I think, more impressive, and cer-
tainly more multifaceted, than Simpson’s. He not only counters Goldschmidt’s 
saltationism by citing abundant gradations from geographic races to species to 
genera, but he also provides deeply insightful analyses of the major problems of 
macroevolution (arguing against saltation, orthogenesis, and neo-Lamarckism) by 
summarizing paleontological studies and especially evolutionary patterns revealed 
by comparative morphology and embryology—an approach that Simpson did not 
take. In reviewing the first edition of Rensch’s book, Simpson (1949) lavished 
praise. Although Rensch is not a paleontologist, Simpson wrote, he provides inter-
pretations that may be “commended to paleontologists as examples of how…to 
understand the facts of their subject.” Simpson praised the book for “an extraordi-
nary richness of pertinent examples and for clearly reasoned interpretation, … so 
packed with well-integrated information that summary is impossible.”
Rensch interprets the temporal course of clade diversification (cited by paleon-
tologists as an inherent “life cycle”) as adaptive proliferation when a lineage 
adapts to new habitats that are relatively free of competitors; the rate of diversifi-
cation may last for more than 100 million years (not a brief, vigorous “adoles-
cence”), and declines, he suggests, because competition increases with the 
number of species. Dollo’s “law” of irreversibility (a mainstay of orthogenesis) 
has many exceptions, but there is seldom reversal to exactly the ancestral charac-
ter, because during the interim, the “whole organism of the animal has undergone 
change:” any reversal has to be functionally integrated with the entire system. 
Examining development and the “mechanisms of construction” shows that many 
possibly nonadaptive features may be ascribed to allometry or to the multiple 
effects of hormones. Increases in body size carry with them changes in such fea-
tures as the number of retinal cells or brain cells, which may support new func-
tions and even be the basis of selection on size. Parallel evolution may arise from 
similar hereditary factors and development, as seen in lepidopteran wing patterns, 
or from similarity of natural selection, as in the longer wings of diverse migratory 
bird species compared to nonmigratory relatives. Apparent orthogenesis, as exem-
plified by Cope’s rule of increase in body size, can readily be caused by selection 
or by correlated growth (especially allometry). Adaptively novel clades (e.g., of 
arboreal mammals) must originate from small, unspecialized ancestors, not giant 
forms. (This argument anticipates Stanley’s 1973 explanation of Cope’s rule of 
size increase.) Alterations of embryonic development (described in a 27-page pas-
sage that draws on comparative and experimental embryology) show that ontog-
eny can be altered in so many ways that the direction of evolution cannot be set by 
autonomous factors. “Jumps” in the fossil record of the origin of new “structural 
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types” are explained by failure to fossilize (the then recently discovered living 
coelacanth Latimeria strikingly shows the incompleteness of the fossil record1), 
by geographic shifts in the distribution of new species that evolved elsewhere, and 
by the accelerated evolution and strong directional selection of lineages that adapt 
to new habitats or ways of life. (Cf. Simpson’s “quantum evolution” and Eldredge 
and Gould’s “punctuated equilibria.”) New organs are usually modifications of 
features that evolved long before (e.g., mammalian ear ossicles, derived from jaw 
bones), and probably evolved by successive small changes (since most “large” 
mutations are harmful in Drosophila and other species). Rensch cautioned that “I 
do not wish to deny the possibility that some day further evidence of the evolu-
tionary effects of macro-mutation may come to light” (p. 106), but he concludes 
(p. 358) that the wealth of forms that compose a single, giant tree of life “is the 
result of continuous, undirected mutation and is patterned by the respective 
conditions of selection,” and that “if there are some special problems to which we 
can only say ‘Ignoramus’ [we do not know], we need not add ‘Ignorabimus’ [we 
shall not know].”
In my view, the major contributors to the Synthesis marshaled available evi-
dence (which on some points, such as the prevalence of natural selection, was 
strikingly sparse) logically and effectively in support of gradual evolution, chiefly 
by natural selection acting on undirected mutations of mostly small magnitude. 
The Synthesis “architects” successfully banished orthogenesis and, together with 
geneticists, Lamarckian mechanisms of change. They replaced mutationism with 
“population thinking,” although they did not (and could not, as the quotation from 
Rensch admits) demonstrate that “macromutations” never contribute to the evolu-
tion of major change in form. They did not address all evolutionary phenomena, 
by any means; they said little about patterns and causes of extinction, for exam-
ple, and Mayr (1960) noted, in a famous essay on evolutionary novelties, that “the 
problem of the emergence of evolutionary novelties has undoubtedly been greatly 
neglected during the past two or three decades.” As is widely recognized, ecology, 
morphology, developmental biology, and phylogeny received little attention during 
the Synthesis, relative to genetics.
Empirical evolutionary research in the 1950s and 1960s greatly increased 
information on genetic variation in natural populations, the seeming ubiquity 
of natural selection (Endler 1986, Table 5.1 lists at least 85 studies of “natu-
ral selection in the wild” from these decades), and speciation. Major theoreti-
cal advances included the articulation of kin selection, the distinction between 
individual selection and group selection (the latter still a contentious issue), and 
the consequent development of theory, based on individual and kin selection, to 
explain classes of characteristics such as life history traits and social behaviors. 
These developments may well have led to “hardening” of evolutionary thinking 
1 The group of lobe-finned fishes known as coelacanths was thought to have become extinct in 




around selection as an almost exclusive factor of evolution, as I will note later. 
(Gould’s 1983 claim that the Synthesis itself became more exclusively selec-
tionist has not been rigorously analyzed Reif et al. 2000.) But the all-important 
role of selection was challenged by interpretations of molecular polymorphism 
and evolution in neutralist terms (King and Jukes 1969; Kimura 1968, 1983). 
Students of phenotypic evolution nevertheless tended to remain convinced that 
the features they studied evolved mostly by natural selection, and Kimura him-
self agreed that this is likely the case. (Remarkably, Wright disavowed the role 
of genetic drift in any but very small populations and was little interested in 
Kimura’s theory, because “the condition that gives the maximum amount of such 
drift is that of complete neutrality and hence of no evolutionary significance” 
Provine 1986, p. 472.)
Evolutionary biology since about 1970 has seen immense growth and integra-
tion with other areas of biology (e.g., ecology, behavior, physiology, develop-
mental biology, and especially molecular biology). The ST has proven flexible 
because it was cast in general terms that could be easily honed to describe spe-
cific, newly discovered phenomena such as codon bias and transposable ele-
ments. Massive evidence of selection and adaptation was revealed not only by 
demographic studies of the kind that Endler (1986) and Kingsolver et al. (2001) 
summarized, but also by “signatures” of selection in DNA sequences, experi-
mental evolution (chiefly in laboratory cultures of microorganisms), the revival 
and documentation of sexual selection, and the frequent fit of data to adap-
tive models of life history, behavioral, physiological, and morphological traits. 
Phylogenetic inference became increasingly rigorous and reliable and is now 
a major element in evolutionary biology, appreciated not only as a reconstruc-
tion of some aspects of evolutionary history, but also as an analytical approach 
to inferring some evolutionary processes. Evolutionary studies became increas-
ingly quantitative and increasingly compared data against neutral (random) null 
models. Evolutionary biologists became increasingly cognizant of mechanistic 
biology: It is necessary to know some molecular biology in order to interpret 
molecular data. At the same time, there has been a resurgence of challenges to 
the ST (Depew and Weber 2013), with calls to expand the ST (e.g., by recogniz-
ing selection at different levels), to extend it (by incorporating other processes 
and other fields of study), or to replace it. Paleontologists have been most con-
spicuous in challenging the ST, but developmental biologists and a few “neon-
tological” evolutionary biologists have also issued calls for change, in some 
instances echoing the paleontologists. Stephen Jay Gould, the most incessant and 
articulate critic of the ST, played all three roles. Most of these calls for change 
explore or advocate explanations other than individual selection within popula-
tions, which is commonly viewed as too exclusive a theory of evolutionary pro-
cess. In the remainder of this essay, I will comment on four contentious issues: 
(1) alternatives to gradualism, (2) internal constraints on adaptation by natural 
selection, (3) challenges from developmental biology, and (4) long-term changes 
in diversity.
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2  Alternatives to Gradualism
Two major alternatives to gradualism have been posed since 1970, both led by 
Gould: a revived dalliance with saltation (Gould 1980) and the model of punc-
tuated equilibria introduced by Eldredge and Gould (1972) and elaborated and 
defended, especially by Gould, in many later publications (see Gould 2002). These 
are entirely different propositions.
2.1  Macromutation
Gould (1980) envisioned a discontinuity between intraspecific evolution and the 
origin of new species (which he named the “Goldschmidt break”) and advocated 
a more favorable reconsideration of a role for discontinuous, macromutational 
changes in the evolution of major character changes. In an introduction to a 1982 
reprint of Goldschmidt’s notorious The Material Basis of Evolution, Gould wrote 
“I find [Goldschmidt] not victorious, but weighted equally with his self-proclaimed 
Darwinian opponents.” (The book was reviewed in Paleobiology by four reviewers, 
among whom Charlesworth (1982) and Templeton (1982) wrote scathing criticisms 
of Goldschmidt that included highly unflattering comments on Gould’s advocacy.)
“Macromutation” has been used with a variety of very different meanings: For 
some, such as Goldschmidt, it is manifested as the origin of a radically altered 
character or set of characters (or a major morphological remodeling, as expressed 
by Schindewolf’s (1950) famous speculation that the first bird emerged from a 
reptile’s egg). For other authors, a macromutation merely causes a discrete differ-
ence in a character, the magnitude of which need not be specified. An evolution-
ary role for single discrete mutational changes of single characters, of substantial 
magnitude, has been admitted from the beginnings of the Synthesis. Haldane (e.g., 
1932a), for example, suggested that evolutionary “jumps” could arise by a vari-
ety of processes, such as hybridization, polyploidy, and the substitution of fairly 
“large” mutations, followed by modifier alleles with small effects. Fisher (1930) 
suggested that the latter model would account for data on inheritance of mimetic 
color patterns in butterflies: A major “switch” gene decides between two alterna-
tives, each of which may be modified later in evolution by other substitutions. This 
model was adopted and supported by mimicry researchers such as Philip Sheppard 
(a student of E.B. Ford) (Sheppard et al. 1985) and by the population geneticist 
Charlesworth (1980), a vocal defender of the ST.
It is true that by the early 1980s, it was widely thought that almost all the allele 
substitutions underlying variation in polygenic traits had very small effects, but on 
closer examination, it became clear that many character differences between 
closely related species are based on fewer gene differences, of larger effect, than 
previously supposed (Gottlieb 1984; Orr and Coyne 1992). Nevertheless, quite a 
few genes contribute to such differences. For example, a bee-pollinated and a 
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hummingbird-pollinated species of Mimulus have very different flowers that differ 
in at least 12 features. Analysis of interspecific crosses documented one to six 
quantitative trait loci (QTL) contributing to each trait. In nine traits, at least one 
QTL accounted for more than 25 % (but always less than 50 %) of the variance 
(Bradshaw et al. 1998). The authors interpreted the data as meaning that genes of 
large effect can contribute to speciation. However, the traits were affected by dif-
ferent QTL, a total of 47 QTL were detected, each QTL might well be a cluster of 
genes rather than a single gene, and the considerable unexplained variance surely 
is attributable, in part, to many loci with effects too small to be detected by the 
rather coarse genetic analysis. This is a far cry from a macromutation that might 
be imagined to underlie a major change in flower form. To be sure, it had been rec-
ognized since before the Synthesis that evolution of major differences in form 
could sometimes arise from changes in development that ensured coherent, inte-
grated change in multiple traits. The chief example was paedomorphosis, as exem-
plified by salamanders (Ambystoma), known as axolotls, that retain larval features 
in the reproductive adult stage.2 The difference between the metamorphic and pae-
domorphic life cycles is closely associated with a major gene that affects delay of 
metamorphosis, but other genes clearly contribute to the threshold that determines 
which developmental mode is expressed (Voss and Smith 2005). Of course, paedo-
morphosis is merely a change in timing of development of features that are the 
product of a very long history of, possibly, entirely gradual evolution.
Whether or not major, discontinuous single-step changes in phenotype have 
occurred in evolution is an empirical question. No mathematical theory excludes 
the possibility; Fisher’s (1930) famous geometrical model, often cited as an argu-
ment against macromutation, is a metaphor, not comparable to, say, models of the 
conditions for stable polymorphism. The manifold effects of polyploidy (Levin 
1983; Ramsey 2011) might be considered macromutational; possibly newly estab-
lished endosymbioses will likewise have large but beneficial effects. The most 
intriguing possibilities are raised by developmental genetics, in which major regu-
latory genes have “coopted” different developmental pathways, or have different 
spatial expression and so are associated with major morphological differences 
among taxa. (For example, the somites that develop into different classes of ver-
tebrae differ among major vertebrate taxa, apparently caused by differences in the 
expression domains of certain Hox genes.) It is conceivable that a single mutational 
change in the association between a regulatory gene and a developmental path-
way accounts for such cases, but it is also possible that it happened incrementally. 
2 This example loomed large in Gould’s first book, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1977). It is with 
some amusement that I read in my review (entitled, with some slight pretension, “The axolotl 
as Parsifal”) that when evolutionary biology embraces developmental biology, “it is then most 
likely to prove that slight changes in the regulatory systems of development—micromutations, 
no doubt, at the molecular level—can be amplified by exponential growth and allometric rela-
tions, and by the profusion of developmental effects that we call pleiotropy, into major pheno-
typic changes, some of which will seem discontinuous” (Futuyma 1978, p. 43). Both of these 
anticipated results, especially discontinuity, still await discovery.
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An instructive example is the gene shavenbaby, responsible for a difference 
between Drosophila species in the presence or absence of larval trichomes: The 
difference is based not on a single mutation, but on a combination of mutations in 
three different enhancers (Stern 2011). Fisher (1930, p. 164), in the discussion of 
mimicry that I have already cited, noted that a single gene determines sex in some 
fishes, but that we would not suppose that the various adaptations of one sex have 
arisen by a single saltation from the other sex. This example, he wrote, emphasizes 
“that it is the function of a Mendelian factor to decide between two (or more) alter-
natives, but that these alternatives may each be modified in the course of evolution-
ary development, so that the morphological contrast determined by the factor at a 
late stage may be quite unlike that which it determined at its first appearance.” It 
is certainly possible that instances will be found in which a functionally coherent 
set of character alterations will be found to have originated by one or a few muta-
tions that affect development. So far, however, it seems as if the bulk of evidence 
continues to favor the view that phenotypic characters generally evolve more or 
less independently at different rates (mosaic evolution) and by multiple, polygenic 
substitutions.
2.2  Punctuated Equilibria
The proposition that Eldredge and Gould (1972) dubbed punctuated equilibria 
(PE) has often been confused with macromutational saltation, but it is entirely dif-
ferent. PE refers both to a pattern that Eldredge and Gould claimed is common 
in the fossil record, and to a proposed process that would, they said, explain that 
pattern. The pattern is rapid shift between one long-lasting, virtually constant phe-
notype and another. The shift is typically not documented by intermediate fos-
sils, but the geological interval during which the shift occurs is typically on the 
order of thousands of years, long enough for appreciable evolution by standard 
processes (Stebbins and Ayala 1981; Hunt 2010). Both in 1972 and afterward, 
both Gould and Eldredge emphasized that character change during the shift (the 
“punctuation”) may well be gradual, i.e., a continuous change in mean charac-
ter state, caused by natural selection acting on undirected variation. The radical 
feature of Eldredge and Gould’s proposed process is that during the long periods 
of constancy (“stasis”), populations cannot readily respond to natural selection 
because of genetic constraints (in the form of epistatic interactions among genes), 
constraints that might be loosened when a population undergoes a bottleneck in 
size. Genetic drift might then initiate evolution toward a different genetic equilib-
rium, which they envisioned to be a different species, reproductively isolated from 
its more widespread “parent” species. Thus, character evolution occurs chiefly in 
concert with, and is caused by, speciation—bifurcation of an ancestral lineage into 
two reproductively isolated descendants. The new, modified “daughter” species 
originates as a small, geographically localized population, in which the evolution-
ary transition from one optimal phenotype to another occurs rapidly. Its existence 
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can be preserved and documented in the fossil record only if it eventually expands 
its geographic range, perhaps supplanting its ancestor (the “parent” species) as 
it does so. This hypothesis, they suggested, accounts for the paucity of cases of 
steady transformation of lineages (which they labeled “phyletic gradualism”) and 
for gaps in morphology that have plagued evolutionary biologists from Darwin on. 
(Note, however, that the phenotypic gaps in this model are small; PE describes not 
the origin of higher taxa with novel features, but closely related, similar species. 
PE was born, in large part, from Eldredge’s study of the trilobite Phacops rana, in 
which ancestral and descendant forms are distinguished by a small difference in 
the number of rows of eye lenses.)
Eldredge and Gould argued that if a character evolved only during the origin of 
a new “daughter” species, and if the direction of character evolution depends only 
on local selection that is unlikely to be correlated among successive speciation 
events, widely separated in time and space, individual selection would produce 
only random fluctuations in the character, averaged over the members of a clade. 
Eldredge and Gould concluded that long-tern trends in characters should therefore 
be attributed not to individual selection within species, but selection at the spe-
cies level: association of character states with rates of speciation or species extinc-
tion (the species-level analogs of birth and death). Paleontologist Stanley (1975) 
phrased the same argument more dramatically, claiming that macroevolution is 
decoupled from microevolution. This argument epitomized the rebellion against 
the ST that started in the 1970s.
Eldredge and Gould’s hypothesis was not entirely original. As one of several 
possible reasons for the embarrassing paucity of transitional forms in the fossil 
record, Darwin (1859, p. 306 of 1979 reprint) wrote: “One other consideration is 
worth notice: with animals and plants that propagate rapidly and are not highly 
locomotive, there is reason to suspect, as we have formerly seen, that their varie-
ties are generally at first local; and that such local varieties do not spread widely 
and supplant their parent-forms until they have been modified and perfected in 
some considerable degree. According to this view, the chance of discovering in 
a formation in any one country all the early stages of transition between any two 
forms, is small, for the successive changes are supposed to have been local or 
confined to one spot.” Rensch (1959, p. 106) wrote that although paleontologists 
often invoke macromutations to account for “saltatory deviations” in fossils from 
successive geological horizons, “these ‘saltations’ are probably due to horizontal 
shifts of geographic races or closely related species.” Eldredge and Gould (1972) 
stated clearly that their model was an application to the fossil record of Mayr’s 
(1954) founder-effect model of speciation (which Mayr later dubbed “peripatric 
speciation”). Mayr, in fact, had already made this application explicit, asserting 
that a locally formed species will invade new areas, and “only then will it become 
widespread and thus likely to be found in the fossil record. But then it is already 
too late to record the evolutionary change through which it has gone. All the pale-
ontologist finds is the fact that one widespread numerous species was replaced or 
succeeded by a rather different species…” (reprinted in Mayr 1976, p. 207).
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Mayr (1954, 1963) had suggested that adaptive evolution might be slow in large 
populations because of what evolutionary geneticists call epistasis for fitness: 
Many mutations fail to increase because they have deleterious interactions with 
many of the vast number of genetic backgrounds in which they are distributed in a 
large, highly polymorphic population. He proposed that changes in allele frequen-
cies due to sampling error (genetic drift) at some loci in a population founded by a 
few individuals, together with the population’s reduced genetic variation, would 
change the “genetic environment,” in which certain alleles would confer high fit-
ness that would not do so in the large “parent” population. This might be a snow-
balling process (a “genetic revolution”), leading to such great change as to form a 
new, reproductively isolated species, rapidly and in a localized area. This was 
envisioned as a process of evolution by natural selection, but the selection was 
“internal,” not necessarily imposed by environmental change. When population 
geneticists later modeled their interpretation of Mayr’s verbal model (and rather 
similar verbal propositions by Carson and Templeton (1984), they found it almost 
indistinguishable from Wright’s 1932 et seq.) shifting balance theory. Like Wright, 
they said, Mayr appears to envision a shift between peaks on an adaptive land-
scape, requiring that selection against departure from the original peak be coun-
tered by genetic drift. All the population geneticists who modeled this process 
agreed that this was very unlikely unless selection is very weak; that is, the “val-
ley” between adaptive peaks is very shallow (Charlesworth and Rouhani 1988; 
Barton and Charlesworth 1984). But a shallow valley would imply, they said, that 
the fitness of hybrids between “parent” and “daughter” populations would be quite 
high; hence, reproductive isolation would be very weak. The majority of popula-
tion geneticists judged Mayr’s peripatric speciation unlikely, and some rejected 
Wright’s shifting balance theory as well (Coyne et al. 1997; but see Wade and 
Goodnight 2000). Furthermore, they found no genetic evidence, based on 
allozymes and early DNA data, that speciation is associated with reduced popula-
tion size. Charlesworth (1984) argued that seemingly unchanging characters actu-
ally show substantial fluctuations around a nontrending long-term average, 
suggesting that they are able to evolve, but are subject to long-term stabilizing 
selection (see also Gingerich 1983). Thus, evolutionary geneticists criticized the 
theory on which Eldredge and Gould based punctuated equilibria theory; they 
rejected genetic constraint as an explanation of stasis; they rejected the proposition 
that character evolution depends on speciation; and they vigorously defended the 
ST (Charlesworth et al. 1982).3
3 I referred earlier to the intense controversy at a symposium on macroevolution held in Chicago 
in October 1980. I attended the symposium, and was scheduled to become editor of Evolution 
three months later. When it became evident that no proceedings of the symposium would be 
published, I invited several participants, representing diverse views, to contribute manuscripts to 
Evolution. This paper, “A neo-Darwinian commentary on macroevolution,” as well as a paper by 
Steven Stanley on macroevolution and the fossil record, a paper on evolution and development 




As to evidence, the little evidence from studies of closely related species, 
based on application of coalescent theory to DNA sequences, generally suggests 
that speciation has not been associated with bottlenecks in population size (e.g., 
Rovito 2010; Yeung et al. 2011). Whether or not “punctuational” changes in fossil 
lineages are associated with biological speciation or are simply episodes of rapid 
evolution within single, nondividing lineages (“punctuated gradualism”) is still 
unclear. In paleontological taxonomy, “species” are morphologically distinguish-
able named units, either successive stages in a single evolving lineage (“chrono-
species”) or reproductively isolated forms (biological species). Temporal overlap 
between “parent” and “daughter” forms is the best evidence that they represent 
cladogenesis (biological species) rather than “chronospecies.” Although punctu-
ated gradualism has been claimed for some lineages of planktonic Foraminifera, 
which provide exceptionally complete fossil records (e.g., Malmgren et al. 1983), 
Gould and Eldredge (1993) claimed that many studies find temporal overlap, sup-
porting their model. A recent comprehensive analysis of 337 Cenozoic “specia-
tion” events in Foraminifera concluded that at most 19 % of Cenozoic events (last 
65 million years) and 10 % of Neogene events (last 23 million years) represented 
change within nondividing lineages: The great majority revealed temporal over-
lap, and hence biological speciation (Strotz and Allen 2013). Analyses of liv-
ing species can also shed light on the question. Starting with Avise (1977) and 
Ricklefs (1980), several authors noted that (controlling for clade age) the total 
amount of phenotypic variation (“disparity”) among species in a clade should 
be correlated with the number of species according to the PE model, but not if 
phenotypic evolution is independent of speciation. Statistical methods for test-
ing this hypothesis have been developed only recently (Bokma 2010; Magnuson-
Ford and Otto 2012), but have indicated that most of the evolution of body size 
in mammals (Mattila and Bokma 2008; Monroe and Bokma 2009) and of habi-
tat use in primates (Magnuson-Ford and Otto 2012) is associated with speciation. 
(See Adams et al. 2009 for a counterexample.) Likewise, DNA sequence diver-
gence seems to have been enhanced by the amount of speciation in some higher 
taxa, but not others (Venditti and Pagel 2010; Goldie et al. 2011; Duchene and 
Bromham 2013).
The theoretical criticisms of founder-effect speciation by Charlesworth, 
Barton, and their coauthors do not necessarily eviscerate Eldredge and Gould’s 
hypothesis that phenotypic evolution is associated with and enabled by specia-
tion. Slatkin (1996) wrote “in defense of founder-flush theories of speciation,” 
noting that relaxation of selection during the exponential population increase 
that may occur in newly founded populations can enable new advantageous 
allele combinations to be formed and selected, and Gavrilets (2004) noted that 
small populations can drift along adaptive ridges in multidimensional genetic 
landscapes, and achieve reproductively incompatible genetic configurations 
without having to cross impassably deep fitness valleys. And as explained in the 
next section, speciation might well promote trait evolution even if it does not 
proceed by genetic drift and reduced population size: Any mode of speciation 
might do.
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2.3  Reconciling Punctuated Equilibria  
with Population Genetics
I proposed a simple explanation of why biological speciation (by any mode) 
is likely to be associated with substantial, long-lasting phenotypic alterations in 
fossil lineages (Futuyma 1987; see Futuyma 2010). I noted that only a minor-
ity of changes in phenotypic characters are advantageous across a broad array 
of environmental conditions; most advantageous alterations enhance adaptation 
to particular ecological niches or circumstances. Many herbivorous insects, for 
example, have the potential for advantageous changes in behavioral or physiologi-
cal responses to certain plant species, perhaps adding the plant to the insect’s diet. 
Most such adaptations have a polygenic basis, often composed of several function-
ally interacting components (e.g., recognizing a plant and possessing the enzymes 
needed to digest it or detoxify its chemical defenses). The geographic distribu-
tion of a specific “niche” (e.g., an environmental condition or a resource such as 
a host plant) is often discontinuous (patchy); moreover, it is likely to change over 
time, due to climate change, if for no other reason. An adaptation to such a “niche” 
arises and may be fixed in a local population, but for two reasons, both owing to 
breakdown of the adaptation by recombination, it may not persist long enough to 
be registered in the fossil record, much less be inherited by a clade of species. 
Specifically, the constellation of alleles and component characters associated with 
an adaptive trait will generally not be maintained intact if the population inter-
breeds freely with another population (such as the ancestral form) that is adapted 
to a different niche. Two likely consequences follow. First, if the adaptation does 
not become widespread, it is unlikely to be documented in the fossil record, and 
unlikely to persist very long because the natal population will eventually become 
extinct. But spread of the new adaptation from its birthplace to other patches with 
the same niche may well be hindered if emigrants are likely to disperse into inter-
vening patches of the ancestral niche, where they will interbreed with ancestral 
genotypes. Second, environments undergo geographic shifts, dramatically illus-
trated by Pleistocene glacial and interglacial fluctuations. When this occurs, spe-
cies commonly “track their niche”: They undergo range shift, during which new 
populations are founded by migrants and some old populations become extinct, 
and the former geographic structure of the species is broken down and reformed. 
(“Niche tracking” suggests that dispersal may often be “easier” than adaptation 
in situ to an environmental change. The several possible reasons include genetic 
constraints, discussed in Sect. 4.2) The founders of a new population often will 
be drawn from separate, differentiated populations, causing gene flow on a more 
massive scale than the “trickle gene flow” that characterizes equilibrium popu-
lations (Slatkin 1977; McCauley 1993). Such gene flow, if between differently 
adapted populations, may break down the differences between them. In both of 
these scenarios, the evolution of reproductive isolation maintains the locally origi-
nated adaptation intact, by preventing free interbreeding with the more wide-
spread, common ancestral genotype. Thus, I concluded, “speciation can facilitate 
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morphological change not by liberating a population from genetic homeostasis or 
accelerating the response to selection, but by enabling a gene pool to remain sub-
ject to consistent selection pressures even as it moves about in space. By isolating 
gene pools from other gene pools that they encounter as they move about, specia-
tion enables them to retain characters that evolved in a local context… 
Although speciation does not accelerate evolution within populations, it pro-
vides morphological changes with enough permanence to be registered in the fossil 
record” (Futuyma 1987, p. 467). In that paper, I emphasized the role of reproduc-
tive isolation in protecting adaptations from dissolution during massive changes in 
geographic range, but I am now inclined to think that its more important effect is in 
enabling a new adaptation to spread by migrants that do not interbreed with residents 
of intervening ancestral-type populations. Eldredge et al. (2005) also considered the 
problem of how to reconcile apparent stasis in fossil lineages with the capacity for 
rapid evolution, and observed high rates of evolution, in populations of living organ-
isms. (See also Thompson 2013.) Chief among the several factors that they suggested 
might cause stasis was spatially and temporally heterogeneous selection, owing in 
part to a “geographic mosaic” of different coevolutionary interactions experienced 
by different populations of a species (Eldredge 2001; Lieberman and Dudgeon 1995; 
Thompson 2005). Although individual populations may respond rapidly to local 
selection, consistent directional selection seldom acts on the species as a whole. 
Eldredge et al. did not discuss what factors overcome the heterogeneity of selection 
and enable significant character change, i.e., punctuation. Their hypothesis for sta-
sis is related to mine and can be extended to account for punctuation by postulat-
ing, as do I, that evolution of reproductive isolation by one such population enables 
the phenotype to spread and persist. My model has won modest approval, especially 
among some paleontologists. Gould (2002, pp. 798–802), in particular, admitted in 
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory that the original explanation of punctuational 
evolution by founder-effect speciation and “genetic revolution” was untenable, and 
strongly endorsed my model, writing that “his simple, yet profound, argument has 
not infused the consciousness of evolutionists because the implied and required hier-
archical style of thinking remains so unfamiliar and elusive to most of us” (p. 799). 
(Well, maybe.) Although this model is not the only one that might account for a cor-
relation between divergence and speciation (Rabosky 2012), the evidence mentioned 
earlier (e.g., Mattila and Bokma 2008; Venditti and Pagel 2010; Strotz and Allen 
2013) is consistent with it. So is evidence suggesting a break between intraspecific 
evolution and divergence between reproductively isolated populations.
For example, the structure of the phenotypic variance–covariance matrix is 
much the same among conspecific geographic populations of damselflies, but 
differs strongly between closely related species, between which divergence has 
been highly discordant with the intraspecific first principal component of varia-
tion (Eroukhmanoff and Svensson 2008). A most intriguing “blunderbuss” pattern 
of evolution of vertebrate body size has been described by Uyeda et al. (2011), 
who show that size evolves at a high rate over short time spans, but does not 
accumulate until lineages have been separated for about a million years or more. 
That is, the amount of divergence between related lineages is much the same 
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after 105 years as at 103 years. After 106 years, however, the amount of differ-
ence mounts steadily and rapidly with time. It is tempting to attribute the million-
year break to speciation, which often requires isolation and genetic divergence for 
about that long (Coyne and Orr 2004).
If Eldredge and Gould (1972) were right in supposing that trait evolution is 
facilitated by speciation, they were surely wrong about the mechanism, as Gould 
(2002, p. 796) came to recognize: “I believe that our critics have been correct in 
this argument, and that Eldredge and I made a major error by advocating, in the 
original formulation of our theory, a direct acceleration of evolutionary rate by the 
processes of speciation.” It is possible, in my view, that phenotypic evolution and 
speciation are functionally associated, although more evidence will still be needed 
before the generality and cause of this pattern can be established. Perhaps Mayr 
(1963, p. 621) rightly wrote that “without speciation there would be no diversifica-
tion of the organic world, no adaptive radiation, and very little evolutionary pro-
gress. The species, then, is the keystone of evolution.”
3  Internal Constraints on Adaptation
Neither Darwin nor major figures in the Evolutionary Synthesis viewed natural 
selection as the sole important factor of evolution, much less as an omnipotent 
agent that could always fit organisms optimally to their environment. Darwin made 
frequent reference to the “mysterious laws of growth,” as well as to environmen-
tal modifications that he supposed (especially in later editions of The Origin of 
Species) might be inherited. Wright included genetic drift as an important compo-
nent of his Shifting Balance Theory; Fisher recognized genetic drift (especially as 
it affects the probability of fixation of a new advantageous mutation), and described 
“runaway” sexual selection in which female preference evolves not because of an 
advantage, but because of linkage disequilibrium with the male trait. In his well-
known essay “What is an adaptive trait?” Dobzhansky (1956) emphasized the 
importance of nonadaptive pleiotropic effects of selected genes. Rensch (1959) 
attributed parallel evolution partly to similarity of hereditary factors, emphasized 
the role of development and “mechanisms of construction,” and explained many 
characters by character correlation, especially allometric growth. Like Rensch, 
Mayr (e.g., 1963, p. 608) attributed parallel evolution partly to shared genetic and 
developmental properties, which also predispose every group of animals “to vary 
in certain of its structures, and to be amazingly stable in others.” Stebbins (1950, 
1974) noted that certain traits, such as the number of ovules per carpel, vary in cer-
tain taxa and are invariant, both within and among species, in other taxa.
During and after the ES, however, evidence mounted that natural populations 
are genetically very variable. Lewontin (1974, p. 92) famously wrote that “[t]here 
appears to be no character—morphogenetic, behavioral, physiological, or cytoge-
netic—that cannot be selected in Drosophila,” and concluded that “there is good 
reason to suppose that any outbred population or cross between unrelated lines will 
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contain enough variation with respect to almost any character to allow effective 
selection.” This view, still widely held by evolutionary geneticists, supports an opti-
mistic view of species’ adaptability, and skepticism that adaptation is often limited 
or channeled by available genetic variation.
3.1  Adaptation: Critique and Defense
As I noted earlier, evidence for natural selection increased greatly after the 
Synthesis, and interest grew in explaining the evolution, by natural selection, of 
classes of characteristics such as life history traits and animal behaviors. Some 
such literature included plausible, but not well-tested, adaptive interpretations that 
became disparaged as “just-so stories” by critics, especially Richard Lewontin 
and Stephen Jay Gould. Much of the literature, though, consisted of optimal-
ity models that could be evaluated by empirically testing their assumptions and, 
especially, by comparing the models’ predictions with observations (Maynard 
Smith 1978). Such models included constraints, or boundary conditions, such as 
trade-offs among traits. “Adaptationism” came under fire in the 1970s, Gould and 
Lewontin’s (1979) eloquently written paper, “The spandrels of San Marco and the 
Panglossian paradigm,” being by far the most frequently cited critique. Echoing 
Gould’s frequent complaint that the Synthesis had “hardened” around natural 
selection, and Lewontin’s (1977, 1979) critiques of the “adaptationist program” 
embodied in sociobiology and in The Selfish Gene (Dawkins 1976), Gould and 
Lewontin criticized what they viewed as a practice of atomizing organisms into 
unitary traits, proposing adaptive explanations of each, and substituting alterna-
tive adaptive hypotheses if the first ones fail. Among the many faults they found 
in the “adaptationist program” was its supposed failure to consider alternatives to 
natural selection, such as random genetic drift, alternative stable states, and espe-
cially nonadaptive by-products of developmental correlation. Maynard Smith 
(1978), among others, defended optimality theory, noting that the traits usually 
studied “can hardly be selectively neutral” (e.g., behavior and other traits that 
affect reproductive success), that the theory does not assume or attempt to show 
that traits are actually at their optima, and that the models make explicit assump-
tions about constraints and heredity, but he agreed that it was important to develop 
adequate methods of testing the models and that the field could benefit from heed-
ing Lewontin’s criticisms. Since then, researchers in this field have indeed become 
more critical, and the literature now includes countless examples of adaptation-
ist hypotheses that were testable, have been tested, and have (usually) provided 
evidence of adaptation. For example, the inflorescence of wild carrot (Daucus 
carota) consists of an umbrella-like array of many tiny white flowers—with one 
or a few purple flowers in the center. Maynard Smith (1978) quotes Darwin’s pas-
sage about this in The Origin of Species: “that the modified central flower is of no 
functional importance to the plant is almost certain,” and then writes that, having 
cited this example in conversation, his companions immediately offered two adap-
tive hypotheses which, however, struck him as “fanciful.” One of these hypotheses 
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was that the dark flower is an “insect mimic” that attracts pollinating insects to 
the inflorescence. In 2009, Goulson et al. reported experiments, including experi-
mental removal of the dark flower, that showed exactly this effect. As tests of 
adaptationist hypotheses improved after Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) critique, 
constraints and the possibility of nonadaptive interpretations (especially based on 
development) became a common theme. A distinction was made between univer-
sal constraints (owing to physics and chemistry that affect, for example, the prop-
erties of materials) and “phylogenetic” constraints, particular to a clade because 
the features established in its earlier history can restrict the variety of possible evo-
lutionary paths. (For example, it has long been supposed that the maximum body 
size of insects is set by the extent to which gas exchange can occur by diffusion 
through the tracheae.) Constraints might be caused by natural selection (“selective 
constraints”) or by internal factors that restrict or bias the kinds of phenotypic var-
iations that can arise. These “genetic constraints” and “developmental constraints” 
are closely related and often are much the same thing. Moreover, the distinction 
between selective and developmental constraints is often unclear, for a phenotypic 
change may cause death by disrupting development (e.g., failure of proper forma-
tion of the embryonic notochord could abort development of vertebrae, which the 
notochord induces). Smith et al. (1985) offered the most widely used definition 
of a developmental constraint: “a bias on the production of variant phenotypes 
caused by the structure, character, composition, or dynamics of the developmental 
system.”
In the now extensive literature on constraints, some authors (e.g., Wake 2009) 
attributed certain evolutionary patterns, such as toe webbing in some salamanders, 
to developmental correlation rather than adaptation (as had Rensch and others dur-
ing the Synthesis). Others provided both theoretical and empirical studies of ways 
in which the direction and extent of evolutionary change might be biased or lim-
ited by genetic variance and, especially, covariance among traits (e.g., Bradshaw 
1991; Schluter 1996; Futuyma et al. 1995; Marroig and Cheverud 2005). The 
broad problem addressed is the extent to which constraints are important in 
explaining a range of phenomena. These include both existing features (such as 
toe webbing) and restrictions on adaptation, such as limits on species’ geographic 
range and ecological amplitude (niche width). The following paragraphs summa-
rize my recent review of the importance of genetic constraints, especially as they 
may limit adaptation (Futuyma 2010). I include under “genetic constraint” both 
so-called phylogenetic constraint and developmental constraint, which implies 
strictures set by developmental properties that do not vary, even though they are 
based at least partly on genetically encoded products (see Sect. 4.1).
3.2  Genetic Constraints
Studies of genetic variation in natural populations, responses to artificial selection, 
and rapid adaptation to environmental changes have led most population geneti-
cists to conclude that almost every characteristic of most species is so genetically 
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variable that the availability of variation seldom limits the response to  selection 
(e.g., Mather 1955; Barker and Thomas 1987; Barton and Partridge 2000). 
However, all acknowledge that genetic correlations caused by pleiotropy can 
greatly retard, or possibly prevent, evolution of a character if there exists antago-
nistic selection on correlated characters; the strength of this effect grows with the 
number of correlated characters (Dickerson 1955; Kirkpatrick 2009; Walsh and 
Blows 2009). Authors past and present (e.g., Schmalhausen 1949; Riedl 1978; 
Schwenk and Wagner 2004) have emphasized the likely importance of “internal” 
selection, owing to antagonistic pleiotropy and epistasis, in limiting selection 
response and evolutionary change.
Several phenomena suggest that genetic constraints may effectively prevent 
response to selection. (1) The most striking evidence of failure of adaptation is 
extinction, the fate of the vast majority of species that have existed. Even with 
plentiful genetic variation, adaptation will lag behind very rapid changes of envi-
ronment. This was surely the case during certain mass extinctions, but a greater 
fraction of species have succumbed during periods of “background” extinction. 
Whether or not the unknown environmental changes that may have caused these 
extinctions were rapid or slow is not known. (2) Almost all species have limited 
geographic distribution and habitat occupancy. Why they cannot adapt to often 
modestly different environments beyond their range is one of the most challeng-
ing problems in evolutionary ecology, in my view (see Kirkpatrick and Barton 
1997; Holt and Gaines 1992). Bradshaw (1991), an authority on rapid adapta-
tion of plants to metal-contaminated soils, cogently attributed habitat limits, 
and many other examples of adaptive failure to what he called “genostasis,” a 
lack of selectable genetic variation. (3) Although convergent adaptation to simi-
lar selective challenges is common, there are also countless examples of unique, 
one-off adaptations; many are familiar synapomorphies of higher taxa. No bryo-
phytes are more than about 15 cm tall, because they lack the vascular tissues that 
evolved only once (as far as known), in the ancestor of tracheophytes; among 
millions of species of insects, only one lineage (aculeate Hymenoptera) evolved 
a sting. The quantitative difference between evolving a feature once and not at 
all is slight, and terrestrial biotas would be very different if vascular plants had 
not evolved. (4) There are “empty niches,” lacunae in the economy of nature, 
as we see from geographic comparisons (e.g., sea snakes in the Indo-Pacific but 
not the Atlantic Ocean) and from the replacement of extinct forms by ecological 
counterparts only after a very long time (e.g., 120 million years between extinc-
tion of the first bivalve-drilling gastropods and the evolution of modern oyster 
drills) or not at all (e.g., sauropod dinosaurs). (5) “Phylogenetic conservatism” is 
a major feature of life that is largely unexplained. It is hard to envision an adap-
tive explanation of many morphological synapomorphies that characterize large, 
old taxa whose species are distributed among many environments, such as certain 
wing vein patterns that distinguish large families of Diptera and Hymenoptera. 
Dobzhansky (1956), in ascribing some traits to pleiotropy, cited a diagnostic fea-
ture of all of the 600 species of Drosophilidae then known: three orbital bristles, 
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the anterior bristle oriented forward and the others toward the rear. Phylogenetic 
“niche conservatism,” associated with limited variation in physiology, morphol-
ogy, and behavior, has immense ecological consequences (Wiens and Graham 
2005). Many families of herbivorous insects have been associated with a single 
plant family for more than 70 million years; congeneric species of plants have 
similar latitudinal distributions and climate associations on different continents, 
after lengthy opportunity for divergence. Thermal tolerance limits are highly 
conserved, varying little with latitude, in both lizards and Drosophila (Grigg and 
Buckley 2013; Kellermann et al. 2006).
Genetic evidence of constraints on adaptation is mostly rather indirect. In a few 
cases, little or no genetic variance could be detected for certain characters in out-
bred natural populations. Bradshaw’s research group found genetic variation for 
copper tolerance in populations (from uncontaminated areas) of those species of 
grasses that have evolved copper tolerance in copper-contaminated areas, but no 
variation at all in other species of grasses that have failed to evolve copper tol-
erance (Bradshaw 1991; Macnair 1997). Tolerance of desiccation and cold dis-
played little or no genetic variation in rainforest-dwelling species of Drosophila 
(Kellermann et al. 2006). In a series of tests, my colleagues and I screened four 
species of Ophraella leaf beetles for genetic variation in their willingness to con-
sume, and ability to survive on, species of plants other than their normal host 
plant; every species failed to display genetic variation in consumption and survival 
on at least one of the test plants (Futuyma et al. 1995). Moreover, the macroev-
olutionary pattern of diet evolution in this genus is partly predictable from, and 
perhaps has been guided by, the abundance or paucity of genetic variation for dif-
ferent responses.
There is considerable evidence that correlations among genetically variable 
traits may retard response to selection; examples include such traits as sexually 
selected male features in fishes, crickets, and Drosophila, floral traits in Ipomoea 
(morning glories), and tarsus length in flycatchers. In an elegant experiment, 
Etterson and Shaw (2001) transplanted families from a Minnesota population of 
Chamaecrista fasciculata further south, estimated genetic variance and covari-
ance among several traits, and determined the relationship between trait com-
binations and fitness in the southern environment—which is expected to prevail 
in Minnesota about 50 years from now. There was little genetic variance for the 
trait combinations that would provide the greatest potential enhancement of fit-
ness at that time, suggesting that future adaptation to climate change may be 
inadequate to ensure population persistence. In several taxa, divergence among 
species has been along the multivariate axis of greatest intraspecific variation, 
a pattern that Schluter (1996) called “evolution along genetic lines of least 
resistance.”
The quantitative genetic approach has been used to test whether or not a postu-
lated developmental constraint actually would prevent response to selection. For 
example, a positive correlation between two characters, perhaps expressed as an 
allometric relationship, may be postulated to represent developmental constraint. 
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This can be tested by artificially selecting for a character combination orthogonal 
to the observed axis of variation (i.e., for increase of one trait and decrease of the 
other). For example, the features of the several “eye spots” on the wing of the but-
terfly Bicyclus anynana are genetically correlated. Beldade et al. (2002) success-
fully uncoupled the size of two such eye spots by artificially selecting in different 
directions, showing that there exists some independent, uncorrelated genetic vari-
ation for each trait and that the observed correlation need not constrain response 
to natural selection, but a similar attempt to decouple their color was unsuccess-
ful (Allen et al. 2008). Theoretically, the likelihood of constraint increases with 
the number of intercorrelated characters, but all selection experiments to date have 
addressed bivariate correlations. Nevertheless, both theory and evidence suggest 
that estimates of genetic variances and correlations generally provide weak evi-
dence on the strength or even existence of genetic and developmental constraints 
(Conner 2012).
Another kind of evidence, the genetic architecture of a trait, might at least 
hint at the possibility of constraints or bias on its evolution. The mutational vari-
ance of a character, the genetic variance that arises each generation by new muta-
tions, is greater, ceteris paribus, if many genes affect its development (Lynch and 
Walsh 1998). Highly polygenic characters may be expected to display consider-
able genetic variation. Conversely, if only a few genes affect a character, the origin 
of a new character state might be a rarer event, and there might be less standing 
genetic variation, and adaptive evolution might have to wait for suitable new muta-
tions to arise (Houle 1998). If so, the rate and possibly the direction of evolution 
of the trait might be limited, or at least biased, by mutation (Hartl and Taubes 
2008; Stolt Even Simpson 1944), in postulating “quantum evolution,” envisioned 
a rapid shift between peaks in Wright’s adaptive landscape, but “in general the 
genetic processes involved do not permit making the step with a single leap” (p. 
210). Stolfus (2006), in contrast to the view that selection generally acts on a non-
limiting pool of standing variation. A considerable number of traits, ranging from 
pesticide resistance in plants and insects to pelvic reduction in stickleback fish, 
have evolved in diverse species and populations by independent mutations of the 
same gene (sometimes the same base pair), suggesting that there are few possible 
genetic avenues to the adaptive phenotype (Wood et al. 2005; Arendt and Reznick 
2008; Martin and Orgogozo 2013). The extent to which adaptation is based on 
standing variation or new mutations is uncertain (Barrett and Schluter 2008), but 
the evidence of abundant “selective sweeps” in DNA sequences, which occur 
when new or previously rare mutations increase fitness, suggests that new muta-
tions might play a more important role than traditionally (and still widely) thought.
In summary, several phenomena, among which extinction is most conspicuous, 
strongly imply that there exist constraints on the rate and direction of adaptation, 
including genetic/developmental constraints. The great attention to the question of 
constraint is a major, valuable development in evolutionary biology. Testing the 
constraint hypothesis in any particular instance, however, is not easy, and the evi-
dence to date does not yet enable us to decide on the importance of internal con-
straints on adaptation.
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4  Challenges from Developmental Biology
As many authors have noted, from Darwin into the early twentieth century, the 
study of evolution was intimately related to embryology. Starting with Haeckel’s 
recapitulation theory, embryology was viewed as a window into the past, a way 
of reconstructing ancestral forms. Early leaders of genetics, such as Thomas Hunt 
Morgan, separated genetics from embryology, which they viewed as speculative; 
embryology likewise became an experimental science that rejected its specula-
tive past and turned away from evolution, considering it not rigorous enough to be 
taken seriously (Smocovitis 1996, p. 193; Amundson 2005). However, compara-
tive embryology continued as a parallel discipline: During the 1920s and 1930s, 
Gavin de Beer, Walter Garstang, and others dethroned recapitulation and described 
other categories of evolution of development, such as heterochrony (Gould 1977; 
Love 2003; Love and Raff 2003). The split between genetics and embryology 
probably affected the formation of the ST (Love 2009), which built on genetic but 
not developmental mechanisms.
It is often said that development was excluded from the Evolutionary Synthesis, 
although this claim has been contested by authors like Smocovitis (1996), 
Amundson (2005), and Love (2009). Mayr claimed that developmental  biologists 
“bitterly resisted the synthesis. They were not left out of the synthesis…they sim-
ply did not want to join” (Mayr 1993, p. 32), and the developmental biologist 
Hamburger (1980, p. 98) noted that leading books on experimental embryology 
in the 1930s did not treat evolution, and that “the modern synthesis did not receive 
assistance from contemporary embryologists.” The “architects” of the Synthesis 
were certainly familiar with contemporary comparative embryology. Ford and 
Huxley (1929) studied the genetics of “rate factors” in a crustacean, Haldane 
(1932b) wrote on the evolutionary significance of the time of action of genes, and 
Mayr (1942) alluded to allometry and compensatory growth. Rensch (1947, 1959) 
treated developmental phenomena in some depth, as I have noted, and Stebbins 
(1950) gave equal time to developmental and selectionist interpretation of patterns 
of morphological evolution. Huxley, whose analysis of allometry was his chief 
conceptual contribution to evolutionary analysis, included de Beer in The New 
Systematics (Huxley 1940), and de Beer included Haldane, Huxley, and Ford in 
Evolution: Essays on Aspects of Evolutionary Biology (de Beer 1938). The only 
(or at least the only well known) experimental embryologist to address evolution-
ary processes (and who did not espouse Lamarckism, saltation, or vitalism) was 
C.H. Waddington, whose experimental studies of canalization and genetic assimi-
lation appeared in the early 1950s, after the Synthesis. Simpson (1953a) expressed 
some cautious doubt that genetic assimilation is an important factor in evolution, 
but did not object to it in theory. Dobzhansky (1951) referred very favorably to 
Schmalhausen’s (1949) views on what Waddington called canalization, and in 
Genetics of the Evolutionary Process (1970, the sequel to Genetics and the Origin 
of Species) referred repeatedly to Waddington’s and Schmalhausen’s concept of 
canalization. He described Waddington’s genetic assimilation experiments, noting 
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that Waddington did not interpret them in Lamarckian terms. One has the impres-
sion that the architects of the Synthesis were entirely open to admitting a role for 
development, but that no one stepped forward to join them as an advocate for 
development—especially experimental embryology.
Whatever the reasons may have been, development was not effectively assimi-
lated into the Evolutionary Synthesis, which lacked a theory of the origin of phe-
notypic variation, as many authors have noted. I do wonder what kind of theory of 
variation could have been derived from developmental biology in the 1940s, when 
even the physical basis of heredity, much less the mechanisms of development, 
was unknown. Developmental biologists had phenomenological descriptors, with 
names such as embryonic induction and prepattern (just as the comparative embry-
ologists had phenomenological descriptors such as heterochrony), but develop-
ment was a black box. Kirschner and Gerhart (2010, p. 276), who have suggested 
ingredients of a theory of variation, write that the “Modern Synthesis did not and 
could not incorporate any understanding of how the phenotype is generated.” 
Certainly, some evolutionary biologists were sensitive to this gap. Early steps 
toward our growing understanding of developmental mechanisms, especially the 
models of gene regulation by Jacob and Monod (1961) and Britten and Davidson 
(1971), informed King and Wilson’s (1975) interpretation of molecular differences 
between chimpanzee and human, and were featured in chapters on macroevolution 
in the textbooks by Dobzhansky et al. (1977) and Futuyma (1979).4 Since then, 
evolutionary developmental biology (EDB) has become (in my opinion) one of the 
most exciting dimensions of evolutionary biology. Mechanistic understanding of 
gene action, of regulatory circuits, of the conservation of elements in the “genetic 
toolkit,” and their association with different downstream genes are rapidly deepen-
ing our understanding of evolutionary changes in form (Carroll et al. 2005; 
Kirschner and Gerhart 2005; Stern 2011; Davidson 2011).
4.1  Structuralism: An Alternative to Variation and Selection?
Amundson (2005) places much of modern EDB in the structuralist tradition and 
contrasts the Synthetic (or “neo-Darwinian”) and structuralist concepts of what 
constitutes the process and “causes” of evolution. Neo-Darwinians, follow-
ing Dobzhansky (1937), define evolution as change of gene frequencies, and the 
4 As a graduate student, I recognized the gap between developmental biology and evolution, 
partly because my advisory committee included two “physiological geneticists” (as developmen-
tal geneticists were called then): Tahir Rizki (a Drosophila geneticist), who had been a student of 
Dobzhansky, and Morris Foster (a mouse geneticist), who had been one of Sewall Wright’s few 
students. Rizki and his students attempted to (verbally) model mechanisms of gene action, and 
Foster imparted the importance of Jacob and Monod’s work in his course. For some years after-
ward, it was easy to keep abreast of the little research at the interface. Two chapters in my 1979 
textbook prominently featured developmental aspects of evolution.
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causes of evolution are therefore the factors that change gene frequencies. For a 
s tructuralist concerned with the evolution of form (organisms’ bodies), evolution 
is change in form, which requires change in ontogenies, the mechanical processes 
by which form develops. For the adaptationist, says Amundson (2005, p. 255), 
“Individuals don’t evolve. Populations do. Populations evolve by natural selection,” 
whereas the structuralist maintains that “Individuals don’t evolve. Ontogenies do. 
Ontogenies evolve by modifications of ontogeny.”
The distinction, then, is between change in the frequency of alleles that affect 
a phenotype, and the material mechanisms by which the phenotype is formed 
and is altered—a contrast closely related to Mayr’s distinction between ultimate 
and proximal causes. But the distinction between explanation by gene frequency 
change versus mechanism is not limited to the evolution of ontogenies and form. 
I noted above (Sect. 1.1) that population genetic theory lacks mechanistic content. 
The mutations that produce genetic variation have no molecular specification; the 
trait affected by a mutation is not specified; selection is represented by coefficients 
that are mute with regard to the ecological or internal sources of selection. Much 
of evolutionary biology since the 1960s has consisted of applying the abstract 
theory to real biological systems. A large industry describes the molecular nature 
of the genes and mutations that affect traits of interest. An even larger industry 
attempts to identify the sources of selection on life history variables, physiological 
and biochemical traits, behaviors, and morphological features, often by describing 
how variation in a trait affects fitness via its interaction with specified environmen-
tal factors. Amundson (2005, p. 176) describes a “Causal Completeness Principle,” 
espoused by earlier authors, according to which understanding development is a 
requirement for understanding evolution. I suggest that understanding develop-
mental mechanisms is just one of the several components of a “causally complete” 
explanation of the evolution of form.
Practitioners and supporters of EDB are rightly enthusiastic for their subject. 
Some authors, however, make slightly hyperbolic claims for EDB’s revolutionary 
impact on evolutionary biology, either by claiming a power and prevalence of cer-
tain developmental mechanisms well beyond what current evidence supports, or by 
suggesting that some developmental phenomena can replace genetic variation and 
natural selection as explanations of the evolution of form. Müller (2010) speaks 
of a “shift from a predominantly statistical and correlational approach to a causal-
mechanistic approach.” We can and should applaud a union of these approaches 
(consider the enormous benefits that have flowed from the union of evolutionary 
and molecular biology!), but I see no need for a “shift,” if that implies lessening 
the role of the one in favor of the other in explaining evolution. Developmental 
mechanisms (which count among Mayr’s (1961) “proximate” explanations) and 
population-level processes such as selection (“ultimate” explanations) are, of 
course, complementary. I will take that position throughout the remainder of this 
essay, as well as the position that as important as speculative hypotheses are in this 
as in all fields; a skeptical demand for evidence is also essential.
A strain persists within developmental biology that seems to echo, even if faintly, 
the idealistic morphology of the nineteenth century that carried over into physicalist 
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or structuralist interpretations of development and evolution. On Growth and Form, 
by the anti-Darwinian Thompson (1917), was intended to show by mathemat-
ics that organisms conform to purely formal laws of growth and structure (Bowler 
1983, p. 157), such conformation proving (Thompson wrote) “that a comprehen-
sive ‘law of growth’ has pervaded the whole structure in its integrity, and that some 
more or less simple and recognizable system of forces has been in control”—by 
which Thompson presumably meant laws of mechanics. A more recent structuralist 
interpretation of development and evolution has been provided by Goodwin (e.g., 
1984), whose position is appealing to many developmental biologists. Like many 
other writers, he misinterpreted the “random variation” in neo-Darwinism (i.e., the 
Synthetic Theory) to imply that “survival is the only constraint,” approvingly cit-
ing pre-Darwinian rational morphologists who interpreted regularities, such as the 
segmented body plan of arthropods, as “basic structural constraints.” He rejected 
Darwin’s attribution of such similarities among organisms to heredity, and in a vig-
orous attack on the ability of genetics to explain similarity among organisms con-
cluded that “gene products affecting morphology are to be understood as stimuli 
which evoke particular categories of response from a structured, self-organizing 
process which has a limited repertoire of possible responses” (Goodwin 1984, p. 
227). The self-organizing processes are the consequences of developmental fields, 
spatial domains in which “every part has a state determined by neighbouring parts,” 
and which are capable of reconstituting themselves if perturbed. Goodwin illus-
trated his point with models (e.g., by Oster et al. 1980) that describe developmental 
events and resulting forms, such as gastrulation and invagination, in terms of the 
properties of cellular elements such as cytoskeletons. He granted that the “main 
source of the heritable differences between multicellular organisms” surely resides 
in DNA (p. 236), even though he maintained, a few pages before, that “there is no 
way of accounting in causal terms for observed differences of form in organisms by 
the identification of differences in hereditary factors” (p. 219).
I am baffled by the argument that, on the one hand, genes cannot explain com-
monality of form among related organisms, and on the other hand that they can 
explain differences—especially since vast amounts of evidence attest to the role 
of gene activity in the formation and maintenance of phenotypes, both within and 
among individual organisms. If mutations of genes cause differences, how is it 
possible that unchanged genes should not cause unchanged, shared properties, at 
least in part? But my principal criticism of Goodwin’s argument, as I wrote in a 
review of the book in which it appeared, is that “to provide physicochemical mod-
els of developmental events is not to replace genes and selection with a sufficient 
physicalist theory, as Goodwin believes: obviously the constituents of organisms 
obey physical laws, but these laws permit innumerable developmental patterns, of 
which only some are permissible under natural selection” (Futuyma 1984). We see 
the regularities of development monstrously violated by mutations and environ-
mental teratogens, and we see countless (but not all possible) variations of devel-
opment and form, even of such supposedly fundamental processes as gastrulation, 
that are attributable to the action of once-mutated genes that have at least been 
permitted, if not fixed, by natural selection.
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Physical and chemical processes are of course the proximal causes of develop-
ment, and models of these processes, by Goodwin, Oster et al. and others then and 
now, are immensely important. They complement not only evolutionary explana-
tions of phenotypes, but also the explanations of development, expressed in terms 
of gene regulatory pathways and networks (Davidson 2011), that form so much of 
current developmental biology and describe the genetic “algorithms” or instruc-
tions for building concrete features, but not the physical events by which the fea-
tures are built. Of course, physics sets constraints, but they are broad and do not 
provide a sufficient account of the origin and evolution of new phenotypes.
Some authors today may disagree with that statement. Perhaps the most 
thought-provoking structuralist interpretations of evolution today are provided by 
Müller (e.g., 2007, 2010) and Newman (e.g., 2010).
Newman’s approach, in the tradition of Turing’s (1952) and Murray’s (1981) 
physicochemical models of animal patterns, is to show in detail that various 
forms and patterns, both of unicellular and simple multicellular organisms, can 
arise from known properties of cells and proteins. Newman’s models are intrigu-
ing and may well be an important step toward understanding the mechanisms by 
which some phenotypes are produced. (I am not qualified to make that judgment.) 
But I have deep reservations about Newman’s interpretation of the evolutionary 
scenarios he portrays. For example, in discussing “organismal motifs” (com-
plex multicellular structures, as found in metazoans), he writes (Newman 2010, 
p. 283) that “the all but inevitable emergence, in this view, of organismal motifs 
that were not products of natural selection, but rather serves as its raw mate-
rial, raises questions concerning both the necessity and sufficiency of the mech-
anisms of the neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis for the origination of ancient 
multicellular forms” (my italics). The mechanisms (“dynamic patterning mod-
ules,” or DPMs) he describes include establishment of cell adhesion by cadher-
ins and C-type lectins like those found in choanoflagellates—but note that these 
must have evolved during the evolution of multicellularity, perhaps in concert 
with other molecules, since choanoflagellates are not multicellular. Cell clusters 
then took on different forms, says Newman, via differential adhesion owing to 
differences in levels of cadherins (resulting in multilayering), lateral inhibition of 
neighboring cells mediated by the Notch transduction pathway (enabling coexist-
ence of multiple cell types), cell polarity mediated by the Wnt gene family (ena-
bling lumen formation), and other such changes. From Newman’s description of 
these DPMs, they all appear to involve multigene pathways, or at least regulation 
of expression level. In other words, they are complex characters that (presum-
ably) did not exist as such in unicellular ancestors of metazoans (perhaps cho-
anoflagellates): They must have arisen during the origin of protometazoans with 
multiple cell layers, lumens, etc., based partly on gene products in unicellular 
ancestors. But these gene products required modification if they were to interact 
in the way the components of the known DPMs do, on which Newman bases his 
scenario. The only known process by which such modifications can form com-




Likewise, I am skeptical of Newman’s proposition that new forms emerged 
abruptly, almost saltationally, and that “since the resulting pattern or form would 
potentially self-organize in a significant portion of the founding population, 
there would be no question of a single, isolated individual” (p. 293) establishing 
a new lineage (one of the criticisms of Goldschmidt’s hopeful monsters). A new 
form might be induced by an environment in many individuals (as in one of the 
Newman’s scenarios), but without genetic specification of the critical components, 
it will persist only as long as the inducing conditions—unless “genotypes associ-
ated with increased reliability of developmental outcome” are selected, “leading to 
what has been termed genetic assimilation or accommodation” (p. 298). Thus, in 
addition to what I view as implausible origin of a morphology without the aid of 
genetic variation and selection, Newman must invoke another quite controversial 
hypothesis, genetic assimilation (which I treat in the next section). At some point, 
the concatenation of questionable scenarios or hypotheses should be resisted until 
sufficient evidence is brought to bear on them.
Müller (2007, 2010) sounds many of the same themes as Newman, mostly in 
the context of the more familiar realm of the development and evolution of major 
multicellular clades (specifically, animals). In a thoughtful review (Müller 2007) 
of EDB, or “evo-devo” in his paper), he analyzes the field’s major research pro-
grams, themes, and theoretical implications such as evolvability and organiza-
tion, which includes features such as modularity. I agree with him that, in contrast 
to the theory of how genetic variation affects population dynamics (i.e., natural 
selection), evo-devo “does not invalidate the formal framework of the Modern 
Synthesis, but adds another level of explanation. The reach of evolutionary theory 
is expanded in that evo-devo accounts not for what kinds of variation are going to 
be maintained through natural selection, but also what kinds of variation can pos-
sibly arise from specific developmental systems” (p. 947). But the evo-devo that I 
think makes the greatest contribution to understanding evolution is not the one that 
“assigns much of the explanatory weight to the generative properties of develop-
ment, with natural selection providing the boundary condition” (p. 947), nor the 
one that “posits that the causal basis for phenotypic form resides not in popula-
tion dynamics or, for that matter, in molecular evolution, but instead in the inher-
ent properties of evolving developmental systems” (p. 948). Like Newman, Müller 
gives lip service to the complementarity of the ST and developmental mechanism, 
but in effect treats them as alternative explanations.
Müller (2010) provides more concrete examples of his views in his treatment 
of morphological evolutionary novelties, in which he distinguishes “Type III” nov-
elties, which are major changes of existing characters (e.g., tusks that are modi-
fied teeth), from “Type II” innovations, which are “new constructional elements 
that do not have a homologous counterpart in the ancestral species or in the same 
organism.” (The latter provision excludes serially homologous structures; thus, 
the paired mouthparts of crustaceans are not novelties because their ancestor 
had paired biramous locomotory appendages.) Examples of Type II innovations 
include the carapace of turtles and the patella (knee bone) of mammals. Müller 
describes developmental mechanisms which, when modeled, produce changes in 
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skeletal patterns as an “emergent consequence of activation-inhibition thresholds in 
 geometrically confined spaces,” illustrated by the loss of digits in salamanders and 
lizards. In his view, such evolutionary changes represent threshold responses to per-
turbations of “developmental systems that are characterized by cellular self-organi-
zation, feedback regulation, and environment dependence” (p. 322). Environmental 
induction, he says, is a realistic initiating trigger of innovations, via phenotypic 
plasticity, that are eventually genetically consolidated (or assimilated, or accom-
modated). Thus, “genetic evolution, while facilitating innovation, serves a consoli-
dating role rather than a generative one, capturing and routinizing morphogenetic 
templates” (p. 323).
Again, I view this position as an unnecessary concatenation of speculations. I 
do not understand, for example, why so complex and unsupported a hypothesis is 
needed to explain the origin of the patella, which arises by osteogenesis in a phy-
logenetically novel location in the body. Selection of mutations in gene regulation 
is an alternative, simpler hypothesis. There is plenty of evidence that changes in 
gene regulation trigger the expression of entire developmental pathways at differ-
ent times in ontogeny (resulting in heterochrony) or at different locations in the 
developing body (resulting in heterotopy; Baum and Donoghue 2010). Müller 
grants that genetic and cellular innovations permitted the formation of such novel 
mineralized tissues, “but the question of phenotypic novelty is why and how these 
processes were initiated in specific patterns and at specific locations of the verte-
brate body” (p. 313). He does not entertain the hypothesis that mutant heterotopic 
expression of bone may have occurred a great many times, in various body loca-
tions, in diverse vertebrates, and that only those few mutant expression patterns 
that provided a selective advantage have been retained. The patella is one of many 
heterotopic bones (cf. the osteoderms of crocodiles, armadillos, and others) that 
have clear selective value. We must bear in mind, also, that the “inherent proper-
ties” of the developmental system themselves can evolve. It has long been known 
that variation in threshold traits, which display discrete or quasi-discrete states, 
usually has a polygenic basis, that the position of the threshold can evolve, and 
that the steepness of transition between states can change under artificial selection. 
(E.g., Suzuki and Nijhout 2006; Chevin and Lande 2013 provide a review and a 
model of the evolution of threshold characters from continuous variation). If a 
simpler hypothesis of genetic variation and natural selection can explain the obser-
vation, especially in view of abundant evidence for that hypothesis, those who pro-
pose more complex (and more vague) hypotheses should expect to be asked for 
evidence.
4.2  Genetic Assimilation and Accommodation
Perhaps no developmental theme has had as long an uncomfortable relationship to 
evolutionary theory as phenotypic plasticity. If defined as “the property of a given 
genotype to produce different phenotypes in response to distinct environmental 
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conditions” (Pigliucci 2001, p. 1), plasticity can be either adaptive or nonadaptive 
(as illustrated by malformations and stunted growth if individuals are deprived of 
key nutrients during growth). The array of phenotypes that a genotype produces is 
the genotype’s norm of reaction. Nobody denies the abundance of adaptive plas-
tic responses (ranging from learning to the different adult morphologies of many 
organisms that are triggered by environmental stimuli during development); nor 
does anyone deny that the mean reaction norm can evolve, based on genetic vari-
ation in reaction norms. [That is, different genotypes display different reactions to 
an environmental stimulus or condition, a property called G × E (genotype × envi-
ronment) interaction.] Under some conditions (such as constant stabilizing selec-
tion for a single phenotype), “canalization” may occur: the evolution of a phenotype 
that is relatively unaffected by environmental (and perhaps also genetic) perturba-
tions. Canalization can sometimes break down in organisms that experience a novel, 
stressful environment, revealing “cryptic” genetic variation. For instance, body size 
of marine threespine sticklebacks (Gasterosteus aculeatus) increased dramatically 
when fishes were reared in freshwater, to which many stickleback populations have 
become adapted (Mc Guigan et al. 2010). The environment, then, may be said not 
only to exert selection, but also to amplify the variation on which selection can act.
Phenotypic plasticity may affect evolution in a variety of ways (Ghalambor 
et al. 2007; Wund 2012). For example, many authors have suggested that the 
expression of a modified phenotype in a newly encountered environment may help 
populations persist until natural selection improves adaptation to the environment 
(see Lande 2009). The time-honored idea (e.g., Mayr 1960) that animals’ behavior 
may initiate a shift in ecological niche, leading to morphological and physiological 
adaptation, provides an important potential role for behavioral plasticity. Aubret 
et al. (2007) found that young tiger snakes (Notechis scutatus), a terrestrial spe-
cies, could swim faster if reared for 5 months in water than on a solid surface, and 
they suggested that this plastic response may have facilitated the evolution of fully 
aquatic snakes, such as sea snakes. Aside from the fairly considerable phyloge-
netic distance between these taxa, we might ask whether the snakes (like human 
athletes) might have been trained to become more proficient at any physically pos-
sible task to which they might have been set. More studies on the possibility that 
behavioral plasticity initiates evolutionary change would be desirable.
I am not concerned not with the entire theme of the importance of phenotypic 
plasticity for evolution, but rather with a single controversial issue: the extent to 
which a phenotypically plastic response to an environmental stimulus becomes 
genetically entrained, such that the phenotype develops even in the absence of 
the stimulus. This is the thrust of several closely related ideas, of which Simpson 
(1953a, p. 110) wrote “Characters individually acquired by members of a group 
of organisms may eventually, under the influence of selection, be reinforced or 
replaced by similar hereditary characters. That is the essence of the evolutionary 
phenomenon here called ‘the Baldwin effect’.” Simpson noted that this idea had 
been independently proposed by Baldwin (in 1896), Lloyd Morgan, H.F. Osborn, 
and Soviet geneticists whose ideas were promulgated by Schmalhausen (1949). 
Waddington (1953) introduced “genetic assimilation” to describe the genetic 
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fixation, due to selection, of part of an originally broad reaction norm, a character 
state that initially required an environmental stimulus. In the most comprehensive 
treatment of this theme, West-Eberhard (2003) wrote that Baldwin’s hypothesis 
allowed for a broader range of outcomes than Waddington’s, and she introduced 
“genetic accommodation” to mean a variety of genetic changes, caused by selec-
tion on genetic variation, in the “regulation, form, or side effects of the novel trait” 
(p. 140). But the common controversial element in the Baldwin effect, genetic 
assimilation, and genetic accommodation is precisely what Simpson identified as 
“the essence” of the Baldwin effect: the evolution from an environmentally trig-
gered individual developmental response to a similar, genetically determined phe-
notype. I will refer to this specific aspect of the evolution of reaction norms as 
genetic assimilation.
Simpson (1953a) noted that the postulated process has three elements: (1) 
Owing to interaction with the environment, at least some individuals develop a 
nonhereditary character state that is advantageous. (2) The population includes 
“genetic factors” that produce the same kind of individual modifications (or, as 
we would say today, affect the reaction norm so as to make the phenotype more 
likely to develop, independent of environment). (3) These genetic factors (alleles) 
are favored by natural selection, increase, and make the character state more 
hereditary. Simpson wrote (p. 113) that each of these processes, viewed individu-
ally, does occur and that all may well occur together. Thus, the Baldwin effect may 
well occur. “Nevertheless two points remain decidedly questionable: whether the 
Baldwin effect does in fact explain particular instances of evolutionary change, 
and the extent to which this effect has been involved in evolution or can explain 
the general phenomenon of adaptation.”
By whatever name, genetic assimilation is not a Lamarckian hypothesis, and it 
is fully compatible with the ST (cf. Lande 2009). After the 1950s, and until very 
recently, genetic assimilation was the subject of little research and was largely 
viewed as a “baroque hypothesis” (Orr 1999) that received little attention in most 
textbooks.5 Recently, however, it has become a focus of intense interest. (For over-
views, see West-Eberhard 2003; Price et al. 2003; Ghalambor et al. 2007; Pfennig 
et al. 2010; Schwander and Leimar 2011; Moczek et al. 2011; Moczek 2012; 
Wund 2012.) Genetic assimilation is now very popular with many evolutionary 
developmental biologists (e.g., Schlichting and Pigliucci 1998; Gilbert and Epel 
2009; also authors in Pigliucci and Müller 2010) and is viewed by some as a major 
extension of, if not replacement for, the Synthetic Theory. The controversy is epit-
omized (and perhaps partly sparked) by West-Eberhard’s (2003) provocative pro-
posal that “most phenotypic evolution begins with environmentally initiated 
phenotypic change… The leading event is a phenotypic change with particular, 
sometimes extensive, effects on development. Gene-frequency change follows, as 
5 For example, genetic assimilation is not mentioned in Dobzhansky’s Genetics of the 
Evolutionary Process (1970) or in textbooks by Dobzhansky et al. (1977), Freeman and Herron 
(2001), or Barton et al. (2007). I treated the topic sparingly, in the context of canalization, in all 
the editions of my textbook.
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a response to the developmental change. In this framework, most adaptive evolu-
tion is accommodation of developmental-phenotypic change. Genes are followers, 
not necessarily leaders, in phenotypic evolution” (pp. 157–158).
This proposition is frequently associated with the idea that expression of phe-
notypic plasticity can help populations persist in a new environment until adapta-
tion evolves by genetic change. That is not controversial, but it is not quite the 
same as genetic assimilation (or accommodation) of an environmentally induced 
character state. After all, two different characters might be involved: Animals 
exposed to unusually high temperature might react via behavioral flexibility, 
by staying in shady microsites, while natural selection enhances thermal toler-
ance over the course of generations. I am concerned here only with the question 
of genetic assimilation: whether or not genes are usually “followers” rather than 
“leaders” in adaptive evolution. There is abundant evidence that reaction norms 
evolve, that phenotypic plasticity and canalization can be shaped by natural selec-
tion, and that genetic assimilation is possible: It has been demonstrated in artifi-
cial selection experiments (e.g., Waddington 1953; Suzuki and Nijhout 2006). The 
major questions today include Simpson’s queries, still unanswered, on whether or 
not it explains particular instances of evolution and whether it accounts, as West-
Eberhard proposed, for “the general phenomenon of adaptation.” To address these 
issues, we should ask how a history of genetic assimilation might be detected and 
demonstrated and how adequate the evidence is at this time.
West-Eberhard (2003) supported her thesis by describing numerous interesting 
examples of closely related species or populations that differ in plasticity of one or 
more traits: Commonly, one species exhibits different adaptive phenotypes under 
different conditions, and another exhibits a relatively fixed, nonplastic phenotype. 
However, such examples show only that reaction norms can evolve, which is not 
disputed. They do not show that genes follow plasticity; on the face of it, plasticity 
might be the derived trait. What is needed, at the least, is evidence of the direction 
of change (Moczek et al. 2011): Is plasticity the ancestral condition and genetic 
fixity the derived state? West-Eberhard’s treatment provides little evidence on this 
point. Evidence on polarity of change is best sought when rapid, recent evolution 
has been observed or can confidently be reconstructed, or by robust phylogenetic 
inference (Schwander and Leimar 2011). Only recently has any such evidence 
been amassed.
One can envision at least three scenarios for genetic assimilation. These are not 
sharply demarcated.
1. A population with an adaptively plastic trait that experiences a variety of envi-
ronments becomes subjected to a new selective regime, owing to constant 
exposure to one of the formerly experienced environmental states. Stabilizing 
selection now favors one of the previously expressed phenotypic states, result-
ing in abbreviation, narrowing, of the formerly broad reaction norm. Plasticity, 
the capacity to produce different phenotypes if exposed to environments that 
the population no longer experiences, may be lost if it is costly (DeWitt et al. 
1998; Snell-Rood et al. 2010), or perhaps, if the population inhabits a constant 
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environment (Moran 1992; Masel et al. 2007), by mutation and genetic drift 
that erode the genetic capacity to produce alternative phenotypes. Thus, the 
phenotype has been canalized around one of the states the ancestral population 
could express.
2. The population has an adaptively plastic trait and is exposed to a new constant 
environment in which a quantitatively, but not qualitatively, different adap-
tive phenotype outside the previous range of observed variation is induced 
by an environmental stimulus that is simply an extension of, or is similar to, 
one of the environmental states that selected for plasticity in the ancestor. The 
expression of this phenotype is later canalized. For example, if the ancestral 
population had been selected to develop larger size when exposed to lower 
temperature, the “novel phenotype” might be a still larger size, triggered by an 
unprecedentedly low temperature or perhaps a novel stimulus. In this case, the 
novel character state arose by plasticity and the genetic change followed, but 
the plastic response is an “exaptation,” a manifestation of an adaptive reaction 
norm that had been forged in the past, presumably by selection among geno-
types with different reaction norms.
3. The population experiences a qualitatively novel environment that induces a 
novel phenotypic character state that happens to be advantageous. One pos-
sibility is that the new optimal character state is, or is close to, the extension 
of the ancestral reaction norm, which proves to be “preadaptive” even though 
the novel environment is not an extension of the range of environmental states 
the ancestral population experienced. As Ghalambor et al. (2007) have empha-
sized, however, the ancestral plasticity might well be maladaptive in a new 
environment: The extended reaction norm might be very different from the new 
optimum. In this case, plasticity, instead of facilitating adaptation to the new 
environment, would retard it. Such cases are not uncommon. For example, pop-
ulations of humans and other vertebrates native to low elevations undergo sev-
eral maladaptive acclimatization responses to low oxygen availability at high 
altitude, such as increased hematocrit and decreased affinity of hemoglobin for 
O2, in opposition to the genetic adaptations seen in adapted highland popula-
tions (Storz et al. 2010).
I consider scenarios 1 and 2 to fit well within the standard Synthetic Theory. 
In neither case have genes been “followers,” and for both cases represent simple 
modifications—abbreviation or extension—of a reaction norm that had already 
evolved (according to the Synthetic Theory) by selection of alleles that moved the 
developmental reaction closer to the optimum for an array of environments expe-
rienced by the ancestral population. The claim that genes are “followers” would 
receive strongest support if scenario 3 proves to be common, i.e., when a fortui-
tously advantageous expression of phenotype is induced in an ancestral population 
by a novel environment.
The number of empirical studies in which the polarity of change is known or 
can be inferred with reasonable confidence is too small to establish any generaliza-
tions about how common these several scenarios have been realized. I suspect that 
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environmental induction of novel characters that are not manifestations of adap-
tive ancestral reaction norms (scenario 3) is likely to be rare (see also Schwander 
and Leimar 2011). Nevertheless, a few convincing cases have been described. In 
one of the clearer examples, Lédon-Rettig et al. (2010) showed that a short larval 
gut, a feature of the carnivorous morph of the spadefoot Spea multiplicata, can be 
induced by an animal diet in a related genus, Scaphiopus, which has the ancestral 
detritivorous habit. Freshwater populations of the stickleback Gasterosteus acu-
leatus have evolved from a marine ancestor and have evolved novel limnetic and 
benthic-feeding morphologies. Some of their features (body shape and gill raker 
length) were induced in experimental marine sticklebacks that were reared under 
conditions of diet and environmental configuration that resembled aspects of those 
under which the freshwater populations have evolved (Wund et al. 2012).
Some other cases are more difficult to interpret. Aubret et al. (2004) found 
that an island population of the tiger snake (Notechis scutatus), which feeds on 
larger prey than mainland populations, has a larger head. This is attributable both 
to a genetic difference and to greater phenotypic plasticity: Young snakes develop 
larger heads if fed larger prey. The reaction norm of the mainland population, pre-
sumably representing the ancestral state, displays similar, but less pronounced, 
plasticity. This may indicate that natural selection, based on success in prey cap-
ture, has shaped adaptive plasticity in the past and that selection in the island pop-
ulation has acted on genetic variation in the reaction norm.
A number of cases illustrate less ambiguously the genetic assimilation of an 
adaptive ancestral reaction norm (scenario 1). For example, some montane popu-
lations of Daphnia melanica that inhabit lakes to which fish have recently been 
introduced have lost the ability to develop pigmentation, a shield against ultra-
violet radiation that also makes the animal more conspicuous to visual predators 
(Scoville and Pfrender 2010). Genetic assimilation has occurred, by abbreviating 
an adaptive ancestral norm of reaction. Similarly, there are many cases in which 
species with discrete alternative phenotypes, either genetic polymorphism or devel-
opmental polyphenism, have given rise to descendants with a single phenotype 
(Schwander and Leimar 2011). Since that state implies genetic fixity, the deriva-
tion of a monophenic form from a polyphenic ancestor can be considered genetic 
assimilation. Examples include loss of one of the alternative male mating strategies 
in insects, of the ability to develop a carnivorous phenotype in some populations of 
a spadefoot toad (Spea), and of polyphenism for wing development in some popu-
lations of a water strider (Aquarius remigis), as well as the transition from random 
bilateral asymmetry to consistent “left-handed” or “right-handed” phenotypes. 
Except for asymmetry, the ancestral polyphenisms are thought to represent adap-
tive plasticity, presumably the product of natural selection, and the evolutionary 
change illustrates my “scenario 1,” narrowing of an adaptive reaction norm.
Considerably, more research, on a range of taxa and characters, will be needed 
before we can judge whether or not plasticity often “leads” adaptation. Most of 
the literature to date represents a biased sample of characters, viz., those in which 
a role for plasticity might be suspected from the outset. It will be illuminating to 
determine whether plasticity has any detectable role at all for sets of randomly 
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selected differences among closely related species. I expect that among those 
cases in which a history of plasticity can be shown, the great majority will be 
interpretable as modifications of an adaptive reaction norm that had evolved in an 
ancestor by the action of natural selection on genetic variation (my scenarios 1 and 
2). They will be interesting and important to document, but they will not represent 
a significant departure from the Synthetic Theory.
4.3  Nongenetic Inheritance
Most of evolutionary theory, during and since the Evolutionary Synthesis, has 
been framed in terms of inheritance based on variation that (as known since 1953) 
resides in DNA sequence. It has long been known, however, that there exist other 
forms of inheritance (Bonduriansky 2012). The cortical structure in ciliates, for 
example, is transmitted in cell division and grows by building onto the template 
provided by inherited cortex. Cultural characteristics such as language and wealth 
are nongenetically inherited. Cultural inheritance can be viewed as an example 
of inheritance of environmentally caused variation. Jablonka and Lamb (2010, p. 
137) use Mayr’s (1982) term “soft inheritance” to include several processes by 
which “variations that are the result of environmental effects are transmitted to the 
next generation.” Some authors (e.g., Koonin and Wolf 2009) have enthusiastically 
welcomed certain of these processes as a return of Lamarckism; the most enthu-
siastic and prolific such advocacy has been by Jablonka and Lamb (e.g., 1995, 
2005). I will comment on only one of these processes, transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance.
Waddington (1957) introduced the term “epigenetic” to refer to the develop-
mental processes by which genotypes become expressed as phenotypes. Today, 
it usually refers to “a mitotically and/or meiotically heritable change in gene 
function that cannot be explained by changes in DNA sequence” (Gilbert 2006, 
p. 118). Some of the huge body of research on epigenesis concerns transgenera-
tional inheritance, via meiosis. The most frequently cited molecular mechanism of 
genomic “imprinting” is methylation of certain cytosine residues, which generally 
silences the gene. The methylated state persists and is replicated in mitosis; it is 
usually erased in the germ line or during embryogenesis, but not always—in which 
case, there is transgenerational inheritance. Methylation and other epigenetic 
“marking” of genes is often induced by specific environmental stimuli, and often 
enhances fitness within that environmental context (Bossdorf et al. 2008). For 
example, the production of some chemical defenses in plants, which are induced 
by damage by herbivores or pathogens, may be epigenetically inherited (Holeski 
et al. 2012). It is this inheritance of a potentially adaptive phenotype by a process 
other than mutation of DNA sequence that stimulates Lamarckian interpretations.
Clearly, epigenesis and epigenetic inheritance are important biological phe-
nomena that have evolutionary implications. But it is necessary to ask whether or 
not transgenerational epigenetic inheritance fits into or departs from the Synthetic 
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Theory, whether it represents a true vindication of Lamarckism, and whether, and 
in what ways, it may be important in evolution.
Many phenomena that were not explicitly considered during the formation 
and early elaboration of the ST (referring here to both mathematical population 
genetic theory and the verbal theory that extended from population genetics to 
macroevolution) subsequently found a place in it quite comfortably. For example, 
maternal effects based on offspring effects of maternal genotype were modeled by 
fairly simple elaborations of traditional population genetic theory (e.g., Wade and 
Beeman 1994; Wolf et al. 1999), as were the evolutionary dynamics of transpos-
able elements (e.g., Charlesworth and Langley 1989). The Synthetic Theory, for-
mulated before Watson and Crick published on DNA, did not specify the nature 
of mutations. Thus, the population dynamics of epigenetic mutations (“epimuta-
tions”) can be described in the same terms as sequence mutations (Haig 2007; 
Slatkin 2009). Population genetic models of epigenetic inheritance and its interac-
tion with genetic inheritance have shown some of its most interesting theoretical 
effects (Day and Bonduriansky 2011). As befits a hitherto unknown biological pro-
cess, some potential effects were not envisioned by Fisher, Wright, or Haldane, but 
neither were many other evolutionary dynamics described by population geneti-
cists since then.
The big question is whether transgenerational epigenetic inheritance is 
Lamarckian. The key feature of Lamarckism is the production, from within the 
organism (in response to some stimulus), of inherited variation that is biased, 
directed, toward an adaptive end. In an incisive analysis, Haig (2007), a lead-
ing researcher on evolutionary effects of epigenetics, argues that transgen-
erational epigenetic inheritance is not Lamarckian, even when the phenotypes 
expressed enhanced fitness in the environmental context that induces them. 
Epigenetic inheritance characterizes few genes. Therefore, some feature of the 
marked gene must distinguish it from others, and make it susceptible to an epi-
genetic mark that resists erasure in the germ line. Moreover, there is consider-
able evidence of genetic variation in the propensity of a gene to be methylated or 
otherwise marked (Dickins and Rahman 2012). Genetic variants that act as mal-
adaptive developmental switches will be eliminated by purifying natural selec-
tion, whereas variants that enhance fitness will be perpetuated by selection. The 
simplest interpretation, then, of environmental induction of fitness-enhancing 
inherited epigenetic switches is that they are adaptations honed by the action of 
natural selection on genetic variation, just like adaptive, phenotypically plastic 
reaction norms. As Dickins and Rahman (2012) remark in their critique of the 
evolutionary role of soft inheritance, epigenetic systems are phenotypes, subject 
to the standard evolutionary processes of mutation, natural selection, and genetic 
drift. Haig notes that adaptive directedness, or “intentionality,” cannot be intrin-
sic to the epigenetic process: It must arise by some other process, and the only 
known candidate process is the “neo-Darwinian” action of natural selection on 
adaptively undirected variation that is the centerpiece of the Synthetic Theory. 
What we should like to have, then, is data on phenotypic effects of a large sample 
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of novel epigenetic mutations, similar to the extensive data on de novo genetic 
mutations, that respond to environmental stimuli in species that have not experi-
enced those or similar environments in their evolutionary history. The prediction 
is that they will show no overall tendency to be directed toward fitness-enhancing 
phenotypes.
Is epigenetic inheritance important in evolution? Almost surely it is, but 
importance can mean many things. In their population genetic models, Day 
and Bonduriansky (2011, also Bonduriansky and Day 2009) find a variety of 
ways in which epigenetic inheritance can affect the dynamics of gene frequency 
change; for instance, it can change the adaptive landscape, resulting in evo-
lution toward a different genetic equilibrium. What is far from certain is that 
inherited epigenetic variation is the source of long-lasting adaptive phenotypes. 
Inheritance of epigenetic effects is frequently observed to persist for two or 
three generations; the highest figure I have encountered (in my limited reading) 
is nine generations. One of the most famous examples of an epigenetic pheno-
type is the “peloria” form of Linaria vulgaris, in which the normally bilaterally 
symmetrical flower is radially symmetrical (the phylogenetically ancestral con-
dition) instead. This form was named by Linnaeus, and it can be found today, 
but there is no evidence at all that there has been unbroken descent from the 
mid-eighteenth century to the present time (a point that Jablonka and Lamb 
2010 do not make in describing this example). The marked state of a gene is 
generally highly unstable, so the low fidelity of transmission will reduce the 
precision of adaptation (Haig 2007) and make it unlikely that an epigenetic phe-
notype will be fixed in a population and persist for any appreciable period of 
evolutionary time.
Instances of fitness-enhancing inherited epigenotypes appear to represent 
adaptations, not the source of adaptations. (As Dickins and Rahman 2012 remark, 
Jablonka and Lamb conflate proximate and ultimate causes of phenotypes.) But 
the adaptive epigenetic phenotype seems seldom to be stable enough to charac-
terize an entire population. Future research might reveal, but so far I know of 
no evidence, that epigenetic differences distinguish different species or differ-
ent populations of a single species. Despite the paucity or lack of even modest 
examples of epigenesis as a source of adaptation, Jablonka and Lamb (e.g., 2010) 
speculate at length about how this “Lamarckian” mechanism will account for 
adaptation (“genetic change is not necessary”), how it may accelerate adaptive 
evolution by enhancing the effectiveness of genetic assimilation, how incompat-
ible chromatin marks may lower the fitness of hybrids and contribute to repro-
ductive isolation, and how it may “play a key role in many macroevolutionary 
changes,” especially if hybridization and polyploidization are accompanied by 
bursts of epigenomic variation. The claim about adaptation is, I believe, flatly 
wrong. The other speculations are interesting and enjoyable to read, but it would 
be good to bear in mind that they are so speculative, so removed from evidence, 




4.4  Evolutionary Developmental Biology  
and Evolutionary Theory
Many evolutionary biologists react with skepticism, or outright dismissal, to great 
speculative leaps about the likelihood that developmental mechanisms will replace 
traditional explanations of macroevolution. Probably most evolutionary biologists 
strongly disagree with the aversion to genetics some evolutionary developmental 
biologists evince, and especially with their tendency to proclaim that internal pow-
ers of organisms steer their evolutionary fate—a seeming echo of the decades of 
widespread, deep, almost emotional aversion to Darwin’s theory of natural selec-
tion on undirected variation. Some evolutionary biologists, especially population 
geneticists, are inclined to dismiss EDB altogether. But that would be a great mis-
take, I believe, for the argument that evolutionary theory lacks but needs a theory 
of the origin of phenotypic variation is convincing—even obvious. As I indicated 
in the historical background with which this essay begins, most biologists since 
Darwin, including the architects of the Evolutionary Synthesis, recognized that not 
all conceivable variations are possible, and that taxon-specific biases or constraints 
must affect the likely paths of evolution. Subsequently, many population geneti-
cists and other evolutionary biologists came closer to Gould (2002) portrayal of 
the Synthetic Theory: that it assumed that variation is always small in extent of 
change, copious in amount, and isotropic in direction. Given the evidence that 
new variation is limited rather than isotropic, evolutionary biology will clearly be 
enriched by a theory, founded in mechanistic molecular, cell, and developmental 
biology, of variation and how it can be shaped by natural selection into diverse, 
sometimes novel phenotypes.
Such a theory is under construction, with firm foundations in mechanistic biol-
ogy, population genetic theory, and perhaps systems theory. Much of it stems from 
the discovery of phylogenetically conserved genes, chiefly regulatory genes, such 
as the Distalless gene, which initiates development of evaginations that form legs 
and other appendages in a wide range of animal phyla. These genes have often 
been recruited or co-opted to govern other pathways. For example, the ante-
rior–posterior axis of all bilaterian animals is patterned by Hox genes that were 
recruited, much later, to pattern the proximal–distal pattern of tetrapod limbs. 
Animal phyla share a “genetic toolkit” of such deeply conserved genes and path-
ways, as Carroll and collaborators (2005), True and Carroll (2002) have called it. 
The remodeling of ancestral features and the origin of new ones may therefore be 
easier than traditionally thought, if existing genetic and developmental pathways 
can be expressed at different times or in conjunction with other such pathways.
A similar theme has been advanced by Kirschner and Gerhart (2005, 2010) 
in their theory of “facilitated variation,” expressed more in terms of cellular and 
developmental processes than of genes. Phylogenetically “conserved core pro-
cesses,” such as the formation of the actin-based cytoskeleton, are “the basic 
machinery” of multicellular organisms that can be expressed, by virtue of gene reg-
ulation, in diverse contexts and in various combinations. They can “deconstrain” 
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evolution and increase “evolvability” (the “capacity to generate heritable, selectable 
phenotypic variation”) partly because they consist of a set of elements that are 
expressed as a functional unit (that was assembled by past genetic variation and 
selection) and need not be separately evolved anew. Other features that enhance 
evolvability include compartmentation (expression only in certain parts of the 
developing organism) and exploration. For instance, an evolutionary change in the 
length of a femur entrains changes in muscles, nerves, and blood vessels, all of 
which grow and proliferate in diverse directions, but persist and differentiate only 
in proper relation to the bone; evolving a longer leg does not require independ-
ent genetic change in all these components. These developmental and cellular pro-
cesses may well be adaptations, formed by an ancient history of genetic variation 
and selection, but they make subsequent phenotypic evolution easier than it might 
otherwise be. The roles of developmental processes that Kirschner and Gerhart 
propose do not go beyond the empirical evidence; as they note, advances in under-
standing the mechanisms by which phenotypes are formed “have not undermined 
the previous achievements of evolutionary theory” (p. 276).
Evolvability has also been explored by Riedl (1978) and by Günter Wagner 
and colleagues, who approach the topic via population genetic and quantitative 
genetic models and data (e.g., Wagner 2010; Wagner et al. 2007; Pavlicev and 
Wagner 2012). They have aimed at developing a theory of the evolution of the 
mapping between genotype and phenotype via development. For example, pleiot-
ropy will tend to reduce evolvability (the potential of a population to evolve under 
natural selection) if it affects functionally unrelated characters, for a mutation that 
improves the function of one character is likely to damage the function of another, 
leading to antagonistic effects on fitness. On the other hand, pleiotropic effects 
on functionally related features may be more likely to have advantageously corre-
lated effects. Population genetic models show that evolvability can evolve, in that 
patterns of pleiotropy can be shaped by natural selection. For example, modifier 
mutations can be selected that reduce the harmful effect of another antagonisti-
cally pleiotropic locus on one of the affected characters, and effectively reduce 
or eliminate the pleiotropic correlation between the characters, thus changing 
the genotype–phenotype map (Pavlicev and Wagner 2012). Consequently, mod-
ularity, similar in concept to Kirschner and Gerhart’s compartmentation, can be 
expected to evolve: Pleiotropy will be more frequent among functionally related 
characters or measurements than among unrelated ones. Pleiotropy is a major 
cause of genetic correlations among characters, which are estimated by the meth-
ods of quantitative genetics (Pavlicev and Wagner 2012). Studies of both genetic 
and phenotypic correlations in a variety of species have supported the theoreti-
cal expectation. For example, genetic correlations among various measurements 
of the mandible of mice decompose the structure into two modules, correspond-
ing to the tooth-bearing part and the ascending ramus to which muscles attach. 
Correlations between corresponding bones of the forelimb and hindlimb are lower 
in humans (in which very different functions evolved relatively recently) than in 
other apes (in which some similarity of function, i.e., climbing, is retained). In 
this and many other instances, quantitative genetics can sketch the developmental 
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map; identifying the genes and the developmental processes to which they 
 contribute can follow.
Wagner’s theoretical approach, then, explores the far reaches of the relation-
ship between development and evolution. Not only can we look forward to learn-
ing the developmental basis of the evolution of modified and novel characters, and 
how developmental processes can facilitate, bias, or constrain evolution; we may 
look forward to understanding how natural selection has shaped the structure of 
the developmental processes themselves.
5  Accounting for Diversity
I will use “diversity” to mean number of taxa (often species) and “disparity” to 
mean some measure of the variety of different phenotypes among the members of 
a clade. A large literature is concerned with accounting for differences in diversity 
(and with disparity to a much lesser extent) among geological time periods, among 
geographic regions, and among clades. Numbers of species change by speciation 
(by which I mean the evolution of reproductive isolation between populations) 
and extinction. Changes in species diversity are often analogized with population 
growth, so differences in diversity may be attributed to differences in available 
time (e.g., since a region became habitable, or since the origin of a clade), in rates 
of increase (speciation rate minus extinction rate), or in limiting or damping fac-
tors (e.g., interspecific competition). Rates need not be constant, of course: A mass 
extinction caused by a bolide impact is a great increase in extinction rate.
The field of evolutionary ecology includes extensive theory and evidence bear-
ing on topics, such as the evolution of interactions among species, that bear on 
the processes that influence diversity. However, much of the theory and other dis-
course on diversity dynamics and differences use species as units of evolution, and 
does not explicitly include evolutionary (or ecological) processes within species. 
This includes most of ecological theory, which addresses conditions for coexist-
ence at the level of regional assemblages, taking into account competition and 
interactions between trophic levels. To the traditional equilibrium theory of eco-
logical diversity, which emphasized the importance of resource partitioning, indi-
rect competition, and predator–prey dynamics, has been added a neutral theory, 
based on rates of speciation and extinction of ecologically equivalent species 
(Hubbell 2001). Such ecological models, in which species are the units, have been 
paralleled in paleobiology, in which changes in diversity have been compared with 
“random clades” (Raup et al. 1973) and have been explored with species-level 
analogs of competition between species (Sepkoski 1996). Some paleobiologists 
have reported that rates of change in the diversity of fossilized taxa are nega-
tively related to diversity (Foote 2010), mirroring long-standing observations of 
rapid evolutionary radiations on islands and rapid increases in diversity after mass 
extinction events: circumstances in which competition is thought to have been 
alleviated. An important contribution of paleobiologists in the 1970s (Eldredge 
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and Gould 1972; Stanley 1975) was to draw attention to species  selection or clade 
selection (Jablonski 2008), selection above the level of the individual or the local 
population, which may be detected as nonrandom differences in diversification 
rate among clades, and may sometimes be attributed to certain characters (see 
below). Models of species selection can account for some evolutionary trends, 
especially in characters that affect speciation or extinction rates. This hierarchi-
cal approach was important in distinguishing “active” trends (a shift in the entire 
distribution of character states among species in a clade) from “passive” trends 
(in which the variance expands from a boundary, carrying with it a change in the 
mean) (Gould 1988; McShea 1994). A hierarchical perspective, recognizing that 
selection can act at multiple levels, has been invaluable for understanding macro-
evolutionary patterns.
Such theory, however, takes speciation rates, extinction rates, and the properties 
of species as given; it does not include microevolution, i.e., the evolutionary pro-
cesses within species that might account for speciation and extinction. Williams 
(1992, p. 31), who perhaps more than anyone else is associated with the defense 
of individual selection and criticism of group selection, wrote that “the microevo-
lutionary process that adequately describes evolution in a population is an utterly 
inadequate account of the evolution of the Earth’s biota. It is inadequate because 
the evolution of the biota is more than the mutational origin and subsequent sur-
vival or extinction of genes in gene pools. Biotic evolution is also the cladoge-
netic origin and subsequent survival and extinction of gene pools in the biota.” 
However, speciation is based on genetic changes within populations; extinction 
occurs when genetic changes (if they occur) are insufficient to enable survival of 
any of the organisms that make up a population or species. Ideally, a microevolu-
tionary theory of these changes could be scaled up to describe a theory of rates of 
speciation, extinction, and diversification. A combination of theory and data can 
account for some examples of speciation and of population extinction, but we are 
very far from having the empirical information that would be necessary to apply 
such a theory on the scale of entire clades.
The possible role of species selection in shaping diversity and macroevolution-
ary trends is viewed by some as an extension of and challenge to the ST (e.g., 
Erwin 2010). However, advocates of species selection differ in whether the pro-
cess is based only on features that are “emergent” at the species level (such as 
breadth of geographic range) or an any “aggregate” feature of the organisms that 
constitute the species. Few cases of species selection based on emergent proper-
ties have been identified, but many features of organisms have been identified that 
affect diversification rate. Such cases seem to fit squarely within the Synthetic 
Theory. For example, Mitter et al. (1988) introduced the method of “replicated 
sister-group comparisons,” in which the species diversity in lineages that possess 
a feature hypothesized to increase diversification, and that has evolved repeat-
edly, is compared with their sister groups that lack the feature. A causal role in 
diversification is inferred, based on the assumption that other diversity-enhancing 
features are randomized among the various lineages. Determining whether a dif-
ference in diversification rate resides in the rate of speciation, extinction, or both 
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is difficult, although extinction rate may sometimes be estimated from the fossil 
record or perhaps from the shape of a phylogeny (a controversial procedure; see 
Rabosky 2010). Mitter et al. (1988) found that herbivorous lineages of insects usu-
ally have more species than their nonherbivorous sister groups. It is not yet known 
whether herbivorous insects are more diverse because adapting to different host 
plants causes rapid speciation (“ecological speciation;” Nosil 2012), because spe-
cializing on different plants reduces competition and the likelihood of extinction, 
or both. From such comparisons, diversification rate has been associated with 
many features (Coyne and Orr 2004), such as resin canals, nectar spurs and the 
herbaceous growth form in plants, sexual dichromatism and feather ornamenta-
tion in birds, and viviparity in fishes. (More powerful phylogenetic methods have 
since been developed to infer the impact of characters on rates of diversification 
FitzJohn et al. 2009.)
Identifying features that affect diversification rate may provide a qualitative 
relationship between evolutionary processes within species (microevolutionary 
processes) and the rate or extent of diversification, but it falls short of a func-
tional model that would predict diversity differences in different times or places. 
Population genetic models and data of speciation are extensive (Gavrilets 2004; 
Nosil 2013), but only in the last few years have there been efforts to scale the 
models up to the macroevolutionary level. Using individual-based computer mod-
els of parapatric populations that adapt to a variety of multidimensional ecologi-
cal niches, Gavrilets and Vose (2005) simulated adaptive radiation, and obtained 
results that matched empirical patterns, especially a rate of diversification that is 
initially high but later declines (cf. also Gavrilets and Losos 2009). In another such 
model, Aguilee et al. (2013) found that landscape dynamics affect diversification: 
In a mosaic of several habitat types, the number of ecologically divergent species 
is greatest if geographic barriers between habitats are alternately stronger (permit-
ting divergent adaptation) and weaker (enabling populations to meet and evolve 
reinforced reproductive isolation).
Possibly, the theoretically least developed component of macroevolution is 
extinction. Populations that are small, for any reason, are susceptible to extinction 
by random fluctuation of population size, an effect that is exacerbated by accu-
mulation of deleterious mutations. However, extinction of entire species is usually 
attributed to failure to adapt fast enough to a changing environment. This state-
ment finds its theoretical expression in models of a single quantitative (polygenic) 
trait, in which the rate of population growth declines, and may become negative, 
as the difference between the trait mean and the new optimum increases. The mod-
els assume either a sudden change in environment of a specified magnitude (i.e., 
different between initial trait mean and trait optimum) (Gomulkiewicz and Holt 
1995) or a steadily changing optimum that is tracked, with a lag, by a changing 
trait mean (Chevin et al. 2010). In the latter case, the rate of trait evolution after 
initial standing genetic variation has been depleted depends on the rate at which 
new genetic variance arises by mutation. Because more mutations occur in larger 
populations, the chance that a population survives is affected by its size. The more 
a population dwindles in size, the more likely it is to dwindle further.
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As is true of many models, these are undoubtedly sufficient to predict survival 
versus extinction, when conditions meet the assumptions. They could certainly be 
modified for different assumptions, such as dependence of fitness on more than 
one character, in which case the genetic variance–covariance matrix (G) and its 
analog for de novo mutation (M), would be substituted for the additive genetic 
variance of the single character. The problem with predicting extinction of any 
particular population or species, or accounting for variation in extinction rate, is an 
empirical one, comparable to predicting the weather in New York two years from 
today, or accounting for the difference in the mean July temperature in two suc-
cessive years: We are not remotely capable, at this time, of obtaining (or, probably, 
of processing) all the necessary data. If we ask, for example, what the likelihood 
is that the American population of the monarch butterfly (Danaus plexippus) will 
survive the next century of climate change, we should need to know the predicted 
extent and pattern of changes in temperature both in its breeding areas of North 
America and its overwintering areas in southern Mexico, in relation to the temper-
ature tolerances of the relevant life history stages of the butterfly; and we need to 
know the magnitude of genetic variation in and genetic correlations among these 
several physiological measurements, as well as the rate at which these genetic 
statistics are changed by input of new mutations. That would require a staggering 
amount of research, but it would by no means be enough. The butterfly will expe-
rience other ecological changes than temperature alone: There are now and will be 
temperature-related changes in precipitation that can affect abundance and qual-
ity of its food plants (species of Asclepias, milkweeds) and probably the conifer-
ous trees in the Mexican mountains where it overwinters; there will be changes in 
land use and in the communities of predators, parasites, and competing species. 
Whether or not the monarch’s current host plants can adapt to the climate change, 
or be replaced by northward-moving alternative species of Asclepias, and whether 
or not the butterfly populations have genetic variation in traits that mediate their 
ecological interaction with other species are unknowns that might be critical deter-
minants of the species’ future. That is, we do not know what ecological factors are 
likely to require adaptation, much less the butterfly’s “evolvability” with respect to 
those factors. In this area, as with many aspects of evolutionary biology, we have 
a theory that explains extinction but has very restricted predictive value—perhaps 
like physics, which explains climate but is unlikely to yield precise predictions of 
daily weather in the long term.
6  Conclusions
Maynard Smith (1966), surely one of the most open-minded of the great evolu-
tionary biologists, wrote “It is in the nature of science that once a proposition 
becomes orthodox it should be subjected to criticism…It does not follow that, 
because a proposition is orthodox, it is wrong.” More recently, Wagner (2010), 
acknowledging criticism of his ideas on the evolution of evolvability, wrote, “But, 
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critics are good because only with relentless rational criticism will any scientific 
idea mature and serve the scientific community or society at large.” I think there 
is value in all the challenges to the ST that I have discussed in this essay, for at 
the very least they have forced biologists to examine and defend orthodoxy, and in 
almost all cases, there has been at least some supportable and valuable content in 
the new idea. At the same time, I have tried to be critical of these challenges, for 
two major reasons. First, although science depends on new ideas and challenges 
to orthodoxy, blind enthusiasm for new ideas can be immensely counterproduc-
tive if it is misguided, for it may consume resources, time, and at worst careers, 
and so the challenges themselves need to be challenged. (And not all challeng-
ers are unsung Barbara McClintocks and Alfred Wegeners; some are Velikovskys.) 
Second, orthodox propositions usually have staying power for good reason. The 
evolutionary principles articulated in the Evolutionary Synthesis displaced and 
vanquished anti-Darwinian ideas by force of rigorous theory and multiple lines of 
evidence consistent with (and in some cases rigorously testing) that theory. The 
claims embodied in the Evolutionary Synthesis were well founded, and hold up 
today to an extraordinary extent. It is, of course, inconceivable that they should 
be complete and sufficient in the face of the vast increase of biological knowl-
edge, especially of molecular, developmental, and physiological processes, but 
they were well founded enough not to be abandoned lightly. Having considered 
several challenges to the explanation of macroevolution developed during the 
Evolutionary Synthesis, I conclude that the ST remains fairly intact, but that the 
challengers have advanced our understanding or at least introduced considerations 
worth pursuing. My specific conclusions follow.
Higher taxa, with pronounced morphological differences from related taxa, 
do not arise saltationally, by single “macromutations,” or reorganization of the 
genome. But there is no strong evidence that all character changes proceed by 
very slight steps, by the substitution of alleles of small effect at multiple loci. 
Some mutations (and genomic changes such as polyploidy) of fairly large effect 
are now known to contribute to evolution. It is possible that mutations of critical 
regulatory genes that switch on certain developmental pathways have caused large 
evolutionary changes, but as far as I know, this is still an open question.
The pattern of stasis punctuated by rapid evolutionary changes was wrongly 
interpreted to mean that natural selection cannot readily alter characteristics except 
via massive genetic change in small populations during speciation. However, sta-
sis, which had been neglected before Eldredge and Gould brought it to the fore, 
requires explanation and is plausibly explained by fluctuating and geographically 
variable selection. The possibility that rapid episodes of character evolution do 
represent speciation, and that speciation facilitates departure from stasis, remains 
to be tested, but is consistent with data.
Critiques of adaptation have some validity, but have probably been overem-
phatic and more skeptical than warranted. Probably no evolutionary biologist has 
ever subscribed to the caricature of the Evolutionary Synthesis in which variation 
was supposed to be copious and “isotropic,” i.e., equally available for all possi-
ble modifications. Nevertheless, many evolutionary biologists have supposed that 
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genetic or developmental constraints have been so loose as to be negligible in 
practice. Identification and characterization of such constraints is now a major area 
of interest, thanks in large part to critiques of the “adaptationist program,” and it is 
clear that constraints can be very important in biasing the direction of evolution or 
preventing adaptation altogether. Still, it remains heuristically valuable to ask what 
kind of selection might have impelled such evolution as has occurred, and in many 
(perhaps most) cases, it is likely that selection of some form has played a role. 
There is little reason to doubt a role for selection in the evolution of features that 
clearly have a close and important bearing on fitness.
The reunion of evolutionary and developmental biology, long overdue, is 
beginning to fill a major gap in evolutionary theory, the nature of evolutionary 
changes in the mapping between genotype and phenotype and the origin of phe-
notypic variation. Before and since the Evolutionary Synthesis, however, some 
developmental biologists have sought to minimize the significance of natural 
selection, and even of genetics, in evolution and development, by viewing the 
physical processes of development, and of biomolecules and cell structures, as 
the locus of explanation. But these are proximal explanations of form, neces-
sary but not sufficient for explaining evolution. Proximal physical processes can 
constrain form and are clearly involved in the production of new forms, which 
cannot exist other than by physical events. But these events cannot explain the 
fixation of the new forms in species populations, nor the further honing of such 
features into more precise, effective adaptations. All proteins and cell structures 
produce effects by physical processes, but genetically based alteration of the pro-
teins and structures alters the processes. Explanation by gene frequency change 
and explanation by changes in the material, mechanistic properties of organisms 
are complementary; one need not diminish the significance of the other. Natural 
selection on genetic variation remains the ultimate explanation of all adaptive 
evolution.
A reawakening of a major role of phenotypic plasticity in evolution is being 
presented as another challenge to orthodox theory. Most of the phenotypically 
plastic traits under discussion appear to be adaptations to environmental heteroge-
neity that have been shaped by natural selection among genetically variable reac-
tion norms. In some cases, part of such a reaction norm (the phenotype evoked by 
and adapted to one of the environmental states) has been genetically consolidated 
or assimilated. In other cases, a more extreme phenotype, developed as a simple 
extension of the ancestral reaction norm, develops in response to a more extreme 
state of the environment. Both of these events, viewed only in the immediate con-
text, appear to illustrate “genes as followers” of developmental phenotypic change, 
but in a longer historical perspective are seen to emerge as a by-product of a his-
tory of selection on genetic variation. Perhaps plasticity could be viewed as the 
leader, and genes as followers, when a plastically produced phenotype is for-
tuitously “preadapted” to a qualitatively novel environment. I suspect this occurs 
rarely, but it remains to be seen.
Many or most epigenetic alterations of phenotype can often be viewed as a 
form of phenotypic plasticity. The developmental switch is usually adaptive; it 
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is often genetically variable, and so it presumably evolved by natural selection. 
Epigenetic changes that are inherited across generations can be modeled as ordi-
nary mutations, the long-term evolutionary effect of which depends on their stabil-
ity (or, conversely, on the rate of “back-mutation”) and frequency of occurrence. 
Their stability seems seldom to extend beyond a dozen generations or so, and no 
cases have yet been described in which epigenetic differences are fixed between 
different populations. They clearly can affect fitness and may affect immediate, 
local adaptation, but any macroevolutionary role has yet to be established. There is 
no evidence, to my knowledge, of a Lamarckian spontaneous origin of adaptively 
directed “epimutation” arising de novo.
In agreement with some other authors (e.g., Sterelny 2000; Minelli 2010), 
I conclude that the developmental phenomena described to date can readily be 
encompassed by the broad principles of the Evolutionary Synthesis.
Variation in rates of diversification stems from dynamics of speciation and 
extinction, both of which are explicable in microevolutionary terms. Indeed, the 
theory of speciation is far advanced, even if still controversial. However, attempts 
to build a theory of diversification from speciation theory have only started. The 
fairly minimal existing theory of extinction is surely valid, but obtaining the infor-
mation necessary to predict extinction or to explain differences in extinction rates 
will be very difficult.
Finally, can microevolution explain macroevolution? It depends on what 
“explain” means. Existing theory can provide a plausible account of the history 
and causes of most or all evolutionary phenomena. In many but not all cases, it 
will be possible to derive some support or counterevidence from data. The degree 
of detail of the account will satisfy some, but not others: For example, there may 
be evidence of selection on the genes underlying a phenotype, and of the source 
and strength of selection, but the developmental events between gene and phe-
notype may be unknown. Opinion will vary on whether or not the explanation is 
complete or sufficient in that case. Likewise, if “explanation” requires that evolu-
tion be predictable for more than a few generations, the theory and data of micro-
evolution will provide no more satisfying “explanation” than does physics if it is 
required to make long-term predictions of weather. I do not know of any macro-
evolutionary phenomena that are inconsistent with existing evolutionary theory, 
any phenomena that would require us to reject one of its principles as simply 
false. Nonetheless, the relative importance of many of the factors of evolution is 
debatable, and I assume that every part of our explanatory theory is incomplete. 
Of course, the Evolutionary Synthesis will be extended, molded, and modified. 
But there will not be a Kuhnian “paradigm shift.” Science really does accomplish 
something.
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Abstract Evolutionary theory has proven generally successful in predicting 
phenotypic changes over one or a few generations of natural or artificial selection, 
but fails to predict evolutionary dynamics over longer periods of time, which is a 
major shortcoming: At longer timescales, existing theory is largely concerned with 
a posteriori explanations and cannot even predict whether a population or species 
will adapt to environmental change, or go extinct. Based on a review of key litera-
ture from before Darwin to today, I argue that the reason for this shortcoming is 
that in the Modern Synthesis fitness is regarded as determined exclusively by how 
well traits are suited to the biotic and abiotic environment. I argue that much can be 
gained by explicitly considering that fitness has a significant intrinsic component, 
determined by how well different traits are adapted to each other. Due to adaptation 
of traits to each other, those traits that are important for the functioning of many 
other traits can vary only within narrow tolerance limits. Short-term selection exper-
iments and year-to-year fluctuations in natural populations taking place within these 
tolerance limits give the appearance of rapid evolution. Yet the tolerance limits will 
prevent changes to accumulate over time, and hence, these traits evolve in a million 
years no more than they do in a decade. Only traits like coloration that have little 
influence on other traits can evolve freely, but that will rarely be sufficient to prevent 
extinction. Significant evolutionary departures require a reshuffling of the interac-
tions between traits and will often coincide with speciation. Emerging from a com-
plex system of interacting traits, the magnitude and direction of these changes will 
be largely independent of the factors that triggered them, rendering macroevolution 
a largely autonomous process.
Keywords Extinction · Macroevolution · Microevolution · Natural selection · 
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1  Historical Examples
In the study of biological evolution, a distinction is often made between microevo-
lution and macroevolution. Microevolution refers to the process of change over time 
in a species or population, for example genetic or phenotypic change, or changes in 
its geographic distribution, or in its interactions with other species. Macroevolution 
on the other hand refers to processes that typically involve a timescale spanning the 
origination and extinction of species. Speciation and extinction dynamics, but also 
long-term genetic and phenotypic evolution are typical subjects of macroevolution-
ary study. Thus, micro- and macroevolution concern partly overlapping processes, 
but at timescales that typically differ by at least three orders of magnitude.
A long-standing issue in evolutionary biology, which has been debated ever 
since Darwin and Wallace presented their theory of evolution in 1859, is whether 
micro- and macroevolution are one and the same process observed at different 
timescales, or essentially distinct processes. Because microevolution can be read-
ily studied experimentally, our mechanistic understanding of microevolution-
ary processes is much better than our understanding of macroevolution, which is 
more restricted to patterns, rather than processes. There is abundant evidence that 
microevolution is due to natural (and sometimes sexual) selection, as Darwin and 
Wallace originally hypothesized. Consequently, the debate whether micro- and 
macroevolution are equivalent processes has focused on the question whether or 
not macroevolution is an adaptive process governed by survival of the fittest indi-
viduals in a population.
Here, I will illustrate the history of this debate using examples from various 
fields of study that have bearing on the issue. I will show that fossil records as well 
as present-day species indicate that extrapolating findings from microevolutionary 
studies to a macroevolutionary timescale leads to predictions that differ dramati-
cally from observed patterns. I will then review findings from developmental and 
population genetics during the later part of the past century that could provide an 
explanation for this discrepancy. Based on these insights, I will finally address the 
relation between micro- and macroevolution and the critical importance of specia-
tion in biological evolution.
1.1  The Predicted Hawk Moth
Despite its beautiful, bright flowers, the Madagascan orchid Angraecum  
sesquipedale is seldom grown by amateur breeders. Nevertheless, to many biolo-
gists, the species is well known as a key player in one of the early success stories 
of evolutionary biology. When Charles Darwin was sent some specimens of this 
orchid by James Bateman, he must have recognized immediately the characteris-
tic feature of the flowers: an unusually long nectar spur. Darwin described these 
extremely long spurs in his 1862 “On the various contrivances by which British 
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and foreign orchids are fertilized by insects, and on the good effects of intercross-
ing.” He argued that although the flowers’ up to 40 cm nectar spurs were unusu-
ally long, there presumably existed a pollinator with a suitably long proboscis to 
obtain the nectar and pollinate the plant. By itself, this prediction was perhaps not 
as daring as some authors have later suggested: Darwin was aware of the existence 
of species with flowers with very long spurs (albeit not as long as those of A. ses-
quipedale), and he also knew that these species were typically pollinated by hawk 
moths. Therefore, he predicted not only that given the existence of a flowering 
plant with 40 cm nectar spurs, there presumably had to exist a pollinator with an 
equally long proboscis, but also that this pollinator presumably was a hawk moth. 
What makes this prediction remarkable is that Darwin proposed a mechanism for 
the process that led to the unusual length of the nectar spurs, as well as the probos-
cis of the (as yet hypothetical) pollinator: evolution by natural selection.
Darwin (1862) hypothesized that pollinators with longer tongues would obtain 
nectar from an orchid without pollinating it, causing selection for longer spurs. 
Longer spurs, in turn, would exert selection on pollinators for longer tongues. This 
evolutionary arms race may sound familiar nowadays, but in Darwin’s time, it was a 
contentious issue. Indeed, George Campbell, the 8th duke of Argyll wrote in his 1867 
“The Reign of Law” that the intricate complexity of the flowers of A. sesquipedale 
reflected divine creation. As a reaction in the same year, Alfred Russel Wallace wrote 
“Creation by Law,” in which he defended Darwin’s coevolutionary model. A polli-
nator for A. sesquipedale was not found during Darwin’s life. Only in 1903, Lionel 
Walter Rothschild and Karl Jordan found a moth with a suitably long tongue on 
Madagascar. It was named Xanthopan morganii praedicta—because Darwin had pre-
dicted its existence. (It was later found that the specimen did not represent a subspe-
cies of the continental X. morganii, but the story of its discovery is far better known 
than the species itself, so it remains widely known by its subspecific epithet.)
The arms race that Darwin and Wallace hypothesized for the evolution of long 
spurs and probosces is of course not unique to orchids and hawk moths. In 1973, 
Van Valen famously called this type of mutually antagonistic coevolution for the 
Red Queen, a character in Lewis Carroll’s 1871 “Through the Looking-Glass, and 
What Alice Found There,” who explained to Alice about Looking-Glass Land: 
“Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.” 
The analogy with an evolutionary arms race is evident: If orchids evolve longer 
nectar spurs, hawk moths have to evolve longer tongues to obtain the same amount 
of nectar, and vice versa, if the moths evolve longer tongues, the orchids have to 
keep up with longer spurs to attain the same pollination success. Van Valen used 
the Red Queen as a hypothetical explanation for the observation that the extinc-
tion risk of genera is constant through time. Older genera are no more likely to go 
extinct than young genera, which could be due to species continuously coevolving.
Presumably, because of the contrast between the duke of Argyll’s rigid reli-
gious views on the natural world and Darwin’s idea of a highly dynamic arms race 
between evolving species, the discovery of X. morganii praedicta has often been 
heralded as a prime example of the explanatory power of evolution. However, the 
coevolutionary arms race suspected by Wallace (1867) and Darwin (1862) suggests 
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that the Red Queen keeps on running: It would lead to ever longer spurs and tongues. 
Yet she appears to have halted, as there is no evidence that the nectar spurs of A. ses-
quipedale are any longer now than they were in Darwin’s time. What’s more, most 
orchid species have shorter spurs, and most pollinators have shorter tongues. Indeed, 
among all of the thousands of species of flowering plants, A. sesquipedale is virtu-
ally unique in having such long nectar spurs. By far, most species have very short 
spurs compared to the few species that are pollinated by hawk moths. As Bradshaw 
pointed out in his 1991 Croonian lecture to the Royal Society of London, “most spe-
cies are very stable, and in situations where evolution is observed in one species 
often none is found in others despite equivalent opportunity.”
As recently as 2007, Whittall and Hodges studied the coevolution of nectar 
spurs and the probosces of their pollinators, not in Angraecum but in a clade of 
columbine flowers, using modern phylogenetic methods. They found that there are 
several different sizes of spurs facilitating several different pollinators, from bum-
blebees with relatively short tongues to hummingbirds and hawk moths with long 
tongues. They found evidence that—as Darwin (1862) and Wallace (1867) had 
predicted—spur length increases rather than decreases, but only seldom, in rapid 
bursts instead of continuously. Therefore they hypothesized that when a new pol-
linator with a longer tongue enters the range of a flowering plant species, its spurs 
catch up rapidly, while pollinators with shorter tongues continue to effectively 
facilitate pollen transfer in the species with shorter spurs.
This finding is interesting for two reasons: It illustrates the possibilities that modern 
molecular techniques, in particular molecular phylogenetic analysis of species’ pheno-
types, offer to study macroevolution. More importantly, it illustrates that evolutionary 
biologists’ interpretation of the history of A. sesquipedale and X. morganii praedicta 
as an example of the predictive power of evolution is rather optimistic. Darwin (1862) 
and Wallace’s (1867) theory predicts that plants and their pollinators engage in an evo-
lutionary arms race to explain unusual phenotypes in a minority of species, but fails to 
predict why the vast majority of species do not engage in the same arms race, despite 
equivalent opportunity. In addition, the theory explains that flowers and tongues get 
longer, not whether and when that process stops. Many evolutionary biologists take 
this for granted as just another aspect of nature’s great and dazzling variety.
1.2  Fossil Elephants
The observation that evolution is not quite as dynamic as Darwin and Wallace per-
haps first envisioned, had been pointed out to Darwin already soon after the first 
edition of “The Origin” was published (1859). One of the first to read Darwin’s 
book was Scottish paleontologist Hugh Falconer. In India, where he was head 
of the Saharánpur botanical gardens, Falconer made detailed studies of the fos-
sils pertaining to species of mastodon, rhinoceros, and elephant. Forced by dete-
riorating health, he returned to Europe and began summarizing his work on fossil 
remains of elephants when he received a copy of Darwin’s book. In a letter dated 
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September 1862, Falconer wrote to Darwin: “I am bringing out a heavy memoir 
on Elephants—an Omnium gatherum affair—with observations on the fossil and 
recent species. One section is devoted to the persistence in time of the specific 
characters of the mammoth. I trace him, from before the Glacial period, through 
it, and after it, unchangeable and unchanged, so far as the organs of digestion 
(teeth) and locomotion are concerned. Now the glacial period was no joke—it 
would have made ducks and drakes of your dear pigeons and doves.” Darwin was 
quick to reply, and his reply to Falconer is particularly interesting. He wrote: “You 
speak of these animals as having been exposed to vast range of climatal changes 
from before to after the Glacial period; I should have thought from analogy of 
sea-shells, that by migration (or local extinction when migration not possible) 
these animals might and would have kept under nearly the same climate.”
From this letter, it is clear that Darwin was aware that “seashells” responded to 
climate change by tracking their preferred habitat rather than by adapting, because 
he suggested that the same could apply to the European mammoth. Darwin 
was right in his suggestion: Migration of whole associations of species during 
Quaternary climatic fluctuations has now been described in detail from, for exam-
ple, pollen records (Bradshaw 1991; Thomas et al. 2004; Davis and Shaw 2001; see 
also Eldredge et al. 2005). Further support comes from extant species that experi-
ence climate change and follow their preferred environmental conditions in space 
(Kelly and Goulden 2008; Tingley et al. 2009). As Bradshaw pointed out in his 
Croonian lecture: “It is customary to take these migrations for granted as a reflection 
of the ecological preferences of the species concerned. Yet is this acceptable? There 
is a valid alternative scenario that the species concerned … could have remained in 
situ and coped with the environmental improvement by evolutionary change. There 
is no sign of this; the stability of the ecological preferences of the species in the face 
of such major environmental alterations is impressive.” Thus, although Darwin was 
correct that mammoths could probably, like most other species, have responded to 
climate change by tracking their niche in space, his reply failed to answer Falconer’s 
question. Falconer did not ask “how would mammoths have responded to climate 
change,” but why they did not show evolutionary change despite great climatic 
vicissitudes. Generations of evolutionary biologists have followed this example, 
ascribing change to natural selection when it occurs, but failing to account for the 
frequent cases where no evolution is observed. Hence, as recently as 2010, Futuyma 
wrote that “we are led to confront an overridingly important question that highlights 
the immaturity of our science: how can we predict whether a population (or species) 
will adapt or become extinct in the face of environmental change?”
2  Punctuated Equilibria
From Futuyma’s remarks, it may be clear that the development of evolutionary 
theory has anything but come to an end with the Modern Synthesis: There are too 
many instances where evolution is not observed while it would be expected, and 
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evolutionary theory fails to predict when and where and to what extent evolution 
will take place, and when no evolution should be expected. To better understand 
what revisions of the Modern Synthesis are needed, let us return to Falconer’s 
critical 1862 letter to Darwin. During the following years, they exchanged several 
letters, and Falconer pointed out that in the fossil records he studied, species often 
appear suddenly differentiated, to remain largely unchanged until going extinct. 
In other words, judging from the fossil record, evolutionary change is largely con-
strained to incipient species. Eventually, Darwin acknowledged in the third edition 
of “The Origin” that “It is a more important consideration, clearly leading to the 
same result, as lately insisted on by Dr. Falconer, namely, that the periods during 
which species have been undergoing modification, though very long as measured 
by years, have probably been short in comparison with the periods during which 
these same species remained without undergoing any change.” Thus, Darwin 
acknowledged Falconer’s observations, but was not worried because they were 
“clearly leading to the same result.” It is difficult to judge exactly what “result” 
Darwin refers to. It is possible that he meant that species are not divinely created 
units, but emerge from other species. In that case, Darwin was correct that irre-
spective of whether change is rapid or slow, the species are historically related.
It is also conceivable, however, that Darwin meant that species diverge due 
to natural selection, and that it does not matter whether this divergence happens 
rapidly in incipient species or gradually over time. We may never know precisely 
what Darwin meant, but it is clear that later students of evolution disagreed on 
this issue; whether rapid change in incipient species leads to the same result, as 
Darwin claimed. The periods of rapid change were themselves not contested. 
Rather, discussion concerned the forces that were responsible. In his seminal 1944 
“Tempo and Mode in Evolution,” George Gaylord Simpson indicated the great rel-
evance of this question when he wrote that the most important distinction between 
students of evolution is between “those who believe that discontinuity arises by 
intensification or combination of the differentiating processes already effective 
within a potentially or really continuous population and those who maintain that 
some essentially different factors are involved. This is related to the old, but still 
vital problem of microevolution as opposed to macroevolution.”
It is interesting that Simpson called the relation between microevolution and 
macroevolution an “old” question already in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, because most present-day evolutionary biologists presumably associate the 
issue not with Simpson’s 1944 “Tempo and Mode” or still older works, but with 
Eldredge and Gould’s 1972 theory of punctuated equilibria. In a seminal con-
tribution to the paleobiological revolution (Maynard Smith 1984), they claimed 
that evolution is not due to the gradual accumulation of adaptive differences in 
established species from one generation to the other, as Darwin envisioned. They 
claimed that the fossil record provides abundant evidence that species change 
rapidly when they originate, to subsequently remain static until going extinct 
(Eldredge and Gould 1972). Subsequent studies of fossil populations confirmed 
this notion (e.g., Lieberman et al. 1995), so that the frequent occurrence of sta-
sis in the fossil record now has good statistical support (Hunt 2007; see also 
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Uyeda et al. 2011). As may be evident from the sections above, Eldredge and 
Gould (1972) were not the first to make these points. Falconer had pointed out to 
Darwin that change is often absent in established species despite dramatic envi-
ronmental change and questioned whether this was compatible with Darwin’s 
theory of gradual transformation of species. Several students of evolution had 
expressed doubts whether evolution by natural selection could, even accumulated 
over geological periods of time, account for more substantial differences between 
higher taxa, and hence, already Simpson (1944) referred to this as an old issue. 
However, between “Tempo and Mode in Evolution” and Eldredge and Gould’s 
theory of punctuated equilibira, the Modern Synthesis had “hardened” (Gould 
2002) to the extent that most evolutionary biologists not only rejected punctuated 
equilibrium theory, but even claimed that stasis interspersed with rapid change 
is not an accurate description of biological evolution. In other words, Simpson 
still considered these “discontinuities” in the fossil record as a generally accepted 
phenomenon, discussion focusing on the underlying mechanism, but 25 years 
later many evolutionary biologists dismissed even the phenomenon as an artifact 
of incomplete fossil records. For example, Stebbins and Ayala (1981) argued that 
fossil species can be distinguished only if morphologically distinct, and others 
claimed that discontinuities were due to incomplete fossil records. Gould (2002) 
replied to such claims with “stasis is data”: The observation that species persist 
“unchangeable and unchanged,” as Falconer put it in his 1862 letter to Darwin, 
cannot be due to missing data. Some students of evolution expressed support for 
punctuated equilibria. Stanley, for example, (in)famously claimed (1975) that “if 
most evolutionary change occurs during speciation and if speciation events are 
largely random, natural selection, long viewed as the process guiding evolution-
ary change, cannot play a significant role in determining the overall course of 
evolution. Macroevolution is decoupled from microevolution…”.
2.1  Phylogenetic Evidence for Punctuated Equilibria
In Darwin and Falconer’s time, evidence for stasis had to come from the fossil 
record. At present, there are more than just fossil data pertaining to the frequency 
of stasis. Soon after Eldredge and Gould had published their theory of punctuated 
equilibria in 1972, it was realized that molecular phylogenies can complement the 
time frame provided by the fossil record (Avise and Ayala 1975). Avise (1977) 
compared phenotypic variation between clades of fishes: In a clade with few spe-
cies, few speciation events would have contributed to morphological variation, 
whereas in a species-rich clade, many speciation events would have contributed. If 
evolution is restricted to incipient species, then the species-rich clade would show 
greater phenotypic variation than the species-poor clade. This approach circum-
vents the problem that fossil species may not represent biological species, or that 
they would be distinguishable only if substantially different (Stebbins and Ayala 
1981), and has the additional advantage that one can study traits that cannot be 
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studied from the fossil record. Later methods to distinguish punctuated equilib-
ria from gradual change using present-day species are based on the same princi-
ple as Avise and Ayala’s pioneering attempts (Ricklefs 1980; Douglas and Avise 
1982; Mooers and Schluter 1998, 1999; Mooers et al. 1999; Bokma 2002, 2008). 
Details of methods differ, but their principle is the same: If evolutionary diver-
gence takes place gradually over time, then recent sister species cannot be signifi-
cantly diverged, because time has been insufficient for differences to accumulate. 
By contrast, if evolution is dramatically accelerated in incipient species, then even 
recent sister species can be substantially diverged. After the initial phase, differen-
tiation accumulates, but under gradual evolution this is due to greater time since 
divergence, whereas under speciational evolution it is due to a growing number of 
speciation events separating species. Molecular phylogenies provide an estimate 
of the time and number of speciation events separating any two extant species, and 
hence, it is possible to distinguish the contributions of gradual and speciational 
change to variation between species.
Phylogenetic methods have now been applied to data from present-day spe-
cies in a number of studies, and evidence accumulates suggesting that Falconer 
was right when he wrote to Darwin that species change rapidly initially, to 
remain virtually unchanged until going extinct. A particularly interesting exam-
ple was already mentioned above and concerns spur length in columbine flowers: 
Whittall and Hodges (2007) found that there are several different sizes of nectar 
spurs facilitating an array of pollinators, from bumblebees with relatively short 
tongues to hummingbirds and hawk moths with long tongues. Evolution of spur 
length seems to be almost exclusively toward longer spurs. However, this does not 
seem to be due to an arms race between flowers and pollinators, as Darwin (1862) 
and Wallace (1867) initially suggested. Instead, increases in spur length appear 
rapid, following the punctuated equilibrium pattern, and are often accompanied 
by a change in pollination syndrome. Whittall and Hodges therefore suggested 
that when a new pollinator with a longer tongue enters the range of a columbine 
population, the spurs evolve rapidly, but the pollinators with shorter tongues keep 
pollinating the species with shorter spurs. Similarly, stasis in floral morphology 
in Malpighiaceae appears to be due to the relation between plant and its specialist 
New World oil-bee pollinators (Davis et al. 2014). One of the best studied groups 
of species are the mammals, and therefore we used mammals to test whether body 
size evolution shows signs of rapid change in incipient species. We found that 
presumably around 60 % of variation in body mass between present-day mam-
malian species is due to short periods of rapid change in incipient species. For 
primates and carnivores exceptionally good phylogenies are available, as well as 
good measurements of species’ average body masses. Interestingly, we found that 
primates appear to diverge about three times faster if evolution is assumed to be 
purely gradual, but when rapid evolution during speciation is taken into account, 
both clades appear to have identical rates of evolution (Mattila and Bokma 2008). 
We also showed that variation in the rate of body size diversification between 
mammalian clades could be explained by differences in speciation and extinction 
rates (Monroe and Bokma 2009). These findings do not only provide evidence for 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
95Evolution as a Largely Autonomous Process
a punctuated equilibrium model of evolution, they also question the role of natu-
ral selection, because if body masses were locally adaptive, we would not expect 
great differences in rates of diversification between clades that share the same 
environment. In other words, if speciation occurs more often in one clade, one 
would expect the body size changes during speciation to be smaller in this clade. 
The observation that the magnitude of rapid change during evolution is independ-
ent of how frequently such changes occur (Mattila and Bokma 2008; Monroe and 
Bokma 2009) suggests that the environment has little effect on this process.
Because phylogenetic analyses are based entirely on present-day species, they 
allow analyses of characters that are not preserved in the fossil record. A good 
example of the use of this feature is studies by Pagel and colleagues, who tested 
for acceleration of nucleotide sequence evolution during speciation (Webster et al. 
2003; Pagel et al. 2006; Venditti and Pagel 2010). They used phylogenies of a 
wide variety of taxa and found that speciation has a significant accelerating effect 
on evolution also at the level of DNA.
3  The Role of Natural Selection
Given the accumulating evidence that species change rapidly when they originate 
to subsequently remain static, the question becomes whether that pattern can be 
reconciled with the Modern Synthesis’ view of macroevolution as the long-term 
consequence of microevolution driven by natural selection. Rapid change per se 
can hardly be argued to challenge the role of natural selection. Wallace already 
noted in 1889 that “Mr Darwin was rather inclined to exaggerate the necessary 
slowness of the action of natural selection … but with the knowledge we now 
possess of the great amount and range of individual variation, there seems no 
difficulty in an amount of change, quite equivalent to that which usually distin-
guishes allied species, sometimes taking place in less than a century, should any 
rapid change in conditions necessitate an equally rapid adaptation.” His statement 
was confirmed mathematically about a century later by theoretical work suggest-
ing that selection as well as genetic drift could lead to rapid evolution especially 
in small populations (Lande 1976, 1980; Lynch and Hill 1986). Thus, the mere 
observation that evolution is sometimes rapid does not warrant conclusions about 
whether this is caused by intensification of selection, or “some essentially different 
factors” (Simpson 1944).
Assuming that evolution is due to natural selection on heritable genetic varia-
tion, evolutionary biologists reasoned that the other component of punctuated equi-
librium, stasis, resulted either from lack of genetic variation, a lack of selection, or 
from stabilizing selection. There are examples of traits that lack the genetic varia-
tion needed to adapt to changing environmental conditions (e.g., Hoffmann et al. 
2003; Kellermann et al. 2009). However, it is exceedingly unlikely that low rates 
of evolution in established species are generally due to a lack of genetic variation. 
For example, bill dimension in Geospiza fortis has been observed to respond to 
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selection due to fluctuations between wet and dry years, with selection differen-
tials of up to one standard deviation units in 1977 and 2004 (Grant 1986; Grant 
and Grant 2011). Calculated over the entire 30-year period of observation, how-
ever, selection differentials are at least an order of magnitude lower, and the rate of 
long-term evolution estimated from differences between species is yet much lower. 
That indicates that the changes do not add up from year to year, but rather oscil-
late around a constant long-term beak size. This observation, which originally led 
to the use of mean-reverting stochastic processes such as Ornstein-Uhlenbeck to 
model evolution, is not unique for Darwin’s finches (e.g., Lieberman et al. 1994). 
Gingerich (1983) already documented various examples of this phenomenon from 
a variety of species: Evolutionary change is independent of time, so that if cal-
culated over short periods of time evolution seems rapid, while if calculated over 
long periods of time it seems slow (Gingerich 2009; Eldredge et al. 2005; Bell 
2010; Uyeda et al. 2011). Lande (1976; see also Roff 2000) pointed out that “A 
simple formula for estimating the minimum selective mortality per generation nec-
essary to explain observed rates of phenotypic evolution is derived (assuming that 
genetic drift was not involved). The minimum mortality rates needed to explain 
observed rates of evolution in tooth characters of Tertiary mammals are very small, 
typically about one selective death per million individuals per generation.” In addi-
tion, artificial selection (domestication) has resulted in rates of change orders of 
magnitude higher than observed in nature. Clearly, many traits are long-term (but 
not short-term) static despite having more than enough genetic variation to evolve.
If low rates of evolution are not generally due to a lack of genetic variation, 
could it be that they are then due to stabilizing selection due to constancy of envi-
ronment? Perhaps, for example, Darwin’s finches (Grant and Grant 2011) do not 
experience greater climatic fluctuations in a millennium than they do between 
years. Stabilizing selection has regularly been proposed as an explanation for low 
rates of evolution. For example, Lynch (1990) concluded that “a comparison of the 
evolutionary rates of cranial morphology in mammals with the neutral expectation 
suggests that stabilizing selection is a predominant evolutionary force keeping the 
long-term diversification of lineages well below its potential.” Also other groups 
of species exhibit low rates of long-term evolution (e.g., Lieberman et al. 1994). 
In fact, mammals are known to exhibit exceptionally “rapid” evolution com-
pared to other groups (Van Valen 1985; Lynch 1990). The hypothesis that stasis 
is due to stabilizing selection is problematic, however. Species remain static even 
though both their biotic and abiotic environments change markedly (Lieberman 
and Dudgeon 1996). Indeed, Falconer had already pointed out that if the European 
mammoth, like many other species, was driven to extinction by climate change, 
then very likely its changing environment exerted a selective pressure, and we 
may safely assume that this pressure exceeded one selective death in a million (cf. 
Lande 1976). In other words, while observed rates of evolution suggest pervasive 
stabilizing selection, environmental changes that simultaneously take place rather 
suggest strong directional selection.
Here, it should be emphasized that the mechanisms behind stasis are relatively 
rarely addressed (but see e.g., Bradshaw 1991; Lieberman and Dudgeon 1996; 
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Merilä et al. 2001; Hansen and Houle 2004; Bell 2010; Futuyma 2010), as the 
majority of evolutionary biologists remain concerned with microevolution, osten-
sibly because macroevolution is not amenable to experiments. Unfortunately, this 
has led many to believe that the pattern of stasis and rapid evolution in incipient 
species is fully in line with the Modern Synthesis: Stasis could be due to stabiliz-
ing selection and rapid change due to directional selection. This was summarized 
succinctly by Maynard Smith (1989): “The relation between population genet-
ics and paleontology is unsatisfactory. It is not uncommon for paleontologists 
to assert that population genetics cannot account for the fossil record, whereas 
population geneticists hold that there is nothing in the record that they cannot 
explain.” Although 25 years have passed since Maynard Smith made that state-
ment, it applies quite well still today. Of course, stasis as well as rapid change 
can be explained by population genetic theory, just like evolutionary theory could 
explain the long nectar spurs of A. sesquipedale as the result of an arms race with 
its pollinator, or stasis in mammoths as a consequence of their migrations. The 
problem is that theory does not predict why spurs became elongated in A. sesqui-
pedale (and not in most other species) and why they became about 30 cm long 
(and not 10 or 100 cm), or why A. sesquipedale evolved, but the mammoth tracked 
its niche. It does not explain which factors exert stabilizing selection in established 
species, and why this would suddenly be different when a new species emerges. 
Put bluntly, when it comes to long-term evolution, current theory provides little 
else than ad hoc explanations.
3.1  The Genetic Basis of Evolution
In order to understand why stasis and punctuated equilibria pose a challenge for 
current evolutionary theory, we will once more return to Darwin, who derived 
the most famous of his many scientific contributions, “On the Origin of Species 
by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life” (1859) long before he sent it to the Linnaean Society for scru-
tiny when Wallace (1855) had independently come to the same conclusions. An 
important reason for this delay was that Darwin wanted to build a stronger sci-
entific basis for his argument so as to avoid the scorn attending the publication of 
Vestiges of Creation (Chambers 1844), not to mention concern about the church’s 
reaction. A subsidiary reason for the delay may have been that Darwin was well 
aware that an important piece was missing from his theory: a theory of inherit-
ance. Darwin was aware that offspring tend to resemble their parents, but did not 
know what caused this resemblance. Mendel had already discovered the mecha-
nism behind inheritance from flower color and shape of peas in the abbey of St. 
Thomas monastery garden, but did not present his ideas publicly until 1865 (see 
Mendel 1866). Hence, Darwin considered some form of blending inheritance to 
provide his theory of evolution with a mechanistic backbone, something which 
was criticized and may have been the reason why the concept of natural selection 
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remained controversial (Larson 2004), while the idea of evolution garnered much 
support among the readers of “The Origin” (with the exception of many church 
representatives).
Even though Darwin, unaware of Mendel’s (1866) progress, had to base his 
theory on an imperfect understanding of inheritance, the fundamental principle 
underlying evolutionary theory has remained unchanged (albeit amended) until 
present: (i) Organisms have traits that are transmitted from parent to offspring, 
(ii) organisms tend to produce more offspring than required to replace them-
selves, which causes competition for resources so that (iii) those among the off-
spring whose traits make them better suited to their local environment have the 
best chances to survive and reproduce. Evolution by natural selection “naturally 
follows” from these three principles (Reznick and Ricklefs 2009), and therefore, 
some biologists claim (as a counterargument to religious movements still ques-
tioning the validity of evolutionary theory) that adaptive evolution is inevitable. 
However, if that is the case, then at the stage where niche tracking was no longer 
possible (if not already much earlier), natural selection should have acted on 
mammoths and other species alike so that they adapted to the changing climate. 
Apparently, that hardly happened or was not possible at all, and they went extinct. 
Hence, extinction, the fate of most if not all species, is perhaps the best and most 
ubiquitous evidence of species’ failure to adapt (Maynard Smith 1989) rather than 
of competitive exclusion due to microevolution (Reznick and Ricklefs 2009). This 
leads us to the core of the “unsatisfactory relation” between genetics and paleon-
tology: Why, if evolution is an obvious, perhaps even inevitable process, do spe-
cies frequently fail to adapt to environmental change?
Mendel happened to work on a system in which the laws of inheritance could 
be shown relatively easily. Of the traits that he investigated in Pisum sativum, 
the majority contained just two alleles. If repeated on other traits or species (as 
he attempted with bees and mice), these experiments would have yielded results 
much harder to interpret. In fact, such results were available already: As a mem-
ber of the nineteenth-century British upper class, Darwin was well acquainted 
with animal breeding. He was particularly fond of doves and pigeons (hence, 
Falconer’s joke about ducks and drakes), but general interest focused on horse and 
cattle breeding, and when two lines of cattle with high milk yield were crossed to 
obtain even higher yield, the offspring could show average yield, lower than each 
of the parental lines. Such observations frustrated not only the breeders aiming for 
improved economy, but also scientific investigations looking for a simple mecha-
nism of inheritance.
Mendel’s laws of inheritance were rediscovered by De Vries (1900) and 
Correns (1900), and a decade later, Johannsen (1905) explained that both herit-
able and non-heritable factors are responsible for differences in the weight of 
bean seeds (introducing the words gene, genotype, and phenotype). Nilsson-Ehle 
(1909) suggested that multiple hereditary factors were responsible for determin-
ing the phenotype of grain color in wheat. Breeding experiments like Castle’s 
(1916) with guinea pigs demonstrated that selection could shift the trait value out-
side of the range of values previously observed and eventually Fisher (1918, 1930) 
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hypothesized that the additive action of multiple genes can explain the inheritance 
of quantitative characters. These developments convinced many that natural selec-
tion could cause changes in the average trait value from one generation to the next, 
as Darwin had hypothesized. Studies in natural populations confirmed this poten-
tial. The most famous of these early studies was the work by Kettlewell (1956) 
on industrial melanism in Lepidoptera, most famously the peppered moth Biston 
betularia. Before the English industrial revolution, the lighter phenotype was 
favored as it was hard to find for birds against a background of light-colored trees 
and lichens. During and after the industrial revolution, when pollution killed the 
lichens and soot darkened the trees, the darker phenotype became favored.
As experiments and theory suggested that phenotypic changes in labora-
tory and natural populations could be explained as the result of natural selection, 
the “Modern Synthesis” emerged, in which natural selection, a century earlier 
regarded with skepticism (Larson 2004), became firmly established as the driving 
force behind evolution. The belief in the potential of natural selection was so great 
that many geneticists “moved straight from the gene level to that of macroevolu-
tion” and “accepted as an article of faith … that all macroevolutionary phenomena 
were consistent with the laws of genetics” (Mayr 1982). More pluralistic views 
about differentiation of species that had existed in the early days of the Modern 
Synthesis were replaced more and more by an undisputed role of natural selection 
as the driving force behind both micro- and macroevolution. This development is 
what Gould (2002) called the “hardening of the synthesis”. Hilarious examples 
of “adaptive storytelling” can be found in Gould and Lewontin’s famous 1979 
paper on the spandrels of San Marco, in which they dubbed this “Panglossian 
paradigm”, after a character in Voltaire’s 1759 satire “Candide”—Dr. Pangloss—
who is convinced that “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds”. This 
Panglossian paradigm was hardly challenged until the early 1970s, when a group 
of young paleontologists started a “paleobiological revolution” (Sepkoski and 
Ruse 2009) that eventually led paleontologists back to the “high table” of evolu-
tionary biology (Maynard Smith 1984).
In more recent years, molecular genetic techniques have provided a picture 
of the genetic basis of traits that early geneticists could only have dreamed of. 
Despite these technological advances, theory remains heavily influenced by very 
early findings, especially the concept of a “gene.” Flower color in peas as stud-
ied by Mendel (1866) is a trait with a relatively simple genetic basis: It can be 
described assuming two factors (nowadays known as alleles). Such factors were 
dubbed “genes” by De Vries (1900), and nowadays, we can precisely determine 
the genomic location of genes controlling simple traits like flower color—with 
greater effort even the functional nucleotide polymorphisms. When Fisher (1930) 
explained that quantitative characters could be thought of as the additive effect 
of a number of Mendelian “genes,” the word gene still did not mean much more 
than “heriditary factor,” because the existence of DNA as carrier of the heredi-
tary information still had to be discovered. However, when during the 1980s and 
1990s most known Mendelian characters were successfully related to genes (fac-
tors) with a specific location on the genome, it became widely assumed that the 
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“genes” underlying more complex traits were also real, existing entities that could 
be located on the genome, based on a simple interpretation of Fisher’s influential 
explanation. Only very recently has it been found (with the help of high-through-
put whole-genome genotyping) that heritable genetic variation can often only be 
partially explained by allelic variants: The rest has become known as “missing 
heritability.” Thus, the simplifying assumption that most traits have a largely addi-
tive genetic basis is based on theory rather than empirical observation and is only 
slowly being replaced by a view of heritability as an emerging property of a com-
plex nonlinear genotype-to-phenotype map.
Selection led to rapid change in coloration in peppered moths, and would 
Mendel (1866) have selected for purple flowers in peas, that would presumably 
have led to fixation of purple flowers in his study population equally rapidly. Such 
rapid evolution is facilitated by the simple genetic basis of these traits, a linear 
genotype-to-phenotype map (Van’t Hof et al. 2011). Examples of evolution from 
such simple traits are not necessarily representative for evolution of complex traits 
or entire organisms. Polygenic traits may respond to selection in a similar fashion 
as Mendelian characters, if their genetic basis is additive (e.g., Lynch and Walsh 
1997), but this seemingly simple observation leads to a paradox: It is widely 
assumed that natural selection acts most strongly on traits that are most important 
for fitness. Hence, selection prunes deleterious alleles especially in traits important 
for fitness, which should lead to a reduction in genetic variation. This would lead 
to the paradox that evolution of traits crucial for fitness should be slow, because 
variation remaining in such traits is mainly of environmental origin (Merilä and 
Sheldon 1999). The solution to this paradox lies in genetic architecture: There is 
genetic variation in fitness-related traits (Houle 1992), even more than in morpho-
logical traits, but the variation is largely nonadditive (Merilä and Sheldon 1999). 
This is an important observation, because it is far from obvious whether and how 
selection can act on traits governed by complex nonlinear genotype-to-phenotype 
maps. Cattle breeders experienced this already in Darwin’s time, and it may have 
been an important reason why the principles of inheritance remained elusive until 
the twentieth century.
Why would especially fitness-related traits have complex genetic backgrounds 
that, paradoxically, potentially impair the efficiency of natural selection? A grow-
ing body of evidence suggests that complex genetic backgrounds aid stable 
development (Nijhout 2002; Levine and Davidson 2005; Davidson and Levine 
2008; Higgins et al. 2010). The environment of species fluctuates perpetually 
(Bell 2010), as exemplified by Darwin’s finches experiencing a virtually random 
sequence of wet and dry years during their lifetime (Grant and Grant 2011). To 
survive in unpredictable environments, many traits are canalized (Waddington 
1942; see also Meiklejohn and Hartl 2002). Perhaps the best known example of 
canalization is phenotypic plasticity, where the trait value achieved depends in a 
systematic (non-random) fashion on some particular aspects of the environment 
(Nijhout 2002; West-Eberhard 2005; Pigliucci and Müller 2010; see also Hallson 
and Björklund 2012). Plasticity can be achieved through regulatory feedback 
in developmental pathways, which are well known to exist not only in various 
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regulatory gene complexes (Nijhout 2002; Davidson and Levine 2008) and oper-
ons, but also above the level of DNA as activator proteins. Also on the inside of an 
organism, the “environment” fluctuates, as mutations accumulate during lifetime, 
concentrations of enzymes fluctuate, and genes are copied and lost. Developmental 
pathways involving feedback loops may buffer against such variations (Bergman 
and Siegal 2003). This idea, that complex genetic backgrounds provide a platform 
for stabilized development in unpredictably fluctuating environments, is the central 
idea behind Lerner’s (1954) “genetic homeostasis,” Waddington’s (1942) canaliza-
tion (see also Schmalhausen 1949), and goes back to Bernard (1878) who wrote 
that “all vital mechanisms, varied as they are, have only one objective, that of pre-
serving constant the conditions of life in the internal environment.”
4  Organisms’ Independence of Their Environment
Bernard’s remark alludes to a simple principle: The fitness of an organism is 
determined not only by its external environment, but also, or even predominantly, 
by how well it functions internally (Schwenk and Wagner 2001). Consequently, 
traits will evolve to form coadapted complexes (Seaborg 1999). This principle is 
largely neglected in modern evolutionary biology, which focuses almost exclu-
sively on natural selection from the outside, but it is certainly not new. Whyte 
(1965; see also Frazetta 1975; Riedl 1977) expressed his surprise that biologists 
had not incorporated it in their theories and encountered few similar ideas in con-
temporary literature, even though the importance of the internal environment and 
coadaptation of parts was understood already long before Waddington (1942), 
Lerner (1954), and especially Schmalhausen (1949) emphasized it. Indeed, it 
can be traced back to Aristotle’s (350 b. Chr.) “On the Parts of Animals” and is 
largely equivalent to Cuvier’s principle of correlation of parts (1798 in Rudwick 
1997), which influenced Bernard (1878) to emphasize that the “milieu intérieur” 
renders an organism relatively independent of its environment. Chetverikov 
(1926) referred to this as the “genotypic milieu,” and Mayr (1963) as “cohesion 
of the genotype.” Mayr also strongly advocated more holistic views of the geno-
type, explaining that the contribution to fitness of any gene depends on all other 
genes. Indeed, Cuvier—who studied fossil and living elephants before Falconer 
did—opposed the idea of gradual evolution (50 years before Darwin) for two rea-
sons: First because his studies of fossils led him to conclude that one form does 
not generally evolve into another, and second because his studies of comparative 
anatomy made him regard “organisms as integrated wholes, in which each part’s 
form and function were integrated into the entire body. No part could be modified 
without impairing this functional integration” (1798, in Rudwick 1997). More than 
150 years later, substantial evidence had accumulated supporting Cuvier’s view: 
Lerner (1954) pointed out that artificial selection for extreme phenotypes tends to 
reduce fitness, as Dawson (1964) concisely summarized: “Genetic analysis of a 
variety of traits in populations of several species has revealed a similar pattern for 
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many traits which are important components of fitness. In general such characters 
have intermediate optima, and prolonged artificial selection for extreme expres-
sion leads to a reduction in fitness.” The principle that it is advantageous when the 
different parts of an organism function well together (Schwenk and Wagner 2001) 
is the ultimate explanation for canalization and developmental plasticity, for if it 
were unimportant how well different traits function together, there would be little 
benefit from canalizing their development!
Cuvier (1798) explained his conditions d’existence as follows: “if an animal’s 
teeth are such as they must be in order for it to nourish itself with flesh, we can 
be sure without further examination that the whole system of its digestive organs 
is appropriate for that kind of food, and that its whole skeleton and locomotive 
organs, and even its sense organs, are arranged in such a way as to make it skillful 
at pursuing and catching its prey. For these relations are the necessary conditions 
of existence of the animal; if things were not so, it would not be able to subsist.” 
Thus, evolutionary changes in an animal’s teeth are useless unless accompanied 
by simultaneous changes in digestive, locomotor, and sensory organs. Cuvier’s 
holistic view of an organism was reflected in the concept of a bauplan which was 
common in continental Europe in the early twentieth century. This view, how-
ever, became more and more replaced by the atomist Anglo-American view of the 
organism as a collection of separate traits (Eldredge et al. 2005; see also Schwenk 
and Wagner 2001; Minelli and Fusco 2012), perhaps because in the laboratory 
“[t]here appears to be no character … that cannot be selected in Drosophila” 
(Lewontin 1974). The view that traits form coadapted complexes, however, 
implies that fitness of any trait, and hence of the organism as a whole, depends on 
the traits themselves and their mutual relations, rather than on the relation of indi-
vidual traits with the outside environment as the Modern Synthesis assumes.
4.1  The Cost of Selection
These different views of what makes an organism have more than just philosophi-
cal implications. Haldane attempted already in 1957 “to make quantitative the 
fairly obvious statement that natural selection cannot occur with great intensity for 
a number of characters at once unless they happen to be controlled by the same 
genes.” To illustrate this, Haldane used the well-known example of the peppered 
moth B. betularia. There are two color morphs of this moth, light and dark, the lat-
ter of which is much easier to spot on a background of pale lichens and white birch 
bark. The dark morph increased in numbers following the industrial revolution as 
soot darkened the trees. Kettlewell (1956) had shown that differential predation by 
birds was so intense that the frequency of the conspicuous morph could be halved 
in a single day. Haldane wrote that “if the change of environment had been so radi-
cal that ten other independently inherited characters had been subject to selection of 
the same intensity as that for colour, only 0.510, or one in 1,024, of the original gen-
otype would have survived. The species would presumably have become extinct.”
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As Van Valen (1963) put it, Haldane’s “dilemma” was that “in the process of 
the evolutionary substitution of one allele for another, at any intensity of selection 
and no matter how slight the importance of the locus, a substantial number of indi-
viduals would usually be lost because they did not already possess the new allele. 
For most organisms, rapid turnover in a few genes precludes rapid turnover in the 
others. A corollary of this is that, if an environmental change occurs that neces-
sitates the rather rapid replacement of several genes if a population is to survive, 
the population becomes extinct.” Apparently, most evolutionary biologists did not 
understand this “fairly obvious statement” because Kimura remarked in 1995 that 
“it seems to be widely accepted among biologists that Darwinian selection can act 
almost without limit as to the number of loci or sites that are simultaneously sub-
stituting advantageous alleles.”
A recent study suggests that the “substitutional load” (Kimura 1995) may be 
smaller than Haldane initially calculated (Nunney 2003), but that applies only 
to the “independently inherited characters” that Haldane considered. “Haldane’s 
dilemma” (as Van Valen dubbed it) becomes much more severe when the traits 
form a coadapted complex, where change in any trait is beneficial only if all the 
other traits change simultaneously, by the right amount, and in the right direction, 
as Cuvier (1798) implies: Evolutionary changes in an animal’s teeth are useless 
unless accompanied by simultaneous changes in digestive, locomotor and sensory 
organs. For complexes of many traits, the chance to find even a single individual in 
a very large population who unites these beneficial mutations is remote (Haldane 
1957; Van Valen 1963; Kimura 1995). Hence, might a change of environment 
necessitate a change in any component of such a complex, it could quite rapidly 
drive even a large population to extinction.
Not all traits are important for the proper functioning of other traits. In mam-
mals, for example, body temperature is crucially important (and virtually static 
over tens of millions of years) even though it is highly unlikely that for placen-
tal mammals all over the planet, the optimum body temperature is 37 °C in all 
their different environments (Hansen and Houle 2004). Therefore, it seems highly 
implausible that the body temperature of 37 °C is locally adaptive. However, it is 
quite possible that 37 °C is the temperature to which most processes are adapted 
inside all these different species. By contrast, a change in color or thickness of 
the fur causes far less internal disruption than a change in body temperature 
would, and therefore, polar bears evolved a thick white fur to compensate for 
a body temperature that is quite extravagant where they live. Darwin’s finches 
may have various beak shapes, yet they are all finch-sized homeotherm ovipa-
rous birds, and “most species displaying geographic variation vary clinally only 
in ecotypic characters affecting primarily size, proportions, and coloration, but 
show no significant evolutionary departures” (Mayr 1992). Indeed, neglect-
ing traits that do not show variation, evolutionary biologists have documented a 
splendid variety of supposedly adaptive variation in traits amenable to change 
like flower color in peas, wing color in B. betularia, fur thickness in mammals, 




In a recent essay on the same topic as this chapter, Futuyma (2010) considered 
“genetic integration” an important but not sufficient explanation for species’ fail-
ure to adapt, because population geneticists did not find evidence for extensive 
gene interactions, while stasis is observed in all the traits of an organism (Futuyma 
2010 p. 1873). However, if some aspects of an organism resist adaptive change 
because they are part of coadapted complexes, then species will in nature track 
their niche, even though other aspects of their phenotype might be amenable to 
change. If species track their niche, also traits with the potential to evolve will 
tend to remain unchanged (Björklund and Merilä 1993; Seaborg 1999). This could 
explain organism-wide stasis, although mosaic evolution (Simpson 1944) may still 
be the norm. More importantly, widespread gene interactions (if not undetected for 
methodological reasons) are not necessary for traits to exert stabilizing selection 
on each other.
Genes may interact in various ways. Pleiotropy means that a gene affects more 
than a single trait (Stearns 2011; Wagner and Zhang 2011). Conversely, however, 
traits do not have to be controlled by the same genes to influence each other. For 
example, body temperature does not have to be genetically correlated with all the 
processes it affects to incur stabilizing selection. Thus, the internal component of 
fitness does not require pleiotropy. Genes may also act epistatically. Mayr pro-
moted the importance of the internal cohesion of organisms for a long time (Mayr 
1954, 1963, 1982, 1992) and often used the term epistasis to describe it. It seems 
that to him epistasis referred to the fitness effect of a gene, which “is always in the 
context with other genes, and the interaction with those other genes makes a par-
ticular gene either more favorable or less favorable.” He criticized “atomist” genet-
icists from R.A. Fisher to B. Charlesworth and R. Lande for neglecting this (Mayr 
1992). To most geneticists, however, epistasis implies that the effect of a gene on 
the phenotype, not fitness, depends on the genetic background. Coadapted traits 
may well affect each other’s contribution to fitness [epistasis sensu Mayr (1992)] 
without any epistatic gene action. Therefore, lack of evidence for widespread epi-
static interactions is no evidence against an intrinsic fitness component.
More recently, it has been suggested that absence of response to selection in the 
wild could be due to genetic correlations, referred to as “the” G-matrix. It is pos-
sible that in special situations genetic correlations change, cancel, or even reverse 
response to selection (Lande and Arnold 1983; Schluter 1996). However, the 
G-matrix is a locally valid statistical simplification of the genotype–phenotype map 
and not a persistent property of an individual or population. Therefore, G-matrices 
are expected to change as, e.g., allelic frequencies evolve and hence cannot mean-
ingfully be argued to constrain evolution (Pigliucci 2006). Of course, the actual 
developmental processes may constrain evolution (Minelli and Fusco 2012), but 
through internal selection (Schwenk and Wagner 2001) and not simply by redi-
recting response to selection (Schluter 1996), because traits that are long-term 
static often show considerable short-term responses (Gingerich 1983; Bell 2010; 
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Uyeda et al. 2011). In summary, stabilizing selection can result from the functional 
interaction between traits (Schwenk and Wagner 2001) and does not directly 
require or predict genetic correlations, genetic linkage, pleiotropy, or epistasis.
4.3  The Strength of Internal Factors
Could coadaptation of characters exert stabilizing selection strong enough to let 
incipient species rapidly evolve into “clearly defined and well marked species” 
(Wallace 1905) that subsequently become static as their body parts become so 
coadapted that they hardly respond to environmental change? Yoo (1980) selected 
Drosophila melanogaster for increased abdominal bristle numbers. In 90 genera-
tions bristle numbers increased from approximately 10 initially to reach a plateau 
at about 40. When selection was suspended, bristle numbers dropped equally rap-
idly with about 10 bristles disappearing in just 10 generations. Such reversals and 
selection plateaus have traditionally been ascribed to (unintended) selection on the 
various other traits that are pleiotropically controlled by the same or linked genes 
(Mackay and Lyman 2005). However, Teotonio et al. (2009) studied reversed 
selection in D. melanogaster and found “that despite the complete convergence to 
ancestral levels of adaptation, allele frequencies only show partial return,” which 
would be a remarkable coincidence if the reversal were due to pleiotropy. It seems 
therefore more plausible that reversals are instead due to a decrease in fitness due 
to strong selection (Lerner 1954; Dawson 1964; Meiklejohn and Hartl 2002) dis-
rupting coadapted character complexes. The speed of reversal in this and other, 
similar studies suggests that the strength of stabilizing selection is comparable to 
that of the typically strong directional selection that preceded it.
5  A Largely Autonomous Process
When Darwin acknowledged Falconer’s comments that species may change rap-
idly when they emerge, to subsequently remain largely static, he remarked that this 
was “clearly leading to the same result.” As discussed above, it remains unclear 
what Darwin meant with that remark. It is clear, however, that rapid change in 
incipient species became a long-standing issue in evolutionary biology. Simpson 
(1944) referred to the discussion on micro- versus macroevolution as “old,” but 
he also wrote that the most important distinction between students of evolutionary 
biology is whether they believe that bursts of rapid evolution represent a funda-
mentally different process or not. When Eldredge and Gould (1972) and Stanley 
(1975) revived the discussion, intense debate followed once more and continues 
(Pennell et al. 2014; Lieberman and Eldredge 2014).
In the early part of the twentieth century, several students of evolution devel-
oped theories to explain phenotypic differences between groups of species, which 
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they deemed too substantial to be explained by a gradual process of evolution. 
These theories, often aimed at explaining hypothetical processes leading to novel 
genera or taxa of still higher rank, have invariably caused intense debate. I have 
therefore chosen not to address these theories here, but to focus on the processes 
that govern evolutionary change within established species, and in incipient spe-
cies—which would generally be considered congeners. That is because we can be 
sure that these processes exist (although we do not know their exact nature) and 
because I believe that one does not need to involve the origin of higher taxa to 
address the relation between micro- and macroevolution.
In the simplest relation between micro- and macroevolution, the latter is noth-
ing else than the long-term consequence of the former. Above I have presented 
various lines of evidence suggesting this is not the case. In the first place, esti-
mates of rates of evolution based on phenotypic differences between species are 
orders of magnitude lower than those obtained from short-term studies (Lande 
1976; Lynch 1990; Lynch and Hill 1986). More precisely, estimated rates are 
inversely related to the time period over which they are calculated (Gingerich 
1983, 2009). In addition, both fossil records and phylogenetic studies of present-
day species suggest that evolutionary change is concentrated in short periods of 
time, often associated with speciation (Webster et al. 2003; Pagel et al. 2006; Hunt 
2007; Whittall and Hodges 2007; Mattila and Bokma 2008; Monroe and Bokma 
2009). These lines of evidence all demonstrate that macroevolution is not micro-
evolution writ large.
This raises two questions: What prevents short-term, ostensibly adaptive evo-
lutionary changes to accumulate over time, and what happens during speciation. 
To address the first question first: Long-term stasis has been observed despite sub-
stantial changes in species’ biotic and abiotic environments, and even in species 
that apparently suffer mortality due to these environmental changes. This indi-
cates that long-term stasis is not due to stabilizing selection exerted by the envi-
ronment (Lieberman and Dudgeon 1996), which implies that it instead originates 
from within the organism, from traits exerting selection on each other. The idea 
that traits are adapted to each other can be traced back to Cuvier and even Aristotle 
(see also Chetverikov 1926; Schmalhausen 1949; Whyte 1965; Frazetta 1975; 
Riedl 1977; Schwenk and Wagner 2001), but I am not aware of direct experimental 
evidence. [Experiments showing reversed evolution when directional selection is 
suspended (e.g., Yoo 1980) are in line with this idea (Meiklejohn and Hartl 2002), 
but do not rule out alternative explanations]. However, theory predicts that selec-
tion cannot act effectively on many traits at the same time (Haldane 1957; Van 
Valen 1963; Kimura 1995), especially not if those traits form a coadapted complex. 
Theory also predicts that systems of multiple interacting factors will have stable 
equilibria (May 1972) to which they return after small deviations. Moreover, traits 
that intuitively appear less important for the proper functioning of other traits, for 
example coloration, appear to be far less constrained than more central traits like 
body temperature in homeotherms, which is what one would expect if traits exert 
selection on each other. Therefore, even without direct evidence, I think it is very 
likely that long-term stasis is caused by traits exerting selection on each other.
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This leads us to an answer on the second question; what happens during speciation. 
It is hard to imagine that when a system of interacting traits moves from one stable 
equilibrium to another, it would remain compatible with the previous system. Thus, 
a transition from one equilibrium to another will very generally be associated with 
speciation. (That does not, of course, mean that every single case of speciation will 
involve a shift to a new equilibrium.) This idea was proposed by Simpson as “quan-
tum evolution,” by Mayr (1954, 1982) as “genetic revolution” (see also Barton and 
Charlesworth 1984; Seaborg 1999; Provine 2004), and by Eldredge and Gould as 
“punctuated equilibria” (1972; Gould and Eldredge 1986, 1993). This is supported in 
the first place by studies indicating that reproductive isolation is driven not by accumu-
lation of genetic mutations in general, but by regulatory changes (Prager and Wilson 
1975). Further support comes from theoretical analysis of complex systems of inter-
acting factors (May 1972): Such systems are not expected to evolve gradually, but to 
shift from one equilibrium either back to the same equilibrium, to chaos (extinction), 
or to a new equilibrium (speciation), as Simpson already anticipated in 1944. Finally, 
it is supported by empirical evidence that evolutionary change is concentrated in short 
bursts, often associated with speciation (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Webster et al. 
2003; Pagel et al. 2006; Hunt 2007; Whittall and Hodges 2007; Mattila and Bokma 
2008; Monroe and Bokma 2009). Thus, traits that do not influence the functioning 
of other traits may evolve gradually, but more substantial evolutionary change that 
involves persistent changes of coadapted trait complexes represents shifts between sta-
ble equilibria of a complex system.
There has been some discussion in literature on what factors could cause a 
population to shift away from a stable equilibrium. Simpson (1944) referred to 
such factors as “superthreshold,” as opposed to the subthreshold factors causing 
only microevolutionary deviations from which the system returns to the old equi-
librium. Simpson apparently considered the possibility that intense natural selec-
tion could be a superthreshold force. Mayr (1954) and also Eldredge and Gould 
(1972) seemed more inclined to think that small population size plays a crucial 
role. Perhaps because Mayr never provided a specific definition of a “genetic rev-
olution,” the concept became associated with small population size. When later 
researchers of speciation found no evidence of widespread bottlenecking, many 
took this as evidence against genetic revolutions (Coyne and Orr 2004), and current 
speciation research largely disregards functionally entangled evolutionary factors 
(Minelli and Fusco 2012). However, recent findings suggest that superthreshold 
changes may be achieved in more ways than through intense selection or extreme 
bottlenecking. One powerful but rare cause could be whole-genome duplica-
tions (De Bodt et al. 2005). A far more common potential trigger is hybridization 
(McCarthy 2008). Studies of gene expression have shown that hybridization of 
species (as is common in plants) or isolated populations [which is harder to detect 
in retrospect, but may have occurred in our own species (Patterson et al. 2006)] 
is often accompanied by substantial regulatory changes that may result in novel 
ontogenies (Nielsen et al. 2000). Thus, rather than through very small numbers of 
individuals suffering inbreeding depression (Mayr 1954, 1982), genetic revolu-
tions may occur in large numbers of outbred individuals experiencing hybrid vigor. 
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Rapid change in incipient species experiencing a novel environment may also be 
achieved through phenotypic plasticity (Pigliucci and Müller 2010) followed by 
acquisition of the necessary adaptations through a decrease in plasticity or “genetic 
assimilation” (Waddington 1942).
If a shift from one equilibrium to another drives rapid change in incipient spe-
cies, its direction and magnitude will be determined by the selective forces exerted 
by traits on each other and not by the environment—even if environmental change 
initially triggered the shift. If that is the case, then rapid change in incipient spe-
cies is largely independent of the environment and independent of microevolution-
ary changes. Our analyses of body mass evolution in mammals suggest that this 
is indeed the case: The magnitude of rapid body mass change in incipient spe-
cies appears to be independent of how frequently such changes occur (Mattila and 
Bokma 2008; Monroe and Bokma 2009), which suggests that the environment has 
little effect on this process. Many groups of ecologically similar species show sub-
stantially different rates of evolution. These differences are so common that they 
are often taken for granted, but I argue that they indicate that the tempo of macro-
evolution is set not by the pace of (a)biotic environmental change, but largely by 
interactions between traits, rendering macroevolution a largely autonomous pro-
cess. [Of course, species may still appear well adapted to their environment due 
to exaptation, pre-adaptation, and ecological fitting (Bock 1959; Gould and Vrba 
1982; Janzen 1985)].
As Anderson (1972) pointed out in his famous essay “More is Different,” the 
elementary entities of solid state physics obey the principles of particle physics, 
yet solid state physics is not just applied particle physics. Likewise, cells consist 
of molecules, but cell biology is not applied molecular biology, and psychology 
is not applied physiology. At each hierarchical stage, entirely new concepts, prin-
ciples, and generalizations are necessary. It is in this fashion that macroevolution 
is related to microevolution. The elementary entities of macroevolution follow the 
principles of microevolution, but we cannot make macroevolutionary predictions 
from mere knowledge of microevolutionary processes. Entirely new concepts and 
principles are necessary to describe a largely autonomous process.
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Abstract The adaptive landscape is an important diagrammatic concept that was 
conceived in population genetics. During the Modern Synthesis, in the first half of 
the twentieth century, the landscape imagery was used to represent evolution on a 
large scale, aiding in the construction of a common language for a new evolution-
ary biology. Not only historic adaptive landscapes by Dobzhansky, Simpson, and 
others are a record of how macroevolution was thought of in those decades; they 
stimulate reflection on “combination spaces” that underlie them. In fact, any land-
scape diagram is the three-dimensional transposition of a multidimensional space 
of combinations of genes, morphological traits, or other kinds of variables. This 
is an important and enduring general point of awareness: The diagram displays 
some aspects of the considered space while hiding others, exposing the author and 
the user to incomplete understanding and to conflating different spaces. Today, 
macroevolution is studied as a multifarious exploration of spaces of possibilities 
of all different sorts, interconnected in complex ways: genotype spaces, molecu-
lar spaces, morphospaces, geographical spaces, ecological spaces, and genea-
logical spaces. Actual macroevolutionary stories and outcomes are a subset of the 
universes of possible combinations—of genes, nucleotides, morphological traits, 
and environmental variables. Visualizations of macroevolution are a challenge of 
showing both distinction and correlation between spaces of possibilities.
Keywords Adaptation · Speciation · Macroevolution · Visualization
The “adaptive landscape” was one of the earliest ways of representing evolu-
tion graphically. It was devised in the early 1930s in the context of population 
genetics, but it was soon reused to represent global biodiversity, speciation, and 
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adaptive radiation. Due to its flexible semantic scope, this pictorial concept played 
a major role in the Modern Synthesis, contributing in particular to the establish-
ment of a common language between experimental geneticists, mathematicians, 
paleontologists, naturalists, and all biologists in general. In addition to facilitat-
ing communication among scientists, it helped shoring up the idea that micro- and 
macroevolution were different degrees of magnification of the same, few, long-
reaching fundamental evolutionary mechanisms. Historic adaptive landscapes also 
reflected their authors’ idea of macroevolution as fundamentally connected with 
adaptation to environmental conditions and, sometimes, to a perceived global 
trend of progressive optimization and complexification.
Today, macroevolution is no longer viewed as driven exclusively by adapta-
tion to local conditions, least of all by optimization, and evolution is studied at 
many scales of observation, each with its peculiar mechanisms and entities. The 
diminished use of macroevolutionary adaptive landscapes reflects this changed 
epistemology. Landscape diagrams are limited to a much narrower scope of appli-
cations, while other forms of visualization (e.g., diversity diagrams, distribution 
maps, and phylogenetic trees) are more prominent in illustrating macroevolution-
ary phenomena. Yet, most graphical representations of evolution share at least 
one characteristic with adaptive landscapes: They show spaces of possibilities 
and their changing occupancy through time. Macroevolutionary studies today 
approach multiple spaces of possibilities—for example, in phylogeny, morphol-
ogy, and geography—combining them and showing their relationships. Not only is 
analyzing historic adaptive landscapes useful to understand the view of macroevo-
lution that they contributed to consolidate, and helpful to appreciate a fundamental 
logic of visual representations of evolution. Over time, historic landscapes gener-
ated overinterpretations and misinterpretations, because they were based on some 
conflations and ambiguities that were deeply related to their unifying goals. Their 
story is therefore also instructive about some enduring risks created by powerful 
and flexible graphical representations of macroevolution.
1  Adaptive Landscapes in the Modern Synthesis
The earliest use of landscape images with peaks and valleys representing evolution 
is usually attributed to Sewall Wright, who used these diagrams for a presentation at 
the 6th Congress of Genetics in Ithaca, New York, in 1932 (Wright 1932, see Figs. 1 
and 2). Theodosius Dobzhansky, who was present at the talk, immediately adopted 
Wright’s diagram for the genetics course he taught at the California Institute of 
Technology, and incorporated it in his Genetics and the Origin of Species (1937) 
and all its subsequent editions (Provine 1986). Dobzhansky’s immensely influen-
tial book became the principal direct source of the landscape imagery across the 
vast literature on evolution (Ruse 1990). Among the most significant treatises on 
evolutionary theory that included references to the adaptive landscape were George 
Gaylord Simpson’s Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944, see Figs. 3, 4 and 5) and 
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Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (1942). The presence of the landscape in 
the formative years of the Modern Synthesis raises the question of what a role the 
landscape imagery may have played in advancing its principal arguments.
The Modern Synthesis—henceforth, MS—is often regarded as “the general 
acceptance of two conclusions: gradual evolution can be explained in terms of 
small genetic changes (“mutations”) and recombination, and the ordering of this 
genetic variation by natural selection; and the observed evolutionary phenomena, 
particularly macroevolutionary processes and speciation, can be explained in a 
manner that is consistent with the known genetic mechanisms” (Mayr 1980: 1). 
The focus on “acceptance” and “conclusions” determines considering the MS as 
a “product.” To elucidate the possible roles of the adaptive landscape in the MS, 
however, a view of the MS as a process is more effective than a view of the MS as 
the product of some process.
1.1  The Modern Synthesis as a Process
The book The Evolutionary Synthesis (Mayr and Provine 1980), based on a confer-
ence organized by Ernst Mayr at the end of the 1970s, documented evidence that 
the MS had occurred simultaneously and at different rates in different fields 
Fig. 1  Dozhansky’s symbolic landscape picture of the relations between the organism and the 
environment. The picture is a topographic map of all the possible genetic combinations, in which 
the “contours” follow combinations with equal adaptive values. Adaptive peaks and valleys are 
marked, respectively, by plus and minus signs [Source Dobzhansky (1937), 3rd ed. 1951, p. 8]
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(e.g., genetics, cytology, or botany) dealing with many different levels of biological 
organization (from chromosomes to higher taxa) and in different countries, “or 
even in the same fields in different divisions of the same university” (Provine 
1980a: 405). As pointed out by Provine in the same book, “The evolutionary syn-
thesis was a very complex process; its historical development cannot be encom-
passed accurately by any simple thesis […] No simple historical thesis, however, 
brilliant, can describe all essential elements of the evolutionary synthesis” (1980a: 
405). There are indeed a few accounts of the MS as a process. They even disagree 
about the time span in which they locate the MS.1 Yet, most authors recognize two 
main phases over the years from the early 1910s to the early 1940s.
The “Darwinian–Mendelian synthesis” of the 1910s and 1920s reconciled the 
Darwinian theory of natural selection with the Mendelian theory of inheritance. 
1 When did the MS begin? Provine, finding no trace of origin in any of the major works of the 
MS, cited Thomas Kuhn saying that “the actual origins of a scientific field generally will not 
be found in the major books that embody the fundamental beliefs of the field” (Provine 1980a: 
400–401). He even expressed the feeling of evolutionary synthesis having “been a part of biology 
for a long time, almost since Darwin” (Ivi: 400).
Fig. 2  Possible courses on Wright’s adaptive surface. The dotted circle is the initial location of 
the population inside the range of all possible genetic combinations. The subsequent dynamics 
depends on the population’s demography (number of individuals, spatial subdivision) and genet-
ics (number of loci, number of alleles, topography of the landscape), as well as on selection pres-
sures, on the environment influencing the fitness values of genotypes, and on the (extremely low) 
rate of viable mutations that modify the topography [Source Wright’s original (1932) reproposed 
by Dobzhansky (1937)]
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Fig. 3  a, b Two pictures by George Gaylord Simpson exemplifying his use of the adaptive 
 landscape in a unified picture of evolution. a “Diagram of explosive speciation” belonging to a 
traditional kind of tree diagrams drawn in paleontology. b Landscape pictures of the three major 
modes of evolution—speciation, phyletic evolution, and quantum evolution—showing an interpre-
tation of macroevolutionary branching explicitly linked to population genetics [Source Simpson 
(1944), Figs. 31 and 35]
Fig. 4  Simpson’s landscape 
of the evolution of horses 
from browsers (right) to 
browsers and grazers (left). 
Eocene: browsing and 
grazing are two  
well-separated peaks; 
only the browsing peak 
is occupied. Oligocene: 
the browsing peak moves 
toward the grazing peak due 
to climate change and size 
increase. Late Oligocene 
and Early Miocene: The 
two peaks are close enough 
and asymmetrical variation 
of the family causes some 
animals to be on the saddle. 
Miocene: A segment of the 
population breaks away under 
selection pressure and climbs 
the grazing peak [Source 
Simpson (1944), Fig. 13]
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In those years, the Mendelian theory, increasingly supported by experimental evi-
dence featuring discrete variation (“mutations”), was considered to contradict the 
conditions for natural selection to occur. Population genetics was essentially a 
powerful mathematical theory of multiple factors (e.g., selection, mutation, drift, 
population size, and allele frequency), a theory that guided laboratory experiments 
and some agricultural applications (Provine 1980b). Population genetics intro-
duced a “particulate theory of inheritance” (cf. Mayr 1980), whereby continuous 
variation began to be considered as the product of a huge array of discrete variants 
of discrete genetic elements. In the “gene pool” of a population, small fitness dif-
ferences could have major impacts and evolution by natural selection could occur. 
Sewall Wright, the inventor of the adaptive landscape, was undisputedly one of 
Fig. 5  Simpson’s graphical portrait of five different selection regimes. “Contours are analogous 
to topographic maps, with hachures placed on downhill side. Direction of selection is uphill, 
and intensity proportional to slope”: a the adaptive optimum is the “typical” character, selection 
concentrates or stabilizes the population; b the “typical” character is ill-adapted, selection favors 
divergence; c selection drives to an optimum which is out of the current adaptive range of the 
population; d centrifugal toward five different optima; e asymmetrical–centripetal, employed also 
in Late Oligocene of Fig. 4 [Source modified from Simpson (1944), Fig. 11]
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the main figures in this phase. For Lewontin (1980), Wright’s “synthesis,” based 
on the importance of gene interactions, was particularly important as a step to the 
subsequent phase of synthesis, because it considered a number of factors (e.g., 
random processes, demography, and geographical subdivision), their balance, 
and their configurations in relation to outcomes like speciation or extinction. For 
Lewontin, the synthetic work of Wright provided hints “of the way in which both 
speciation and extinction can flow mechanically from the processes of modulation 
of variation” (Lewontin 1980: 61).
The “second synthesis” of the 1930s and 1940s was characterized by the 
engagement into evolutionary theory of previously separated fields, such as sys-
tematics and taxonomy, zoology and botany, paleontology and morphology, and 
cytology and embryology. In the early 1930s, all these fields had been dominated 
by theories that were incompatible with, or irrelevant to, the theory of evolu-
tion by natural selection, or any theory of evolution at all. By 1947, according to 
Ernst Mayr’s memories, there was “an essential agreement among [scientists of 
all fields] on the gradual mode of evolution, with natural selection as the basic 
mechanism and the only direction-giving force” (Mayr 1980: 42). A synthe-
sis had occurred. Between 1930 and 1947, books such as Dobzhansky’s (1937), 
Simpson’s (1944) and Huxley’s (1942) had been published. A renewed evolution-
ary theory had united geneticists on the one hand, and those called by Mayr “the 
naturalists” on the other. Mayr described the MS as a process engaging separate 
fields of research by virtue of common language, communication, reciprocal 
awareness, and familiarity. The MS would consist in the spread of a very general 
way of thinking, with resolution of oppositions into complementarities, yielding a 
sense of a single theory potentially explaining in a consistent way a unified set of 
phenomena. In this process, liable to different views, we will focus on the role of 
adaptive landscapes.
1.2  Mayr’s Communication View Versus Lewontin’s 
Export View of the Modern Synthesis
Under the assumption that the MS was a complex, two-step historical process that 
took place between the 1910s and the 1940s, the nature of steps and the relation-
ship between them can still be viewed in different ways. We will compare two 
views, one held by Ernst Mayr, the other by Richard Lewontin. For Mayr, the 
second step of the MS was a phase of enhanced communication. For Lewontin, 
it consisted in the diffusion and application of mathematical models. It is easy to 
guess that the adaptive landscape’s role in the MS depends on the view of the MS 
we embrace. Adopting Mayr’s view, we will consider Sewall Wright’s visualiza-
tion as a migrant metaphor, generating new common pictorial (rather than math-
ematical) language between disparate fields.
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The main reason why Ernst Mayr had organized the 1980 Evolutionary 
Synthesis conference was to revise a dominant view of the MS held by geneticists 
since the 1950s. In Provine’s words:
…most geneticists in the 1950s […] believed that the evolutionary synthesis was a func-
tion or product of advances within the field of genetics and that these advances were 
applied to other fields like systematics, paleontology, embryology, cytology, and morphol-
ogy […, that] the real advances took place in genetics and were exported to other fields 
of evolutionary biology, thus creating the evolutionary theory (Provine 1980a: 402–403, 
emphasis added).
At one level, Mayr’s discontent concerned the relative contributions of different 
professionals to the second synthesis: He was opposing the idea that geneticists 
had been the main contributors to the synthesis, with a minor or even passive 
involvement of those whom Mayr called the “naturalists,” e.g., systematists and 
paleontologists (cf. Mayr 1959, 1973). At the same time, the target of Mayr’s cam-
paign was the view of synthesis as an export (from genetics). As Provine recog-
nized at the end of the 1980 conference, the evolutionary synthesis was “more than 
a simple application of new concepts in genetics to other facets of evolutionary 
biology, as earlier accounts have suggested” (1980a: 405).
Interestingly, the previously standard view was maintained by at least one 
participant of the 1980 conference: population geneticist Richard Lewontin. At 
the conference, Lewontin presented his own version of the “export view” of the 
synthesis, as an increasingly extensive use of population genetics mathematical 
models as a guide for empirical research and hypothesis testing in all biological 
fields. He stuck to the view that the “second synthesis” was an extension, a true 
export from genetics to other fields, insisting on the importance of mathematical 
theory and on the potentially tight relationship between theory and observations. 
For Lewontin, all the mathematical theory produced in the “Darwinian–Mendelian 
synthesis” by Sewall Wright and the other “architects” would have been be able to 
guide the naturalists’ work by providing detailed predictions and means to subtly 
distinguish among competing hypotheses for explaining observations; the obsta-
cle to this was the scarce mathematical knowledge and understanding of most 
biologists: “…a tremendous amount of understanding and synthesis of evolution-
ary ideas could have been derived chiefly from the theoretical work of Fisher and 
Wright. These insights were explicit in the writings of Fisher and Wright, but sim-
ply unavailable to most biologists for reasons of literacy” (Lewontin 1980: 58). 
Fields like systematics and paleontology were making use of too few of the mod-
els that mathematical geneticists had worked out. The genetical theory was indeed 
not “correctly incorporated” in the work of other biologists, so, if theory had to 
say something, it was that “we have not yet found the observations sufficient to 
distinguish among the [evolutionary] hypotheses” (Ivi: 66). These limitations 
deprived evolutionary hypotheses of sufficient support and, ultimately, rendered 
the synthesis incomplete.
Mayr’s view radically differed from that of Lewontin’s. The former asked to the 
latter: “Wasn’t the evolutionary synthesis possible on the basis of a very minimal 
agreement that there are small genetic changes and that the phenotypes produced 
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by even every small genetic changes may differ and probably usually differ in 
their selective values? […] perhaps we should not complain about the failure of 
application of the sophisticated and advanced theoretical analyses…” (Q&A sec-
tion in Lewontin 1980: 67). Lewontin, of course, replied: “I really disagree.” His 
point was that much of mathematical theory was destined to be “a guide for per-
plexed experimentalists” that was not exploited yet (Lewontin 1980: 65).
A core aspect of synthesis in Mayr’s view was the construction of a common 
language among specialists in fields that had grown apart. Terminological incon-
sistencies were in need of full resolution, as in the case of “mutation,” used “to 
describe aspects of the phenotype by naturalists and to describe aspects of the 
genotype by geneticists” (1980: 14). The construction of a new, shared vocabu-
lary was then, for Mayr, a mainstay of the MS: “The creation of a new evolution-
ary terminology greatly contributed to the eventual synthesis. At least some of 
the misunderstandings resulted from the lack of an appropriate and precise termi-
nology for certain evolutionary phenomena. Nearly all the architects of the new 
synthesis contributed terminological innovations” (Ivi: 29). The MS had to fill in 
communication gaps among specialists throughout the world who might not have 
been aware of each others’ work and advancements: Before synthesis, for exam-
ple, much progress made by experimentalists had “percolated only very incom-
pletely” (Mayr 1980: 28) to the naturalists, and vice versa:
The conceptual advances made by either [experimental geneticists and naturalists] were 
not perceived by their opponents; in fact, they were usually unknown to them. As a result, 
the construction of a unified and comprehensive theory of evolution during the first three 
decades of the century was impossible. The naturalists had wrong ideas on the nature of 
inheritance and variation; the experimental geneticists were dominated by typological 
thinking that resulted in their distrust of natural selection and a belief in the importance 
of pure lines and mutation pressure. Like the naturalists, the geneticists had many miscon-
ceptions about the nature of variation. They had at least as great an ignorance of the excel-
lent taxonomic literature on species and speciation as the naturalists had of the genetic 
literature (Ivi: 13).
Distinctions were clarified, resolving long-standing oppositions into comple-
mentarities, and allowing for untroubled division of scientific research programs. 
Important, for example, was the clarification that “the naturalists and the experi-
mental geneticists were concerned with different levels” (Mayr 1980b: 11) of 
the “biological hierarchy,” whereas in earlier years, much confusion was brought 
about by “discussions that made no distinction between phyletic evolution (tem-
poral genetic changes in populations) and the multiplication of species—that is, 
the splitting of a phyletic line into two or more reproductively isolated lines” (Ivi: 
35). Consistency was a key word in Mayr’s view of synthesis: Authors such as 
Haldane, Simpson, Huxley, Mayr, and Dobzhansky had been showing consist-
ency between experiments and field work, genetic and phenotypic data in the wild, 
theoretical and field genetics, and microevolution and macroevolution. Notice that 
for Lewontin, “consistency” was a pejorative term compared to “entailment” or 
“necessity”: “As an evolutionary geneticist, I do not see how the origin of higher 
taxa are the necessary consequence of neo-Darwinism. They are sufficiently 
explained, but they are not necessary consequences” (Lewontin 1980: 60).
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The MS was, in Mayr’s view, the described process of concrete communication 
across disciplines, which, in turn, incubated some convictions. For example, dif-
ferent fields of biology came to be viewed as focusing on different aspects of the 
same unified Darwinian theory, rather than advancing multiple competing theories, 
as was believed in the first decades of the century. Experimental and mathematical 
evidence of the agency and efficacy of natural selection was acknowledged across 
the board, along with what Mayr called a neo-Darwinian or population thinking, 
characterized by the centrality of variation and by the importance of ecological 
factors and population structure. In this social dynamics of science, Mayr vindi-
cated the importance of naturalists who developed a new, evolutionary systemat-
ics, and a population understanding of species. The adaptive landscape imagery, 
devised in one particular field, became a metaphor, i.e., a way of building recipro-
cal confidence and common language, as well as serving as a vehicle for carrying 
over scientific content across different disciplines.2
1.3  Adaptive Landscapes in the Communication View  
of the Modern Synthesis
In Mayr’s account, an ingredient of the MS was the increased confidence of scien-
tists toward each other’s methods. In the MS, Mayr emphasized the role of “bridge 
builders,” i.e., individual scientists active in overcoming the hostility that devel-
oped among many fields as a result of the lack of communication between them. 
Sewall Wright, as a mathematician and, to a limited extent, former laboratory sci-
entist, was a bridge builder between geneticists and naturalists.3 For example, his 
‘shifting balance theory’ and the observations he drew from the work of naturalists 
were explicitly mutually reinforcing, “an early direct link” to speciation theory 
(Pigliucci 2008: 596). Another “astoundingly early recognition” was the compati-
bility of population genetics with the fossil record. Wright’s landscape metaphor 
was yet another communication device, purposefully tailored to an audience of 
naturalists.
We have seen in the beginning that the adaptive landscape had been proposed 
by Wright to summarize the general dynamics of a Mendelian population in a 
form understandable to other biologists. Wright consciously aimed at showing 
2 A dictionary definition of metaphor states that “a metaphor is defined as a figure of speech con-
cisely comparing two things, saying that one is the other,” while its etymology contains the idea 
of transfer. The English “metaphor” derives from the sixteenth century’s old French métaphore, 
from the Latin metaphora “carrying over.” In Greek metaphorá (μεταϕορά) “transfer,” from met-
aphero (μεταϕέρω) means “to carry over,” “to transfer”: from meta (μετά) “between” + phero 
(ϕέρω), “to bear,” “to carry.” With this etymology, metaphor seems just the right word to qualify 
the adaptive landscape in the MS as seen à la Ernst Mayr.
3 Ironically, for personal and arbitrary reasons, Wright was absent from Mayr’s list of bridge 
builders (Provine 1986).
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the potential relevance of population genetics to other fields of biology where 
mathematical models were largely dismissed as abstract and obscure. His effec-
tive visualization allowed any biologist to intuitively grasp the meaning of par-
ticular concepts employed in mathematical models, such as genetic combinations, 
mutation pressure, selection pressure, and drift, and to relate them to his or her 
own research field. The diffusion of the adaptive landscape was thus not the direct 
transfer of mathematical concepts expected in “export” views of the MS, but a 
way of engaging colleagues into new, open-ended, seemingly promising research 
questions (Ruse 1990). On the other hand, the mathematical foundation of the 
visualization was the source of its authority, even though the confidence in math-
ematical models was a rather recent acquisition:
[for many years experimental scientists had] insisted that the solution to the problems 
of evolution would have to be found by asking entirely different questions and by using 
entirely different methods. They insisted that the hypothetico-deductive approach was 
pure speculation and that the looked-for laws could be found only by induction from 
experiments (Mayr 1980: 27).
Was the great success of the adaptive landscape due to the biologists’ increased 
trust toward mathematical models? Or did the diagram itself stimulate confidence 
in mathematical models by showing that they could be consistent with—and rel-
evant to—empirical observations in many fields?
In its visual form, the landscape metaphor became particularly popular among 
paleontologists and morphologists, used to visual representations of macroevolu-
tion as we shall see in Simpson’s work (see Fig. 3a). In this pictorial convergence, 
the sense of a shared language was amplified. After the MS period, the land-
scape diagram had a long and rich history in evolutionary biology. In the 1990s, 
it was used as the principal iconic image for Climbing Mount Improbable (1996) 
by Dawkins (Fig. 6). Even though the latter might not be of particular theoretical 
significance, it clearly illustrates the efficacy of the landscape imagery as a com-
pelling visual aid in communicating scientific ideas for general audience in the 
context of popular scientific writing.
In today’s evolutionary literature, terms such as “peaks,” “valleys,” “climb,” 
“rugged,” or, more recently, “ridges” (Gavrilets 1997) are still common, even in 
cases where an adaptive landscape is not represented graphically. This demon-
strates that, during the MS, adaptive landscapes opened up an enduring semantic 
area for the verbal description of evolutionary phenomena. The adaptive landscape 
was thus also a linguistic creation, a figure of speech important in the development 
of a new, shared evolutionary language.
1.4  Dobzhansky’s Landscape
Let us now begin an analysis of the landscape pictures proposed during the MS. In 
general, a landscape image, despite what is first evoked by its name, does not 
directly represent the environment. Rather, the landscape is an image of something 
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that lives in an environment, e.g., a population or a species. The landscape surface 
in fact represents the entire virtual space of possibilities of the living entity in 
question. The vertical dimension of the evolutionary landscape represents “adapt-
edness,” i.e., fitness.4 Therefore, the physical environment, albeit not depicted 
directly, is extremely important because it influences the whole shape of the sur-
face by codetermining the elevation of each and every location of the surface.
Wright’s diagrams were designed to represent a population. They would have their 
scope extended in Dobzhansky’s and Simpson’s work, but a verbal description with 
the original scope is found in Huxley’s influential book (1942), specifically in chapter 
“Mendelism and evolution.” Huxley drew upon the Wrightian idea of a “peak shift” 
to describe the theoretical and empirical pattern of a population that transitions from 
a phase of relaxation of selective pressure and excess of variability to a phase when 
the pressure is re-established and the population turns into a “stable type” slightly 
modified from the starting “type”:
Wright (1932), in discussing such problems in more general terms, concludes that 
there must be available to most species a number of gene-combinations all of about the 
same survival value, he compares them to peaks separated by “valleys” of intermediate 
4 In some versions of the landscape, including Wright’s (1932), the vertical dimension also depends 
on absolute, intrinsic values, such as “harmony” of the genetic combination (see also Bokma, this 
volume). As we see below, in Dawkins’s landscape, the vertical elevations of the surface are largely 
determined by some intrinsic and absolute measure such as “complexity” or “perfection.”
Fig. 6  According to ethologist and evolution writer, Dawkins (1996), a landscape like this 
depicts “the eye region of Mount Improbable” (p. 177) [Source redrawn after Dawkins (1996), 
Fig. 5.30]
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combinations which are less favourable. Normally it is difficult or impossible for  selection 
to shift the type from an established peak to another, although this might be equally sat-
isfactory if reached: but when the intensity of selection is reduced (or when low size of 
population promotes the accidental survival of genes and gene-combinations), many “val-
ley” combinations are realized, the species can cross dryshod to other peaks, and it will be 
a matter of chance on which Ararat the type eventually remains perched when the rising 
tide of selection again floods out the valleys (Huxley 1942: 113).
Huxley’s “landscape of gene combinations” is close to Wright’s original idea: Its 
“evolving entity” is a population or, at most, a species. Each point of the surface 
represents one possible individual in the population or species.
A landscape picture (Fig. 1) appeared in the first pages of Dobzhansky’s book 
Genetics and the Origin of Species as “a symbolic picture of the relations between 
the organism and the environment.” The context was an appreciation of life’s 
diversity and of the strong correlation between diversity and adaptedness 
(Dobzhansky 1937: 3, 6). The “evolving entity” on Dobzhansky’s landscape was, 
again, a population of individuals, and each point of the landscape corresponding 
to an individual, actual or potential, seen as a particular genetic combination. The 
“adaptive value”5 of each genetic individual, represented by elevation, was also a 
measure of its genetic contribution to the following generation. The population’s 
peak position would thus be maintained because, by definition, the next generation 
was mostly produced by genotypes corresponding to the peaks of the landscape, 
re-proposing parental genetic combinations. In other words, peaks represented 
groups of related genetic combinations favored by natural selection.
Figure 2, reproduced by Dobzhansky from Wright (1932) without modifica-
tions in the last chapter of Genetics and the Origin of Species entitled “Patterns 
of evolution,” showed that natural selection was not only a mechanism for stabi-
lization of peak positions, but also a mechanism for evolutionary change in the 
context of a “balance of factors.” The figure showed different cases of evolutionary 
dynamics on the landscape. At any particular time, the population was found in a 
small area of the landscape, and several factors, beside natural selection, such as 
mutation, population size, and population subdivision, could determine its move-
ment on the landscape. In certain cases, the population chased a peak that was 
escaping due to environmental change. But the figure made it apparent that the 
population’s exploration of the landscape, determined by many factors, was not an 
inflexible and close-ended movement of peak climbing.
Up to this point explored, the present discussion was concerned with similar-
ities between the landscapes of Dobzhansky’s and those of Wright and Huxley. 
There is, however, one significant difference in the landscape use by these authors 
pertaining to macroevolution. Dobzhansky’s landscape is definitely a macroscopic 
one: It illustrates the idea that living beings are “…a great array of families of 
5 “The relative capacity of a given genotype to transmit their genes to the gene pool of the 
 following generations constitutes the adaptive value, or the Darwinian fitness, of that genotype. 
The adaptive value is, then, a statistical concept which epitomizes the reproductive efficiency of a 




related gene combinations, which are clustered on a large but finite number of 
adaptive peaks” (Ivi: 10), and comprehends not only all existing species, but also 
nonexisting ones:
Every organism may be conceived as possessing a certain combination of organs or traits, 
and of genes which condition the development of these traits. Different organisms possess 
some genes in common with others and some genes which are different. The number of 
conceivable combinations of genes present in different organisms is, of course, immense. 
The actually existing combinations amount to only an infinitesimal fraction of the poten-
tially possible, or at least conceivable, ones. All these combinations may be thought of as 
forming a multidimensional space within which every existing or possible organism may 
be said to have its place (Ivi: 8, emphasis added).
For Dobzhansky, the scope of population genetics is evolution itself: Since spe-
cies are made of populations, the same rules that work within a population also 
govern “the genetic constitution of species” (Dobzhansky 1937: 16). Stated very 
explicitly, “Evolution is a change in the genetic composition of populations. The 
study of mechanisms of evolution falls within the province of population genet-
ics” (Ibidem). Change in the genetic composition populations, in accordance 
with environments, creates diversity and discontinuities at all taxonomical levels, 
up to “phylogenetic changes leading to the origin of new classes of organisms” 
(Ibidem).
Physical environments are an invisible, fundamental, and macroscopic shaping 
factor. The environmental scope of the landscape logically matches the complete 
set of all “the environments that exist in the world” (Ivi: 8). On Dobzhansky’s 
landscape, existing organisms are on peaks because they are well adapted to envi-
ronments. Valleys “symbolize the gene combinations the adaptive values of which 
are low in the existing environments” (Ivi: 277); therefore, they are “deserted and 
empty,” and they host species and individuals that do not actually exist.
Dobzhansky’s peaks are arranged in ranges, reflecting the hierarchically nested 
structure of taxonomy:
…the adaptive peaks and valleys are not interspersed at random. “Adjacent” adaptive 
peaks are arranged in groups, which may be likened to mountain ranges in which the 
separate pinnacles are divided by relatively shallow notches. Thus, the ecological niche 
occupied by the species “lion” is relatively much closer to those occupied by tiger, puma, 
and leopard than to those occupied by wolf, coyote, and jackal. The feline adaptive peaks 
form a group different from the group of the canine “peaks.” But the feline, canine, ursine, 
musteline, and certain other groups of peaks form together the adaptive “range” of car-
nivores, which is separated by deep adaptive valleys from the “ranges” of rodents, bats, 
ungulates, primates, and others (Ivi: 10).
Lion, tiger, puma, and leopard are reciprocally distinct, while altogether they 
belong to a group (felines) distinct from the one containing wolf, coyote, and 
jackal (canines). Two individuals on the same peak grossly belong to the same 
population or species. Two individuals on the same “range” belong to a same 
higher taxon, e.g., genus or family. In Dobzhansky’s argument, the hierarchi-
cal structure of diversity mirrors, through adaptedness, the discrete variation of 
habitats: “The enormous diversity of organisms may be envisaged as correlated 
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with the immense variety of environments and of ecological niches which exist on 
earth. But the variety of ecological niches is not only immense, it is also discon-
tinuous” (Ivi: 9).
Let us now summarize some of the messages concerning macroevolution con-
veyed by Dobzhansky’s landscape. A pictorial representation devised for population 
genetics could be extended in scope to include the entire global biota. This possibil-
ity reinforced the idea that evolution at large fell “within the province” of popu-
lation genetics: Dobzhansky suggested global diversity patterns to be explained as 
simply a global cumulative pattern summed over all the contemporaneous popu-
lations. Organic diversity and diversity of habitats were tightly linked due to the 
process of adaptation which produced a condition of adaptedness and distributed 
biodiversity on adaptive peaks. Groups differed because they were adapted to dif-
ferent habitats and, vice versa, environmental variation in time and space corre-
sponded to organized variation in organisms: “It is a natural surmise as well as a 
profitable working hypothesis, that the diversity and discontinuity on one hand, and 
the adaptation to the environment on the other, are causally related” (Ivi: 8). The 
constant production of diversity at macroscopic level was basically due to progres-
sive adaptation, since “[t]he evolutionary changes not only enable life to endure the 
shocks emanating from the environment; they permit life to conquer new habitats, 
and to establish progressively firmer control of the older ones” (Ivi: 4).
1.5  Simpson’s Landscapes
Simpson’s book Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944) set out “to determine how 
populations became genetically and morphologically differentiated, to see how 
they passed from one way of living to another or failed to do so, and to exam-
ine the figurative outline of the stream of life and the circumstances surrounding 
each characteristic element in that pattern” (Ivi: xxx). The “figurative outline of the 
stream of life” well describes the tradition of graphical representations of paleon-
tologists and morphologists, and in Fig. 3, we see that the adaptive landscape—a 
typical representation of population genetics—resonated, in Simpson, with those 
images. In fact, tempo and mode in evolution were not explained, for Simpson, 
despite population genetics models but by means of them, expanding, where nec-
essary, with models specifically designed to answer macroevolutionary questions. 
So, after the first chapter on paleontological data and models of rates of evolution, 
Simpson devoted a long chapter to the “Determinants of evolution” studied by 
population geneticists, i.e., factors like variability, mutation rate, character of muta-
tions, length of generations, size of population, and selection, and tried to use these 
factors in explanatory hypotheses of paleontological patterns. Simpson’s whole 
book was an attempt to synthesize paleontology and genetics through the illustra-
tion of “the basic evolutionary phenomena” and of “the grand pattern and great 
processes of life” (Ivi: xxvii) that risked to be overlooked due to the increasing 
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disciplinary fragmentation and specialization. Unified ways of depicting “the 
 pattern of evolution” (Eldredge 1999) suggested a unified account of evolution.
Simpson focused in particular on two topics on which “the paleontologist enjoys 
special advantages” (Ivi: xxix): The first was suggested by the word “tempo” of 
evolution, and it had “to do with evolutionary rates under natural conditions, the 
measurement and interpretation of rates, their acceleration and deceleration, the 
conditions of exceptionally slow or rapid evolutions, and phenomena suggestive of 
inertia and momentum” (Ivi: xxix). The second topic was labeled “mode” of evolu-
tion, i.e., the possible ways in which new species and new groups are born (Fig. 3b).
Whereas Dobzhansky’s landscape was about genes, Simpson’s landscapes were 
about morphology. In this phenotypic context, Simpson observed that “in any phy-
letic series various different characters are changing over the same period of time” 
(Simpson 1944: 4). While some characters depended in different ways on the exter-
nal environment, being under incomplete genetic control, other characters appeared 
to be genetically related and to change in a correlated way, although this relation 
could break down after a period of evolutionary stability. This justified Simpson’s 
approach to landscapes that concerned with just a few characters or a character 
complex, chosen and weighted case by case. Consideration of a subset of charac-
ters, perceived to be evolutionarily significant, also had a pragmatic advantage: It 
alleviated an epistemological limit of considering of too many characters simultane-
ously. In his first chapter on “Rates of evolution,” Simpson affirmed that although 
“[considering] whole organisms, as opposed to selected characters of organisms, 
would be of the greatest value for the study of evolution […] it cannot be said that 
the problem is quite insoluble, but certainly it is so complex and requires so much 
knowledge not now at hand that no solution is in sight at present” (Simpson 1944: 
15–16). We see that while Dobzhansky acknowledged adaptation as a result of all of 
the organism’s traits, Simpson considered the “evolving entity” as the ensemble of 
all variations of the chosen character (or character complex) in a population. In this 
new framework, Simpson’s landscapes still represented all variations that were pos-
sible but unobserved. It was this virtuality that enabled the landscape to represent 
change through time, as a realization of previously virtual possibilities.
Simpson’s account of horse evolution in North America exemplified how char-
acter complexes and changing physical environment interact in shaping the evolu-
tionary landscape. Figure 4 depicted the evolutionary phases by which a family of 
browser species, Hyracotheriinae, split into browsers and grazers under the effect 
of environmental change combined with characters correlation. For Simpson, in 
the Eocene (56–33.9 million years ago), browsing and grazing in the Equidae rep-
resented two well-separated peaks, but only the browsing peak was occupied by 
members of the family. Grazing was possible but not realized: It was an empty 
peak. Later, in the Oligocene, the environment played an important role: While the 
local climate became drier, vast forests started to shrink, grasses evolved, and ani-
mals became larger.6 Anchitherinae evolved from Hyracotheriinae. Due to charac-
6 See Stigall, this volume, for updated evidence on the nonadaptive nature of the matching 
between climate and speciation in this evolutionary radiation.
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ter correlation, larger size drew the transformation of other characters in the 
direction of the grazing adaptation. For example, teeth crowns became higher 
(Simpson 1944: 93), and, incidentally, high crowns were in the direction of the 
grazing adaptation. The increased reachability of a possible adaptative condition is 
shown as a kind of change of the shape of the phenotypic landscape: The browsing 
peak “moved toward the grazing peak.” In the Late Oligocene, the two peaks were 
close enough that there was a saddle between them: Variation around the browsers 
peak was asymmetrical, specifically biased toward the grazing peak which was 
still unoccupied. Some of the animals were therefore on the saddle between the 
two peaks. Being relatively ill-adapted, they were subject to centrifugal, fraction-
ating selection in two directions: back to the browsers peak and forward toward 
the grazing peak. With relative ease, by the Late Miocene selection shaped a 
branch of grazers, because the saddle was asymmetrical too: “the slope leading to 
grazing […] is steeper than those of the browsing peak, and the grazing peak is 
higher (involves greater and more specific, less easily reversible or branching spe-
cialization to a particular mode of life)” (Ivi: 93).
Another figure of Simpson’s book (Fig. 5) showed a repertory of general selec-
tion patterns. Simpson commented on the figure as follows:
The field of possible structural variation is pictured as a landscape with hills and valleys, 
and the extent and directions of variation in a population can be represented by outlin-
ing an area and a shape on the field. Each elevation represents some particular adaptive 
optimum for the characters and groups under consideration, sharper and higher or broader 
and lower, according as the adaptation is more or less specific. The direction of positive 
selection is uphill, of negative selection downhill, and its intensity is proportional to the 
gradient. The surface may be represented in two dimensions by using contour lines as in 
topographic maps (Ivi: 89).
A peak in the center of the population (Fig. 5a) indicated that the “typical char-
acter” was favored, and selection was “centripetal,” concentrating the population 
around its mean. Conversely, when a valley was in the center of the population 
(Fig. 5b), the typical character was disadvantaged, and selection was “centrifugal” 
driving the members of the species away from the typical but maladaptive con-
dition. In cases where there were no peaks in the population, but the population 
was on a slope (i.e., there was no optimum in its immediately possible characters 
but there was an adaptive tendency in a particular direction), there would be lin-
ear selection, probably driving the population toward a new, previously unexplored 
peak (Fig. 5c). When a valley was surrounded by peaks (Fig. 5d), selection would 
not only be generically centrifugal but would also drive different parts of the popu-
lation on distinct adaptive peaks (fractionating selection). Sometimes the slopes 
surrounding a peak could be nonuniformly steep (Fig. 5e), i.e., variations of an 
optimal character in a direction could bring to maladaptive situation faster than in 
other directions; in such cases, centripetal selection would be asymmetrical: more 
severe on some variations and more permissive on others.
Two of these selection patterns are the ones employed by Simpson in the horses 
case: weak asymmetrical centrifugal selection toward grazing (Fig. 5e) in the Late 
Oligocene, when variation in the direction of grazing was more strongly favored 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
130 E. Serrelli
by selection; and fractionating selection (Fig. 5d) during the Miocene, when a seg-
ment of the population broke away under selection pressure and climbed the graz-
ing peak with relative rapidity, consolidating into a new taxon, Equidae.
Simpson’s adaptive landscapes had, as usual, adaptation as their central organ-
izing principle, and they represented adaptive dynamics, but Simpson was much 
less radical than Dobzhansky in seeing adaptation as a central organizing principle 
of evolution. The adaptive landscape of the evolution of horses in Oligocene and 
Miocene was, in fact, adaptive in that it considered the evolution of food habit, 
“an essential element in the progress of the Equidae” (Simpson 1944: 90). It con-
sidered the characters that directly or indirectly relate to food habits, to begin with 
the height of teeth and including many others. It was a dynamic model, articulated 
in four phases, and portraying natural selection as a vector on the local landscape 
which, in turn, changed dynamically. But natural selection, determined by the 
changing local environment and constrained by correlations within the considered 
character complex, was not the only mechanism of differentiation. Simpson wrote:
No theorist, however radically non-Darwinian, has denied the fact that natural selection 
has some effect on evolution. An organism must be viable in an available environment in 
order to reproduce, and selection inevitably eliminates at least the most grossly inadaptive 
types of structure. Aside from this obvious fact, theories as to the role and importance of 
selection range from belief that it has only this broadly limiting effect to belief that it is 
the only really essential factor in evolution […]. The last word will never be said, but all 
these disagreements can be reconciled, and the major discrepancies can be explained. In 
the present synthesis adaptation, preadaptation, and nonadaptation all are involved, and all 
can be assigned immediate, if not ultimate, causes (Simpson 1944: 74, 77).
In fact, adaptive events were time-limited patterns in Simpson’s view of evolution. 
We have seen how Dobzhansky’s landscape linked the micro- and the macroscales 
of evolution. Simpson’s adaptive landscapes did the same with a different strategy. 
They represented those patterns that were “fundamental in nature and broad in 
scope.” They did not represent the whole organic world, nor they dealt with all the 
characters of organisms and populations. However, they constituted a flexible tool 
for describing a vast array of evolutionary events from the morphological point of 
view, with specific reference to connecting micro- and macroevolution.
1.6  The Lasting Communication Efficacy of Adaptive 
Landscapes: Richard Dawkins’s Mount Improbable
In a communication perspective, the MS consisted in the development of inter-
actions between once disparate fields. The improvement of a common language 
was both a consequence and an enabling condition. In this context, the adaptive 
landscape summarized the researches of mathematical population genetics in a 
widely understandable form that, furthermore, looked consistent with observa-
tions of “naturalists,” opening up tentative reconceptualizations and research pos-
sibilities. If a metaphor is an object flexible and open enough to enable generative 
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contaminations between contexts, then the adaptive landscape was a metaphor for 
evolutionary biology. We can see the enthusiastic acceptance of the metaphor as 
both a consequence of the credit gained among biologists by mathematical mod-
els, and a contribution to such credit made possible just by its communicational 
effectiveness.
The communicational virtues of the landscape, such as comprehensiveness, 
conciseness, and context-independence, were again exploited many years later 
by science writer Richard Dawkins, notorious for his ability to convey his “big 
picture” of evolution by using eloquent examples and simple and powerful meta-
phors (see Elsdon-Baker 2009). In the popular book Climbing Mount Improbable 
(1996), Dawkins proposed a vision of evolution as “mountain climbing.” Taking 
for example the fig tree as a particularly complex and “perfect” organism, 
Dawkins wrote: “…the fig tree stands atop one of the highest peaks on the mas-
sif of Mount Improbable. But peaks as high as the fig’s are best conquered at the 
end of the expedition” (Dawkins 1996: 1–2). Dawkins’s main point was that the 
most perfected forms, seen from the standpoint of simple forms, were only appar-
ently unreachable. Like in mountain hiking, there were gradual paths to the high-
est peaks:
…the story of the fig is, at the deepest level, the same story as for every other living crea-
ture on this planet […]. We shall reconstruct the slow, gradual evolution of wings and of 
elephant trunks […]. We shall program computers to assist our imagination in moving 
easily through a gigantic museum of all the countless creatures that have ever lived and 
died, and their even more numerous imaginary cousins, who have never been born. We 
shall wander the paths of Mount Improbable, admiring its vertical precipices from afar, 
but always restlessly seeking the gently graded slopes on the other side (Dawkins 1996: 2).
The task of evolutionary biology was to relentlessly seek graded slopes on hidden 
sides of the mountain, because evolutionary paths are linear trajectories of explo-
ration of forms: They are series of gradual modifications, where each form is a 
slight improvement of the previous. The moving force on Dawkins’s landscape 
was natural selection, described as a cumulative process of finding (also called 
“exploration,” “discovery,” and “expedition”). Accidental improvements were 
cumulated because of heredity. The resulting vector on Mount Improbable always 
pushed upwards. Hence, mountain climbing, once started, had to keep going, and 
when a peak was reached, there was no possible improvement nor “jump” from 
a kind of structure to another. Dawkins was very clear on this point: Natural 
selection cannot accept downhill movements. Valleys cannot be crossed. Rather, 
through small steps, simpler and more probable structures turned into complex 
and improbable ones. Every step along the Mount’s slopes consisted in the dis-
covery of a solution (shape, mechanism, and function) which was slightly but sig-
nificantly more complex, perfect, improbable, and “designoid” than the previous 
steps. Dawkins explained the idea of designoid as follows:
Accidental objects are simply found. Designed objects aren’t found at all, they are shaped, 
moulded, kneaded, assembled, put together, carved: in one way or another the individual 
object is pushed into shape. Designoid objects are cumulatively found, either by humans 
as in the case of domestic dogs and cabbages, or by nature in the case of, say, sharks.  
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The fact of heredity sees to it that the accidental improvements found in each generation 
are accumulated over many generations. At the end of many generations of cumulative 
finding, a designoid object is produced which may make us gasp with admiration at the 
perfection of its apparent design. But it is not real design, because it has been arrived at by 
a completely different process (Ivi: 22–23).
One of Mount Improbable’s pictorial representations, reproduced here in Fig. 6, 
was based on a map of the alternative forms of the eye structure found in different 
living and extinct species.7 At the bottom of the drawing, there were the simplest 
forms of photoreception, those performed by a slight photosensitive spot on the 
body surface. At the top, instead, were the most perfect forms, divided into two 
comprehensive groups: “composite” and “photographic” eye. The vertebrate eye 
was the most perfect form of photographic eye: (1) It had specialized cells with 
many strata of pigments that effectively captured a huge percentage of photons; 
(2) single cells were sensitive to the direction of light, and they were arranged as a 
concave surface (in humans, the retina) with a small, pinpoint opening or “pin-
hole” that projected a single image on the surface itself; (3) it had a transparent 
lens which reduced diffraction and improved the image through an appropriate 
refraction index; and (4) it was provided with muscular apparatuses capable of 
modifying focus, regulating pupil size and moving the eye, as well as with neural 
systems necessary for controlling the eyes and elaborating information from them. 
Between the top and bottom boundaries of the landscape, many other eye forms of 
varying complexity—at least forty—were possible, and many of them were actu-
ally found in different species. For example, depicted at the center of the drawing 
7 By framing the concept of “design” in an evolutionary view, and by taking just the eye evolu-
tion example, Dawkins harked back to a historical case in the development of Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection: The eye had been a classical example by which natural theologists built the 
“argument from design,” advocating the need for an intelligent designer to account for the most 
“adaptively complex” structures. William Paley, one of Darwin’s intellectual interlocutors, was 
the oft-cited champion of this school of thought. He had defended the argument from design 
in his influential book, Natural Theology: “…there is precisely the same proof that the eye was 
made for vision, as there is that the telescope was made for assisting it. They are made upon 
the same principles; both being adjusted to the laws by which the transmission and refraction 
of rays of light are regulated” (Paley 1828: 17). Darwin had looked at the eye with some worry 
while he was developing the theory of natural selection, and perceiving that the theory would 
require the demonstration of gradual implementation of complex structures. In his Notebook C 
(1838), he had written: “We never may be able to trace the steps by which the organization of 
the eye, passed from simpler stage to more perfect, preserving its relations. The wonderful power 
of adaptation given to organization. This really perhaps greatest difficulty to whole theory.” And 
again, in the Origin of Species, Darwin had declared: “To suppose that the eye with all its inimi-
table contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts 
of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by 
natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest degree […]. If it could be demon-
strated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, 
successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break down” (Darwin 1859: 143, 
146). The main concern of Dawkins’s book was, in fact, a new clarification of the classic “prob-
lem of design.” Mount Improbable answered the problem by giving a visual shape to the classical 
argument of “chance and necessity” (cf. Monod 1970). Darwinism was defended, for Dawkins, 
by demonstrating the existence and viability of several intermediate forms (Elsdon-Baker 2009).
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as a vulcan, there was Nautilus, a marine cephalopod, so ancient to be considered 
a living fossil, had a particularly perfected pinhole eye. Of the above list of verte-
brate eye characteristics, Nautilus had only (1) and (2), but its structure and its 
rough images suited well the functional needs of the species.8
With the vertical dimension of Fig. 6, Dawkins attempted to represent several 
properties: perfection, complexity, improbability, and the time dimension. The eyes 
at the bottom of the figure were supposed to be the early evolutionary precursors 
of all forms. An initial path of improvement could split into different alternatives, 
leading to peaks in different directions, like the “composite” and the “photographic” 
mountain ranges. Each range contained different alternatives that were legitimate and 
viable forms, exhibited by living species that were adapted to their respective envi-
ronments. Dawkins’s landscape of eye evolution focused on a character “complex” 
like Simpson’s, but without the same taxonomical cohesiveness: It had an extensive 
taxonomical scope, spanning all animals, but taxonomy was not the core criterion of 
the landscape; groups and “ranges” were assembled according to the eye form.
2  Thinking Deeper: Adaptive Landscapes  
and Spaces of Possibilities
In recent years, there has been much debate on adaptive landscapes (reviewed in 
Serrelli 2011). Here, we focus on a single major theme that has not been consid-
ered in depth elsewhere, i.e., the observation that any three-dimensional landscape 
is always inextricably linked to a space of potential and explored possibilities 
(space of virtual combinations) the number of dimensions of which typically 
exceeds three. The link between the landscape and space is sometimes implicit. 
The subsequent sections examine the virtual spaces that underlied the various 
historic landscapes discussed above. Up to this point, we have focused on their 
macroevolutionary scope and on strong connection to adaptation. We now turn 
our attention to their role as representations of spaces of virtual combinations in 
attempt to draw general insights about macroevolutionary discourse.
2.1  Genetic Spaces: Wright and Dobzhansky
In population genetics, any realized population is a small subset of the virtual 
space of possible combinations of its alleles. As the population evolves, it moves 
through the space of genetic possibilities, exploring new combinations. Many 
analyses have observed that, in a space of genetic combinations, any particular 
combination has a huge numbers of neighbors, where neighbors are combinations 
8 For detailed information on the eye of Nautilus and for updates with respect to Dawkins’ 
notions, see Saunders and Landman (1987), Muntz (1999), Warrant (1999), Colicchia (2006).
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that can be reached by small modifications of the chosen combination. Each and 
every combination in the space has a fixed number of neighbors, a number that is 
called dimensionality of the space. Wright’s original landscape (Figs. 1 and 2) was 
thus the three-dimensional “packing” of a multidimensional space of combina-
tions: While fitness was represented on the vertical dimension, neighborhood on 
the surface was thought to reflect neighborhood in the space of genetic combina-
tions. Some recent criticisms of the adaptive landscape have focused on the impos-
sibility to preserve the same neighborhood relationships on a two-dimensional 
surface, but the point is not very relevant here.9 Rather, we shall consider how a 
diagrammatic picture can blanket different combination spaces and movement 
mechanisms, incubating conceptual misunderstandings: We will look at the dis-
crepancies between Dobzhansky’s and Wright’s virtual spaces that, nonetheless, 
were mapped on aesthetically identical landscape pictures.
One difference between Dobzhansky’s and Wright’s genetic spaces concerned the 
exploration mechanism. Dobzhansky saw mutation as a major mechanism. Sewall 
Wright, on the other hand, regarded mutation to be either a frequent reversible 
event, or a rare and mainly lethal occurrence. In 1932, in presenting the dynamics 
on the landscape, Wright had excluded mutation as a major evolutionary mechanism. 
Commenting on the peak equilibrium situation, (Fig. 2 square a) Wright reflected:
…further evolution can occur only by the appearance of wholly new (instead of recurrent) 
mutations, and ones which happen to be favorable from the first. Such mutations would 
change the character of the field itself, increasing the elevation of the peak occupied 
by the species. Evolutionary progress through this mechanism is excessively slow since 
the chance of occurrence of such mutations is very small and, after occurrence, the time 
required for attainment of sufficient frequency to be subject to selection to an appreciable 
extent is enormous (Wright 1932: 360, emphasis added).
A clarification of the expression “recurrent mutations” will be useful to understand 
Wright’s mutation notion and its role in his landscape.
Wright’s population genetics (e.g., 1931) considered the possibility of nonre-
current, “wholly new” mutations, but they were rare, almost exceptional. These 
9 Kaplan (2008), for example, explains: “The problem […] is that this compression misrepre-
sents the distances between most of the genotypes—accurate representations of distance cannot 
survive the packing of many dimensions into a few” (630). Pigliucci (2008) writes: “there is no 
metric that allows one to ‘pack’ genotypes side-by-side” (593). Sewall Wright was actually in 
agreement with this 'impossible packing' objection: “The two dimensions […] are a very inade-
quate representation of such a field” (Wright 1932: 356–357), and a surface picture “cannot accu-
rately represent relations that are multidimensional” (Wright 1988: 116). But, while he would 
probably have considered it a major objection for a geometrical model, he shielded the surface 
picture by declaring the latter “useless for mathematical purposes” (Ibidem). The surface is not to 
be considered a point-by-point map of the combination space: It captures and displays some gen-
eral features of the space. It is, indeed, a metaphor. Kaplan (2008), like others, accepts Wright’s 
defense of metaphor in general, but then, he criticizes this particular metaphor as poor and mis-
leading with respect to the complexity of the space it represents. Other authors (e.g., Gavrilets 
1997, 2004) accept Wright’s idea of metaphors and the clarity of this particular metaphor, but 
think that its messages are wrong, i.e., that the genotype space is not like Wright thought. For fur-
ther discussion of what I call the “impossible packing objection,” see Serrelli (2011).
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mutations introduced novel alleles into the combination space, adding a number of 
new possible combinations. They modified the space and, consequently, the sur-
face. The population moved as a secondary effect of the transformed space. Far 
more important were recurrent mutations, namely mutations that, in the offspring, 
changed one parental allele into another one which was always already present in 
the population’s genotype space. They were formalized as two opposite mutation 
pressures acting on the frequency of one allele. Mutation pressure toward the con-
sidered allele was the chance for other alleles to turn into the considered allele. 
Mutation pressure away from the considered allele was the chance for the consid-
ered allele to turn into other alleles. Recurrent mutations did influence the popula-
tion movement, but slightly, because the mutation rate was always very low: 
Wright admitted that some mechanisms (e.g., cosmic rays, as suggested by some 
authors) could increase mutation rates, but they did “not appear adequate to 
explain evolution to an important extent” (Wright 1932: 361). The most important 
movement mechanism in Wright’s Mendelian space was recombination10 among a 
constant set of alleles, moderately influenced by recurrent mutations. Therefore, 
Wright’s space included most of the possible evolutionary change, because such a 
change consisted in the realization of different combinations in the same space.
In Dobzhansky’s account, the Wrightian “trial and error” mechanism for the 
population to explore the landscape space was “provided primarily by mutation 
and sexual reproduction, which are able to generate a practically limitless variety 
of genotypes” (Dobzhansky 1937: 278).11 For example, when a peak moved due 
to environmental change, mutations were the possible source of new adaptive gen-
otypes (Ivi: 277). But Dobzhansky’s mutation clearly meant the origin of novel 
alleles, whereas in Wright’s population genetics, mutation was totally conceptual-
ized in terms of existing alleles. Dobzhansky’s landscape introduced the mutation 
concept as a movement mechanism into Wright’s landscape.12 But mutation can 
10 Neo-Darwinian population genetics strongly held recombination as the major genetic evolu-
tionary mechanism. For Ernst Mayr (e.g., 1980), the underemphasis of mutation by Wright and 
others in the first decades of the twentieth century could be straightforwardly explained by the 
fact that macromutations were studied by authors such as Hugo DeVries, who considered it as 
the non-Darwinian mechanism for the origin of species. The redefinition of mutation was, for 
Mayr, achieved later by the second phase of the MS.
11 Dobzhansky recognizes that mutation works together with recombination, so that even the 
right mutations may fail to prevent extinction “if the requisite constellations of these elements do 
not appear in time” (Dobzhansky 1937: 277).
12 In the second phase of the MS, mutation was reintegrated into population genetics and began 
to be seen as a major mechanism for the origin of evolutionary novelties. Those were the years in 
which Dobzhansky worked and wrote. But the absence (almost “eclipse”?) of recombination in 
those later works was, for Ernst Mayr, an “astonishing” fact: “It would be decidedly whiggish to 
suppress the fact that even [many biologists] slighted recombination in the 1930s. Dobzhansky, 
who later did much to establish the evolutionary importance of recombination, hardly referred 
to it in the first edition of his book (1937) […]. Recombination was, of course, well known 
since 1900 as one of the basic Mendelian processes and described in every genetics textbook. 




be hardly seen as a mechanism for movement in the completely defined allele 
space envisaged by Wright. In other words, while Dobzhansky still visualized the 
evolution of a population as movement in a defined space, by changing the idea of 
mutation, he unnoticeably violated the assumptions that made that visualization 
possible.
More puzzles were created by the macroevolutionary scope of Dobzhansky’s 
genetic space, and they were concealed by the landscape picture. One concerns the 
wide environmental scope, another has to do with neighborhood criteria.
Wright’s landscape had maintained very clearly that the “niche”13 inhabited by 
the population was supposed to shape the whole landscape by influencing the fit-
ness of each and every possible combination in the space. The whole idea of an 
adaptive landscape was based on all possible and realized organisms sharing the 
same gene pool. Dobzhansky’s landscape, instead, assumed that multiple niches 
could simultaneously be represented on the same landscape. Beside the fact that 
this bold extension of the taxonomical scope would hinder the measurement of 
distances among the genotypes in the space, the real problem seems to lie in pos-
tulating a single global gene pool on which all selection pressures on earth would 
act (although, as we have seen, Richard Dawkins might like this idea).
An even more serious source of inconsistency for Dobzhansky’s space is the 
conflation of different and independent neighborhood criteria. The Wright–
Dobzhansky version of the landscape has no graded axes: The surface is formed 
“by aggregation” of related combinations.14 A peak or a valley is a group of 
related combinations. Relatedness is thus the organizational criterion of the sur-
face, rooted in the combination space and to be preserved in the space-to-surface 
transition. Distance on the surface is proportional to relatedness, but Dobzhansky 
talked about peaks and ranges in terms ecological niches, conflating similar ecol-
ogy with close genealogical relationship. Why should closely related taxa also 
occupy the same ecological niche?
There were different criteria in conflict in Dobzhansky’s landscape, and the 
attempt to connect different spaces of possibilities results in their conflation. 
Genealogical and ecological groupings do not coincide. We shall see that the 
 fascinating challenge of representing macroevolution is, indeed, the task of dis-
entangling distinct though correlated spaces. Geographic, genealogical, morpho-
logical, and ecological groupings do not coincide. Today we are aware that they 
should be represented on different landscapes: geographical landscapes (based on 
spatial distribution), genealogical landscapes (based on relatedness), morphologi-
cal landscapes (based on shared combinations characters), and ecological land-
scapes (based on the combinations of environmental variables that are suitable for 
the considered organisms).
13 Attributing the term “niche” to Wright is slightly anachronistic. I use niche in the “evolutionary” 
sense (sensu Odling-Smee et al. 2003), as the set of selective pressures acting on a population. See 
below for further analysis of ecological niches.
14 This answers, in passing, an often expressed doubt on Wright’s landscape (e.g., Provine 1986).
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2.2  Phenetic Spaces: Simpson
Simpson’s landscapes hinged upon phenotypic combination spaces. How does a 
phenotypic combination space differ from a genotypic one? How relevant are such 
differences? Sewall Wright, reviewing Simpson’s landscapes, wrote that
Phenotypes are, no doubt, more appropriate units for dealing with selection, whether 
between individual or groups, but genotypes seem more appropriate for mutation or ran-
dom drift. The choice, however, is practically irrelevant in connection with pictorial repre-
sentation of changes that occur in populations (Wright 1988: 120).
Pigliucci (2008) considered the transition from a genotypic to a phenotypic space 
as “a bold and questionable move” and criticized Wright for oversimplification: 
“Wright acknowledges that Simpson took the idea of adaptive landscapes—
defined in genotypic space—and translated it with little fanfare at the phenotypic 
level” (Pigliucci 2008: 597). Despite Pigliucci’s argument, however, a phenotypic 
landscape actually refers to a peculiar combination space that can be studied with 
great autonomy from any “underlying” genotypic space, a space made up by all 
the possible combinations of a limited number of distinct phenotypic characters.
An important difference between phenotypic and genetic spaces is, rather, 
that phenotypic characters vary in a continuous fashion, whereas genetic charac-
ters (loci) have discrete variants (the alleles). In a phenotypic space, a trait—e.g., 
body size—can in principle assume any value in a continuous range. The concept 
of neighborhood is not applicable in the same way as in a space of discrete char-
acters and so is not dimensionality. Different, continuous measures of phenotypic 
distance should be devised in Simpson’s space. As for the movement mechanism, 
the character complex in an individual could still be seen as a recombination of the 
parents’ traits, and Simpson’s landscape might supposedly integrate reproduction 
and inheritance rules, but they would be more complicated than the relatively sim-
ple Mendelian recombination between parents in a genotypic space.
Simpson’s landscapes, differently from Dobzhansky’s and more similarly to 
Wright’s, are local in their environmental and taxonomical scope: They explain 
singular evolutionary events. In these events, local ecological conditions determine 
selection pressures, causing different morphological structures to fall “under the 
influence” of a new peak, and local populations to adaptively split.
Simpson’s landscapes are limited also in scope of considered characters. 
Whereas Wright and Dobzhansky had defined the individual organism as an assem-
bly of all its (genetic) traits, Simpson’s concept of character complex strongly 
reduces the number of considered traits. This decreases the dimensionality of the 
space of combinations. The concept of a character complex also implies constraints: 
The various characters in a character complex cannot come in any combination 
of values, but a change in one character causes a consequent change in the other. 
In horse evolution, for example, body size influences teeth structure. Constraints 
among characters are not considered universal, nor stable over long periods of time: 
Simpson specifies that such constraints themselves evolve. But within the scope of 
the considered evolutionary event, the combination space is completely defined.
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We see that Wright’s, Dobzhansky’s, and Simpson’s landscapes are three-
dimensional pictures that refer to distinct combination spaces. Their spaces share 
important features while differing by other, equally important, ones.
2.3  Evolution Imagined on a Universal Landscape: Dawkins
Dawkins’s Mount Improbable expressed some of the central pillars of his view 
of evolution: the universal scope of a few simple powerful mechanisms, the pri-
macy of function as a major organizing principle of the living world, and the idea 
of a measure of absolute complexity and perfection. That being said, Richard 
Dawkins’s landscape of eye evolution (Fig. 6) inherited some characteristics from 
both Simpson and Dobzhansky.
Like Simpson’s, Dawkins’ landscape was phenotypic and dealt with a particular 
character complex: all and only the taxa that did have any kind of eyes appeared 
on the landscape. In some of his most cautious works, Dawkins qualified himself 
as an “epistemological adaptationist,” limiting his explanatory framework to some 
features that are adaptively complex, because adaptively complex characters are 
those characters needed an evolutionary explanation the most : “I shall be an adap-
tionist in the […] sense that I shall only be concerned with those aspects of the 
morphology, physiology, and behaviour of organisms that are undisputedly adap-
tive solutions to problems” (Dawkins 1983: 17). Consequently, the sole movement 
mechanism on Dawkins’s landscape was natural selection, a force that con-
stantly cumulated small improvements toward adaptive complexity. In Climbing 
Mount Improbable, there was little mention of the possible mechanisms by which 
a species could climb down a peak (contra Wright, see Fig. 2). In “Universal 
Darwinism,” we find Dawkins’s interpretation of Wright’s view of evolution:
The phrase ‘random genetic drift’ is often associated with Sewall Wright, but […] he 
clearly sees selection as the driving force of adaptive evolution. Random drift may make 
it easier for selection to do its job by assisting the escape from local optima, but it is still 
selection that is determining the rise of adaptive complexity (Dawkins 1983: 31).
Unlike Simpson’s landscape, Dawkins’s had a universal taxonomical and envi-
ronmental scope: Like Dobzhansky’s, it included species from all over the natural 
world. In this extension with respect to Simpson, the morphological criterion over-
rode the taxonomical criterion, or, better, the two were assumed as coincident for 
the organization of the landscape surface.
An elusive aspect of Dawkins’s phenetic landscape is its lack of consideration 
of phenotypic evolution and constraints. Natural selection was to be intended, in 
Dawkins’s view, as competition among genes or “replicators.” Dawkins’s famous 
argument for this was that units of selection need to be stable in time, and genetic 
replicators are the only candidates for such stability. At the immense scale of 
Mount Improbable, competition among replicators proceeded, for Dawkins, in 
some universal genetic space, where there was also little room for a Wrightian 
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“balance of factors” such as migration rate, population subdivision and size with 
consequent random fixation, plurality of equally fit combinations, and epista-
sis (implying that alleles can never be thought as actually having individual fit-
ness values). Phenotypic evolution is the result of the exploration of the universal 
genetic space.
A radical novelty of Dawkins’s landscape concerned the measure of adap-
tiveness: Some peaks and ranges were higher than others, giving the landscape a 
“staircase” shape. Organisms with “mere photoreception” or “pigment cup-eye” 
were at valley bottoms, regardless their being adapted and well fit to their own 
environment and life conditions. Fitness was in fact less relative to a particular 
environment: It had an absolute component called, by Dawkins, “perfection” or 
“adaptive complexity.” The latter concept had been explained, for example, in 
another essay titled “Universal Darwinism” (Dawkins 1983): “A complex thing is 
a statistically improbable thing […]. Living things are not just statistically improb-
able in the trivial sense of hindsight: their statistical improbability is limited by the 
a priori constraints of design. They are adaptively complex” (Ivi: 16–17).
The solution to the eye “dilemma” in contemporary evolutionary biology (e.g., 
Lamb et al. 2007, 2009; Gregory 2008b; Lamb 2011) lies in the integration of 
phylogenetic and adaptive approaches, where adaptation is seen as a complex dia-
lectic between structures and functions, with the chance—already considered by 
Darwin—of co-option of preexisting structures to contribute to novel functions in 
different ecological contexts. None of this can be shown in Dawkins’s landscape, 
where structures evolved with little trace of the complex and taxon-specific char-
acters correlations that were hinted to in Simpson’s landscapes. Dawkins’s abso-
lute measure of “adaptive complexity” hid, in fact, the configuration of selective 
pressures that explained specialization and speciation in Simpson’s evolutionary 
episodes, such as the Equidae evolution is the Oligocene and Miocene. Dawkins’s 
metaphor, though effective, was thus an oversimplified picture, and we find many 
inconsistencies when we try to derive the hypothetical virtual space that would 
underlie this three-dimensional picture.
2.4  Lessons Learned About Graphical Representations 
of Evolution
Our analysis of historic macroevolutionary landscapes has brought to light several 
avenues of reflection on representing macroevolution graphically.
Graphical representations may work as a bridge between fields that are mutu-
ally independent, sometimes suspicious of each other, and locked. Adaptive 
landscapes, in the 1930s and 1940s, were an important means for shaping the 
emerging common language of evolution.
Graphical representations are not only means of communication, but also ways 
of thinking. In the MS, adaptive landscapes expressed fundamental ideas about the 
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evolutionary process. Notably, they embodied the idea of a unity between micro-
evolution and macroevolution (considering them just different focalizations or 
magnifications of evolution) and assumed the association between macroevolution 
and adaptation.
A visual representation of evolution frequently displays virtual possibilities 
for an evolving entity, encoded as combinations that lie in a particular structured 
space. We have seen Wright’s and Dobzhansky’s genetic spaces, and how genetic 
spaces can slightly differ, for example, by their exploration mechanism. We have 
appreciated that a landscape illustration can somehow hide those differences. With 
Simpson, we have seen spaces of combinations of morphological characters, and 
the idea of a character complex, i.e., a small subset of correlated characters that 
evolve together. We have also appreciated the difference between spaces of combi-
nations of continuous versus discrete traits.
When we employ a visual depiction of evolution, a good practice therefore will 
be to ask ourselves which space of virtual combinations underlies the image, and, 
consequently, what dimensionality, which movement rules, and which constraints 
do hold. An important feature of a combination space is its scope. If an illustra-
tion privileges ecological aspects, a larger scope will imply the consideration of 
larger areas, more ecosystems, more avatars, considering a larger part of a compo-
sitional hierarchy (see Tëmkin and Eldredge, this volume). A large morphological 
scope will mean more morphological possibilities. A broader genealogical scope 
will mean distantly related taxa, in a completely different logic. The possibilities 
and effects of changing the scope of a landscape depend, then, upon the aspects of 
evolution that are being visualized.
In the next section, we shall see the challenge of current macroevolutionary 
studies, that is, representing the exploration of multiple interrelated spaces by 
means of compositions of multiple graphical representations, including—why 
not?—landscapes, where appropriate.
3  Visualizing Macroevolution Today
Some tasks that were urgent in the MS are definitely less pressing today. 
Evolutionary biologists do not shoehorn macroevolution into microevolution-
ary terms—for example, they do not force macroevolution into population genet-
ics models. Rather, they study macroevolution as an autonomous domain with a 
variety of methods. Macroevolution is also peacefully decoupled from adaptation, 
although, of course, the two are still related in complex ways (see Bokma, this 
volume). Macroevolutionary phenomena such as speciation, diversity, and dispar-
ity, with their peculiar patterns, do not necessarily constitute adaptive “peak climb-
ing,” although, for instance, patterns of adaptation such as specialization or niche 
breadth are integral part of macroevolutionary explanations, as Stigall explains 
in this volume. This epistemological milieu may count as a reason why adaptive 
landscapes are less and less recruited as visual aids in macroevolutionary studies. 
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Dawkins’s view of macroevolution, embodied in his Mount Improbable metaphor 
and in his adaptive landscape of eye evolution, took evolution to be a giant enter-
prise of adaptive search performed by the living world at large, through the sorting 
of genes in some supposed global pool. Other macroevolutionary landscapes, such 
as Dobzhansky’s and Simpson’s, were more circumstantial and devoted to a sense 
of adaptation more relative and local. They all shared the focus on adaptation as a 
driver of macroevolution.
Compared to the years of the MS, contemporary evolutionary biology 
approaches macroevolution with a much greater variety of notions and tools, some 
of which will be sketched out in what follows. Examples could be taken from liter-
ally everywhere in contemporary evolutionary publications. For reasons of space, 
however, the examples will be mainly restricted to a single area, i.e., studies of the 
Ediacara biota. We shall also see landscapes surviving in some interesting forms, 
two of which are particularly relevant to macroevolution: One is related to low-
dimensional spaces, the other to high-dimensional molecular spaces.
3.1  Phylogenetic Diagrams
A very important way of visualizing macroevolution is “evolutionary trees” or 
“phylogenetic trees” or “dendrograms” (Fig. 7). Trees allow for mapping charac-
ters, distinguishing between ancestral and derived character states, and formulat-
ing hypotheses about multiple origins and evolutionary mechanisms of particular 
characters. In the tree imagery, the spatial disposition of taxa reflects common 
descent and some sort of divergence. Such use of spatial distance is reminiscent of 
the macroevolutionary landscapes by Dobzhansky and Dawkins. Relatedness, 
although mixed with ecology, was the foundational principle of Dobzhansky’s 
landscape. Individuals and groups sharing recent common ancestors were located 
Fig. 7  A toy dendrogram in two versions: unrooted (left) and rooted (right). The two trees differ 
by one taxon, Y, hypothetically added as an “outgroup” to root the tree. Branch spans might reflect 
elapsed time (if the tree is a chronogram) or amount of change (if the tree is a phylogram). Trees 
are a fundamental way of visualizing and studying macroevolution, but they are prone to misinter-
pretations that can be avoided by correct “tree thinking” [Source modified from Gregory (2008a)]
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close to each other. Recent ancestry was evoked also by their gathering in ranges. 
Dawkins’s landscape lined up existing species in a map of branching evolutionary 
trails, from the most ancient to the most recent. Unlike landscapes, phylogenetic 
trees are not constrained to displaying the virtual possibilities that are available at 
a given time: They are devoted to history. Unlike the movement on adaptive land-
scapes, especially on Wright’s, the divergence represented by evolutionary trees 
does not happen in a predefined space. Divergence is, in principle, indefinite; a 
space can be constructed to measure distance and reconstruct divergence, but only 
in hindsight, and edges represent relationships, not precise trajectories whose 
points are specific individuals or groups. Also, with respect to landscapes, phylo-
genetic trees lose the adaptive dimension: They become pure genealogy.15
Reading a tree, just like understanding the meaning of an adaptive landscape, 
requires an appropriate way of thinking. Many studies have revealed the cognitive 
properties and difficulties of tree thinking.16 Tests on people’s tree-reading abili-
ties have suggested that typical tree misreadings are expression of cognitive ten-
dencies and that some tree-drawing habits can trigger and shore up the 
misreadings. The habit of laying out taxa left to right according to prejudices 
about ancestry and primitiveness, or species-poor to species-rich (even performed 
by the automatic “ladderize” function in phylogeny computer programs!), can 
reinforce the habit of reading trees from left to right combined with a persistent 
progressionist view of evolution. Certain present-day species are described as 
“primitive” and considered “ancestral” to other extant species, even though evolu-
tion has not stopped in any lineage (Omland et al. 2008: 855).
Looking at the phylogram in Fig. 7, many people think they can infer, for 
example, that Y is older than W and that W is, in turn, older than Z and X, because 
of how far “back in time” their origins are shown. This is a misinterpretation 
because the nodes do not represent the origin of Y or Z or X, but rather the last 
common ancestor shared between Y and all the others, and between Z and X. The 
inference of which taxon is the oldest is an overinterpretation: It depends on a ten-
dency to project the tip back to the node.
15 An indirect link between trees and landscapes is the following. Phylogenetics today is  carried 
out with the aid of computer programs that, given a dataset of genetic sequences and other char-
acters, explore the space of possible trees and determine which tree is the most likely under the 
given data, as well as how much we can be confident in it being the solution (see Wiley and 
Lieberman 2011). The process of discovering the tree is often imagined as a series of blind 
“robot walks” on the landscape of all possible trees, with the most likely trees on top of likeli-
hood peaks, surrounded by similar trees that are good, but not quite!
16 Some examples of this flourishing literature are O’Hara (1992, 1998), Baum (2005), Gregory 
(2008a), Omland et al. (2008), Thanukos (2009, 2010), McLennan (2010), Meisel (2010), 
Halverson (2011), Torrens and Barahona (2012). Perhaps similar discourses could be made on 
network thinking, concerning for example network drawing choices (that are also available as 
options in computer programs), cognitive tendencies in reading them, biases in recognizing mod-
ules and hierarchical levels in networks (Papin et al. 2004). But, unlike the tree-thinking “story,” 
this one has not been written yet.
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An analog mistake consists in considering a species as ancestral to the oth-
ers: The reading along the tips habit. Extinct ancestor species could be included 
among the tips, but the tree says nothing about descent of tips from one another. 
As a rule, ancestors should not be looked for on tips. Chimps are not ancestors to 
humans, while the two groups share ancestors.
The same species that seems ancestral is often considered as globally primitive 
with respect to the others. This is the primitive taxon fallacy. In Fig. 7, Y would 
appear primitive, but basal with respect to the others. Omland et al. (2008) provide 
the example of some animals, like the platypus or the marsupial opossum, that are 
often labeled “primitive mammals” even in the scientific literature. The authors 
show that this idea can be suggested by cladograms, wherein the opossums are not 
the “focal species.” Every tree indeed does have a focus, it is always incomplete, 
and it is enriched according to the focus. In Fig. 7, Y is unlikely to be the focal 
species. Y is probably introduced as an outgroup to study the other groups. The 
side of Y would be more populated with relatives in a cladogram where Y is the 
focal species; therefore, Y would not appear ancestral or primitive.
In fact, tree-drawing habits can probably be traced back to the same cognitive 
tendencies we see in tree reading. To contrast these misrepresentation loops, tree-
thinking authors propose specific training and constant effort toward tree-drawing 
choices that are less common. The order of taxa is a free choice since a tree can be 
rotated around any node, like a hanging mobile. The tree reader can be put into a 
cognitive tension by means of “zigzag” rotation or random rotation. In Fig. 8, bila-
terian animals are far right, indulging our idea that they are somehow advanced 
with respect to the others; yet, we can imagine to invert sponges and bilaterian ani-
mals by rotating the section of the tree around the node of their common ancestor. 
How advanced would we look then?
A more fundamental misconception consists in interpreting the tree as a tree for 
making inferences about species, as opposed to a tree for making inferences about 
characters. This is the tree of species fallacy. To summarize these and other con-
ceptual issues, Omland et al. write:
Which of the species is the oldest? Which is the youngest? Which is most ancestral? Most 
derived? Most primitive? Most simple? Most complex? The answer is that a phylogeny 
provides NO INFORMATION about any of these questions! (Omland et al. 2008: 856).
Omland et al. emphasize that any taxon is a mix of ancestral and derived characters. 
Trees provide a structure for inferring which character states are ancestral and which 
are derivative. In fact, the addition of taxa is instrumental to getting a suitable nest-
ing pattern to resolve the evolution of the character at hand. The branching pattern 
in Fig. 7 may be sufficient to make inferences about some of the characters of U, V, 
X, Z, and W. Here, Y plays the role of an outgroup, added because there is evidence 
of it exhibiting ancestral states of those characters. This tree, where Y is alone in the 
species-poor area, is not the right context to infer or test such ancestral state: That 
would be another instance of the primitive taxon fallacy. In order to study the evolu-
tion of a character, taxa should be added until a suitable nested pattern is obtained: 
Y should be nested into a sufficient and meaningful phylogenetic context.
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3.2  Stratigraphies and Geographies
Adaptive landscapes did not visualize the physical environment or the geo-
graphical space. Interpreting adaptive landscapes as geographical landscapes was 
possible—for example by identifying genetic separation with geographical separa-
tion—but wrong, being it based on a conflation between distinct and incommensu-
rable spaces (Serrelli 2011). In fact, geography and ecology are invaluable sources 
of data and patterns for macroevolution. They are recorded and exposed visually 
by stratigraphy, geography, and paleogeography.
Stratigraphy is an ancient way of studying the accumulation of sediments and 
rocks over geological time. The relationship between stratigraphy and living beings 
is very intimate. Stratigraphic diagrams usually imitate the spatial disposition of 
layers: oldest at the bottom and most recent at the top. Same age formations get 
Fig. 8  Cladogram of Ediacaran groups (dashed branches, all extinct) and living groups (solid 
branches) by Xiao and Laflamme (2009), an example of how morphology and descent are decou-
pled. All sponge-like taxa together form a “grade,” i.e., a morphological grouping with no immedi-
ate phylogenetic implication. Ediacaran sponge-like forms are a clade, distinct from the two clades 
of modern sponges. Ediacaran radial forms belong partly to extinct clades, partly to clades that sur-
vive today (Cnidarians, e.g., jellyfishes). Ediacaran bilateral forms belong to various clades; some of 
them are Ddeuterostomes and their clade flourishes today in the form of, e.g., worms, sea urchins, 
and vertebrates. “Crown group,” a technical term of cladistics, means a collection of taxa com-
posed by the living representatives of the collection together with all their ancestors back to their 
most recent common ancestor, as well as all of that ancestor’s descendants. Bilaterian animals are a 
crown group of all living bilaterian animals with their last common ancestor and all its descendants, 
therefore also some Ediacaran bilaterians [Source redrawn from Xiao and Laflamme (2009)]
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aggregated into “floors.” However, such vertical disposition is largely the result of 
theoretical transformations. In actual rocks, depth and age are not proportional. A 
layer in a stratigraphy is rarely homogeneous: Intrusions of atypical areas with 
atypical processes or organisms are a rule. Sediments can also be found in different 
states according to their history after formation. An example of a stratigraphic dia-
gram is Fig. 9, from Hofmann and Mountjoy’s (2001). Figure 10 shows the current 
geographical disposition of the formations.17
A challenge for stratigraphy is to integrate knowledge about local geology into a 
global picture of the world’s geological evolution. As we go back in time, localities 
17 Hofmann and Mountjoy studied a geologic formation called the “Miette Group,” in British 
Columbia, Canada. Within it, they focused on the Byng carbonate platform, a recent part of the 
Upper Miette Group. The Byng formation within the Upper Miette context is a case of spatial 
and geographical heterogeneity. Furthermore, parts of the Byng Formation are “dolomitized.” 
Dolomitization is a chemical process by which calcium is replaced by magnesium, obliterat-
ing fossil shells. Other parts of the Byng formation are predominantly limestone. In the beds of 
limestone made by accumulations of biogenic carbonate—that is, shells—millimeter-scale tiny 
animals such as Cloudina and Namacalathus are found. These fossil shelly organisms are from 
the Neoproterozoic, a very ancient period—from 1,000 to 541 million years ago—that preceded 
the so-called Cambrian explosion. The Cambrian explosion is the relatively rapid and abundant 
appearance of animal phyla, including all those surviving today (except Bryozoa, which appeared 
later). See “Cambrian fauna” in Fig. 7a.
Fig. 9  Stratigraphic section of the Namacalathus–Cloudina assemblage in the Miette Group, 
Salient Mountain area, British Columbia. Geologic depositions are graphically transformed into 
horizontal layers to show formation sequence. Right part of the figure: magnification of the Byng 
formation layers, with respective elevation in meters. Filling patterns inform about the composi-
tion of each layer (carbonate or sandstone). Labels on the far right mostly indicate fossil findings, 
where present. Cloudina and Namacalathus (also drawn inside Byng formation layers) cannot be 
found in sandstone, where carbon has been eliminated by dolomitization. Left part of the figure: 
larger geological context. Layers are flanked by labels: right to left, the subformations, forma-
tions, and periods [Source simplified redrawing from Hofmann and Mountjoy (2001)]
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move, subside, and become closer or slide apart (Fig. 11).18 The geological history 
of the planet appears as an exploration of different geographies. Knowledge of the 
rules of this exploration allows for inferring past geographies and for interpreting 
fossils and other traces of macroevolution in the evolving geographical space. 
Global and local data must be used to reconstruct the correct paleogeography and 
paleoecology, posing interesting challenges to the visual representation of macroev-
olution and to the scientific imagination of both evolutionary biologists and 
18 Cloudina and Namacalathus are part of the worldwide Ediacaran biota, the earliest known com-
plex of multicellular organisms. Most Ediacaran life forms are known by indirect traces (“trace 
fossils”), but Cloudina and Namacalathus are particular for their skeleton which is liable to fossili-
zation. Cloudina has global distribution, while Namacalathus is rare. The Cloudina–Namacalathus 
association studied by Hofmann and Mountjoy (2001) in British Columbia was first found in 
Namibia, in the “Nama sequence.” Today, Canada and Namibia are antipodal, but, back to 1 million 
years ago when rocks formed, their latitude was very different, and so, was the global configuration 
of landmasses as we see in Fig. 11. Hofman and Mountjoy argue that finding a new instance of the 
Nama sequence constitutes a widening of the known geographic range of such assemblage, making 
it “cosmopolitan” and enhancing expectations that the assemblage will be found at least in other 
areas that, in the Neoproterozoic, were between current Canada and current Namibia.
Fig. 10  Geography of the Miette Group, Salient Mountain area, British Columbia. Dark gray is 
the Byng formation, wrinkled and tilted in “sheets” due to tectonic movements (see the “Colo-
nel Thrust”), while shown as a horizontal layer in stratigraphy (Fig. 9) [Source modified from 
 Hofmann and Mountjoy (2001)]
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
147Visualizing Macroevolution: From Adaptive …
laypeople. There are many sources of data to do that, from the most classical paleo-
magnetism (rocks containing polarized metals that “lock” the north–south orienta-
tion at the time of solidification) to contemporary computer GIS techniques.19
Centuries of geology have deposited different inconciliable naming systems. 
Strata are often named after modern reference places, which, furthermore, reflect 
the history of geological findings more than any meaningful aspect of geological 
history. Rhode (2005) identifies the necessity to “sort out the mess that man has 
made of the geological timescale” in introducing an interesting database of geo-
logical information called GeoWhen. The same goal is pursued by official organi-
zations such as the International Commission on Stratigraphy.20 The Commission 
has to “precisely define global units (systems, series, and stages) of the 
International Chronostratigraphic Chart that, in turn, are the basis for the units 
(periods, epochs, and age) of the International Geologic Time Scale; thus setting 
global standards for the fundamental scale for expressing the history of the Earth.”
3.3  Morphospaced Stratigraphies
A very classical diagram of macroevolution marks, on a timeline, the oldest 
and the most recent finding of fossil taxa. The oldest finding is considered as a 
proxy for the origin (e.g., speciation), and the most recent is considered close to 
the extinction date. The arrangement of several fossil taxa with their life spans 
19 See the Paleomap Project by Chrisptopher R. Scotese (http://www.scotese.com/). Some inter-
esting works with GIS in paleontology have been carried out by Lieberman (Rode and Lieberman 
2004; Hendricks et al. 2008; Abe and Lieberman 2009, 2012; Lieberman 2012; Myers and 
Lieberman 2011) and Jablonski (e.g., 2008). GIS is routinely used to study current biodiversity. 
GIS techniques are also used the context of “geophylogenies,” i.e., integrations between geo-
graphical and genealogical data (Kidd and Liu 2008; Kidd 2010) that we shall see below.
20 http://www.stratigraphy.org/.
Fig. 11  Reconstruction of 
continent positions in the 
early Vendian (the Vendian is 
650–543 million years ago), 
prior to the Ediacaran biota. 
Some paleocoordinates of 
Ediacaran assemblages are 
shown [Source redrawn and 




shows important macroevolutionary patterns. An example of this way of repre-
senting is Fig. 12, from a Xiao and Laflamme (2009). The subject of the figure 
is the Ediacaran biota, a distinct group of complex macroscopic organisms that 
flourished just before the Cambrian radiation of animals. We see that fossil spe-
cies remain relatively stable spanning different periods (see Bokma, this volume, 
Tëmkin and Eldredge, this volume). In fact, this kind of diagram is made possi-
ble by the paleontological fact of stasis. In the early years of evolutionary biol-
ogy after the Modern Synthesis, stasis was downplayed as an evolutionary pattern. 
Accordingly, divergence representations like Simpson’s Fig. 3a prevailed on the 
kind of graphical depiction we are examining.
The vertical arrangement of Fig. 12 is stratigraphic, and in this case, taxa span mul-
tiple strata. But taxa are included according to a particular criterion, unrelated to the 
identification of layers or to geography: in this case, a hybrid ecological–phylogenetic 
Fig. 12  Morphospaced stratigraphy of the Ediacara biota. Vertical dimension is time. Avalon, 
White Sea, and Nama assemblages are considered as noncontemporaneous stages composed, in 
turn, of fossils from different sites of various ages within their time interval. Each vertical col-
umn represents a taxon with its life span and is labeled with its name. The horizontal arrange-
ment is meant to show clusters of morphologically similar taxa. Morphospaced stratigraphies 
have no immediate phylogenetic implication, and they are made possible by evolutionary stasis 
(taxa remain stable along their lifespan) [Source drawn after Xiao and Laflamme (2009), modi-
fied from Brasier and Antcliffe (2004)]
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criterion. Horizontally, taxa are ordered according to morphological criteria.21 Avalon, 
White Sea, and Nama are three major Ediacaran assemblages. The Ediacara biota is 
named after Australia’s Ediacara Hills; the Avalon assemblage gets the name from a 
dreamy peninsula in Newfoundland, Canada; the Nama assemblage of Namibia was 
the subject of Figs. 9, 10 and 11; and White Sea is in Russia. Notice in Fig. 12 that 
Xiao and Laflamme (2009) accept the hypothesis that the three assemblages represent 
successive, although partly intersecting, evolutionary stages, rather than contempora-
neous biogeographic provinces or environmental/ecological associations (for an anal-
ysis, see Shen et al. 2008). Besides that, the diagram makes it clear that, at each point 
in time, the various species represent explorations of different morphologies and life-
styles. The horizontal arrangement is a heuristic disposition aiming to show the exist-
ence of clusters of species sharing similar anatomies, i.e., grades. In this way, some 
forms, like Dickinsonia, are shown as “transitional,” not because they are unstable and 
maladapted, but rather because they are located at crossroads of morphological clus-
ters or large-scale splitting trends.
Shen et al. (2008) represent, in another way, the morphological features of the 
organisms in the three Ediacara assemblages. Figure 13 plots the Ediacara fossil 
findings considering 50 morphological characters—e.g., overall shape, first-order 
21 From left, Rangeomorphs are “fractally quilted with frondlets arranged to form a repeti-
tive, self-similar pattern;” Erniettomorphs “have biserially quilted tubes that are alternately 
arranged along a midline,” and they are not bilaterally symmetric; Bilateral forms are character-
ized by “anterior–posterior differentiation with a differentiated ‘head’ region;” Discoidal forms 
are characterized by “concentric and sometimes radial features;” taxa such as Charniodiscus 
and Palaeopascichnus are morphologically unique intermediates between more abundant mor-
phologies; Triradial forms are characterized by triradial symmetry or consist of three spiral arms; 
Tetraradial forms are rare, Pentaradial forms are characterized by a five-fold symmetry, Octoradial 
forms include “one species which consists of eight spiral arms tightly wrapped into a disk”.
Fig. 13  Distribution of the fossils of the three Ediacara assemblages in a morphospace of 50 
characters, mathematically transformed into two dimensions by means of “nonparametric multi-
dimensional scaling” (MDS). The structure of diversity within each assemblage differs, although 
the global range of the realized morphologies remains remarkably stable. The relative stability of 
morphospace occupancy shows, for Shen et al. (2008), that shifts in paleoenvironments are not the 
controlling factor of morphological evolution in this case [Source modified from Shen et al. (2008)]
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symmetry, central–peripheral differentiation, and the presence of peculiar fea-
tures—and shows how each assemblage occupies the morphological space so con-
structed. Each point is a fossil, and the realized morphospace of each assemblage 
is visualized as a convex “hull.” The two coordinates in the “scatterplot” (Dim1 
and Dim2) are worked out from the 50 characters by means of “nonparametric 
multidimensional scaling” (MDS). The figure shows that throughout the three 
Ediacaran assemblages, the overall size and position of the realized morpholo-
gies have remained markedly static, while taxonomic diversity within each biota, 
i.e., the number of taxa and their distances, has changed. Shen et al. talk about 
“the decoupling of taxonomic and morphological evolution,” likening, under this 
respect, the “Avalon explosion” to the Cambrian explosion.
While macroevolution is undoubtedly a simultaneous exploration of multiple 
configurations of characters in morphospaces, it also consists in geographical 
exploration, as well as exploration of ecological possibilities and of genealogical 
outgrowths. These explorations, while related, are not necessarily coupled. Shen 
et al., for example, are careful in decoupling morphology from ecology and gene-
alogy. They deal with morphology and “make no inference on the phylogenetic 
homology and functional biology of the coded characters.” On the other hand, 
they try to test the claim that Ediacaran morphology was primarily controlled by 
paleoenvironments. Avalon-type biotas occur in deep marine habitats, whereas 
Nama-type biotas occur in distributary-mouth bar shoals, yet, according to Shen 
et al.’s analysis, morphologically the “groups are indistinguishable or strongly 
overlapping,” implying that “paleoenvironments were not a major factor control-
ling the extent of Ediacara morphospace.” Morphological proliferation is thus not 
tightly coupled with ecological exploration.
Genealogical relationships in the Ediacaran biota are not shown in Figs. 12 and 13. 
Figure 8, modified from Xiao and Laflamme (2009), is a tree showing hypothetical 
broad-scale phylogenetic relationships among some major Ediacaran fossil groups 
in the context of later, still living groups. The tree shows how morphological groups 
or “grades” can be either monophyletic like Rangeomorphs, nonmonophyletic like 
Bilateral forms, and surely polyphyletic like Discoidal forms, scattered across differ-
ent lineages. The example shows that descent relationships, even when known with 
reasonable confidence, may not be fully reflected in morphology, generating visuali-
zation conflicts.
3.4  Diversity Curves
The dynamics of biodiversity variables over geological time is a crucial aspect of 
macroevolution. Graphical representations of those dynamics are essential in mac-
roevolution studies. Figure 14 shows two versions of a familiar diagram of extinc-
tions. In charts of this kind, the horizontal axis (left to right) represents time. The 
vertical axis reports a variable of biodiversity. The first version (a) traces the num-
ber of families over the whole history of multicellular life, marking the “Big Five” 
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mass extinctions. A taxonomical or phylogenetic criterion is used to split out the 
rise and survivorship of different groups (Cambrian, Paleozoic, and modern fau-
nas). The second chart (b) is from the original study in which Raup and Sepkoski 
(1984) demonstrated the existence of the Big Five. Their chart shows not an abso-
lute value, but a frequency: percent extinctions. The two paleontologists were 
working in the context of the “birth of paleobiology” (Sepkoski 2012), when com-
putational methods were run on large datasets to expose important macroevolu-
tionary patterns, legitimating macroevolution as a proper field of study.22 
Temporal biodiversity graphs, whether local or global in scale, always require the 
assembly of many heterogeneous data and their elaboration through statistical and 
computational procedures.
Temporal charts may visualize dynamic values. Origination/speciation rates 
and extinction rates are a fundamental aspect of macroevolution. Rates are 
dynamic values, although they can also be expressed as frequencies (a specia-
tion rate, for example, can be well seen as number of speciation events per unit of 
time). Extinction and speciation rates are not constant over time, and species abun-
dance or scarcity results from the balance between these two processes.
Other temporal charts may focus on biometrical measures. These are continu-
ously varying traits that are measurable in living organisms or fossils, and that can 
be mapped over groups and over time. An increase or decrease of the average 
value of a particular character through time may constitute a macroevolutionary 
trend. Niche breadth is a particularly interesting example of a biometrical trait 
measured and plotted over macroevolutionary time. There are several concepts of 
22 The importance of this pioneering study can hardly be overestimated. Later, many “mass 
extinctions” beyond the Big Five have been revealed and studied in the fossil record, and 
 knowledge in this field is constantly evolving.
Fig. 14  Profiling large-scale biodiversity variables is crucial to macroevolutionary studies, but 
requires the construction of huge datasets by the integration of many different studies a number of 
families since the dawn of multicellular life, b extinction rate (in percentage of extinct taxa per unit 
of time) since the Late Permian [Source a Redrawn and modified from Ian Metcalfe’s research page 
(http://www-personal.une.edu.au/~imetcal2/web-data/Research/Mass-Extint/Extinct.html), 
accessed on June 13th, 2014; b from Raup and Sepkoski (1984)]
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ecological niche (Peterson 2003). The Hutchinsonian niche (Hutchinson 1957, 
1965), foundational to modern ecology, is an n-dimensional hypervolume whose 
dimensions are environmental variables that define the requirements of an individ-
ual or a species, e.g., elevation, temperature, precipitations, soil dimensions such 
as nitrogen, and mean solar insolation. Along each of these dimensions, there is a 
range where the considered organism can live. The resulting hyperspace is the 
organism’s (Hutchinsonian) niche—see Fig. 15a.23 The niche hypervolume com-
prises all combinations of the environmental conditions which do permit an indi-
vidual of the species to survive and reproduce indefinitely. Hutchinson defined the 
niche breadth for an organism as the habitable range along each particular envi-
ronmental variable (Fig. 15b). Niche breadth may widen or shrink in macroevolu-
tion, as organisms become, respectively, more generalist or more specialist 
(Fig. 15c). Something will be said below on the correlation between niche breadth 
and geographic range, in relation to connecting multiple spaces of possibilities.
3.5  Legacy of Macroevolutionary Landscapes
The genotypic landscapes of Wright and Dobzhansky predate by several dec-
ades the advent of molecular biology and DNA sequencing. Since then, molec-
ular biology has shown lower level sequence spaces (Smith 1962, 1970). These 
are very similar to Wright’s allele spaces, but in sequence spaces, individuals are 
not sets alleles, they are sequences of nucleotides; the number of loci is replaced 
by the number of nucleotides in the sequence; and the number of possible states 
23 Hutchinson distinguished the fundamental niche—the maximum inhabitable hypervolume in 
the absence of biotic constraints—from the realized niche, a smaller hypervolume occupied by 
the species when under competition, predation, parasitism, and other constraints.
Fig. 15  a Niche of an organism considering three environmental variables. For each variable, 
the niche includes the range in which the organism/species can survive and reproduce indefi-
nitely. b Realistic niches have many more than three dimensions. Summary measures can be 
extrapolated to go back to two dimensions. Within the fundamental niche, there are “peaks” of 
optimal combinations of values; the realized niche, constrained by community organization, is a 
subset of the fundamental niche. c A hypothetical macroevolutionary trend toward specialization 
(i.e., niche breadth reduction) (original drawing)
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for each nucleotide is four (A, C, T, G). The conception of mutation has also 
changed. Mutation can still be seen from the alleles point of view, as the origin 
of brand new elements, and as a “different rules” mechanism altering the combi-
nation space (as it was in Wright and, less clearly, in Dobzhansky). On the other 
hand, mutation (at least point mutations) can now be treated as movement in the 
sequence space, i.e., not as the origin of a brand new factor, but rather as the reali-
zation of a possibility which was already specified in the combination space.
The relevance of sequence spaces for macroevolution does not derive, of 
course, from the illusion of constructing mega-landscapes of nucleotides (as 
Dawkins had imagined with alleles).24 Rather, sequence spaces are guides to map-
ping what macroevolution has been realizing, as a subset of a whole lot of possible 
alternatives. Sequence spaces are source of evidence to explain, for example, why 
some combinations were not realized in macroevolution, opening up new research 
questions.
Relevant to macroevolution studies are, for example, low-dimensional sequence 
spaces of short genetic regions, for which a meaningful fitness value can be cal-
culated. RNA models (Schuster et al. 1994) match nucleotide sequences with the 
determined RNA’s secondary structure, which in turn can be assigned a fitness 
value. This modeling tradition has shown that many sequences in the sequence 
space produce the same RNA structure, or structures that are equally fit with 
respect to some biochemical function, implying that a lot of nearly neutral move-
ment can happen in the sequence space. Low-dimensional sequence spaces can 
also be used to study proteins. While the entire sequence space of an average pro-
tein is intractable owing to the “hyperastronomical” number of variants (Voigt 
et al. 2000), a significant region of the protein can be correlated to some meas-
ure of function or fitness (Rowe et al. 2010). Low-dimensional biochemical spaces 
have become amenable to experimental investigation: Knowledge of neighbor-
hood and fitness rules is applied to guide chemical synthesis; engineered proteins 
(e.g., Stadler and Stadler 2002) can be put to work in organisms, and their function 
measured; and empirical fitness landscapes can then be compared to theoretical 
ones (Carneiro and Hartl 2010; Lunzer et al. 2005; Poelwijk et al. 2007). Another 
model, the block model (Perelson and Macken 1995), reduces dimensionality by 
envisioning genes or proteins as combinations of distinct functional domains and 
can be studied with suitable mathematical methods (Orr 2006).
Given the interest of low-dimensional spaces, many modeling works use bio-
logically unrealistic exploration mechanisms to study their general properties. In 
some models, for example, a DNA sequence recurrently mutates to a finite number 
of alternative sequences (Smith 1962, 1970; Gillespie 1983, 1984, 1991). General 
space properties such as the relation among correlation, ruggedness, and expected 
outcome of adaptive walks were found by Kauffman (1993) (see also Kauffman 
24 A hypothetical sequence space accommodating whole genomes would be absurdly high 
dimensional (a human sequence space, for instance, would have 2.9 billion dimensions); not to 




and Levin 1987). His NK models, with N genes and K fitness interactions between 
genes, were tunably “rugged.” Correlated landscapes have great K, i.e., many 
interactions among genes. They are smoother than completely random landscapes 
(i.e., they feature fewer local optima, Weinberger 1990), and this affects proba-
bilistically the dynamics of adaptive walks therein. These studies are more a way 
of exploring the properties of combination spaces than a way of simulating mac-
roevolution, but more and more empirical studies (cf. Poelwijk et al. 2007) take 
advantage of metrics and methods developed for these artificial fitness landscapes.
So far, I have provided examples of low-dimensional character spaces that are 
relevant to macroevolution and partly liable to two-dimensional representation in 
the form of landscapes. The genetics of macroevolution, however, also requires a 
completely different kind of spaces, now that high-throughput sequencing is read-
ily available. To go beyond molecular phylogenies and explore the mechanisms of 
genomes evolution, scientists need spaces with huge dimensionality that imitate 
whole gene pools, in which each combination is a whole genome. But low-dimen-
sional and high-dimensional spaces are separated by an epistemological “phase 
transition”: High-dimensional spaces need another kind of mathematics, basically 
holistic, probabilistic, with a strong role of statistics (Hansen 2012; Doebeli 2012). 
Even here, however, “undrawn” landscapes are an indispensable aid. Terms like 
“ruggedness” have precise mathematical, statistical meaning. They are used in 
mathematical theories even in the frequent cases where no landscape picture can 
be usefully drawn.
Simpson’s phenotypic landscapes also maintain their service to macroevolu-
tionary studies. They had been formalized and researched at first by Lande (1979a, 
b) and then by others (see Arnold et al. 2001, 2008) who introduced the name 
“Simpson–Lande landscapes.” Methods such as “principal component analysis” 
extract a series of bidimensional maps that together show the “shape of variabil-
ity.”25 Simpson–Lande landscapes are essentially phenotypic, but, expanding the 
biometrical tradition of population genetics (Provine 1971), and they track not 
only the movement of populations in phenotypic space, but also its genotypic 
effects, e.g., changes in heritability and emergence of correlations. The task is per-
formed by mathematical tools such as the “G-matrix” that constitute the field of 
“quantitative genetics.” The G-matrix is a multivariate version of classic heritabil-
ity, h2, that measures the additive genetic variance and covariance of traits within 
a population. The evolution of the population can be theoretically studied by look-
ing at how the G-matrix reacts to an adaptive landscape. Rice (2004, 2012) also 
developed mathematical formalisms to introduce a phenotype landscape that 
explicitly maps genetic and developmental traits onto the phenotypic traits that are 
acted upon by selection. The old adaptive landscape with a few characters à la 
Simpson is thus not abandoned; on the contrary, it explodes into a series of useful 
representations.
25 For another example of a two-dimensional measure extracted from the variability in a multidi-
mensional space, see Fig. 13.
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Simpson–Lande and similar landscapes address the complex dynamics of phe-
notypic and genotypic combinations. They refer not only to spaces of phenotypic 
characters, but to true dynamical systems that produce their exploration vectors.26 
Morphospaces are phenotypic spaces of a different kind, devoided of immediate 
dynamic aspects. We have seen in Fig. 13 an analysis of how Ediacaran taxa 
occupy the “regions” of a 50-dimensional morphospace. A space with so many 
dimensions cannot be fully represented in two or three dimensions, but several 
kinds of distances can be calculated, for example, with the principal components 
method, and plotted onto those morphological “topographies.” The distances and 
neighborhood in another space, for example, the genealogical space (Fig. 8), 
might be added, but this would require different visualization strategies. In a gene-
alogical space—for example, Wright’s landscape (Fig. 1) cleared up from 
Dobzhansky’s conflations—closely related taxa are close to each other, regardless 
their morphology.
Ever since Wright, Dobzhansky, and Simpson, landscapes are two-dimen-
sional transformations of multidimensional spaces of possibilities. Coupled with 
spaces, landscapes are used to explore what is possible, what is realized, what is 
observed, and what is unobserved, in the biological domains. Sometimes, draw-
ing a landscape is not possible or useful, for example, when dimensionality of the 
space is too high. Even here, however, landscape thinking is a fundamental tool to 
approach combination spaces. Genotypic spaces, sequence spaces, morphospaces, 
ecological spaces, and others are essential in studying macroevolution. As we will 
see in the next section, the combinations observed in these spaces are mapped onto 
each other—e.g., phylogenetic, geographical—and vice versa, to yield a complex 
understanding of macroevolution.
3.6  Composing Multiple Spaces
Creative ways of connecting different spaces of possibilities and their exploration 
have become the challenge of macroevolutionary studies and visual representa-
tions. A clear example of the interaction among different spaces of possibilities in 
macroevolution, with the consequent necessity of appropriate representations and 
connecting bridges, is provided by the simultaneous evolution of morphological 
features, niche breadth, and geographic range.
26 A notion of landscapes tightly related to dynamical systems is extremely interesting (see 
Fusco et al. 2014). Here, a dynamic vector is associated with each and every combination of the 
considered variables, so that the space—so to speak—fully includes the rules of its own explora-
tion. The idea diverges somehow from all the presentation made in this chapter, which relates 
landscapes to static combination spaces whose exploration mechanisms exceed the combina-
tions. As a matter of fact, macroevolution studies often employ these kinds of spaces (e.g., mor-




As we have seen with Simpson and other evolutionists, individuals can be seen 
as realizations in a space of possible combinations of characters. Possible combi-
nations of morphological characters make up a morphospace (Fig. 13), whereas 
possible genomes make up a genotypic space (Fig. 1). Evolutionary change of 
morphology can be seen as movement inside morphospaces, although struc-
tural renovation of these spaces is possible as well, especially in macroevolution, 
as noted in Simpson’s discussion of the transience of character complexes. The 
same applies to genetic evolution. In turn, movement in genetic and morphologi-
cal spaces affects movement in ecological spaces, as the modified characters affect 
the ecological conditions that are inhabitable and their “fitness” with respect to the 
organisms.
As we have seen, a niche is a hypervolume in the space of combinations of 
environmental variables that are relevant to an organism (Fig. 15). Being a mul-
tidimensional space of combinations, the niche can be conveniently imagined as 
a landscape and, in certain cases, visualized that way (Fig. 15b). All the possible 
combinations of environmental variables will be aggregated into a surface. For a 
particular species, each combination will be valued for its suitability. Different 
species, perhaps related by common descent, will have different landscapes, 
affecting their possible coexistence (Holt 2009). Through macroevolutionary time, 
species or their descendants will move to different and new ecological niches. A 
species niche is related, on the one hand, to the particular combination of charac-
ters of its members, and, on the other hand, to geographical range.
The ecological niche of a species concurs in determining its geographical distri-
bution, so much so indeed that niche theory allows for inferring the ecological 
niche from geographical distribution: The niche for particular organisms is deter-
mined by statistically examining the combinations of environmental conditions 
that occur at the geographical locations currently inhabited by that organism. 
Geographic range is a sovraindividual measure, at least in the sense that it is not 
appreciated by measuring some trait in the individual fossil, rather it is appreciated 
by looking at the collective property geographical range.27 The inferred niche 
hypervolume can then be used to project changes in geographic range under possi-
ble scenarios of environmental change (Peterson and Vieglais 2001; Peterson et al. 
2011; see also Stigall, this volume).
In sum, we have a plethora of interconnected spaces of possibilities that are 
explored interdependently in macroevolution. Scientists are becoming more and 
more sensitive to integrating genealogy, morphology, genetics, ecology, and geog-
raphy, without conflating them as the early, pioneering neo-Darwinists did. For 
27 “Range size heritability” is a strong concept that has been also tied to the issue of species 
selection. In an interesting study on carnivores, Machac et al. (2011) clarify that range size herit-
ability patterns are accounted for by phylogeny only in part. The patterns actually emerge as a 
consequence of the interplay between evolutionary and geographic constraints: Geographic con-
straints (e.g., temperatures, precipitations) are the most proximate factor shaping species’ ranges, 
but related species are sensitive to shared sets of geographic constraints.
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example, a considerable effort is put into relating phylogenies to ecological 
events. Composite pictures are created to aid this task. Any evolutionary tree is, of 
course, a very incomplete representation of macroevolution, because it does not 
show why and where in the world the branches originate and expand or contract. It 
does not show biogeographical information. But evolution does not happen in a 
vacuum, for a sort of internal tendency to change toward a direction. If macroevo-
lution happens by the formation, persistence, and disruption of ecological equilib-
ria (Tëmkin and Eldredge, this volume), then phylogenetic trees must be combined 
with information on the geographical distribution of taxa that belong to the phy-
logeny, and with ecological representations. On the other hand, patterns of geo-
graphical distribution reconstructed from the fossil record may be mapped onto a 
phylogenetic tree, and used as a criterion to discriminate between different 
allopatric speciation processes. This is possible if different ecological modes of 
speciation are developed by the researcher into contrasting phylogenetic 
predictions.28
Macroevolution is a multispatial process: It happens in several intertwined 
“spaces,” not only geographical spaces, but also genealogical spaces, ecological 
spaces, and genetic and morphological spaces. In these spaces, macroevolution 
develops as a bundle of stories that are interrelated, but not coincident. Landscapes 
can be a useful tool for thinking to some of these spaces. Although microevolu-
tionary concepts—one for all: fitness—are not scalable to macroevolution, integra-
tion can be attempted. Pictures can play an important bridging function here, as 
they did in the MS (Sidlauskas et al. 2009).
4  Conclusion
Looking at graphical representations of macroevolution is a way of appreciating 
that macroevolution is a bundle of explorations of different and interconnected 
spaces of possibilities. Life on earth explores morphospaces, genetic spaces, geo-
graphic and ecological spaces, and genealogical spaces. Of course, macroevolution 
includes the outgrowth of new spaces of possibilities. “Major transitions” such as 
the origin of the eukaryotic cell by endosymbiosis or the inception of multicel-
lularity, for example, opened unprecedented spaces of possibilities. Evolutionary 
biologists avail themselves of more and more advanced methods to map these 
changing spaces of possibilities and to discover the exploration mechanisms at 
work inside them. Macroevolutionary adaptive landscapes were an important 
28 Stigall, this volume exemplifies the methodology of integrating biogeography and phylogeny 
at the macroevolutionary scale. When a daughter species occupies an area different or additional 
to the ancestral distribution, the speciation mode of that branching is classified as dispersal: The 
new species must have originated as a migrating subpopulation. When a daughter species occu-
pies a subset of the ancestral range, speciation mode is considered vicariance: The ancestral spe-
cies must have been passively fragmented by ecological barriers.
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device of communication during the Modern Synthesis. They enforced reciprocal 
knowledge, confidence, and trust among separate disciplinary communities, and 
they helped in constructing a shared language to talk about evolution. They were a 
real scientific metaphor, if by metaphor, we mean a medium connecting different 
places. Macroevolutionary landscapes were meant to present evolution as a uni-
tary process, from micro to macro, from genetics to paleontology, spanning all life 
on earth. While landscapes showed their flexibility in representing all this breadth, 
they also operated conflations between genealogical, ecological, geographic, and 
morphological spaces of possibilities. The rich history of evolutionary landscapes 
is useful to reflect on how scientific visualizations are imbued with deep ways of 
thinking, and to analyze the visualizations that appear in contemporary macroevo-
lutionary studies. Here, we have seen evolutionary trees, stratigraphies and geog-
raphies, morphospaces, ecological spaces, diversity curves, and again landscapes 
of different kinds of spaces. We have also begun to appreciate the challenge of 
connecting knowledge of macroevolution, intrinsically fragmented over differ-
ent spaces of possibilities, by means of composite pictures and, more importantly, 
composite and interdisciplinary studies.
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Abstract This paper understands macroevolution from a general perspective 
focused upon energy and thermodynamics. Its biological perspective is ecological, 
more particularly regarding energy flows. The basic image is the spontaneous disper-
sion of energy gradients, which, while microscopic, entrains and enables the hier-
archical organization of material systems, including the living. The paper will deal 
with the philosophy of development (involving final cause), the dissipative structure 
concept, the maximum entropy production, and maximum power principles. The 
origin of life was the origin of detailed informational control of energy flows. Key 
processes in organic evolution relating to energy flows were the tendency to generate 
a plenitude of ecological niches, as well as the evolution of endothermy, involving 
increases in both the size and complexity of organisms. Organisms serve the uni-
verse by serving as exemplary channels speeding up the dissipation of energy gra-
dients. In my perspective, the course of human evolution can be understood, not as 
being a goal of organic evolution as such, but as entrained by a universal develop-
ment toward thermodynamic equilibration.
Keywords Development · Dissipative structure · Diversity · Ecological niche · 
Energy flow · Entropy production · Hierarchies-subsumptive · Compositional
1  Introduction
Natural philosophy is an attempt to construct a scientifically based ‘big picture’ 
understanding of the world. It attempts to synthesize understandings gathered 
from any and all of the specialized sciences. Its epitome was FWJ Schelling 
(1775–1854), with his global developmental model (Esposito 1977). Natural phi-
losophy projects—both directly and indirectly—a culture’s vision of the universe, 
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and suggests a role for humanity in that picture. Using the ethnographic definition 
of ‘myth’ as generative stories that are believed, we can see that natural philoso-
phy elaborates a myth (Salthe 1992, 2004a), in effect directly challenging religious 
myths.
Natural philosophy lost its place as an avowed discipline around the end of 
the nineteenth century, when science began to become largely entrained into sup-
porting engineering, medicine, and technological advance. Individuals, especially 
some philosophers (e.g., Peirce, Whitehead, Buchler, Bunge), continued to con-
tribute to natural philosophy, while some scientists, capping off their careers, 
contributed as well (Duhem, Einstein, Elsasser, Monod). My own approach 
emphasizes thermodynamics as a unifying science in a world that is capable, as 
well, of being modeled using hierarchical structures (Salthe 2007, 2012). My 
objective with regard to natural philosophy is to display biological evolution as an 
aspect of cosmic evolution.
2  The Energy Flow Perspective
In a joint paper with Eldredge and Salthe (1984), I opted, as a materialist, to focus 
upon the energy connections in the world, as contrasted with the more idealistic 
information perspective that has dominated biology since the middle of the twenti-
eth century. This necessarily means that my outlook was, and is, ‘ecological’ inas-
much as ecology is at base the study of energy flow relations taking place on earth 
between the influx of solar radiation and its reradiation into space (Lotka 1922; 
Kleidon 2010). This perspective was most fully presented by the Odum broth-
ers, between Odum (1971) and Odum and Odum (2000). Of course, it is informa-
tion that channels most energy flows in the world, but my focus is upon the flows 
rather than the informational constraints.
Information regulates the flows of energy everywhere that matter exists, either 
as spontaneous configurations (crystals, river drainage systems) or as organi-
zations (dissipative structures including the living and machines) (Bejan and 
Lorente 2006, 2013; Bejan et al. 2008). Even when not guided by forms, energy 
will flow, as in diffusion and wave front spreading, and so it will have been taking 
place even before gravitating matter appeared in the universe. Energy flow is the 
change that is the source of all other changes, including biological evolution, as 
energy disperses away from regions of higher concentration (Annila 2010; Annila 
and Salthe 2010). Energy dispersion is everywhere spontaneous, and everything 
of interest in the world emerges from tapping into that dispersion, temporarily 
diverting some of it into forms of every kind, as demonstrated, for example, in the 
records of macroevolution. I note that energy dissipation is logically prior to its 
capture in events and by processes—that is, it is spontaneous, entraining every-
thing that occurs.
What is energy? It is that which, when gathered together, emerges as matter 
and which scatters about when matter dissipates, which it tends to do. Everything 
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emerges from energy flow by tapping into that flow and extracting a small portion 
for work (the exergy), leaving the rest (heat energy) to disperse as entropy. Thus
Entropy can be visualized as undirected particle motion, causing particles to 
gradually disperse and slow down as their local situation cools. Heat is the rapid 
motion of locally concentrated particles. So energy is basically a microscopic con-
cept, but its flow can result in organizing meso- and macroscopic forms at many 
scales, including living systems and their constructions (Gladyshev 2006; Salthe 
2007).
3  The Larger Framework
What is needed here are a few lines to orient us in the bigger picture—which is 
required because energy is integral to that picture and because the big picture is 
naturally the focus of natural philosophy. Before there was gravitating matter in 
the universe, it is hypothesized in the big bang theory to have been energy in a uni-
versal quark-gluon ‘soup,’ followed by an expanding matter-radiation ‘soup,’ fol-
lowed by the formation of stars and galaxies, pulled together by the gravitational 
attraction that was emergent with baryonic matter. In one galaxy, the sun and its 
planets formed. We can use a subsumptive, or specification, hierarchy (Salthe 
2012) to make a general summary, modeling successive originations of modes of 
being, or integrative levels, as subclasses, as follows: 
displaying what one might call the really ‘mega’ aspects of macroevolution. From 
each realm that is more generally present in the universe (the outer brackets), 
more highly specified realms will have originated in particular locales by way of 
the addition of new informational constraints. The more primitive realms remain 
in place, making possible and supporting the more derived ones wherever these 
occur.
The biological realm may have emerged in only one locale in the universe. As 
a general scientific perspective, that seems rather unsatisfactory, and the discipline 
of the origin of life studies takes, the view that life is funded upon just another 
phase of matter, and so we should eventually be able to duplicate its origin in 
vitro. However, implicitly mitigating this view is our understanding of the elabo-
rate mechanisms of the genetic system. It is this system that makes life possible. 
It is so complicated that no single spontaneous ‘origin’ as such seems plausible, 
but rather—given that this was a ‘spontaneous’ event—a long concatenation of 
happenstances in special, perhaps unique, environments (Salthe 2009). That is to 
say, here we are dealing with history. The origin of the genetic system is basically 
unknown, likely unknowable. It was, in effect, the origin of informational control, 
of machinery, and of digitality as well, and it requires a semiotic perspective to 
available energy → exergy + entropy.
{physical realm → {chemical or material realm → {biological realm {etc.}}}}
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understand it (Pattee 2007; Barbieri 2011). Prior to that origin, all energy utiliza-
tion resulted only in mass action. After it, by way of the genetic apparatus, mass 
action supports a piecemeal linking of molecules in an orderly manner, resulting 
in the generation of highly specific catalysts (enzymes). This difference is physi-
cally enormous. Life adds to the list of constraints that could characterize a locale, 
informing activities that may take place there. These constraints include generally 
various boundary conditions—temperature, roughness, etc., as well as the chemi-
cal affordances. Genetics adds technique!
4  Subsumptive Logic and the Philosophy of Development
Subsumptive logic can be succinctly shown in the following hierarchy (Salthe 
2012):
In words, this might be summed up (paraphrasing G.G. Simpson) as ‘physics is 
the science that applies to everything, while biology is a realm to which all the 
sciences (to the left of it in the hierarchy) apply.’ Given a particular format like 
this, our ideas become entrained in certain directions. The logic of a phylogeny 
requires, if it is taken to provide a model of biological evolution, that refinement 
is the basic process at work through time. Materially, this means that new kinds 
are formed by way of the addition of new, modifying, informational constraints 
and new information (which may cause loss of form as well as its modification). 
Thus, reptiles are, logically, more highly specified amphibians and birds more 
highly specified reptiles—and so birds are also more highly specified amphibians. 
There can be nothing radically, totally new. Everything has a precursor; nothing 
can come from nothing. This is a materialist as well as a developmental princi-
ple. (This ‘developmental’ point is a challenge for evolutionary biology, which has 
denied any developmental tendencies in biological evolution.)
I have argued (Salthe 1993) that the basic logic of development as a kind of 
change is refinement and that evolution, as a kind of change (not as the label for 
that particular example, organic evolution), is without logic. By this, I mean that 
evolution is just the willy-nilly accumulation of marks from the effects of for-
tuitous encounters with unfamiliar situations. Darwinian adaptation is a purely 
opportunistic ‘grasping at straws’ and could never be planned logically. Note that 
any example of development will also ‘evolve’—that is, a developing system will 
individuate by accumulating accidental marks. In biology, these can sometimes be 
registered in the genetic system (Jorgensen 2011; Shapiro 2011) and may then be 
passed along as part of the, now changed, genetic heritage of a lineage.
This idea that development is fundamentally a process of restriction (or 
refinement) is not a claim that there can be nothing new in biological evolution 
(assuming here that evolution is basically a developmental process); any modifica-
tion would trivially register something new. Locally, within an evolving clade, a 
{physical world {chemical world {biological world {social world}}}}
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changed form could present the possibility of opening up new opportunities for 
resource exploitation. But each opening necessarily closes off other possibili-
ties that might have been explored instead. This is better appreciated by stepping 
back and examining a larger chunk of a phylogeny. Thus, bird evolution has pre-
cluded the possibility of a fossorial life—despite some digging out of nests and the 
kakapo’s burrow. This adaptive zone is being explored in most regions by other 
vertebrate clades, such as amphibians (caecilians) and mammals (moles, mole 
rates, etc.). Thus, while the more detailed picture shows openings up into new 
Hutchinsonian niches (the niche of a given population, Salthe 2001), the larger 
picture shows a gradual closing off of lifeway possibilities (Eltonian niches—gen-
eral life ways, like, say, the cat way of life) for each lineage. Then, local evolu-
tionary openings are into increasingly more restricted (more highly specialized) 
possibilities (Fig. 1). As local diversity increases, global disparity increase stalls. 
This general pattern, like any, will have exceptions and would, of course, be nul-
lified by catastrophic extinction events, which tend to ‘reset’ an evolving system. 
We humans appear to be one of these exceptions.
By mapping numbers of species to information theoretic concepts, Brooks and 
Wiley (1986) produced a general interpretation of biological evolution that is con-
cordant with the present view. In their view—and the record shows that—the vari-
ety (informational or Shannon entropy) of biological kinds increased rapidly early 
in evolution, with a subsequent gradual decline in the origination of new kinds 
continuing onto an asymptotically declining future (Fig. 2; see also, e.g., Vermeij 
1987, Fig. 13.1). Viewing the biosphere as a pool of informational variety, or 
Fig. 1  General view of 
Hutchinsonian ecological 
niches through geological 
time, based on developmental 
logic
Fig. 2  The evolution of 
biological information, based 
on Brooks and Wiley (1986)
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‘disorder,’ Brooks and Wiley represented generic and specific biological forms as 
embodying a degree of order compared to the informational disorder that would be 
the case if there were no individuated biological kinds and instead only masses of 
individuals of every possible form. That is, the order in biological kinds represents 
less disorder/variety than might be maximally possible given the coding possibili-
ties of the genetic information held in living systems. Maximal disorder here is 
being conceived as the complete expression of all genetic information, while order 
would be represented by the larger than molecular bodies making up the various 
specific kinds of actual living things as based on the species-specific portions of 
genomes. Brooks and Wiley note that, overall, the variety of definable biological 
kinds has increased over time, expressing informational entropy increase.
From the ecological perspective, it is easily understood that variety of biologi-
cal forms also represents a variety of Hutchinsonian ecological niches (Fig. 1). It 
also therefore reflects the variety of sources and modes of utilization of energy gra-
dients. Biological variety can continue to increase over time in part because bio-
logical kinds themselves generate new ecological affordances. The ‘actual’ curve 
in Fig. 2 increases in a diminishing returns pattern. This rate of increase diminishes 
over time because, even though the universe appears to be expanding, the earth is 
finite. As well, the energy efficiency of the capture of incident solar energy by pho-
tosynthesis is quite low—around six percent—representing a kind of ‘rock-bottom’ 
constraint, and there is no reason to suppose that it could increase over time. As 
well, the more kinds that exist, the more will tend to go extinct at any time.
5  Dissipative Structures
The world in which evolution occurs is not at equilibrium in any aspect. This 
means that energy flows are maintained everywhere all the time. This might refer 
to the slow, steady expansion of a high-pressure region of the atmosphere driven 
by solar insolation or, more dynamically, the flow of ocean currents called for by 
the tendency for energy (here temperature differences) to even out. But‚ at smaller 
scales, everything dynamic, from thunderstorms to dust devils, from schools of 
fishes to individual organisms, are in more or less constant motion—in some cases 
with organisms, even (internally) while ‘at rest.’ These individuated active systems, 
from a flame to a hurricane, are examples of ‘dissipative structures’ (Prigogine and 
Nicolis 1977; Prigogine and Stengers 1984). Nothing that moves is not either a 
dissipative structure, or part of one, and often both, with one dissipative structure 
nested within another. Simple spontaneous types at meso- and macroscopic scales 
are waves, vortices, and branching tree forms like lightening. At the chemical scale, 
dissipative structures would be continually maintained exothermic pathways from 
substrates to end products, while endothermic reactions would be nestled within 
exothermic ones.
Dissipative structures appear when energy gradients become too steep to be 
significantly degraded by gradual heat conduction. At that point, they emerge as 
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convective forms of various kinds as allowed by local conditions (Schneider and 
Kay 1994; Salthe 2007). The processes of life’s origination—that is, the origin of 
the genetic system—will necessarily have occurred within dissipative structures. 
Some of these dissipative structures will have developed later at several scales into 
living cells and organisms, being captured by ‘genetic takeover’ (Cairns-Smith 
1993). The viewpoint of this paper is that living things as we know them are inter-
nally informed dissipative structures (Wicken 1987). This means that they are 
especially stable and can ‘skate across’ gaps in energy supply that would lead to 
the dispersion of abiotic dissipative structures. The energy supply for this stability 
is internally stored ATP, which would, of course, need to be regenerated. Living 
systems have internalized their primary energy source as well as the (genetic) 
source of their actual forms, which relate appropriately (adapt) to particular 
environments.
Current discussions of dissipative structures have been centering on the maxi-
mum entropy production principle (MEPP; e.g., Annila 2010; Kleidon 2010; 
Martyushev 2013). As I put it in 2010, ‘an energy dissipative system that can 
assume several to many conformations will tend to take up one, or frequently 
return to one, that maximizes the entropy production from the energy gradients it 
is dissipating—to a degree consistent with the system’s survival.’ The latter quali-
fication is required because literal maximization—an explosion!—would destroy 
the system. MEPP is a universal, global principle, on the reasonable supposition 
that our universe is a thermodynamically isolated system, thereby being subject 
to the second law of thermodynamics. How this cashes out locally is by way of 
the maximum energy dispersion principle (MEDP). Local energy dispersion will 
eventually result in the production of heat energy (entropy), but much of it imme-
diately would be in the form of various waste products (imagine the feeding of a 
shark). In living systems, energy dispersion is produced by work; the faster/harder 
the work, the more of the supporting energy gradient gets dispersed as heat energy. 
Living systems are always, with intermittent rest periods, striving in one way or 
another; and while at rest, energy continues being used for healing. MEDP, then, 
refers to energy gradient dispersion by non-equilibrium systems such as organisms 
located within an out-of-equilibrium, thermodynamically isolated system (the uni-
verse) which elicits MEPP as an expression of its tendency toward thermodynamic 
equilibrium known as the second law of thermodynamics. Local MEDP serves 
global MEPP.
In the ultimate macroevolutionary perspective, Chaisson (2001, 2008, 2012) 
has shown that evolution (cosmic, biological, and technological) has produced 
systems that depend upon, and produce, greater and greater intensities of energy 
flows through them (Fig. 3). Energy throughput per unit mass is known as power. 
In dissipative structures, this power is the source of the energy (the exergy) that 
organizes and maintains them. In social systems, we are used to referring to this 
portion and that expended in various projects, as supporting ‘work,’ and I think we 
can safely refer to the portion used by living systems to maintain and reproduce 
themselves as work as well. I would further extend that usage to all dissipative 
structures (Salthe 2010a)—thus, tornadoes work hard at destroying houses.
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An extremely curious fact about our world on earth is the constitutively poor 
energy efficiency of any effective work, which is never better, with significant 
loadings, than 50 % (Odum 1983). There has been no explanation of this known 
to me (Salthe 2003). However, if we consider ourselves, and all dissipative struc-
tures, to be part of the universe, we could see that all the multiple works mani-
festing this poor efficiency are activities of the universe, working through us, in 
its project of universal thermodynamic equilibration. This perspective (see also 
Martyushev 2013) is uncongenial to our fundamental cultural outlook of human 
individualism. On the template of the following subsumptive hierarchy (Salthe 
2013), which would be in effect anywhere on earth:
showing how some realms of nature, modeled as classes and subclasses, relate to 
each other logically, we have
That is, work is a mode of free energy usage, which in turn is a mode of entropy 
production.
The line of reasoning in the previous paragraph is not ‘scientific.’ That is, it has 
no relation to the motivations for most scientific investigations or to the world view 
of the subsequent reports. It is concerned with the possible meanings of scientific 
knowledge, which is, in fact, the province of natural philosophy and of this paper.
We may ask: are species dissipative structures? No. What about populations? 
As parts of local ecosystems, possibly. Species cannot be said to be active agents 
in the ecological world. My current view is that species are essences, meaning 
that, as such, they have no dynamic ecological role, which is carried out instead, 
and not always identically, by local populations. Insofar as they are causal entities, 
species are coded scripts in DNA within cells. The essence of this would be that 
{physical world {chemical world {biological world}}}
{entropy production {free energy dissipation {work}}}
Fig. 3  Energy flow intensity 
in selected entities through 
time. Redrawn from Chaisson 
(2012). erg/t/g is ergs per unit 
time per gram weight
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small portion of the script carried by every member of the collection of organisms 
making up what we discern as a species and by no member of any other species. It 
could be just a few dozen kilobases, and it could be located in only one organism 
or free living cell of a species on the brink of extinction. Practically, it could never 
actually be identified. In short, species are constructs of the informational disci-
pline, Systematic Biology. Populations, however, occupying actual space in time, 
and working Hutchinsonian niches, would be functioning parts of local ecosys-
tems, where they transform energy in their position in a food chain and food web. 
But this sort of function—e.g., the ecological efficiency—is actually only the sum 
of the activities of the included organisms, which are the actual dissipative struc-
tures involved. However, it seems possible that a population’s relations to other 
local populations would be what allocates the characteristic number of individu-
als in that population. This would be a greater-than-organism function that effects 
the total energy transformations of that population, giving the population an actual 
ecological function of apportioning the energy throughput of a local ecosystem.
6  Senescence and Reproduction
All dissipative structures, if they survive assaults, develop through to senescence, 
which sets the stage for recycling. I have proposed (Salthe 1993) that development 
can be characterized by three general stages, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1  General stages of development
Modified from Salthe (2010b), based on thermodynamic (Zotin 1972; Polenttini 2013) and infor-
mation theoretic criteria
Immature stage
Relatively high energy density (per unit mass) flow rate
Relatively small size and/or gross matter and energy throughputs
Rate of increase of informational constraints relatively high, as part of high growth rate
Internal stability relatively low (it is changing fast), but dynamical stability (persistence) is high
Homeorhetic stability to same-scale perturbations relatively high
Mature stage (only in relatively very stable systems)
Declining energy density flow rate still sufficient for recovery from perturbations
Size and gross energy and matter throughput typical for the kind of system
Form is definitive for the kind of system
Internal stability adequate for system persistence
Homeostatic stability to same-scale perturbations adequate for recovery from insults
Senescent stage
Energy density flow rate gradually dropping below functional requirements
Gross matter and energy throughput high but its increase is decelerating
Form increasingly accumulates deforming marks as a result of encounters, as part of 
individuation
Internal stability of system becoming high to the point of inflexibility
Homeostatic stability to same-scale perturbations declining
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Senescence is most often treated as a human disease, even though it is the nat-
ural culmination of all dissipative structures. Basically it results, in my perspec-
tive, from the inevitable taking on of new information (any modifications) after 
the definitive form of a kind of system has been achieved. Living systems have not 
been able to escape it. And so senescence is not a particular by-product of natural 
selection. It has had an enormous consequence. After the evolution—or was it the 
development? or might it even have been the incorporation?—of the genetic appa-
ratus, the division of a (now living) cell entailed the multiplication of a particular 
identity. Protobiotic systems likely fragmented and spread over an abiotic ecosys-
tem. Once the genetic system had made its appearance, fragments could take with 
them information that made their predecessor successful enough to grow enough 
under bearing conditions to fragment. This allowed them to split more read-
ily when that was promoted by instability due to increasing size. Identity and its 
reproduction had been born. Before that, every piece of matter was different from 
all others; after that, we have definite kinds, enforced by genetic identity. Which 
living systems, after the origin of life, would inherit the earth? Those that could 
maintain a presence in the face of inevitable senescent decline and, as well, those 
that could utilize their energy sources faster than other competing kinds (Matsuno 
and Swenson 1999). This latter involved being able to respond successfully with 
an increased rate of energy acquisition when presented with larger energy sources 
to some extent even during senescent decline (Polenttini 2013). Abiotic dissipa-
tive systems would do this spontaneously, but the more complicated living dissipa-
tive structures could be inhibited by their own delicate form to different degrees, 
giving rise to competition for moderate energy gradients. We now had particular 
kinds, in effect competing with other particular kinds, for energy. This situation 
placed a premium upon the ability to switch to new energy sources as those being 
utilized became depleted locally, driving the possibility of ‘speciation.’
7  Ecosystems as Energy Flow Pathways
Energy flows are everywhere in the universe and would have been happening on, 
and within, the primitive earth as well. The energy viewpoint is useful in allowing 
us to realize that there always have been ecosystems on the earth after it formed, 
perhaps at first only a single global one, with weather phenomena, orogenic activ-
ity, erosions, and so on (Kleidon 2010). Logically, we need to see protoliving sys-
tems emerging within, and getting intercalated into, preexisting liquid water flow 
systems. This would have been contextualized by the precipitation/evaporation 
cycle, where the emerging living systems likely were fostered within moderate 
flow eddies created and maintained within faster flowing hydrological systems that 
could deliver substrates. All of this will have been contextualized by local diur-
nal cycles produced by the spinning of the earth, allowing temporary survival (at 
night) of delicate forms at different scales, promoting further epigenesis. So the 
origin of life would have occurred within some abiotic dissipative structure(s) in 
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an abiotic ecosystem where the energy flows were moderate, as well as intermit-
tent (Branscom and Russell 2013; Pross and Pascal 2013). In this sort of setting, 
we know pretty well how phospholipid membranes, microspheres, protobionts, 
and metabolism could have been produced spontaneously within increasingly 
lively ‘living ponds.’ With life being characterized as a system having propagation 
and interpretation (Pattee 2007), we can fairly well imagine crude forms of propa-
gation going on, but biosemioticians would insist that interpretation became asso-
ciated with the genetic apparatus, yet we have little idea about how this may have 
originated. (With this fact, I could assert that the energy perspective is actually on 
a sounder scientific basis than the alternative information perspective! Of course, 
both perspectives are required to understand living systems.)
The earth spins in a stream of electromagnetic radiation dissipated from the 
sun’s fusion dynamics. On earth, some of this energy (the sun’s entropy!) is further 
dissipated by the evaporation of water and the production of weather phenomena. 
This leads in turn to geophysical dissipation in the weathering of rocks and the 
production of dissipative structures such as drainage systems and ocean currents. I 
trace this particular dissipative pathway because it is solar radiation that is tapped 
also by most known current living systems, by way of photosynthesis. Living sys-
tems dissipate this energy gradually through food webs and beyond that by con-
tributing to the mass wasting of rocks and the production of soils, as well as by 
plant transpiration, producing the humidity required by storms.
A given biotic storage of energy could be dissipated in many ways—action, 
predation, fire, floods, and ultimately by way of detrivory. Quoting my 2010 paper 
again, ‘an energy dissipative system that can assume several to many conforma-
tions will tend to take up one, or frequently return to one, that maximizes the 
entropy production from the energy gradients it is dissipating—to a degree con-
sistent with the system’s survival.’ This is, again, MEPP, as carried out locally by 
way MEDP. So, at any locale, we can expect ‘things to happen’ that rapidly dis-
sipate whatever energy gradients are present. This might at any moment call for a 
lightning strike, a predator’s strike, decay processes, and photosynthesis. On earth, 
biological systems have been entrained into this consequence of the second law of 
thermodynamics in a big way. It can be asserted that biological entities are almost 
always ‘striving.’ A major source of evidence for this viewpoint has been produced 
by Adrian Bejan as reported in numerous papers, in order to illustrate his ‘con-
structal theory.’ He has convincingly shown that all flow systems on earth, natural 
or manufactured, are formed so as to ‘develop the flow architecture that maximizes 
flow access under the constraints posed to the flow’ (Reis and Bejan 2006). This 
is exactly what would be predicted by the MEDP perspective. It has been noted 
that MEDP is often not a testable phenomenon in particular cases. Constructal 
form has however been amply demonstrated in many material systems, allowing 
plausible conjecture. I note here in passing that many adaptive scenarios in neo-
Darwinian discourse are similarly hobbled by non-testability, with much less indi-
rect evidence to back them up! In my 1975 paper (Salthe 1975) I cited references 
showing that natural selection functions more intensely during times of strenuous 
activity—which would, of course, be times of greatest entropy production.
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The MEDP label has been objected to by noting that, for example, living systems 
do not literally maximize the energy flows through them, which would kill them. 
Instead, they optimize the energy flows, as discussed by Lotka (1922) and Odum and 
Pinkerton (1955), who dubbed this principle the ‘maximum power principle’ (MPP) 
(Salthe 2010a). Literal maximization anywhere would be explosive. In fact, dissipa-
tive structures generally intervene as a natural energy source increases before it can 
become explosive (Schneider and Kay 1994; Salthe 2007). Thus, while the expanding 
universe demands MEPP, this tends to be realized locally as MEDP, and this is further 
modulated in the more delicate living systems to MPP. The trade-off for the universe 
in the latter case is an increasing diversity of energy flows, producing some that might 
not occur at all abiotically. The predominant perspective on organismic energy use 
focuses upon energy efficiency, taking energy savings to be a major desideratum (e.g., 
Shepard et al. 2013). This is derived from the engineering mind-set, where energy 
supply is an important limitation. But organisms generally have reliable sources of 
energy within their niche spaces, as well as internal sources of energy such as ATP, 
both of which facts allow effective actions to trump energy savings as immediate 
goals. Excessive exertions might lead to death, but survivors are successful at—pre-
cisely—exertions. This means that energy efficiency would evolve within the overrid-
ing context of striving (Annila and Salthe 2010). The MEDP perspective is that energy 
efficiency would evolve mostly in order to promote striving. This would mean that, 
while effectiveness is the true focus of selection, efficiency increase during extreme 
activity could perhaps contribute to that effectiveness, but it would hardly count as a 
major focus of selection, except as weeding out really inefficient abnormalities.
8  Biological Evolution
As Darwin pointed out, evolution can be visualized as producing a tree of bio-
logical forms (e.g., Rieppel), which can be modeled by a subsumptive hierarchy, 
{{class {order {genus { }}}}}. Each form comes out working its own ecological 
niche. From this, evolution can be viewed as an exploration of ways to degrade 
increasingly more particular energy gradients, creating a diversity, and increas-
ing number, of energy sources. The big picture shows life beginning with chem-
osynthesis and/or photosynthesis, followed, in the animal branch, at length by the 
evolution of detrivores to utilize an increasing layer of dead biomass. The key idea 
here is that, given a significant energy source, sooner or later a dissipative system 
will emerge to disperse it. This led further to more macroscopic forms with mouths 
and digestive systems utilizing the dead organic mass more rapidly and converting 
some of it to a form more readily accessed by microorganisms as well. Eventually, 
some of these detrivores evolved the ability to prey on others of like kind, becom-
ing carnivores. After a while, other detrivores acquired endosymbiont microbes that 
allowed them to explore herbivory, which led eventually to the establishment of the 
typical modern food chain with the addition of predation. And then, carnivores and 
herbivores began exploring increasingly more specialized ways of life.
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With regard to MEDP, the evolution to carnivory and herbivory entailed more 
rapid energy conversions, with top carnivores, for example, tending to speed up local 
food chain transformations. Viewing populations as dissipative structures, predation 
dissipates prey energy faster than would slower microorganismic decay of individu-
als from prey populations. With animals, apex predation can also elicit faster prey 
reproduction, at earlier ages, since older individuals tend to be preferentially har-
vested. These effects have been observed in fisheries (e.g., Odum 1983). Herbivory 
and carnivory also entailed increased organismic striving (in plants for increased 
growth rates) as a functional requirement, and this entails more energy throughput 
and heat energy production. This leads us to note Van Valen’s (1973) Red Queen’s 
hypothesis, which energized and generalized its forerunner, Gause’s (1934) competi-
tive exclusion principle. On the supposition that there are characteristic energy avail-
abilities in a given habitat, if one population begins to reproduce more successfully, 
it will impact other populations working the same general Eltonian niche (syntopic 
species of woodland herbs in a forest, for example), requiring these to compensate 
in order to keep up. The result will also affect others in a food web, delivering a con-
stant jockeying for energy between populations in a habitat.
Eventually, evolution resulted in a hierarchy of biological systems (e.g., 
Eldredge 1989) that can be modeled as a compositional hierarchy (wholes and 
parts, Salthe 2012). But how did it accomplish this? As it happens, nature is not 
intrinsically opposed to this structuring, which would in that case require specific 
kinds of work to create it. Gladyshev (2006) has shown that such a hierarchy is 
compatible, as a steady state, with the second law of thermodynamics and so can 
come about spontaneously (Fig. 4). This suggests that the abiotic ecosystem prior 
Fig. 4  Steady-state 
thermodynamic relations 
among levels in the 
compositional hierarchy of 
biological systems on earth. 




to the origin of life will already have self-assembled into such a structure in crude 
form; biological systems will then have come along and filled in the slots, as it 
were. Of course work needs to be done to keep any system going, but we need to 
understand in just what way the work is done to maintain the hierarchical form 
biologically. Figure 4 shows the biological hierarchy as a spontaneously achieved 
thermodynamic steady state resulting from self-assembly of the levels. Each level 
acts in its role as a higher level to the next lower level in a way that fosters the 
hierarchy as a quasi-stable, steady-state entity. The work that is done—in addi-
tion to the primal work of photosynthesis—is done by each level maintaining an 
environment that keeps eliciting the contributions of its next lower level. That is, it 
maintains a situation favorable to the activities of the next lower level. For exam-
ple, the organism creates conditions that promote the activities of its incorporated 
cells. This work creates a top-down affordance inviting the continued bottom-
up contributions of the next lower level that structurally makes possible its next 
higher level. The work accomplished at one level creates, at the next lower level, 
conditions that allow it—the higher level—to continue to emerge.
But the Gladyshev model is not complete. It is one thing to understand that a 
compositional hierarchy could be a thermodynamically secure structure—unlike 
a tall building, for example—but there is also the question of why it would con-
tinue to be thermodynamically favored once achieved. This question moves us 
from the classical thermodynamics informing Gladyshev to non-equilibrium ther-
modynamics. In that format, we can bring in MEPP. That is, I would posit that this 
hierarchical form is the one that elicits the most favorable kinds of flow structures 
throughput the hierarchy that promote the MPP overall and therefore maximizes 
as much as possible the system’s global rate of entropy production (Salthe 2004b).
So, we have two basic thermodynamic principles working here. One is the clas-
sical Gibbs free energy perspective utilized by Gladyshev, stating that a system 
will spontaneously move to a least free (available, usable) energy configuration. 
The other is MEPP, stating that this will emerge in a non-equilibrium system as 
rapidly as possible. In living systems, the solar energy captured by photosynthe-
sis is routed metabolically on its way toward ATP synthesis and the heat energy 
released from the cytochrome system. Living systems that did not sufficiently 
moderate the rate the energy dispersion through them burned out and went extinct.
Moving now from the more speculative to more solid evidence in favor of the 
idea that evolution has increased the rate of earth’s energy flows/entropy produc-
tion, we can recall Bejan’s multiple evidences that facilitating energy flows acts 
as a final cause of any and all dynamic material structures, as well as Chaisson’s 
more particular evidence (Fig. 3) that per unit mass energy flows have increased 
during evolution. But in my view, the clearest evidence for the influence of 
MEDP/MEPP in biological evolution is the convergent evolution of homeothermy 
(endothermy) in mammals and dinosaurs/birds. There are tendencies toward this 
in other phyla as well, for example, the endothermy of tunas and some other 
large, fast swimming predatory fishes. Even a plant has achieved it—the flower 
of the skunk cabbage, which stimulates beetle pollinator activity in cool weather. 
Behavioral homeothermy is another common tendency, as in lizards. Endothermy 
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requires significant amounts of energy dissipation and is a direct result of physical 
entropy (heat) production, with no other more elaborate product. It, and behavioral 
homeothermy, do nothing more than increase the rates of activity of the animals 
in question. Regardless of particular adaptations that may have been facilitated 
by homeothermy (such as living in colder climates), its ‘universal’ achievement 
is simply to directly increase the entropy production of an animal per second of 
life. Surely, a frog might be imagined to think, ‘What a waste of energy! Look at 
me—I get along quite well without it (even in Siberia)!’
9  Humanity’s Role in the Universe
Evolutionary Biology has not identified any goal of organic evolution. Neither 
increase in complexity, nor increase in consciousness has been accepted as bio-
logical evolution’s goal on earth. One may suspect that this may be an effect of the 
neo-Darwinian domination of evolutionary studies, where all effects are viewed as 
the results of local caprice, allowing no tendency to evolve out of anything beyond 
contingeny, or to long survive environmental change if it did emerge. The concept 
of natural selection allows of no directional tendencies that are not merely local, 
provisional, and contingent. Even humanity is not viewed as occupying a privi-
leged position at the top of a perceived chain of evolved forms—an image that in 
any case likely reflects rejected ancient religious opinion.
However, as alluded to above, there is a scientifically based concept of a uni-
versal goal of all events and actions—the dispersion of energy gradients toward a 
universal final state approaching thermodynamic equilibrium, where orderly fluc-
tuations here and there will soon get damped out. This ‘heat death of the universe’ 
has had many objections on various grounds, but in the long run, it seems to me 
that it cannot be avoided given our current knowledge. This knowledge amounts to 
the empirically derived fact that entropy must increase if it changes in a thermody-
namically isolated system. Since it is produced each time any action occurs—and 
copiously with significant work—we may reasonably infer that the universe, or 
our section of it, is a thermodynamically isolated system. Given that assumption, 
the second law of thermodynamics, perhaps second only to the law of gravita-
tion, is the physical law most immediately impacting our lives—disorder threatens 
everywhere, and we must work harder than seems reasonable to achieve anything 
(Salthe 2003).
I have argued that the second law is a ‘natural’ example of final cause (e.g., 
Salthe 1993; Salthe and Fuhrman 2005). Directional tendencies in nature have 
been parsed (Mayr 1988) as:
or
{teleomaty {teleonomy {teleology}}}




where each innermost subclass (or integrative level) is a more specific example of 
the next outermost class. Thus, e.g., purpose is a kind of function. The essential 
point is that all the labels in the second hierarchy here are end-directed. The sec-
ond law of thermodynamics is a teleomatic principle, and thus
on the template:
As Lotka pointed out, some solar energy reradiation from earth’s surface is 
delayed while being rerouted through living systems, but this has the ‘universal’ 
payoff of slowly undermining earth’s gravitated mass by way of activities that 
stir up soils, undermine rocks, and spray water—slight events with slowly accu-
mulating effects, adding to the much more powerful abiotic disturbances such as 
earthquakes and storms. Over geological time, events with slight effects gradually 
accumulate to global significance.
Spontaneous diffusion and mass wasting are insufficient to dissipate all energy 
gradients formed by gravitation and its sequelae. Dissipative structures such as 
storms speed things up in the presence of massively steeper energy gradients, 
but still many gradients will have been very slowly dispersed until life appeared: 
Thus, lichens speed up the mass wasting of rocks; microorganisms at work even in 
depths of earth’s oceans and mantle produce corrosive chemistry and heat energy; 
tree roots and burrowers in the soils do so as well and open soils up for further 
chemical transformations. Microorganisms everywhere transform chemical gradi-
ents to simpler forms. (I can’t resist an exception that ‘proves the point’—bacte-
rial action has resulted in the buildup of small gradients of gold, but subsequent 
human activities have torn apart many regions of the earth to collect it.) The role 
of biological diversity in this is clear; it increases the number of energy gradients 
being dissipated and works on some smaller and more cryptic energy gradients 
that are not touched significantly by abiotic dissipative structures.
Humanity’s role regarding MEPP emerged significantly with industrializa-
tion, as visualized in Fig. 3. Human economies have added to all of the dissipa-
tive effects on earth’s surface and, after the industrial revolution, have magnified 
some of them many fold, by way of various mining activities, modern travel and 
warfare. But, as Machu Picchu and China’s buried terracotta army show, intense 
labor was not a consequence of the industrial evolution. Yet, after that direction 
was taken, hard labor was magnified manyfold and mechanized. Our current 
throwaway economy may be its crowning achievement. Warfare may have a spe-
cial role in human entropy production. It is deplored by everyone, yet is indulged 
continually somewhere on earth’s surface—taking a large-scale glimpse, it would 
be everywhere anytime. Entrainment by the second law can serve as an explana-
tion for the paradoxical role of war as an attractor of human activity regardless 
{physicochemical world {biological world {human socioeconomic world}}}
{entropy production {free energy decline {work {social projects}}}}
{physical world {chemical world {biological world {socioeconomic world}}}}
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of everyone’s voiced disapproval, working as a final cause of human activity. The 
second law would provide a very slight pull at any moment, but is always reli-
ably beckoning so as to tip the scales of decision making in cases of uncertainty. 
Yet industrial activity may be an even greater, if somewhat more careful, producer 
of heat energy and debris. The keynote seems to be, Build → Destroy → Rebuild, 
with heat energy being the only definite result in the long run.
10  Conclusion
Have I, in this paper, reduced all the complexities of biology and sociology to 
physics? In one sense, yes. On the other hand, my perspective in this paper is that 
humanity is a part, or aspect, of the universe in addition to being the growing point 
of a lineage in a cladogram. We no longer can view ourselves as a goal of organic 
evolution. In the phylogenetic perspective, we are merely one more primate, while 
in the physical perspective, we have become mighty workers in the service of uni-
versal dissipation.
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Abstract This expansion of the hierarchy theory of evolution provides a new 
perspective in which biological phenomena are conceptualized. In this work, we 
(1) attempt to revise the ontology of levels of biological organization and clarify 
the relationship between the economic and genealogical hierarchies; (2) explore 
the implications of network theory for evolutionary dynamics in a hierarchical 
context; and (3) elucidate evolutionary causality by disentangling abiotic drivers 
from proximal evolutionary processes (the origin and sorting of variation) and 
their integration across hierarchies. We suggest that a pervasive pattern of stabi lity 
in living systems across scale results from the architecture of nature’s economy 
itself—biological systems consisting of hierarchically nested, complex networks 
are extremely robust to extrinsic perturbations. We further argue that instances of 
evolution are episodic and rapid; they are transient between equilibrial states that 
ensue when network stability is compromised by sufficiently strong disturbances 
affecting biological entities at multiple levels of organization. We also claim that 
environmental abiotic factors are ultimately responsible for these perturbations 
that, when filtered through the economic hierarchy, shape the patterns of diversity 
and disparity of life as we know it.
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1  Introduction
The natural world is infinitely complex and hierarchically structured. Hierarchy 
theory is an approach to understanding the way complex systems work by identify-
ing levels of organization and their relationships in the context of scaling. In a broad 
sense, a system is a network of functionally interdependent and structurally intercon-
nected components comprising an integrated whole. The complexity arises from intri-
cate, nonlinear interactions of a large number of parts that such systems have, where 
the whole is more than the sum of its parts: That is, given the properties and the laws 
of interactions of parts, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of the whole.
Coining the term “hierarchy” is attributed to Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, a 
philosopher and a theologian of the late fifth–early sixth century, who used the Greek 
word ἱεραρχία (“rule by priests”) in reference to ranks of celestial beings and eccle-
siastical power in early Christian church (Hathaway 1969). Despite its narrow origi-
nal meaning, hierarchical organization can be recognized in almost every system in 
the world from the structure of the natural world to all the domains of human life. 
Hierarchies are manifest in the physical composition of natural and artificial objects, 
engineered mechanisms, genealogical relationships, classification schemes, and soci-
oeconomic organizations. The relative arrangement of levels and the nature of their 
interactions vary greatly depending upon the specific kind of hierarchy considered.
That hierarchy is a key structural principle of biological systems was first 
 recognized by Woodger (1929), whose work influenced the development of hier-
archical approaches across biological disciplines (e.g., Hennig 1950, 1966; Pattee 
1973; Whyte 1969). In biology, the concept of hierarchy acquired a plethora of 
disparate meanings ranging from the descriptions of organization of knowledge to 
models of functional interactions of living systems to taxonomic classifications. 
The pervasiveness of hierarchies in nature was amply captured by Francois Jacob’s 
maxim, “every object that biology studies is a system of systems” (Jacob 1974).
Biological evolutionary theory is ontologically committed to the existence of 
nested hierarchies in nature and attempts to explain natural phenomena as a prod-
uct of complex dynamics of real hierarchical systems. Consistent with the general 
tendency of complex systems to attain and remain in equilibrium, living systems 
display remarkable metastability despite non-equilibrial dynamics at all levels of 
organization triggered by extrinsic disturbances, suggesting that hierarchical sys-
tems have some common properties that are independent of their specific content 
and can be applied across physical, biological, or social sciences.
2  General Properties of Hierarchical Systems
2.1  Architecture of a Hierarchy
A hierarchy is an arrangement of entities in which some are represented as being 
above, below, or at the same level as other entities. A level in a hierarchy refers 
to a class of entities of the same rank or significance. The entities that comprise 
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a level are referred to as “holons” (Koestler 1967, 1978) in the literature on hier-
archy theory. The meaning of levels and the relationship among them depend on 
what kind of hierarchy is considered: order, inclusion, control, or level hierarchy 
(Lane 2006). The applications of hierarchies in explaining natural world range 
from ontologically agnostic theoretical constructs as instrumental in making sense 
of complex processes (Allen 2008; Allen and Starr 1982) to specific ontological 
claims regarding the structure of reality (Salthe 1985). While different kinds of 
hierarchies exist in biological systems, we focus on a particular class of hierar-
chies—nested compositional hierarchies—as a fundamental structural principle of 
real biological systems that lies at the heart of evolutionary phenomenology. In 
subsequent sections, the term “hierarchy” is used in this narrower sense.
A nested compositional hierarchy is a pattern of relationship among entities 
based on the principle of increasing inclusiveness, so that entities at one level are 
composed of parts at lower levels and are themselves nested within more extensive 
entities. Levels are classes of such parts and wholes, and represent ordered organiza-
tion in the context of scale. The rank of levels is assigned according to the scale of 
the entities that are their members. The term focal level designates a level at which 
a particular phenomenon is observed. Higher (or upper) and lower levels refer to 
more inclusive and less inclusive levels relative to the focal level, respectively. 
Mathematically, a nested hierarchy is defined as an ordered set that can be repre-
sented graphically as a rooted tree (an acyclical graph) or a Venn diagram (Fig. 1).
Small differences in scale among entities at levels of adjacent ranks can blur 
clear distinction between levels. The higher levels tend to appear increasingly 
Fig. 1  Diagrammatic views of hierarchical systems. a A rooted tree, or acyclical graph; b a Venn 
diagram. Note that the tree structure is a general representation, where links, or edges (solid lines), 
can designate different kinds of relationships among entities (circles) at different levels, such as 
order, inclusion (nesting), or control. The Venn diagram, even though entirely consistent with the 
graph, visually emphasizes a recursive organization of entities and, therefore, represents a nested 
compositional hierarchy more specifically
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 diffuse and less well defined, possibly due to a slower pace dynamics among enti-
ties of greater scale (Wimsatt 1976). The perceived discontinuity between levels 
largely results from differences in the nature of interactions between entities at a 
given level and entities at different levels. A general compositional asymmetry was 
also implicated as a general property of nested hierarchies: Systems express much 
greater variation at lower levels than at higher levels (Weiss 1973).
At any given level, entities have specific attributes or traits that can either be 
aggregate or emergent. Aggregate traits are cumulative properties or combined 
attributes of entities at the lower level; emergent traits are properties that cannot be 
reduced to or be expressed in terms of properties of entities at the lower level. For 
example, sex ratio (the ratio of male and female organisms) is an emergent trait of a 
species or population because it characterizes a collective state of many organisms 
that cannot be characterized by having this property individually. On the other hand, 
the ecological specialization of a species is an aggregate trait because it refers to the 
cumulative range of ecological circumstances occupied by each individual of a spe-
cies. Approaches for distinguishing between emergent and aggregate traits in bio-
logical systems were reviewed by Grantham (2007). At a given level, all entities may 
either share the same traits or display variation in the traits.
2.2  Hierarchical Dynamics
Two major types of interactions can be distinguished in a hierarchy: within and between 
levels. Entities at a given level interact directly with each other in the same dynamic 
process, whereas entities at different levels only interact in an aggregate  fashion 
(Eldredge and Salthe 1984). The differences in the dynamics of processes between 
v ersus within levels ultimately arise from scalar differences (frequently of different 
orders of magnitude) in process rates, yielding a distinction between strong interactions 
with high-frequency dynamics within levels and weak interactions with low-frequency 
dynamics among levels (Simon 1962, 1973). Such non-transitivity of direct effects 
across levels (Salthe 1985) establishes the levels as quasi-independent (“nearly decom-
posable” sensu Simon 1962) systems allowing for investigating dynamics of indivi-
dual levels on their own right (Bunge 1979; Levins 1970). Consequently, the details 
of within-level interactions can be ignored when considering between-level dynamics 
(Simon 1962). Scalar differences are also responsible for weaker integration of more 
inclusive units and weakening the strength of interactions at successive, higher levels of 
a hierarchy, making it more difficult for the investigator to draw boundaries around and 
characterize these units from the epistemological standpoint.
2.2.1  Interactions Within a Level: Network Dynamics
A commensurate scale of entities and rate of processes within a level allow for 
representing the intralevel interactions as complex networks in the context 
of network theory. A complex network is a system of interacting entities that is 
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 conventionally represented by a graph, a collection of nodes (vertices) connected 
by links (edges), often having non-trivial topological features (Fig. 2). Links can 
have different directions, weights, and signs. Typically, directed edges represent 
the unidirectional flow of information, matter, or energy from a source (starting 
point) to a target (endpoint); non-directed edges show mutual interactions, where 
information, matter, or energy are exchanged between a pair of nodes. Networks 
allow for undirected interactions, such as cyclical relationships and feedback 
loops, so that the functional dynamics of interactions within a network is tempo-
rally restricted. Consequently, entities from different hierarchical levels cannot 
effectively be members of the same network.
Networks can be characterized by different topological properties, including 
the degree distribution (the frequency distribution of the number of links per node, 
or vertex connectivity), clustering coefficient, and average path length (the mean 
number of nodes along the shortest path connecting two nodes). For comprehen-
sive reviews of general network theory, see Albert and Barabási (2002), Barabási 
(2002), Dorogovtsev and Mendes (2003), Newman (2003), and Strogatz (2001).
In biology, networks are present at all levels of organization from metabo-
lism and regulation of gene expression to ecological trophic webs and social 
Fig. 2  Diagrammatic views of networks. a A scale-free networks with most nodes (white  circles) 
having few links (solid lines) and few nodes, or hubs (filled circles), having a very large number of 
links. In scale-free networks, the distribution of node connections, the frequency of nodes plotted 
against the number of links per node (node degree) follows a power law (b). c A random network 
with most nodes having approximately the same number of links producing a bell-shaped curve of 
the degree distribution graph (d)
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networks within populations. Even though relationships among entities at each 
level may be defined by unique laws and rules that govern the dynamics within 
a given level (Pattee 1970), empirical studies of real-world networks reveal that 
many biological, social, and technological networks share some fundamental 
architectural principles (Barabási and Albert 1999). Biological complex net-
works are typically hierarchical and highly modular and have a high cluster-
ing coefficient, a heavy tail in the degree distribution, and a short mean path 
length. The latter characteristic is frequently referred to as “small-world” pro-
perty (Amaral et al. 2000; Barthélémy and Amaral 1999; Milgram 1967; Watts 
and Strogatz 1998). The significance of network isomorphism across levels of 
 biological organization lies in the fact that the topology of the network’s con-
stituting elements is translated into particular network-wide emergent properties 
that have profound implications for evolution.
Topology is the principal attribute of any network that places boundaries on 
how it functions and how it might have formed. Many biological networks have 
few nodes with a disproportionately large number of connections (“hubs”), while 
the rest of the nodes have relatively few (Barabási and Oltvai 2004; Proulx et al. 
2005; Fig. 2a). Such degree distribution of vertex connectivity that follows a 
power law function is often referred to as “scale-free” because it lacks a modal 
hump characteristic of Poisson-distributed mean path length (an average number 
of nodes along the shortest path connecting two nodes) (Albert and Barabási 2002; 
Barabási and Albert 1999; Barabási and Bonabeau 2003; Barabasi et al. 1999; 
Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2002; Simon 1955; Fig. 2b). Scale-free networks have 
different global features than random networks in which all nodes have relatively 
the same number of links (Fig. 2c, d).
The most astonishing common emergent property of non-random networks 
is robustness, an exceptionally high degree of tolerance against random failures 
and external perturbations (Albert et al. 2000; Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2003; 
Newman 2003). These networks are relatively insensitive to randomly losing the 
more highly abundant but less connected nodes but become vulnerable when los-
ing hubs, the rare highly connected nodes. This property is generally attributed to 
power law distribution of connectivity because hubs are less likely to be affected 
by random perturbation than other nodes. The adverse effect of this architec-
ture is that perturbations increasing the chance of affecting hubs or resulting in 
the preferential removal of hubs can cause a severe disruption or collapse of the 
entire network (Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2002). Thus, the dynamics of the net-
work response in face of different degrees of perturbation are not linear: Until the 
threshold is reached, the network is unaffected and remains stable, but beyond 
the threshold, it breaks down. It is important to note that such overarching gen-
eralizations greatly oversimplify real functional network dynamics: Scale-free 
distribution alone is insufficient to account for robustness in actual and simulated 
molecular networks (Albert et al. 2000; Siegal et al. 2007).
Topology alone is not sufficient for understanding complex networks. The 
nodes and their interactions within a network may vary greatly and display 
 complex, nonlinear dynamics that can change over time (Strogatz 2001).
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2.2.2  Interactions Among Levels: Emergence
Dynamics between any two adjacent levels can either be unidirectional, if only 
one level exerts an effect on the other, or bidirectional, where both levels mutually 
affect each other. In bidirectional, or dual control, systems (Polanyi 1968), upward 
causation refers to the effect that the lower level exerts on the upper level; down-
ward causation refers to the effect that the upper level exerts on the lower level. 
One fundamental feature of a hierarchical organization is the asymmetry of inter-
level processes (Salthe 1985; Valentine and May 1996) that entail in the asymme-
try of the causal effects across hierarchical levels. Consider a minimal hierarchical 
structure consisting of a focal level and contiguous higher and lower levels (“the 
triad” of Salthe 1985; Fig. 3). The upward and downward causal effects exerted 
upon the focal level differ in function. Interactions among entities at a higher 
level exert constraints, or determine boundary conditions. Thus, downward causa-
tion establishes the direction of control, affecting simultaneously all subsystems 
contained within the system (level) where they originate. A consequence of this 
asymmetry is that dynamics at lower levels might not be manifest at higher levels, 
although dynamics at higher levels must always propagate downward. Only emer-
gent characters can exert downward causation to processes at the next lower level. 
The constraints (“non-holonomic constraints” of Pattee 1977) are most effective 
across contiguous levels, and their importance drops off as the levels involved are 
increasingly remote (Eldredge and Salthe 1984). Non-contiguous levels may affect 
the dynamics at the focal level indirectly through cascading upward and down-
ward effects across levels. Interactions among entities at a lower level establish 
Fig. 3  Dynamics of 
bidirectional interactions 
among levels in a nested 
compositional hierarchy. a 
The upper and lower levels 
establish boundary conditions 
(downward constraints) and 
initiating conditions (upward 
constraints), respectively, 
for the focal level. The focal 
level, in turn, creates initiating 
conditions for the upper level 
and constrains the processes 
at the lower level through 
upward and downward 
causation, respectively. 
Even though the levels are 
depicted separately, they are 
hierarchically nested (b)
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initiating conditions (“upward causation”) (Salthe 1985). Upward causation can be 
exerted by both aggregate and emergent characters.
Considering the entire dynamics of the triad, the processes occurring at a focal 
level can simultaneously be initiating conditions for upper, and boundary  conditions 
for lower levels, and, in turn, be affected by boundary and initiating conditions 
established by these levels, respectively.
2.2.3  Global Dynamics
Complexity of biological evolutionary phenomena stems from the synergetic effect of 
idiosyncratic processes at different organizational levels and the dynamics of interlevel 
interactions. A global architecture of a hierarchy has a quasi-fractal quality resulting 
from nesting of self-similar elements: An entity is composed of a network of its parts 
and, at the same time, is an element of a network that makes up a higher-level entity 
(Fig. 4). Such a structure of hierarchically nested networks has a profound effect on 
evolutionary processes, as will be discussed in later sections. While the appropriate level 
of mechanistic description for a particular phenomenon rests on the level at which it 
manifests (Didion 2003), to comprehensively elucidate the causal processes involved 
one must consider (1) the network dynamics of entities at the focal level, (2) the 
boundary conditions (constraints), (3) the initiation conditions emerging from network 
dynamics of entities at adjacent higher and lower levels, respectively, and (4) cascading 
upward and downward effects from more remote levels.
Fig. 4  Diagrammatic view 
of global dynamics in a 
hierarchy. Intralevel direct 
interactions are shown 
as solid links connecting 
individual entities (circles) 
within networks at all the 
levels; interlevel indirect 
interactions representing 
upward and downward 
causation are shown as 
up and down arrows, 
respectively. Note that the 
global architecture of such 
compositional hierarchy 
consisting of nested units 
of similar organization 
(i.e., networks) has a fractal 
dimension (Mandelbrot 1977, 
1982)
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3  Biological Hierarchies
3.1  The Dual Nature of Life
The two defining processes of life are (1) interaction, or active exchange of mat-
ter and energy, and (2) replication, or transmission of heritable information. It 
has been previously suggested that the dualism of these two different kinds of 
phenomena—dynamic and informational—is a general feature of complex sys-
tems (Pattee 1970) and, more specifically, they are the two elemental processes 
of evolving systems (Hull 1980, 1981, 1988). Replicators are those entities that 
pass on their structure (i.e., information) intact through successive generations 
(Dawkins 1976). Interactors are those entities that interact with their environments 
in such a way as to make replication differential. They are causally related to rep-
licators in such a way that the survival of the former is causally responsible for the 
differential propagation of the latter (Hull 1980, 1988).
In evolutionary history, the tasks of heritability and dynamic interactions became 
irreversibly decoupled, producing differentiated and specialized sets of entities at 
each level of biological organization of greater functional efficiency (Maynard Smith 
and Szathmáry 1995). In the RNA world at the dawn of history of life, the dynamic 
and informational kinds of processes—metabolism and heredity—were integrated 
by ribozymes, molecules capable of catalysis and self-replication (Gilbert 1986). 
Increasing biological complexity demanded an emergence of highly efficient accu-
rate mechanisms of genetic transmission, so the flow of information became the sole 
function of highly specialized DNA, whereas extremely versatile proteins special-
ize in catalysis. At the cellular level, the genetic nucleus in eukaryotes is separated 
from metabolic cytoplasm and other organelles; at the organismal level, the geneti-
cally transmitted germ line is segregated from the mortal soma; and at the popula-
tion level, as is the case in many eusocial insects, non-reproductive castes are distinct 
from reproductive individuals.
To represent the entirety of the biotic realm in terms of survival (dynamics of mat-
ter and energy exchange) and reproduction (transmission of heritable information), 
a system of two interconnected hierarchies was advanced that included (1) the eco-
nomic, or ecological, and (2) the genealogical, or reproductive, hierarchies (Eldredge 
1985a; Eldredge and Salthe 1984; Salthe 1985; Fig. 5). This model is capable of 
representing diachronic (time-extensive) and synchronic (simultaneous) processes. 
Some levels are fully or partially congruent between the two hierarchies (contain the 
same or overlapping classes of individuals), whereas others—particularly above the 
organism—are not. The lack of exact one-to-one correspondence of entities between 
the hierarchies precludes establishment of a single consistent hierarchical structure 
(Eldredge and Salthe 1984). In essence, the economic and genealogical hierarchies 
represent, respectively, the temporal and spatial dimensions of the organic realm. This 
entails a fundamental dissimilarity in the nature of interactions in the two hierarchies: 
The time vector in the genealogical hierarchy allows only unidirectional control of 
information flow, making it time-irreversible, which reflects the historical nature 
of biological systems and yields a static hierarchy of classification (Grene 1987). 
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The economic systems form a hierarchy of control, allowing for dynamic interactions 
of entities within and across levels through upward and downward causation. The dis-
tinction between the two types of hierarchies allows for teasing apart causal relation-
ships between them.
3.2  Biological Entities
The entities that make the economic and genealogical hierarchies are integrated, 
spatiotemporally constrained systems distributed across the scale from molecular to 
planetary sizes. Such entities are referred to as individuals in a philosophical  context 
Fig. 5  The dual system of nested compositional biological hierarchies. The economic, or eco-
logical, hierarchy represents dynamics of matter and energy exchange; the genealogical, or 
reproductive, hierarchy describes transmission of heritable information
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(Ghiselin 1974, 1981; Hull 1976, 1978, 1980, 1981; “mereological sums” sensu 
Brogaard 2004). It is important to note that the definition of individuals does not 
require that they replicate. As historical units, individuals differ from classes, or col-
lections of entities whose membership is based on shared properties. A relationship 
does exist between classes and individuals: Individuals of the same level are particu-
lar instances of concrete entities of the same class (Bunge 1979). Levels themselves 
are not individuals, but classes of individuals of the same rank. Depending on their 
composition, size, and scale, biological individuals vary greatly in duration and degree 
of cohesion, which can present difficulties for differentiating them in practice. Taken 
together, biological hierarchies consist of nested individuals, where individuals at dif-
ferent levels are of different kinds and of different scales (Eldredge and Salthe 1984).
3.3  The Genealogical Hierarchy
The basis of genealogical hierarchy is the flow of information through time. The 
transmission of information relies on the ability of genealogical entities to repro-
duce (replicate). The actual physical mechanism of information transfer is DNA 
replication, but the historical fate of this information depends on replication pro-
cesses of genealogical individuals at higher levels: Entities can successfully repli-
cate only as parts of the larger whole. Such interdependency of genealogical units 
across hierarchical levels precludes regarding more inclusive individuals simply as 
packages of genetic information [or “vehicles” sensu Dawkins (1982)]. The fol-
lowing list identifies the principal levels and entities of the genealogical hierarchy.
3.3.1  Molecular Level
This level of organization encompasses the genome—the entirety of genetic 
 material, the nucleic acids. Information transfer is achieved by a template-based 
 replication of entire chromosomes, so that individual genes replicate only in concert 
as a sequence of linked fragments. DNA has the peculiar property of being both a 
replicator and an informer: It serves as a template for its own synthesis and functions 
as a template for making proteins. As such, it serves as a source of information, as 
software for the assembly of interactive entities. DNA has an interactive role as well 
(such as associations with histones and transcription factors), but these interactions 
exclusively serve the purpose of storage and retrieval of genetic information.
3.3.2  Cellular Level
As genealogical entities, cells are reproductive individuals owing to different 
processes of cell division mechanisms. In eukaryotes, the division of the DNA-
containing nucleus by mitosis or meiosis is distinct from cytokinesis, the divi-
sion of the metabolic cytoplasm, and may be decoupled from it, such as in the 
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production of multinucleate coenocytes or plasmodia in some protists and fungi. 
It is possible to distinguish the level of organelles, but only a few of them (mito-
chondria and chloroplasts) can replicate and they can do so only within a host cell. 
In prokaryotes, there is a single cell compartment and DNA replication is followed 
by binary fission. Cellular and organismal levels are conflated in unicellular organ-
isms, so that cell division becomes the locus of reproduction at the cellular and 
organismal levels.
3.3.3  Organismal Level
From a genealogical perspective, a multicellular organism is an integrated whole 
consisting of multiple cell lineages that can survive only as parts of larger organ-
isms (excepting the laboratory). Organismal replication includes sexual and 
asexual modes of reproduction. In sexually reproducing multicellular organisms, 
only a specialized part of the organism—the germ line and associated tissues 
and organs—is technically a part of the genealogical hierarchy, even though the 
genetic transmission is greatly affected by ontogeny (Buss 1983).
3.3.4  Population Level
At the population level, the information transfer is conducted by demes, or breed-
ing clusters of organisms (Gilmour and Gregor 1939; Wright 1955). In some 
organisms, such as some eusocial insects, demes can be restricted to highly spe-
cialized reproductive castes, whereas other members of the population do not 
contribute to the reproductive process directly. Even though it is possible to distin-
guish a continuum of genealogical hierarchical levels for conspecific individuals 
with greater degree of sociality or complex spatial structure (e.g., families, clans, 
and metapopulations), the included individuals in all cases are the same kind of 
entities—individual organisms—that reside at the same hierarchical level.
Collectively, conspecific demes comprise a spatially distributed network of 
few highly productive demes (localized in “sources” habitats) and demes in which 
within-habitat reproduction is insufficient to balance mortality (distributed in “sink 
habitats”) (Pulliam 1988). The persistence of demes depends on the dynamics of 
continuous local extinction and recolonization in the species-wide, sink-source 
network, making demes rather ephemeral entities that frequently separate and reu-
nite over relatively brief time intervals (Futuyma 1989; Miller 2006).
3.3.5  Species Level
Species are segments of time-extended, population-level lineages demarcated by 
origin through lineage-splitting, or speciation events, and eventual demise through 
extinction. Typically, species are considered to be more inclusive population-level 
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lineages, though the exact level of inclusiveness differs among authors. The 
 temporal boundaries of species become less distinct at smaller timescales due to a 
gradual process of divergence that appears instantaneous at geological timescales. 
Species replication is the process of speciation, or cladogenesis, that ultimately 
results from the perturbation and partitioning of demic networks. In sexually 
reproducing organisms, speciation is typically followed by reproductive diver-
gence that ensures that the new species remain discrete individuals by preventing 
hybridization (Dobzhansky 1937). Reproductive divergence can be due to con-
tinued selection for mate recognition characters within isolated demes (Paterson 
1985), selection of characters genetically linked to reproductive characters, or by 
chance events. For a review of proposed species-level aggregate and emergent 
traits, see Jablonski (2008).
3.3.6  Monophyletic Taxon Level
A monophyletic taxon (clade) is a group of species that includes an ancestral 
 species and all of its descendants. Clades arise and diversify as a result of con-
tinuous speciation events, thus representing a product of genealogical dynamics at 
the species level. The relative degree of inclusiveness of the resulting hierarchical 
structure is conventionally represented by ranks of the Linnaean classification. The 
ranks are merely convenient communication devices and lack biological signifi-
cance (Ereshefsky 2001; Okasha 2011).
3.3.7  The Tree of Life Level
All life forms that evolved throughout the Phanerozoic aeon, all species—living 
and extinct—are presumed to descend from a single common ancestor. At this, 
highest, level of biological organization, the tree of life is a record of the history of 
the biosphere from the origin of life to the present.
3.4  The Economic Hierarchy
Biological individuals in the economic hierarchy are open systems that interact with 
their environment through energy and matter exchange. These interactions can be 
meaningfully represented and analyzed as complex networks using the theoretical 
apparatus of network theory. Because the environment can have biotic, abiotic, or 
both components, the literature on economic hierarchy invariably conflated biogeo-
graphical, geobiological, and biogeochemical aspects resulting in multiple irrec-
oncilable ecological hierarchies (Miller 2001). A unique, internally consistent, and 
ontologically sound economic hierarchy can be constructed by restricting its mem-
bers to solely biotic entities. From an epistemological  standpoint, decoupling the 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
196 I. Tëmkin and N. Eldredge
biotic and abiotic ecological components is critical for elucidating the causal rela-
tionships between them. Boundaries in ecological hierarchies above individual levels 
are complex and difficult to identify precisely in practice.
3.4.1  Molecular Level
Proteins govern the economy of life at the molecular level. By their ability to 
 catalyze reactions, and interact with other proteins and nucleic acids, they read and 
express genetic information and ultimately determine the phenotype at the cellular 
level. Interactions at the molecular level in biological systems do not occur out-
side cells but must have been instrumental in prebiotic chemistry (Michod 1983). 
Unquestionably, there are multiple levels in the functional hierarchy of control 
subsumed under the molecular level of biological organization. However, these 
elements reside at the same phenomenological level because their relationships 
are governed by the same principles of chemical interactions that occur at com-
mensurable rates. At the molecular level, interactions are best described by a hier-
archy of control, rather than that of nested composition, that can be represented 
as an integrated system of complex networks including transcriptional regulation, 
protein–protein interactions, cellular metabolism, and cell signaling (Albert 2005; 
Bray 2003; Zhu et al. 2007). Complex molecular interaction networks predomi-
nantly display scale-free or broad-tailed distribution and have been shown to be 
extremely stable in face of environmental and genetic perturbations under real and 
simulated conditions (Albert 2005; Almaas 2007; Barabási and Oltvai 2004; Giot 
et al. 2003; Jeong et al. 2000, 2001; Meiklejohn and Hartl 2002; Siegal et al. 2007; 
Stearns et al. 1995; Wagner and Fell 2001).
3.4.2  Cellular Level
Economic processes at the cellular level amount to maintenance of homeostasis of 
the cell through integrating metabolic processes, transport of substances across the 
plasma membrane, spatially structuring the internal environment using the cytoskel-
eton and membrane-bound compartments, and interactions with other cells.
3.4.3  Organismal Level
In an economic sense, individual organisms are highly integrated, cohesive wholes 
composed of interacting cells, structural units typically differentiated into func-
tional modules (tissues and organs). The phenotype, a complex of emergent prop-
erties of the organism that includes morphology, physiology, behavior, and, in 
some instances, cognitive abilities, is derived epigenetically through deve lopment 
from the dynamics of gene regulatory networks (Villarreal et al. 2012). The endur-
ing and robust organismal phenotypic stability (“canalization” of Waddington 
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1942; “epigenetic stability” of Wagner 1996) maintained over the life cycles of 
conspecific individuals is an emergent property of evolved, complex develop-
mental genetic networks (Álvarez-Buylla et al. 2008; Bergman and Siegal 2003; 
Gibson and Wagner 2000; Scharloo 1991; Siegal and Bergman 2002).
3.4.4  Population Level
From the standpoint of economic interactions, populations are referred to as 
 avatars (Damuth 1985). Avatars are more inclusive entities than demes: Whereas 
all members in a population interact with their environment, however differently, 
only a subset of individuals of reproductive age in a population comprises an 
interbreeding group. In eusocial insects, some castes are never reproductive, so 
their entire function is an economic one that indirectly benefits the reproduc-
tive outcome of a population as a whole. Differences in the economic processes 
within avatars may result in a population structure, where non-random associa-
tions among individuals may reflect age and sex structure, geographical distri-
bution, pecking orders, territoriality, survivorship, and behavioral differences 
that can be expressed using the tools of network theory (Dyer and Nason 2004; 
Fewell 2003).
The most extensive population-level interactor corresponds to a metapopulation 
(Levins 1969), an instantaneous cross section of an entire species lineage, a geo-
graphic and ecological mosaic of contemporaneous avatars. The spatial distribu-
tion of avatars in a metapopulation is referred to as patchiness, a great variation in 
the continuum from near-contiguous ranges to highly isolated, disjunct patches. 
Moreover, the metapopulation structure may be hierarchical, where a large ava-
tar consists of smaller, more strictly localized units, in which interactions among 
 individuals are more uniformly distributed (Hanski and Gilpin 1991).
3.4.5  Biotic Assemblage Level
Biocenosis (Möbius 1877) is a highly integrated, discrete assemblage of non- 
conspecific avatars occupying a particular biotope (habitat). It roughly corresponds 
to the concept of community (Clements 1916) and represents a biotic component 
of an ecosystem, the network of interactions among organisms, and between 
organisms and their environment. Because the concept of the ecosystem includes 
both biotic and abiotic components, it cannot be consistently used in the context 
of a hierarchy composed of entirely biotic entities, if the logical structure of com-
positional nested organization is to be preserved: An association of avatars alone 
does not comprise an ecosystem. Moreover, it has been suggested that ecosystems 
are not temporally limited and, therefore, lack individuality (Maynard Smith and 
Szathmáry 1995; Szathmáry 1989). Decoupling the biotic and abiotic components 
of an ecosystem (i.e., biocenosis and an assemblage of ecological niches realized 
by avatars, respectively) allows for investigating their causal links.
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Biocenoses are characterized by stable taxonomic composition and ecological 
interactions that fall into four fundamental types: trophic, topic, phoric, and fabri-
cational (Beklemishev 1970). They differ widely in their complexity and typically 
exhibit a hierarchy of control of their functional subsystems that includes synusiae 
(Gams 1918), guilds (Root 1967; Simberloff and Dayan 1991), consortia (Masing 
1981; Reinke 1872), and coenomes (Chernyshenko 2012). The complexity of the 
configuration of biocenosis boundaries precludes an easy demarcation of adjacent 
biocenoses.
The best characterized form of biotic interactions is trophic, or predator–prey 
relationships, typically referred to as food webs and represented by directed net-
works. Most examined real-world food webs share various topological properties 
(i.e., non-random degree distribution and short path length), but display a range 
in connectivity from power law to broad-scale degree distributions (Camacho 
et al. 2002; Dunne et al. 2002a; Montoya and Solé 2002; Solé and Montoya 2001; 
Williams et al. 2002). Despite differences, many food webs share common motifs, 
specific configurations of nodes not found in other kinds of networks (Milo et al. 
2002). Other kinds of ecological interactions, such as plant–animal mutualistic net-
works, also show a variety of node connectivity distributions, including scale-free, 
truncated power law, or broad-scale regimes (Jordano et al. 2003).
From the explicitly hierarchical perspective, biocenoses can be conceptualized 
as hierarchical patch mosaics that can be perceived and studied as spatially nested 
patch hierarchies in the context of a landscape (Wu 1999; Wu and Loucks 1995). 
The nested structure of biotic assemblages most likely represents a continuum of 
levels. Recognizing discrete, nested hierarchical units—such as local, regional, and 
provincial assemblages—appears to be highly context-dependent, mirroring the 
 difficulty of attributing significance to classificatory ranks of monophyletic taxa.
3.4.6  The Biosphere Level
The biosphere, or the global biocenosis—frequently referred to as Gaia (Lovelock 
1972, 1979; Lovelock and Margulis 1974; Volk 1997)—has long been viewed as 
a self-regulating planetary system that affects Earth’s geochemical, hydrological, 
and climatological dynamics [Vernadsky 1926 (1998)].
4  Evolution
4.1  The Domain of Evolution
In such a complex view of life that emphasizes interactions within and across 
levels as well as between the two hierarchies of life, everything becomes caus-
ally related to processes of biological evolution (directly or not, and to different 
extents). To understand the nature of the evolutionary process, we need to (1) 
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provide a clear-cut definition of biological evolution and (2) identify entities of 
biological systems capable of evolving.
A widespread, commonplace notion equates evolution with any kind of histori-
cal development. By defining biological evolution as “descent with modification,” 
Darwin made a sharp distinction between biological evolution and other processes 
of change (Darwin 1859). Biological evolution amounts to the fate of information 
that can be altered as it is transmitted from ancestors to descendants. Such defini-
tion does not limit evolution to processes that take place at the level at which the 
information ultimately resides (i.e., nucleic acids), but encompasses phenomena 
across levels of biological hierarchies that directly or indirectly channel, alter, or 
interrupt the flow of information through the entire timescale. Thus defined, evo-
lution is restricted to living systems and different aspects of human cultural evo-
lution (e.g., languages and material culture). Historical processes in non-living 
entities are deterministic, stereotypically repeated processes: Thus, related types 
of minerals or similar stars have analogous predecessors, not common ancestors.
4.2  Evolving Entities
What properties should entities have in order to evolve? Minimally, evolving 
 entities must be able to (1) store information that can be potentially altered and (2) 
transmit the information through some sort of replication process by partitioning 
or copying of a preexisting entity. Thus, evolving entities must be individuals; that 
is, they have to persist for some duration of time in order to have any structure that 
can be transmitted and altered. These requirements also imply that replication is 
necessary but not sufficient for evolution: Simple replicators that produce descend-
ants identical to ancestors cannot evolve (Fig. 6a), whereas hereditary replicators 
that generate progeny that might differ from its ancestral template can (Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Fig. 6b, c).
There are two modes of hereditary replication: proliferative (Fig. 6c) and 
 non-proliferative (Fig. 6b). Non-proliferative replication results in an entity pro-
ducing a single descendant, so that diversity remains the same over generations, 
even though the information content itself could have been altered, as in the case 
of a species giving rise to a descendant species. Proliferative replication gener-
ates variation in heritable attributes, offering the possibility of sorting of variants, 
so that only some of them persist and transmit information to the next generation. 
While both modes of replication occur in biological systems, proliferatively repli-
cating biological individuals are the main focus of evolutionary biology, because 
only these processes ultimately result in biological diversity that characterizes life 
at all levels of biological organization. Non-proliferative replication is significant 
only as a means for linear modification of historical lineages established by pro-
liferative replication. In the variational process of evolution, the properties of an 
ensemble change, not because individual elements change, but rather because of 
the action of some process sorting on preexisting variation within the ensemble. 
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Paraphrasing the requirements for an evolving entity stated at the beginning of 
the section, the evolving individual must be (1) capable of generating variation in 
stored information amenable to sorting and, consequently, (2) must be relatively 
less spatiotemporally restricted than the lower-level constituents that display the 
variation.
Having established explicit criteria for evolution, we can identify where 
 evolution can occur (at least in principle) in the dual hierarchical system and deter-
mine its upper and lower bounds. First, the levels containing evolving entities 
must contain individuals capable of proliferative replication. Second, there must 
be processes enabling sorting of variation at that level. As the information transfer 
is a defining feature of entities in the genealogical hierarchy, evolution is restricted 
to entities of the genealogical hierarchy, although not including all its levels. Even 
though the term evolution is used to describe a change in ecological entities (such 
as community or ecosystem evolution), ecological individuals do not reproduce. 
Undoubtedly, successional systems have histories, but they undergo changes as 
individuals, paralleling individual ontogeny (Clements 1916).
The minimal evolving unit is a nucleotide sequence. Changes at the level of 
individual nucleotides (i.e., substitutions, insertions, or deletions) have evolu-
tionary significance only in the context of contiguous nucleotides that make the 
nucleic acid fragment a homology unit. The upper bound of evolution is at the 
level of the species. Even though supraspecific entities (monophyletic taxa) do 
Fig. 6  Types of replication processes. a In simple replication, any variation that might occur is 
not transmitted to descendants and, consequently, simple replicator systems cannot evolve. b, c 
In hereditary replication, descendants that differ from their ancestors can pass on variation to 
their offspring, enabling such hereditary replicator systems to evolve. Non-proliferative heredi-
tary replicators (b) produce a single descendant, resulting in a constant level of variation over 
generations, whereas proliferative hereditary replicators (c) continuously increase variation over 
generations. Large circles illustrate replicator entities; enclosed filled circles denote their com-
ponent parts and open circles represent changes in a replicator’s elements that produce variation 
among replicators
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show patterns of differential survival, they lack the capacity to replicate: Evolution 
above the species level is an epiphenomenon that results from processes that occur 
at lower levels.
4.3  Evolutionary Patterns
The history of life on Earth is characterized by a combination of unique and 
repeated events. An evolutionary pattern is an empirically discernible regularity 
in the history of a biological system. As such, the elements of a pattern recur in a 
predictable manner. A great many evolutionary patterns are recognized for classes 
of individuals at different levels of biological hierarchies, although some patterns 
appear to be isomorphic across levels (such as trends for increasing complexity; 
e.g., McShea and Brandon 2010).
There are two fundamental categories of historical patterns: diversity and dis-
parity patterns. Diversity patterns describe the dynamics of change in the quan-
tity of evolving individuals at a given level of a genealogical hierarchy. They are 
the product of the origin and death dynamics among individuals. Most studies 
have focused on three kinds of rates of evolution: rates of morphological evolu-
tion, rates of taxic evolution, and rates of genomic evolution (Raup 1987; Schoch 
1986). Historical species-level diversity, or taxic, patterns (conceptualized as phy-
logenies) have long been considered a cornerstone of evolutionary theory (e.g., 
Alroy 2000; Gould 2002; McKinney 1990a; Fig. 7a). Phylogenetic patterns are the 
product of speciation and extinction dynamics and can be approached by causal 
analysis of rates of biological diversification. Since taxonomic ranks are arbitrary, 
the only meaningful approach to taxic diversity is through comparison of species-
level diversity between sister groups (Cracraft 1984; Vrba 1980, 1984a). Taxic 
diversity patterns are typically studied by counting the distribution of taxa through 
time and typically represented by spindle diagrams (Gould et al. 1977, 1987; Raup 
et al. 1973; Stanley et al. 1981) or diversity curves (Newell 1952, 1967; Sepkoski 
1978, 1993) and the shape of their profiles investigated for biological significance.
Disparity patterns describe the dynamics of change in the attributes (typi-
cally phenotypic) of evolving individuals at a given level (Fig. 7a). For example, 
it might be of interest to determine not only how many species existed at any 
time, but also how different they are phenotypically (what area of morphospace 
they occupied). Morphological disparity, or transformational, patterns are typi-
cally analyzed by quantitative approaches of morphometrics (Rohlf and Marcus 
1993), theoretical morphology (McGhee 1998, 2007), and constructional morpho-
logy (Schmidt-Kittler and Vogel 1991; Seilacher 1970). Even though disparity and 
diversity can be investigated on their own right, empirical evidence suggests that 
patterns of diversity and disparity can be intimately linked.
Patterns of diversity and disparity vary in scale and mode. With regard 
to their scale, patterns can be local or global taxonomically and temporally. 
Taxonomically global patterns apply to many distantly related organisms up to and 
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including all of life, whereas taxonomically local patterns are unique to a specific 
taxon. Temporally global patterns recur throughout the history of life, whereas 
temporally local patterns are unique to a specific period in the geological history.
The three principal modes of evolutionary patterns are stasis, trend, and random 
walk (Fig. 8). Stasis is a historical pattern characterized by little or no net change, 
typically showing minimal oscillations around a stable mean (Figs. 7b and 8a). An 
example of stasis is the taxonomically and temporally global disparity pattern of 
marked morphological stability, or equilibrium, displayed by many species in the 
fossil record (Eldredge et al. 2005).
A trend is sustained directional change in a statistic descriptor for some 
 attribute observed over time (Figs. 7a and 8b). Trends display two kinds of dynam-
ics: passive or active; the latter can be either strongly or weakly driven (McShea 
1994). A classic example of a global trend is an increase in body size over time 
across evolutionary lineages (“Cope’s Rule”; Kingsolver and Pfennig 2004; 
McKinney 1990b). The dynamics of driven trends occur primarily in one direction 
and apply to most component lineages, whereas passive trends are the net result of 
complex dynamics operating in different directions in different lineages or at dif-
ferent times. For many examples and a general discussion of evolutionary trends, 
see McNamara (1990, 2006).
Fig. 7  Hypothetical examples of evolutionary patters at different hierarchical levels. At the level 
of monophyletic taxa (a), sister clades showing different diversity and disparity patterns: clade a1 
displays a low rate of taxic evolution and stasis in disparity; clade a2 exhibits a high turnover rate 
accompanied by a passive directional trend in disparity (a3). At the species level, species lineage 
remains in stasis, showing minimal oscillations around a stable mean (b), whereas at the popula-
tion level, component demes (c) continually differentiate, merge, or become extinct,  producing 
short-lived diversity and disparity patterns of stability (c1, d1), directional change (c2, d2), 
 divergence (c3, d3), or decline (c4, d4). Gray plane in c indicates an instantaneous cross section of 
the species lineage described by a corresponding disparity profile in d (inspired by Eldredge and 
Gould 1972: Fig. 5–10 and Miller 2006: Fig. 3)
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A random walk is a pattern characterized by a succession of independent steps, 
where increases and decreases of a trait are equally probable (Fig. 8c). Both  stasis 
and random walk patterns are not inherently directional but, unlike stasis, random 
walks depart from the mean and produce increasing evolutionary divergence over 
time. An example of a random walk is a global diversification (species origina-
tion and extinction) pattern in marine animals throughout the Phanerozoic aeon 
(Cornette and Lieberman 2004). Population-level dynamics may approach ran-
dom walk in fluctuating environments and during biocenotic crises, but such 
microevolutionary patterns, as reflected by incomplete stratophenetic series in the 
fossil record, might rather reflect sampling bias and time averaging effects (e.g., 
Roopnarine 2003; Roopnarine et al. 1999).
5  Causes and Mechanisms of Biological Evolution
5.1  Hierarchical View of Evolutionary Processes
Evolution occurs at the nexus between the economic and genealogical hierarchies, 
where the dynamic interactions in the former are translated into a historical pattern 
of the latter. In other words, the interaction of individuals in the economic hierarchy 
with their environment is causally related to differential replication of genealogical 
individuals. A change in the information content at a given level has an effect on the 
diversity pattern of genealogical individuals: Variation can either increase through 
the origin of new variants, or decrease through sorting, where only a subset of vari-
ants persists. The origination of novelties at any given level does not necessarily 
entail sorting at the higher level; it does, however, provide raw material for sorting. 
These initiating conditions are necessary but insufficient for evolution. For instance, 
large changes in allele frequencies do not cause speciation and rampant species 
 turnovers do not necessitate trends in monophyletic groups.
Sorting of variation is a consequence of differential birth and death rates among 
genealogical individuals differing in their properties. (The meaning of birth and 
Fig. 8  Three principal modes of evolutionary patterns. a A stasis, showing minimal fluctuations 
around a stable mean (dashed line) that results in little or no net change; b a trend, illustrating 
sustained directional change (dotted arrow); and c a random walk, characterized by a series of 
independent steps that depart from the mean in either direction
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death is different depending on the kinds of individuals: At the molecular and 
cellular level, replication processes result in the nominal death of a parent as it 
physically becomes part of its descendants, whereas at the organismal and spe-
cies levels, parents typically remain alive, so that their durations, even if briefly, 
overlap with those of their descendants.) The dynamic shuffling of genealogical 
entities through sorting may result in the evolution of the more extended (more 
inclusive) genealogical individuals.
The origin and sorting of variation may be tightly coupled because variation at 
a focal level can emerge from sorting of lower-level individuals. Complex evolu-
tionary patterns integrate variational dynamics of sorting processes that occur at 
different levels with their effects propagated indirectly to other levels within the 
genealogical hierarchy via downward and upward causation.
Hierarchy theory provides a theoretically and operationally unified framework 
for unraveling causal processes responsible for generating evolutionary patterns by 
identifying the involved individuals and their properties, hierarchical levels where 
these individuals reside, and their interactions within and across levels as well as 
between the two hierarchies. The outline of a formal approach to investigating 
causality is presented below:
•	 Identifying the focal level(s) in the genealogical hierarchy at which the pattern 
under study is manifest;
•	 Identifying entities and their specific attributes at that level pertinent to the 
pattern;
•	 Discerning whether these attributes are emergent or aggregate;
•	 Determining whether variation in these attributes is a product of sorting of 
lower-level attributes or by de novo introduction at the focal level;
•	 Identifying the level(s) and entities in the economic hierarchy that can poten-
tially directly impact the fate of replicators by sorting the variants at the focal 
level in the genealogical hierarchy and/or by modifying their attributes (genera-
ting variation);
•	 Exploring cascading effects of upward and downward causation by more remote 
levels in the economic hierarchy that potentially indirectly affect variants at the 
focal level in the genealogical hierarchy.
5.2  Sorting of Variation
Sorting operates on individuals’ traits, and there are two key requirements with 
regard to traits as subjects of sorting: (1) A trait exhibits little or no variation 
within an individual relative to the variation among individuals at the given focal 
level and (2) the differential origin and demise of individuals covary consistently 
across one or more higher-level individuals with that trait. Even though there 
are undoubtedly level-specific sorting processes, there are two general modes of 
 sorting that are isomorphic across hierarchical levels: selection and drift.
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Selection is a deterministic process that represents a special type of sorting 
resulting from non-random differences in fitness, or replication success. Gains in 
fitness produce adaptations, or attributes that ensure greater stability and persis-
tence of an individual entity, typically envisioned as maximizations of the match 
between biological entities and their immediate environment. In Darwin’s origi-
nal formulation, selection (“natural selection”) operates on phenotypic proper-
ties of individual organisms (Darwin 1859). The concept of selection has been 
subsequently extended to entities at other hierarchical levels (Dobzhansky 1937; 
Lewontin 1970; Wright 1931, 1953, 1980). Most generally, selection can be 
 characterized as any process in which differential extinction and proliferation of 
interactors causes the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced them 
(Hull 1988). For a recent, comprehensive review of selection, see Okasha (2006).
Drift is a non-deterministic sorting process owing to chance. Drift was origi-
nally proposed as a process of random fluctuations in allele frequencies due to 
sampling effects in finite populations (“genetic drift,” Wright 1929, 1955). The 
neutral theory of molecular evolutions endowed the stochastic processes of genetic 
drift and mutation pressure with much greater significance than initially thought 
(Kimura 1968, 1983). Similar in principle, stochastic processes later were pro-
posed to occur at other levels (e.g., Gould et al. 1977). In contrast to selection, 
drift operates on replicators directly, as the function of the latter is independent of 
ecological context (Hull 1988). The interplay of selection and drift can produce 
complex evolutionary patterns. For example, selection operating in different direc-
tions in multiple populations across species can result in stochastic dynamics for 
clades (Gould 2002; Raup 1981; Raup and Gould 1974).
5.2.1  Molecular Level
There is no evidence for specific, molecular-level processes of sorting of genetic 
variation that do not involve processes at higher levels (though such processes 
must have been instrumental in prebiotic evolution). The expression of molecular 
variation is downwardly constrained, or canalized, by the higher, phenotypic levels 
of the cell and organism.
5.2.2  Cellular Level
Sorting at the cellular level may arise by a number of different mechanisms. In 
unicellular organisms, where the cellular level of organization is coincident with 
that of the organism, natural selection and drift play major roles. In multicellular 
organisms, additional sorting processes involve a variety of cell–cell interactions 
during development in the soma (e.g., apoptosis, stem cell segregation). Sorting in 
the germ line includes a diversity of deterministic processes leading to intrageno-
mic conflict (segregation distortion, meiotic drive, and maternal effect letha-
lity) and stochastic events (e.g., random fertilization and transposition). Some of 
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sorting processes at the cellular level leading to differential reproductive  success 
of individual cells are analogous to natural selection: differential rates of cell 
division among different cell lineages or cell types, tissue repair, and neoplastic 
growth. If the latter becomes malignant and develops into cancer, the tumor cells 
are effectively outcompeting normal cells in the struggle for resources and space 
(Casás-Selves and DeGregori 2011). Many of these processes must occur simulta-
neously, but their relative frequencies are unknown.
5.2.3  Organismal Level
The individual has been historically regarded as the primary focus of sorting 
through natural and sexual selection, and genetic drift. Natural selection has long 
been recognized as the causal agent of organismal adaptation. In genetic terms, the 
theory of individual selection culminated in the Fundamental Theory of Natural 
Selection stating that the rate of change of population fitness is equal to the genetic 
variance in fitness (Fisher 1958). The theory was later modified for frequency-
dependent and for multiple loci (reviewed by Lewontin 1970). The stochastic sort-
ing at the level of the organism that cascades downward to the molecular level is 
interpreted as genetic drift, which is a lower-level description of population-level 
process expressed in terms of dynamics of allele frequencies.
5.2.4  Population Level
At the population level, variation among demes arises from upward causation 
by sorting of their component conspecific individual organisms and by density-
dependent demographic processes at the focal level. Kin selection [generalized 
by Hamilton (1964a, b) and named by Maynard Smith (1964)], that enhances the 
reproductive success of an organism’s relatives, even at a cost to the organism’s 
own survival and reproduction, can bias genetic variation within a deme, but is 
unlikely to account for sorting among demes. Apart from stochastic processes that 
may be affecting small populations, there is no evidence for intrinsic population-
level sorting processes that can result in the differential survival of demes. Thus, 
sorting at the population level is a consequence of downward causation deriving 
from the cascading effect of higher-level ecosystemic (biocenotic) dynamics in the 
economic hierarchy.
5.2.5  Species Level
Variation among species arises as a historical consequence of interdemic genea-
logical relationships described collectively by metapopulation dynamics extended 
through geological time. In Sewall Wright’s formulation, species are con-
structed from a shifting balance of demes with different proliferative capacities 
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(Wright 1931, 1982). Species sorting is a consequence of differential speciation 
and extinction events within a monophyletic group. Differential births and deaths 
of species are epiphenomena resulting from interactions of a (meta) population with 
its environment. Species and, consequently, more inclusive monophyletic taxa, are 
exclusively genealogical units that do not have ecological roles and, consequently, 
cannot participate directly in sorting (Eldredge 1985a, 1989; Ghiselin 1981).
The punctuated equilibria model suggested a range of hypotheses explaining 
patterns of differential speciation and extinction rates in an implicit hierarchical 
framework (Eldredge and Gould 1972). One such possibility is species selec-
tion, or differential reproductive success among species within monophyletic 
groups favoring species that persist for long periods and speciate at higher rates 
(Gould and Eldredge 1977; Stanley 1975, 1979). An important distinction is made 
between selection operating on aggregate traits that ultimately reside at the organ-
ismal level (the Effect Hypothesis; Vrba 1980, 1987) and selection operating on 
emergent, heritable properties of species level (species selection sensu stricto) 
(Vrba 1984b, 1989; Vrba and Eldredge 1984; Vrba and Gould 1986; Grantham 
1995, 2001). In strict-sense species selection, the focal level is the species, with 
downward causation influencing the frequencies of organismic traits among 
clades and upward causation shaping overall clade composition. The paucity of 
affirmative examples of true species selection operating at the species-lineage 
level suggests that patterns of species sorting are better accounted for by effect-
macroevolution, the upward causation of sorting of lower-level entities (Eldredge 
1995; Lieberman and Vrba 1995). Species drift (Gould 2002; or phylogenetic drift, 
Stanley 1979), a stochastic origination and persistence of species in the absence 
of environmental interaction, is another potential species sorting mechanism that 
might be most pronounced in clades with relatively small numbers of species.
5.2.6  Supraspecific Levels
Higher taxa do not replicate, because their origins reside at the species level and 
sorting of monophyletic groups is restricted to extinction dynamics. Mass extinc-
tions are an example of sorting at higher level, where entire clades may become 
extinct as a result of environmental changes or contingent factors of large magnitude 
(e.g., volcanism or meteor impact). Such higher-level sorting events have a profound 
effect on the lower level by downwardly filtering variation retained at lower levels.
5.3  Process Integration Across Hierarchies
Stability emerges as an all-pervasive pattern in most biological systems: Individual 
cells persist as highly stable homeostatic systems, phenotypes of individual organ-
isms are remarkably buffered against environmental and genetic variation, the 
variance within demes fluctuates little over time, and species remain in stasis for 
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most of their duration. The overall stability of biological systems across levels of 
organization is not surprising given the general tendency of complex systems to 
acquire complex network architectures that ensure relative insensitivity to exter-
nal perturbations (Albert and Barabási 2002; Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2002). 
The state of relative equilibrium is further reinforced by the nested hierarchy itself 
because stability in adjacent levels effectively limits the extent of the origin and 
sorting of variation at the focal level by reducing potentialities of initiating condi-
tions (upward causation) and tightly canalizing the boundary conditions (down-
ward causation), respectively. Such systems are expected to remain in equilibrium 
in the absence of external perturbations.
Evolution occurs as a response to perturbations that are sufficient to disrupt 
the steady state of the system, so that the buffering mechanisms preventing the 
cascading effects across hierarchies fail. Regaining the equilibrium in a new state 
constitutes the basis of evolutionary transitions resulting from the integration of 
processes affecting origin and sorting of variation across levels of the genealogi-
cal hierarchy brought about by extrinsic perturbations. Therefore, the key to the 
explanation of fundamental evolutionary patterns needs to be sought in factors that 
disrupt the stability of biological systems and the way the effects of such pertur-
bations cascade up and down hierarchical levels. Genealogical individuals do not 
interact with their environment to the extent that economic entities do. It is the 
external factors influencing the economic dynamics of biological individuals at 
different levels that ultimately bring in motion sorting mechanisms that alter the 
landscape of biological diversity and disparity in subsequent generations.
5.4  Evolutionary Drivers
What are the external (extrinsic) factors strong enough to bring about evolutionary 
change? The ultimate evolutionary causes are abiotic environmental factors of cos-
mic and planetary scale that translate into climatic, lithological, and geochemical 
processes perturbing the stability of biological systems across levels. These factors 
either have a direct impact upon entities in the genealogical hierarchy or indirectly 
affect them via interacting with individuals in the economic hierarchy.
The nature of evolutionary response to an extrinsic environmental perturba-
tion is determined by the scope, the scale, and the temporal mode of the impact. 
The scope refers to the range of levels in biological hierarchies affected directly 
by the perturbation. For example, gamma-ray bursts produce perturbations of 
wide scope because they deplete the ozone layer, causing a deleterious muta-
genic effect at the molecular level due to a flux of ultraviolet radiation, while 
they can also produce acid rain and global cooling affecting global biocenotic 
processes (Melott et al. 2004). The emergence of the Central American Isthmus, 
completed 2.8 million years ago, is of comparatively narrower scope: It dis-
rupted regional marine biocenoses, ultimately leading to divergence of geminate 
species (Lessios 2008).
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The scale refers to the spatial extent of the impact that can range, for  example, 
from factors influencing bacterial microhabitats of gut flora within indivi-
dual organisms to factors affecting the global ecosystem, such as the Great 
Oxygenation Event that occurred 2.4 billion years ago.
External factors vary in the temporal mode of their action: They can be either 
regular (perpetually acting or periodic/recurring) or contingent (unique or aperiodic). 
Examples of the former include perpetual cosmic radiation, everlasting tectonic plate 
movement, and periodic Milankovitch cycles; examples of the latter—a mudslide 
destroying local microhabitats, volcanic eruptions causing collapse or major restruc-
turing of biocenoses on an island, and the asteroid impact that precipitated the mass 
extinction at the Cretaceous–Paleogene boundary at around 66 million years ago.
The magnitude of evolutionary response is contingent upon the nature and spa-
tiotemporal scale of environmental physical perturbations. Attempts were made to 
capture this relationship by a formal model. According to the intermediate distur-
bance model of maximal speciation (McKinney and Allmon 1995), at the inter-
mediate levels of environmental disturbance, speciation rate is maximal due to a 
balance between population fragmentation and establishment of favorable condi-
tions for isolate persistence. The sloshing bucket model (Eldredge 2003) is a more 
generalized framework rooted in the dual hierarchical model that postulates a 
direct correlation between the magnitude of disturbance and its evolutionary con-
sequences that can be expressed as a series of levels progressing from virtually no 
disturbance, resulting in stasis, to massive perturbations affecting the global biota. 
According to the model, the higher the level of perturbation, the higher the level in 
the economic hierarchy at which its effects will be expressed and, consequently, 
the higher the level of the genealogical hierarchy at which the evolutionary pattern 
of change in diversity and disparity will be recorded.
5.5  Stability and Change in Biological Systems
While it might not be possible to construct a strict hierarchy of extrinsic drivers, 
their effect can be evaluated from a hierarchical perspective relative to their impact 
on evolutionary entities. To establish the significance of perturbation at multiple 
hierarchical levels, it is critical to consider the causes and effects of perturbations 
at each level along with their upwardly and downwardly cascading effects.
5.5.1  Molecular-Level Perturbations and Their Effects
Perturbations at the molecular level can affect either or both replicator and inter-
actor entities at that level. If perturbations in the chemical balance are sufficient 
to disrupt metabolic and protein interaction networks, they might have a strong 
upward effect upon physiology at the cellular and organismal level to the extent 
of an organism’s death. The limit of the upward effect would depend upon the 
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magnitude of such perturbation and can have a cascading effect on world’s biota. 
Examples of such occurrences include a tectonically driven nickel famine respon-
sible for a global decline of anaerobic organisms at the end of the Archean aeon 
(Konhauser et al. 2009). Such an event, having directly impacted a particular line-
age (or number of lineages) of the genealogical hierarchy (the methanogens), must 
have had ecological consequences for other organisms interacting with methano-
gens, thereby indirectly impacting their evolution at higher levels.
Direct perturbations of the genetic machinery can be environmentally induced 
via abiotic or biotic factors, or arise intrinsically due to random errors in DNA rep-
lication or repair. Although largely deleterious, mutations in DNA resulting from 
environmental radiation or chemicals are generally regarded as the ultimate source 
of novelty at the molecular level. Alteration of DNA can also result from sequence 
editing by viruses (Villarreal 2005) and concatenation via symbiosis (Maynard 
Smith and Szathmáry 1995). Duplication events followed by functional divergence 
of a duplicated gene are the principal source of new genes; small-scale muta-
tions, such as point mutations and indels, are among the sources of new alleles and 
changes in non-coding regulatory sequences. Even though the mutation process 
is not entirely haphazard, as some parts of the genome are more likely to mutate 
or get repaired, mutations are random with respect to higher levels. In addition, 
heritable differences in gene expression pattern can be brought about by epige-
netic processes (such as nucleotide methylation) that do not necessitate a physical 
change in the DNA sequence (Jablonka and Lamb 1995, 1998, 2005).
Because molecular genetic systems reside within living cells, the consequences 
of their perturbations must be viewed from the levels of the cell and the organism: 
Filtered to a higher level via differential gene expression, molecular genetic vari-
ation manifests at the cellular and organismal levels. In multicellular organisms, 
mutations in somatic cells are of little evolutionary consequence; however, tumors 
could have a role in the origin of new cell types, tissues, and organs (Kozlov 
2014). It is mutations in the germ line of the parental generation that form the 
basis of phenotypic novelty at the level of individual organisms. In addition to its 
regulatory function as a genotype, the genome as a whole (the nucleotype) exerts 
an effect at the cellular level by virtue of its size and composition: for example, by 
influencing cell size (Gregory 2004; Gregory and Hebert 1999).
Translation of genetic changes into organismal phenotypes is channeled through 
a preexisting, inherited ontogenetic program that establishes organism-level bound-
ary conditions limiting the range of potential phenotypes due to morphogenetic and 
phylogenetic constraints. This organism-level phenotypic stasis is an emergent prop-
erty of molecular developmental networks that can be attained without direct selec-
tion for stability (Gibson and Wagner 2000; Scharloo 1991; Siegal and Bergman 
2002). Models based on empirical data demonstrate that developmental networks 
are remarkably resilient to perturbations and show that the robustness resides in the 
topology of the network and the nature of the interactions within the system (Albert 
and Othmer 2003; Álvarez-Buylla et al. 2008; Siegal et al. 2007; von Dassow 
et al. 2000). Perturbations resulting in gene duplications and point mutations may 
lead to a preferential increase in the degree of highly connected proteins, further 
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contributing to the overall stability of gene regulatory networks (Berg et al. 2004; 
Eisenberg and Levanon 2003; Wagner 2003). Furthermore, stochastic perturbations 
of gene regulatory networks contribute significantly to the emergence of stability in 
morphogenesis at the level of the organism (Álvarez-Buylla et al. 2008). In simula-
tions, small populations that experience high mutation rates evolved to become par-
ticularly robust (Elena et al. 2007). As gene regulatory networks, metabolic networks 
are characterized by evolved redundancy and other topological features that make 
them robust to environmental fluctuations (Hintze and Adami 2008; Jeong et al. 
2001; Ravasz et al. 2002).
Genetic variation is further buffered under normal conditions at the level of the 
deme and accumulates as hidden polymorphisms. Environmental perturbations that 
fall outside the normal range, such as temperature fluctuations, can functionally com-
promise the buffering capacity of genetic networks, resulting in the rapid increase of 
suppressed phenotypic variance (evolutionary capacitance sensu Bergman and Siegal 
2003; Hermisson and Wagner 2004; Rutherford and Lindquist 1998). Such bursts of 
phenotypic variation provide raw material for sorting at the level of the deme.
Perturbation of developmental gene regulatory networks can result in a sub-
stantially reconfigured, albeit stable and robust, pattern of the network without 
non-functional intermediates and without creating new protein–protein interaction 
(Ingolia 2004). This emergent property of canalization in gene networks provides 
a mechanism for a rapid and stepwise phenotypic change (Cossins 1998), despite 
the fact that the accumulation of mutations contributing to hidden variation could 
have been a gradual and cumulative process. It is noteworthy that the stasis at the 
organismal level does not imply persistence of a particular morphology; instead, it 
suggests the fidelity of maintenance of the ontogenetic program as individuals go 
through life cycles frequently characterized by disparity of form (“semaphoronts” 
of Hennig 1950, 1966).
In addition to maintaining the fidelity of ontogenesis, topological features of 
genetic developmental networks exert an effect on the nature and direction of 
phenotypic change. The cis-regulatory elements, comprised of multiple bind-
ing sites for specific transcription factors, are the principal functional modules of 
gene network architectures that govern gene expression (Davidson 2001; Howard 
and Davidson 2004). The modules, composed of functionally quasi-autonomous 
gene regulatory subnetworks can be identified with specific biological functions 
(Hartwell et al. 1999; Wagner 2002). Modularity allows for certain parts of net-
works to be modified without affecting the integrity of ontogeny, so that different 
morphological features can evolve autonomously and over relatively brief periods 
of evolutionary time (Abouheif and Wray 2002; Alon 2003; von Dassow et al. 
2000), with the magnitude of phenotypic effects depending on the specific compo-
nents of the networks being altered (Davidson and Erwin 2006).
In summary, within a normal range of environmental conditions, molecular 
genetic networks buffer regular small-scale perturbations at the molecular levels, 
simultaneously increasing evolvability by accumulating hidden (unexpressed) vari-
ation at the molecular level and further enhancing robustness by evolving redun-
dancy and interconnectedness. Such molecular-level dynamics is translated into 
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relative phenotypic stability at the organismal and cellular levels. When the level 
of perturbations exceeds the threshold of the structural integrity and, consequently, 
the buffering capacity of genetic networks, the networks either collapse or become 
reconfigured, which is manifested at the higher levels as a rapid increase of pheno-
typic variation as a result of the release of previously accumulated hidden polymor-
phisms. Such a dynamical system, where the breakdown of the equilibrial state leads 
to a short-term episode of destabilization during which the system undergoes reor-
ganization just to regain an equilibrium under altered circumstances, may possibly 
account for the empirical pattern of punctuated equilibria, characterized by a pro-
longed period of phenotypic stasis and a relatively brief burst of phenotypic change 
triggered by speciation as documented in the fossil record (Eldredge and Gould 
1972; Hunt 2008; Mattila and Bokma 2008; Strotz and Allen 2013). Consistent with 
the results from studies on gene regulatory networks, population genetic models of 
punctuations indicate that the rapid transition between two states of genotype com-
position is accompanied by the increase in variance during punctuation while being 
preceded and followed by prolonged periods of low haplotypic variation, the dyna-
mics independent of selection regime (Bergman and Feldman 2003).
5.5.2  Organism-Level Perturbations and Their Effects
The evolutionary fate of the organismal-level replicator, the germ line, depends 
upon economic success of the soma in the context of an individual organism’s life. 
Variation in the phenotype (morphology, physiology, and behavior) of individual 
organisms is a synergetic effect of lower-level morphogenetic dynamics (upward 
causation), developmental and mechanical (“constructional” sensu Seilacher 1970) 
constraints acting at the focal level, and higher-level economic interactions with 
conspecific individuals and individuals of other species at higher levels (downward 
causation). The evolutionary effect of environmental perturbation at the level of indi-
vidual organisms depends on the magnitude of perturbation: ranging from no evolu-
tionary consequences (as in a trivial deleterious chance event of accidental death by 
a falling rock) to a substantial shift in the entire population in adaptive response to a 
climatic change mediated by natural selection. A classic example of environmentally 
driven evolutionary change resulting from selection operating on organismal traits is 
the evolution of jaws and beaks in Darwin’s finches in response to the rainfall perio-
dicity that results from cyclical waxing and waning of oceanic temperatures (Grant 
and Grant 2011). Such perturbations typically produce short-term, population-level 
anagenetic trends that over a greater period of time appear as fluctuations around a 
stable mean and contribute little to the evolution of higher genealogical entities.
5.5.3  Population-Level Perturbations and Their Effects
The introduction of phenotypic variation among organisms can result in the evolu-
tion of higher genealogical entities upon spreading and fixation of the mutation 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
213Networks and Hierarchies …
in a deme. As all the members of a deme are simultaneously members of avatars, 
demic sorting is a consequence of interactions of avatars with their environment. 
The avatar dynamic is driven by density-independent variation in resources and 
fluctuating physical factors, and density-dependent population reductions when 
resources are depleted. It is indirectly influenced by upward causation largely 
resulting from natural selection at the level of individual organisms and con-
strained by integration of biocenotic interactions among avatars within an eco-
system. Together, these processes can generate patterns of differential survival of 
demes but, as pointed out by Lewontin (1970), interdeme selection occurs under 
a restricted, although not exceptionally rare, set of circumstances and  contributes 
little to evolution. Measured against the evolutionary timescale, in the context 
of equilibrium at the level of biocenosis, these localized, short-term processes 
are unlikely to yield significant evolutionary consequences in the context of the 
entire metapopulation, where net equilibrium is maintained by continuous local 
extinction, recolonization, and habitat tracking (Eldredge 1985b) of conspecific 
demes integrated by the network of genetic sources and sinks (Fig. 7b, c). With 
the exception of species consisting of spatially restricted, small populations, it is 
unlikely that drift can have a strong effect upon the fixation of mutations. These 
predictions are consistent with empirical evidence indicating that the rate of muta-
tion fixation in natural populations is substantially lower than the potential rate 
(Maynard Smith 1978; Shaposhnikov 1965, 1978).
5.5.4  Biocenosis-Level Perturbations and Their Effects
Biocenoses are highly structured cybernetic systems of avatars interconnected 
by networks of energy and matter flow, exemplified by mutualistic relationships, 
trophic and host–parasite interactions, and competitive redistribution of resources. 
The resilience of biocenoses to perturbations emerges from the interplay of diverse 
ecological interavatar networks operating contemporaneously within ecosystems. 
Most examined real-world networks are characterized by non-random (predomi-
nantly broad-scale) degree distribution and short path length (Camacho et al. 
2002; Dunne et al. 2002a; Jordano et al. 2003; Montoya and Solé 2002; Solé and 
Montoya 2001; Williams et al. 2002). These general structural features of ecologi-
cal networks are implicated in their inherent stability. Food webs and mutualis-
tic networks have been shown to preserve integrity even when subjected to strong 
perturbations (Dunne et al. 2002b; Montoya and Solé 2003; Olesen and Jordano 
2002; Solé and Montoya 2001; Williams et al. 2002).
Sufficiently strong perturbations, capable of disrupting the buffering capacity 
of ecological networks, elicit differential responses related to avatar diversity and 
connectivity (Fig. 9a). Species-rich biocenoses with food webs characterized by 
skewed degree distributions are robust to random species removal, but become 
unstable, when removals target generalist or most-connected species. Species-
poor biocenoses with food webs characterized by Poissonian degree distributions 
are highly susceptible to both random or targeted species removals (Montoya and 
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Solé 2003). Highly connected avatars act as energy bottlenecks in food webs 
(Allesina and Bodini 2004) and, therefore, when selectively targeted, they cause 
large numbers of secondary extinctions (a number of coextinctions after species 
removal) resulting in food web fragmentation (Dunne et al. 2002b; Montoya and 
Solé 2003; Solé and Montoya 2001), ultimately producing a large detrimental 
effect on an overall community stability (Pimm 1980, 1991).
The analyses of food web dynamics support the hypothesis that biocenotic 
 stability increases as the number of links in a food web grows due to an increasing 
number of paths through a species, dampening the impacts of its population fluc-
tuations (MacArthur 1955). It must be emphasized that topological properties of 
trophic networks alone are not sufficient to capture the complexity of the dynam-
ics and nonlinear biocenotic response to ecological perturbations involving avatar 
loss, calling for more realistic models that must take into account abundance, the 
nature and strength of interavatar interactions, and phylogenetic constraints (Cattin 
et al. 2004; Duffy 2002).
Highly non-equilibrial regimes of ecological remodeling are expected to endure 
for comparatively short periods of time until biocenoses reconstitute the balance 
and ecologically “lock” the locally optimal configuration of avatars in place. The 
reestablishment of network connectivity and increasing interdependence among 
avatars following a biocenotic crisis promotes species abundance within bio-
cenoses (Anderson and Jensen 2005). The increased interconnectedness promotes 
further self-stabilization of the system. Thus, non-equilibrium and stochastic 
Fig. 9  Hypothetical models of ecological responses (a) to biocenosis-level perturbations 
and their evolutionary consequences (b). During prolonged periods of environmental  stability, 
 biocenoses behave as homeostatic avatar networks (a2–4), resulting in a long-term taxonomic 
and morphological stability (coordinated stasis; b). Environmental perturbations capable 
of  disrupting ecological networks can cause biocenotic collapse (a3 → a1) or trigger a major 
 reconfiguration of avatars, leading to a biocenotic replacement (a4 → a2). Intensive ecological 
reconfiguration is accompanied by a variety of species-level responses, simultaneously affecting 
multiple lineages and concentrated in a relatively brief time interval (turnover pulse; b): invasion 
(b1), persistence (b2), speciation (b3–5), extinction (b6), and abandonment (b7). The taxonomic 
composition of the emerging biocenosis (a2) includes species that survives the crisis (black 
 circles), invasions (gray circles), and newly evolved species (white circles)
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processes can underlie stability of ecological systems (e.g., Turner et al. 1993; 
Urban et al. 1987; Wu and Levin 1994).
Any response to a perturbation and transition to a new equilibrium requires that 
information about the perturbation to spread within the network. The mechanism 
of such rapid biocenotic response may be linked to the small-world property of 
ecological networks: Short path length in food webs suggests a potential for wide-
spread and rapid dispersion of the effects of perturbation (Williams et al. 2002).
In the absence of disturbances in the physical environment, biocenoses behave 
as homeostatic systems, constraining interavatar (and, hence, demic) dynamics, 
which is reflected in persistent taxonomic stability and morphological stasis. This 
expectation is consistent with the predictions from ecological theoretical models 
that in a stable environment, the phenotypes of avatars within a biocenosis will 
remain in stasis for extensive duration (Stenseth and Maynard Smith 1984) and 
that highly integrated biocenoses effectively limit the establishment of durable 
populations of invasive species (Case 1990). The latter is substantiated by empiri-
cal data indicating that the collision of regional biotas does not typically result in 
formation of taxonomically mixed biocenoses (e.g., Zherikhin 1987).
Geographically co-localized avatars appear to frequently persist in stasis over 
extended intervals of geologic time (“coordinated stasis” of Brett and Baird 1995; 
Bonelli et al. 2006; Brett et al. 1996; Fig. 9b). Even though paleontological data 
do not allow for direct assessment of interavatar network dynamics, the observa-
tion that biocenoses frequently display analogous species composition when vastly 
separated geographically [“parallel communities” of Thorson (1957) or “homeo-
morphic paleocommunities” of Wallace (1978)] and across great expanses of time 
(Boucot 1975, 1978; Levinton and Bambach 1975; Walker and Laporte 1970) sug-
gests that it is the ecological roles of the component taxa that are responsible for 
prolonged persistence of biocenoses.
Environmental perturbations capable of disrupting biocenotic networks (such as 
climate change or geological phenomena) are inextricably causally linked to evo-
lutionary response at multiple levels and, most importantly, to speciation, due to a 
combination of two ensuing factors: They (1) trigger the expression of suppressed 
phenotypic organismal variance as a consequence of a compromised evolutionary 
capacitance at the molecular level and (2) provide a narrow window of opportunity 
for the spread and fixation of novel genotypes by releasing biocenotic control over 
demic dynamics during a brief interval of destabilization. High-level perturba-
tion of entire metapopulation dynamics (conceptualized here as avatar networks) 
brought about by a biocenotic crisis has an upward effect of increasing speciation 
rates by simultaneously fragmenting metapopulations into isolated avatars (and, 
consequently, isolated demes) via patch extinction and by affecting their persis-
tence and differentiation (Allmon 1992; McKinney and Allmon 1995).
Such high-scope biocenosis-level disturbances affect multiple lineages simulta-
neously, irrespective of their phylogenetic relationships (Fig. 9b). As documented 
by the fossil record, the empirical pattern of cross-lineage, synchronous, species-
level transitions is referred to as a “turnover pulse” (Foote 2005; van Dam et al. 
2006; Vrba 1985, 1993). A turnover pulse is a relatively rapid intensive period of 
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taxonomic and ecological restructuring: A breakdown of ecological networks results 
in unchecked fluctuations in population demographics, largely driven by stochastic 
processes as the avatars, the former members of the collapsed biocenosis, opportun-
istically reconfigure their economic connections and spatial relationship. The factors 
affecting the taxonomic composition and the ecological configuration of the future 
biocenosis are influenced by a large number of factors, including phenotypic proper-
ties, behavior, stenotopic-eurytopic characteristics, dispersal ability, and population 
size. Controlled environmental perturbations in the laboratory have demonstrated 
a variety of context-dependent population responses that differentially affect popu-
lation size and phenotypic variance, and might have nonlinear positive density-
dependent effects in a variable environment (Benton et al. 2004).
Turnover pulses are the main engine that shapes the taxic patterns and trends of 
diversity and disparity. Even though it might be difficult or impossible to predict a 
specific species-level response due to stochasticity and nonlinear dynamics precipi-
tated by perturbation, it generally falls into one of the following categories: extinc-
tion, speciation, or migration (habitat tracking) (Eldredge 1995; Miller 2002). In 
addition, substantial destabilization of biocenotic organization allows for success-
ful invasion by non-native species that become important contributors to the emerg-
ing new biocenosis and also can induce a rapid morphological evolution in native 
species (Freeman and Byers 2006). The differential response to population-level 
perturbation agrees with the empirically derived correlation of taxic origination 
and extinction rates among clades in the fossil record (Stanley 1979, 1990): More 
geographically restricted, especially endemic, species are expected to speciate and 
become extinct at a higher rate than more geographically widespread species.
Extremely high levels of biocenotic perturbation may involve the entire global 
biota resulting in mass extinction events, where entire multiple lineages become 
extinct as a result of high-magnitude environmental factors (e.g., volcanism or 
meteor impact), such as the global Permian–Triassic (P–Tr) extinction, during 
which speciation was greatly depressed (Erwin 1993).
6  Epilogue
6.1  Summary
Incorporating insights from the hierarchy theory of evolution and from network theory 
provides a more complete theoretical framework for explaining complex patterns and 
processes of biological evolution. More specifically, network theory provides a descrip-
tion of interaction dynamics at all scales of biological organization and sheds light upon 
mechanisms of emergence in a hierarchical context. The proposed model of hierarchi-
cally nested networks of biological individuals offers promise for elucidating causal 
factors of metastability, displayed at all levels of biological hierarchies, and the factors 
responsible for its breakdown. The perpetual interplay of stasis and flux in network 
dynamics at all levels of life’s hierarchies shapes its historical patterns and trends.
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The prevalent pattern of stability in living systems across scale results from the 
structure of biological systems: Consisting of hierarchically nested, complex net-
works, they are extremely robust to extrinsic perturbations. The taxic patterns of 
diversity and disparity are the product of the synergetic outcome of complex net-
work responses to partially temporally decoupled perturbations at different levels 
of the economic hierarchy and their cascading effects. Environmental perturbations 
contribute to both generating variation at the molecular level and facilitate the 
expression of hidden phenotypic variance by compromising evolutionary capaci-
tance. The spread and fixation of novel genotypes, ultimately responsible for pro-
ducing taxic evolutionary patterns, are enabled by temporary removal of control 
over population dynamics brought about by environmentally triggered disruption or 
destabilization of ecological networks at the level of biocenosis. Stochasticity and 
nonlinear dynamics characterizing the processes of the biocenosis in flux are among 
the principal factors behind the evolutionary contingency of life’s history.
6.2  Future Perspectives
Defining a formal mathematical description of the theory developed here will facili-
tate quantitative empirical research and modeling of complex evolutionary phenom-
ena in a hypothesis-testing framework. The mathematical approaches from the fields 
of graph theory, dynamical systems, fractal geometry, and chaos have been shown 
to be particularly effective in capturing important aspects of complex biological 
systems (e.g., Strogatz 2000). Facilitated by advances in computational technology, 
these methods have been fruitfully applied to studying different complex biological 
phenomena ranging from explaining allometry of plant vascular systems (West et al. 
1999), causality in complex ecological dynamics (Sugihara et al. 2012), recovery 
following mass extinction (Solé et al. 2010), evolutionary responses of paleocommu-
nities to ecological crisis (Roopnarine 2006, 2009), and the origins of life (Kauffman 
1995). Mathematical description of hierarchical dynamics useful for modeling com-
plex phenomena can be facilitated by object-oriented technology (Booch 2007). A 
few models have incorporated an explicitly hierarchical framework as an integrated 
modeling approach attempting to combine multiple-level-specific models into a 
global hierarchical model (Pavé 2006; Schmidt-Lainé and Pavé 2002). The applica-
tion of these methods to evolutionary complexity is still in infancy and presents a 
wide field of opportunity for theoretical and methodological developments.
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Abstract The Modern Synthesis explains the evolution of life at a mesolevel by 
identifying phenotype–environmental interactions as the locus of evolution and by 
identifying natural selection as the means by which evolution occurs. Both micro- 
and macroevolutionary schools of thought are post-synthetic attempts to evolution-
ize phenomena above and below organisms that have traditionally been conceived 
as non-living. Microevolutionary thought associates with the study of how genetic 
selection explains higher-order phenomena such as speciation and extinction, while 
macroevolutionary research fields understand species and higher taxa as biological 
individuals and they attribute evolutionary causation to biotic and abiotic factors 
that transcend genetic selection. The microreductionist and macroholistic research 
schools are characterized as two distinct epistemic cultures where the former favor 
mechanical explanations, while the latter favor historical explanations of the evolu-
tionary process by identifying recurring patterns and trends in the evolution of life. 
I demonstrate that both cultures endorse radically different notions on time and 
explain how both perspectives can be unified by endorsing epistemic pluralism.
Keywords Microevolution · Macroevolution · Origin of life · Evolutionary biology · 
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But how … shall we describe a process which nobody has seen performed, and of which 
no written history gives any account? This is only to be investigated, first, in examining 
the nature of those solid bodies, the history of which we want to know; and 2dly, in exam-
ining the natural operations of the globe, in order to see if there now actually exist such 
operations, as, from the nature of the solid bodies, appear to have been necessary to their 
formation. (Hutton, cited in Teggart 1916: 249)
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… We need a third gambit, one that admits history as a fair game to the scientific 
 enterprise – but does so without exclusive attention to the individual facts of the matter. 
One that focusses on historical pattern. (Eldredge 1999: 10)
1  Introduction
When you look up micro or macro in a dictionary, the “micro” is defined as small or 
minute and “macro” as large or long. To exemplify the meaning of the words, many 
dictionaries will give you a lineup that goes from the micro to the meso to the macro. 
The terms stem from the ancient Greek mı-krós, mésos, and makrós and are loanwords 
borrowed from more ancient Indo-European (including Indo-Iranian) languages spo-
ken by Vedic Indian and Mesopotamian peoples. Like their predecessors, Greek phi-
losophers used the concepts as prefixes to form combinatorial words whereby the 
micro–meso–macro determined either the size or the temporal and chronological 
scale of the phenomenon denoted by the noun that followed in the combination.
Stated otherwise, the micro, meso, and macro refer to verbal, geometric, and 
arithmetic measurements of matter, space, and time. We still use the micro–
meso–macro prefixes. Biochemists, for example, call DNA a macromolecule to 
indicate that it is a structure composed of smaller subunits; archaeologists divide 
the Paleolithic or Stone Age into a Lower Mesolithic and Upper Paleolithic 
period to give chronometric and spatial accounts of hominid tool technologies. 
Paleontologists use geological time to define visible eukaryotic multicellular life 
that evolved at the beginning of the Cambrian as transitioning from the Paleozoic 
or ancient life to the Mesozoic or middle life and the Cenozoic or more recent life.
The conceptualization of matter, space, and time brings us to the heart of cos-
mology, i.e., the study of the universe. Cosmologies are worldviews that function 
as epistemic systems that delineate the boundaries of the universe and everything 
in it. Over the ages, cosmologies have often been depicted in cosmographies such 
as ancient Greek Chains of Beings, Judeo-Christian Scala Naturae, or Far Eastern 
Wheels of Time that function as mappings of the world.
Aristotle, for example, distinguished between the realm of non-being (nothing), 
the physical realm of coming and becoming (the cosmos), and the metaphysical 
realm of being (roughly the aetiology or causes that underlie all order in the uni-
verse which he reified into an ultimate and final cause: the unmovable mover). The 
micro–meso–macro prefixes were exclusively used to measure the physical realm 
which these ancient peoples understood as a single cosmic whole that for the sake 
of analysis is dividable into embedded parts, i.e., the micro-, meso- and macrocos-
mos. Together, they form the great chain of being and becoming, and that chain 
of being and becoming, for Aristotle, follows metaphysical, causal laws that give 
teleological directionality to how change occurs.
Aristotle’s chain of being as well as his more ultimate distinction into 3 realms 
was synthesized into Judeo-Christian cosmologies where the micro–meso–macro 
come in the form of a lineup of distinct and hierarchically structured layers of 
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reality, respectively, made up of inanimate matter, animate (living) matter, and 
the celestial/divine. The latter ladder became reconceptualized in more scientific 
terms by Spencer (1862, 1876, 1915) who, following Hutton, distinguished a lin-
ear sequence that goes from the inorganic to the organic and superorganic. The 
micro or inorganic associates with chemistry and particle physics, the meso or 
organic with the life sciences which include the humanities as well as the earth 
sciences, and the macro or superorganic with astronomy and the planetary sci-
ences. Early historical linguists, ethnologists, and sociologists adhered to a doc-
trine we now call organicism and understood languages, cultures, and societies 
as beings or living organisms, but Spencer reconceptualized these phenomena as 
extended organs of living beings that surpass the organic and thus also form part 
of the superorganic.
In all these hierarchical lineups, the living holds the middle between on the 
one hand the dead and on the other hand what transcends the living. In religious 
terms, that what transcends the living coincides with the supernatural and is there-
fore conceptualized as distinct in matter, space, and time. In scientific terms, what 
transcends the living can associate either with geology, physics, and astronomy, 
or, on a smaller scale, with sociocultural, linguistic, and political structures which 
equally surpass the individual or the collective. In the sciences, the organic has 
a more fluent connection with some aspects of the superorganic, because living 
beings can individually and collectively alter aspects of the superorganic, either 
ecologically speaking by altering the earth’s surface and atmosphere, or in what 
regards the creation of new phenomena such as cultures and languages. However, 
the living cannot influence or alter star or planetary formations, or at least there is 
no evidence that proves we can, so eventually there is a rupture. In recent years, 
science has also made the divide between the inorganic and organic more fluent 
because we accept that living matter is made up of the same chemical compounds 
and physical particles. Life and inorganic matter both follow the same chemical 
and physical laws. Nonetheless, living matter evolves, and the evolution of life is 
considered to follow new rules which are formulated in the form of evolutionary 
mechanisms.
What is noteworthy is that none of these lineups converge with the actual his-
tory of the universe, which according to the current standard view goes from 
the Big Bang to star and planetary constellations, the evolution of life out of 
 non-living matter on at least one of these planets, and the evolution of new phe-
nomena out of life. It demonstrates that our ways to conceptualize the universe are 
outdated and biased toward more ancient cosmologies that no longer form part of 
our worldview. Huxley (1942, 1957), for example, when defining what he called 
“evolutionary humanism” tried to fix the problem and went from the cosmic to 
the biological to the psychosocial, but he was silenced by mainstream scientists, 
strangely so for being too fanatic.
Another observation drawn from investigating these scales is that life has 
always held the middle, but its exact position and beginning within a univer-
sal cosmic scale has been far from stable. Are populations, species, or higher 
taxa real? Are cultures, languages, and societal structures alive? These make up 
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fundamental questions of Western science. Biology is traditionally defined as the 
science of life and evolution as the change that life undergoes through time. But 
definitions of life are diverse. Darwin (1859) understood biological organisms as 
individual living beings. He evolutionized the study of the living by measuring 
how well organisms cope in the struggle for existence and how able they are in 
reproducing fertile offspring. By emphasizing struggle for existence and reproduc-
tive success, organisms are subjected to a two-way selection process, one natural 
and one sexual. Success is measured by how well organismal variation helps in 
survival and attracting mates. Both are tested within the environment. Organismal 
variation can be reduced to hereditary variation, but it is the organism that has to 
struggle. And selection can be explained by environmental parameters, but it is 
the organism that is selected, either by other organisms or by the abiotic environ-
ment. So there is a duality that takes the issues to a micro- and macrolevel, but 
only the organism–environmental interface is considered real or relevant for study. 
Organisms collectively make up populations, but for Darwin, species are real in 
name only and in reality always “incipient” and prone to undergo further gradual 
change because of generational organismal–environmental interactions that even-
tually underlie descent with modification.
Evolutionary theory has therefore been mostly defined at a mesolevel. 
Following Darwin, the founders of the Modern Synthesis argued that the evolu-
tion of existing life occurs through the natural selection of adaptive organisms at 
the level of the environment as a consequence of the weeding out of maladaptive 
organisms that did not make it, either in the struggle for existence, or the battle 
between the sexes. Consequently, the unit of selection has traditionally been iden-
tified as the phenotype or living organism, and the level where selection occurs has 
been identified as the environment. In a very real sense, expanding evolutionary 
research toward a micro- and macrolevel implies an inclusion of the dead. It avers 
a recognition that the Modern Synthesis explains biogenesis but not abiogenesis 
and merely defines evolutionary research of existing life at a mesolevel, one that is 
inspired by older cosmologies.
Discussions on micro- and macroevolution reach their peak after the founda-
tion of the Modern Synthesis and associate with advances made in fields such 
as on the one hand population and especially molecular genetics as well as 
organic  biochemistry and, on the other, paleontology, ecology, systematics, and 
 biophysics. These debates have been brought to us in the form of discussions on 
biological or genealogical and ecological hierarchies and what their epistemic 
entry points or levels of analysis are, major transitions, patterns, trends, evolution-
ary rates, and discussions on the mechanisms that cause variation, speciation, and 
(mass) extinction.
The debates invoke fundamental epistemological questions on spatiotemporal 
scales (material loci or units and levels as well as tempos of evolution), causa-
tion (mechanisms that underlie evolutionary change at these loci), and questions 
of reductionism and holism. Ultimately, they invoke an inquiry into how an evo-
lutionary worldview necessitates a reconceptualization of matter, space, and 
time. Things can hardly become more fundamental, and herein lies the important 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
231Uniting Micro- with Macroevolution into an Extended Synthesis …
contribution to science that both micro- and macro-oriented evolutionary scholars 
have brought forth.
We currently find ourselves in the midst of this fascinating cosmological revo-
lution. Although evolutionary theory was first formulated over 150 years ago, we 
are still delineating the consequences of an evolutionary worldview and the impact 
it has on our epistemic frameworks that are themselves formulated by an evolving 
species.
My background lies in evolutionary epistemology as well as comparative 
anthropological science of intellectual history, what Nietzsche called the geneal-
ogy of thought. As such, my contribution here involves an epistemic and historical 
contextualization of the evolutionary cosmological issues that the micro- and mac-
roevolutionary debates bring forth, as well as an anthropological delineation of 
two distinct scientific cultures that, although they share a common cultural ances-
tor, have evolved distinct scientific practices and intellectual ideas to study evolu-
tion. In so doing, I build on the following three books written by Niles Eldredge, 
Time Frames (1985), Reinventing Darwin, The Great Debate at the High Table 
of Evolutionary Theory (1995), and The Pattern of Evolution (1999). The present 
work reads both as a comment and as an elaboration of these ideas.
2  Microevolution
In 1946, over fifty evolutionary scholars from various biological fields united 
in the first meeting of the Society for the Study of Evolution (Eldredge 1999: 
138–40; Smocovitis 1996). The Society was an outgrowth of a North American 
National Research Committee, founded a couple of years earlier with the goal 
to investigate shared evolutionary problems of genetics and paleontology. The 
societal members elected George Gaylord Simpson as their president, and Ernst 
Mayr functioned as secretary. During their meetings, the scholars established a 
common epistemic framework for eukaryotic phylogeny: Multicellular organ-
isms undergo descent with modification because they evolve by means of natu-
ral selection. The established theoretical framework served as the foundation of 
the Modern Synthesis (Huxley 1942; Provine and Mayr 1980) that, according to 
Mayr, designates:
… the general acceptance of two conclusions: gradual evolution can be explained in 
terms of small genetic changes (“mutations”) and recombination, and the ordering of this 
genetic variation by natural selection; and the observed evolutionary phenomena, particu-
larly macro-evolutionary processes and speciation, can be explained in a manner that is 
consistent with the known genetic mechanisms. (cited in Gould 1982: 382)
Contrary to their intellectual ancestors, these founders did not address origin of life 
questions, and they stayed clear from ontogenetic and sociocultural sciences. At the 
time, there were good reasons that justified these decisions. History was no longer 
considered a science (Popper 1957). Weismann’s (1893) barrier caused for a rupture 
between ontogeny and phylogeny because scholars assumed that ontogenetically 
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acquired characteristics do not feed back into the gene pool. Consequently, embry-
ological and overall epigenetic research (Waddington 1942) was not considered 
a relevant subject area of evolutionary biology. The founders also refrained from 
sociocultural behavioral research because the subject was simply not considered to 
define their area of research. At the time, behaviorist schools considered behavior 
an outgrowth of individual and societal learning, and learned behavior in turn was 
an acquired behavior that did not feed back into the gene pool. In so far as learn-
ing is underlain by neurocognitive conditions, the subject belonged to the neuro-
logical and psychological sciences; in so far as learning requires teachers, it is a 
sociocultural group behavior that needs to be studied by anthropologists and soci-
ologists. These fields developed altogether different epistemic frameworks and sci-
entific practices to understand behavioral phenomena. The adoption of early social 
Darwinian theories had caused havoc in colonial and war times (Eliav-Feldon et al. 
2009; Fanon and Philcox 2004), and many of the founders of the Modern Synthesis 
spent a lifetime eliminating vitalist and historicist (unilineal, orthogenetic, straight 
line) evolutionary ideas. Rosalind Franklin’s work had led to the discovery of the 
double helix (Watson and Crick 1953), which later became understood as a “fro-
zen accident” (Crick 1968), and such conceptualization temporarily eliminated dis-
cussion with cytologists and cell biologists who investigated heredity beyond the 
nucleated genome (Margulis 1998: 25). Bacteriology was altogether considered 
a medical science. Bacteria, viruses, and fungi were known to genetically infect 
multicellular life during ontogeny (Avery et al. 1944; Griffith 1928; Lederberg 
and Tatum 1946; Morse et al. 1956), and such infections can alter fitness (Haldane 
1949; Lederberg 1999), but it was assumed that most infections did not enter the 
germ line and were thus negligible from an evolutionary point of view.
For an evolutionary scholar that wanted to work within the epistemic bound-
aries delineated by the Modern Synthesis, little else remained but the study of 
genes. The microevolutionary tradition developed by trying to incorporate lower- 
and higher-order phenomena on the scale, but at the same time reducing these phe-
nomena to a genetic level of analysis. Adaptation became synonymous with fitness 
(how many times genes are passed on), and natural selection became understood 
as genetic selection (Williams 1966), because ultimately, these dead structures 
are the only “survivors” and “beneficiaries” (Lloyd 1988, 2000) of evolution. By 
understanding living organisms as temporary “vehicles” that ride “selfish genes” 
(Dawkins 1976), the micromolecular genetic level is considered more lasting 
in time and therefore more real, just because genes are “replicators” that have 
“fecundity, longevity, and copying fidelity” (Dawkins 1976).
Such an approach is interesting, because it demonstrates an epistemic struggle 
with evolutionary time and a subsequent search for generational continuity and 
stability which the founders as well as Darwin proclaimed a necessary feature in 
order for natural selection to work. By taking the differential distributions of genes 
over populations as point of departure, it implies an annihilation of the individual 
living organism which had always been understood as the unit of selection. It is 
here that we therefore find a first attempt to “evolutionize” the dead, i.e., to apply 
evolutionary theory to non-living phenomena.
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I give two examples, research on kinship and research on sex. In these debates on 
the targets and beneficiaries of selection, attention was first drawn to those who from 
a genetic point of view do not benefit. Statistically speaking, kinship and altruism do 
not enhance an individual’s fitness though other members of a population can benefit 
from such cooperative actions. When asking what such traits are good for, Wynne-
Edwards (1962, 1986) raised the possibility that such traits benefit the group. But 
such higher-order selection was fiercely denied by Williams (1971) and Maynard 
Smith (1964), Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Instead, calculations began that 
enable such seemingly altruistic behavioral traits to become reduced to individual 
fitness via reciprocity or tit for tat (Axelrod 1981, Hamilton 1964). In times of com-
petition, it pays to cooperate. Nonetheless, questions of benefit are a natural out-
growth of questions on adaptation. If selection favors the fit, then traits can only 
evolve when they are somehow adaptive or they would not be selected in the first 
place. So if the individual living organism does not benefit, it must be either some-
thing above or below the organism that benefits, the group or the genes themselves.
Another conundrum, passionately studied in flower power times, was the ben-
efit of prolonged sexual immaturity, menopause and andropause, homosexual-
ity, and meiotic sex which constrains “selfish genes.” Meiotic sex (Edwards 
1998; Fisher 1930; Hamilton 1967; Maynard Smith 1978; Becks and Alavi this 
volume) involves the acceptance of half of the nucleated genes from total stran-
gers in neglect of the individual’s own genes. Why would evolution have taken 
such a route when organisms reproduced by division wherein they passed on their 
complete genome? The most common answer given was that genetic recombina-
tion is beneficial because it increases variation and it enables genetic repair or the 
masking of maladaptive traits (which the fruit fly experimenters already showed 
to be mostly recessive) in future progeny. In particular, the first argument implies 
a higher-order population level. By examining how well genes fare in a popula-
tion’s gene pool, mate choice and sexual fitness become understood as a form of 
group selection (Van Valen 1975). Given that it takes two, meiotic sex annihilates 
the sexual individual as an independent organism in favor of the study of genetic 
(re-)combinations at a population level. What matters more is the differential dis-
tribution of genes over populations through time.
Neo-Darwinian theory was very successful in reducing many seemingly social 
behaviors to a genetic level, but an equally valid question, from an epistemologi-
cal and historical point of view, is why, from all behaviors, it was particularly 
social and cooperative behavior that received so much attention. One reason is 
the following. Evolutionary theory itself evolved in the nineteenth century as an 
outgrowth of discussions on sociopolitical debates on the common goods of soci-
ety and moral debates on human nature. Without divine law, scholars sought nat-
uralistic, secular principles that enable individuals to bond into societal political 
structures. Hobbes, for example, saw humans and the whole of nature as fierce 
and violent. Rousseau endorsed that all are good-natured but corrupted by society. 
Pierre Joseph Preudhom developed his political ideas on mutualism which gave 
way to socialism. The ideas developed, with on the one side, the liberal camp that 
understood nature as “red in tooth and claw” and, on the other side, the socialists. 
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Darwin was part of the liberals and the struggle he assumed, for Spencer was one 
of the “fittest” in a world filled with “parasites.” On the other side, you had the 
socialists and communitarians, one of them being Kropotkin who emphasized 
mutual aid (see Sapp 1994 for a discussion). These features were also found in 
nature, under the form of symbiosis, mutualism, and commensalism, but these 
ideas did not survive the synthesis, or better yet, they did, but in the form of para-
sitism and “master–slave” relationships that were studied as outcomes of behavio-
ral features from within fields such as ecology. Because symbiotic behavior was 
understood as a type of socialism and studied from within ecology, the subject was 
not considered a hallmark of synthetic evolutionary studies. For Neo-Darwinians, 
who focused on the vertical transmission of nucleated genes, cooperation forms an 
anomaly. Another reason why especially sexual behavior received so much atten-
tion during the rise of microevolutionary studies is that eukaryotic sex forms a 
hallmark of natural and sexual selection theory (see Becks and Alavi this volume). 
If not for sex, traits cannot be passed on from one generation to the next. Finally, 
research on cooperation and social behavior in particular was also approved during 
the Darwin centennial, discussed in the next part.
2.1  Evolutionizing the Inorganic and Superorganic
Shortly after the Society for the Study of Evolution was founded back in 1946, 
the Darwin centennial was organized at the University of Chicago in 1959. Tax 
(1960) organized the event and invited the scholars whom Julian Huxley (1942) 
had called the founders of the Modern Synthesis (Theodosius Dobzhansky, E.B. 
Ford, Ernst Mayr, George G. Simpson, G. Ledyard Stebbins, Bernhard Rensch, 
and Sewall Wright), anthropologists, and behavioral scientists (including, among 
others, Daniel Axelrod, A. Irving Hallowell, Clyde Kluckhohn, Alfred Kroeber, 
Louis Leakey, Niko Tinbergen, Gordon Willey, and Leslie White), as well as reli-
gious leaders. The conference was organized around five panels: the origin of life, 
the evolution of life, man as an organism, the evolution of the mind, and social 
and cultural evolution, a lineup that Smocovitis (1999: 296–7) rightfully notes: 
“… follows both a logical sequence of the history of life on earth, and the logical 
ordering of knowledge: the physical sciences were followed by the biological sci-
ences and the social sciences.”
It is easy to deduce from the program that the purpose of the meeting was to 
investigate the impact an evolutionary worldview had on all the sciences, from the 
micro- to the macrolevel. Following Huxley (1942, 1957) who in turn was highly 
inspired by his grandfather Thomas Henry Huxley as well as Herbert Spencer, it 
was both a plea for “universal evolution” and an attempt to undo the “eclipse of 
Darwinism” that had originated from the 1880s onward due to advances in symbi-
ogenesis, neo-Lamarckianism, epigenetics, and embryology. Waddington was the 
only disturbance in that regard. The population geneticists had mechanized natural 
selection by mathematizing selection as gene distribution studies, and the founders 
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had put discontinuity and saltationist debates to rest, so it was now time to evolu-
tionize the behavioral and sociocultural sciences.
In comparison, during the Chicago Darwin bicentennial that was chaired by 
the philosopher Robert Richards in 2009, the main themes were eco–evo–devo 
and History and Philosophy of Science, neither of which had been represented 
at the 1959 centennial. Back in 1959, the former schools were part of the eclipse 
that needed to be undone. The latter, philosophers of science, were altogether not 
engaged, with the exception of Nagel (1949, 1951) who, a couple of years ear-
lier and from within logical positivism, had written on the use and abuse of tel-
eology in biology, and Grace A. De Laguna, who wrote a positive review of the 
conference proceedings she characterized as having taken on a “fresh approach 
to the philosophical problem of ends in nature.” In her abstract and by following 
Pittendrigh (1958), she summarizes the problem as follows:
They accept ‘teleonomy’ only as descriptive, and neglect its significance for theory. The 
present thesis is that each of the three recognized phases of universal evolution: inorganic, 
organic, and post-organic initiated by the advent of man and his culture, is characterized 
and made possible by the emergence of a distinctive type of teleonomic organization. (De 
Laguna 1962: 117)
The centennial thus reinstated in a post-synthetic and post-war spirit the attempt to 
extend the principles of natural selection to phenomena studied within the behav-
ioral, cognitive, and sociocultural sciences, in particular the “superorganic” goal-
oriented behavior of the living (Axelrod 1981; Hamilton 1964; Tinbergen 1963; 
Trivers 1971; Williams 1966). Inspired by Pittendrigh and Williams’ notions on 
teleonomy, sociobiologists (Wilson 1975) took things altogether to another level. 
Early sociobiologists assumed that behavioral and cognitive traits were ultimately 
underlain by genes, and their scientific work initiated an era where specific genes 
were postulated for language, cognition, and cultural traits. In short, such investi-
gations reinstated evolutionary research on ontogeny from within a Neo-Darwinian 
framework (Campbell 1960, 1974; Hahlweg and Hooker 1989; Tinbergen 1963).
What about the inorganic? Darwin’s On the origin of species by means of natural 
selection provides a theory of biogenesis, and it explains how existing life brings 
forth new life. He speculated that life evolved in a small little pond, a primordial 
soup, and that all living organisms are genealogically related through the blood line 
(Darwin 1859: 420–2) and thus brought forth from a single common ancestor (for a 
discussion, see Gontier 2011). But he did not go beyond this speculation to address 
the origin of life out of inorganic matter. This transition was mostly studied from 
within epigenetic circles (for a discussion, see Maienschein 2012), where schol-
ars investigated abiogenesis by means of spontaneous generation instead of natural 
selection, to explain how the living evolved out of inanimate matter. The doctrine 
was called to halt by scholars such as Redi and Pasteur, who reintroduced more pre-
formationist notions by defending that Omne vivum ex vivo, all life comes from pre-
existing life. This credo also formed the basis for cell theory, which takes the cell as 
the basic unit of life and argues that all life comes from cells (Mazzarello 1999). The 
view strengthened Darwin’s evolutionary theory that all life shares a common origin 
wherefrom descent with modification follows (for a discussion, see Huxley 1870).
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Thinking through the consequences of Darwinian evolution theory, and in the 
context of research on the origin of life, Haeckel (1866) and Huxley (1870), who 
coined the term abiogenesis and also denied it, were the first to universalize evolu-
tionary theory toward the inorganic. Comparative research led Haeckel to theorize 
that “higher animals” had evolved from “protozoa” such as “monera” and subse-
quently diversified into kingdoms (“Protista,” Animalia, and Plantae). He depicted 
his monophyletic reconstructions in the first evolutionary trees of life that in turn 
gave credibility to his recapitulation theory alternatively known as his biogenetic 
law (literally, the law of the genesis or historical origin of life). During the First 
World War, he published a work on crystals which he characterized as “anor-
ganic life” (Haeckel 1917) wherein he came very close to the work so typical of 
biophysics.
Returning to the Chicago 1959 centennial, what is interesting, and very reflec-
tive of the time, is the differentiation the organizers made between origin and evo-
lution of life problems which they examined in two distinct panels. Back then, 
origin questions were frowned upon as speculative and unscientific because the 
initial conditions can neither be repeated nor observed, though today progress is 
indeed being made in that regard. But such scientific demands equally go out to 
the future, which we can neither observe nor induce, yet prediction is valued as 
one of the highest epistemic goods of any scientific theory. Equally, “what is life” 
questions are also often dismissed as unscientific, while on the contrary, mechani-
cal questions on how life evolved, and thus, identifying the mechanisms of evolu-
tion is considered science. The 1959 panel on the origin of life was composed of 
physicists, biochemists, geneticists, and ecologists who focused on the ecological 
conditions favorable to evolve eukaryotic life on earth, the biochemical aspects of 
the double helix, and the evolution of physiology, especially nerve wirings.
The structure of genetic material had been discovered 6 years earlier through 
X-ray crystallography, and topics included how genes mutate and how they 
underlie general animal physiology. Analyzing the panel, it altogether remains a 
strange combination of scholars and topics. Participants included the astrobiol-
ogist Harlow Shapley, a participant of the great debate on the size of the universe 
and its nebulae (galaxies), who also introduced the “liquid water belt theory” that 
defines habitable zones for life; Sir Charles Galton Darwin, descendent of Darwin 
and physicist involved in X-ray crystallography; Hermann Joseph Muller, a Nobel 
laureate known for his work on the impact radiation has on genetic mutations; 
the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky and biochemist Earl A. Evans; Ralph W. 
Gerard, a neurophysiologist and behavioral scientist working on the chemico- 
electric wirings of the central nervous system; Clifford Ladd Prosser, a compara-
tive physiologist; Georgii F. Gause, a Russian biologist known for his ecological 
competitive exclusion principle that states that only one of two similar species 
competing over the same niche will survive (the other one will go extinct); and 
Hans Gaffron, a biochemist working on photosynthesis in plants.
One can only interpret such a selection for a panel on the origin of life from 
within the bias there existed among the founders of the Modern Synthesis 
and their predecessors to understand the evolution of multicellular life and to 
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understand that evolution exclusively by means of natural selection. Granted, great 
scientists such as Manfred Eigen (Eigen and Schuster 1977), Orgel (1973, 1992) 
and De Duve (1991) or the Schopf (1978) brothers and Fox and Dose (1972) were 
still coming of academic age (which on average takes a decade or two longer). But 
by then, Wallin (1927) had published his work on symbiogenesis, Pauling (1939) 
had already received the Nobel prize for his work on the nature of the chemical 
bond, Miller (1953) had performed his experiments on the primordial atmosphere 
of life that spontaneously generated amino acids, and Oparin’s (1955) work had 
been translated and was well read within the Americas and Europe. Luria and 
Delbruck (1943), in discussions on Lamarckian versus Darwinian inheritance and 
the occurrence of mutations as random or directed toward environmental change, 
gave statistical evidence that bacteria mutate randomly and only subsequently 
become the target of selection. Avery et al. (1944), who pointed out that DNA and 
not proteins were the transforming factor during, what we now call, lateral gene 
transfer among strands of pneumococci were also not invited, and neither was 
Lederberg (1951, Zinder and Lederberg 1952), who discovered the mechanisms 
of transduction and bacterial conjugation and reintroduced the term abiogenesis 
before Carl Sagan did.
Perhaps funding ran out, but the composition of the 1959 Origin of Life panel 
does demonstrate a conscious selection of favoured topics as well as a lack of 
scholarly interaction between the founders of the Modern Synthesis and pioneers 
in areas such as abiogenesis, actual molecular genetics as opposed to theoretical 
population genetics, cytoplasmic heredity, and prokaryotic life. In their defense, it 
is true that such inclusion would not have involved a celebration of natural selec-
tion or Darwin per se. But in so far as they endorsed universal evolution and even 
accepted the possibility for selection to be directed as opposed to blind in what 
regards sociocultural evolution, much more so than later sociobiologists would, it 
remains strange why, besides selection, there appears to have been no room what-
soever for symbiogenesis or spontaneous generation (or self-organizing, autocata-
lytic complex adaptive systems as we call them today). Spontaneously generated, 
biochemical catalytic and autocatalytic systems show selectiveness, but much of 
this can be explained by electromagnetics, physics, and chemistry, rather than by 
struggle for existence and competition. This is one of the reasons why such views 
were not favoured at a time when biology was seeking its own field-specific and 
epistemic boundaries. Wright (1929, 1932) was there to defend drift, but he was 
part of the evolution panel, and drift, before Kimura (1968, 1983), was understood 
as a period of no selection rather than as a mechanism in and of itself.
Nonetheless, in relation to post-synthetic introductions of origin of life debates, 
and battles over which came first, genes (Eigen and Schuster 1977; Orgel 1973, 
1992), proteins (Miller 1953; Miller and Urey 1959; Kauffman and Levin 1987; 
Kauffman 1995), or cells (De Duve 1991; Fox and Dose 1972; Oparin 1955), the 
inorganic eventually became evolutionized. Today, all known evolutionary theories 
(natural selection, symbiogenesis, spontaneous generation or self-organized com-
plex adaptive systems theory, lateral gene transfer, drift, punctuated equilibria) are, 
to some extent, put to use to understand abiogenesis.
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
238 N. Gontier
It was especially Eigen (1996: 547), who selectionized the inorganic or 
 “prebiotic” by asking whether “‘being alive’ really [is] a necessary prerequisite of 
selective and evolutionary behavior.” His theory on the autocatalytic hypercycle 
explains, from a selectionist point of view, the origin of autocatalytic RNA mol-
ecules and DNA compartmentalization into larger genomes. His background in 
physics and his adherence to Shannon’s rising information theory even enabled 
him to turn natural selection into a physical law of functional optimization toward 
increasing complexity:
That is how a physical interpretation of the Darwinian principle might sound. According 
to Darwin’s principle, whatever is better adapted spreads out and displaces its less 
well adapted predecessor. Thus, complexity, built upon simplicity, has accumulated 
throughout biological evolution from the first single-celled organisms to human beings. 
Evolution as a whole is the steady generation of information - information that is written 
down in the genes of living organisms. … Today we can apply our knowledge to molecu-
lar systems such as genes and the products of their translation. We can also investigate 
in a much more objective way the physical nature of the Darwinian principle: theoreti-
cally, by defining accurately the prerequisites and constraints, and experimentally, by 
exact control of experimental conditions. We find that the selection principle is neither 
a mystical axiom immanent in living matter nor a general tendency observable primar-
ily in living processes. On the contrary, it is - like many of the known physical laws - a 
clear ‘if-then’ principle, that is, a principle according to which defined initial situations 
lead to deducible behavior patterns. It is thus analogous to the law of mass action, which 
regulates the attainment of the quantities of the components in a chemical equilibrium.  
(Eigen 1997: 17–8)
It is a complex theory, but the short version is that within genetic landscapes—
to be read quite literally, in the context of (pre-)RNA worlds (Cech 1986; Gilbert 
1986), not the wild type, but the most optimal variations of the wild type (the 
quasi-species) together as a group are the target of selection. In order for the 
quasi-species to overthrow the wild type (and thus to evolve by splitting), it needs 
to be more optimal. It is a bit like the “hill-climbing” metaphor Dawkins (1996) 
uses to describe what he calls “accumulative selection.” Eigen (1996: 19):
Selection contains an element of exact ‘if-then’ behavior. It has nothing to do with the 
 tautological interpretation ‘best adapted = selected’. ‘Selection’ could in principle just 
refer to any kind of preference. But here it means a particular kind of preference, which 
adheres unerringly to a single scale of values. Selection is based upon self-replication. It 
distinguishes sharply between competitors, it constructs a broad mutant spectrum on the 
basis of value, and in this way it organizes and steers the entire, complex system.
Selection becomes understood as replication of preferential information. Eigen 
and Dawkins’ ideas find their roots in the works of Fisher (1930) and Wright 
(1929), with that very important difference that Eigen saw his ideas on natu-
ral selection as a physical law restricted to the early “life” of replicators (RNA 
and DNA molecules and viruses). Eigen therefore pointed out the limit of natural 
selection. As soon as there is a distinction between a genotype and a phenotype 
(and thus an established translation machinery), he argued that selection occurs 
at the level of the cell, which is different from how selection occurs at the level of 
replicators.
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The chief criticism of Darwin’s idea was directed against its supposed claim to explain 
all of evolution. However, the development of life, from molecular systems to human 
beings, has passed through many stages of organisation, and, while some of these were 
Darwinian in nature, many were fundamentally different. Since the preservation of all liv-
ing systems is based upon reproduction, selection plays a role at all levels. But selection 
is expressed in many different ways, sometimes as coexistence or even cooperation, and 
sometimes as competition and the often irreversible weeding-out of some forms of life.  
(Eigen 1996: 29–30)
Eigen’s introduction of information theory and focus on increasing levels of com-
plexity and optimization also inspired scholars such as Szathmáry (2002, 2006), 
and other researchers interested in the major transitions of life, as well as schol-
ars that form part of the field of biosemiotics. For Eigen, for example, the ori-
gin of autocatalytic replicators, and their compartmentalization into a genome, 
was a transition that marked a “peculiar ‘once-forever’—selection mechanism 
[…] a consequence of hypercyclic organization” (Eigen and Schuster 1977: 
542). Oparin, for example, once asked why life does not originate de novo on a 
daily basis. The most popular answer in his time was that existing life takes up 
all resources, which is an ecological argument. The answer scholars like Eigen, 
Jacob (1977), or Monod (1971) gave is that it is so unlikely an event, that if it 
were to happen once, it will most definitely not happen twice due to the complex-
ity involved. Life genealogically builds upon what exists, and what exists is the 
outcome of once-forever events, likely at the time, but often not repeatable there-
after. This tinkering argument is based upon an understanding of genes as carrying 
an increasingly complex informational code, and just because of its emphasis on 
information and increasing complexity, it is so popular with creationists (Hoyle 
1981), whom assume that such tinkering requires an intelligent designer.
Nonetheless, if the origin of the genetic code was a “once-forever” event, 
another way of stating the latter is as follows: However the genome evolved, 
it is unique to that period. In so far as the situation of viruses resembles that 
realm, probably because they too are remnants of that particular phase (see, e.g., 
Villarreal 2004; Villarreal and Defillips 2000), they too can be studied as exam-
ples of hypercyclic organization. But beyond that, the law of selection stops and 
selection takes on different forms, sometimes as co-evolution, sometimes it is 
completely overthrown by other mechanisms and thus, itself, as a mechanism, not 
selected simply because the if-then conditions are not met. If correct, then such a 
view would imply a higher-order sorting or selection of evolutionary mechanisms. 
One of the challenges we are faced with is understanding how various and dis-
tinct evolutionary mechanisms work together to bring forth the phenomenon that 
 evolution is.
Finally, ecology, for the founders as well as the organizers of the centennial, 
was by and large reduced to the study of genetic landscapes (Serrelli this volume), 
as well as the conditions for habitable life on earth. Research on both ontogeny 
and ecology (Odling-Smee 1988; Van Valen 1973, 1976), which are both areas of 
research that were first defined by Haeckel, became reintroduced in standard Neo-
Darwinian theories from the 1960s and 1970s onward, partly because of advances 
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in symbiosis and symbiogenesis (Margulis 1970, 1981) and partly due to advances 
in macroevolutionary fields, including biophysics. Eldredge (1985b, 1989, 1992), 
Gould (1977), Lewontin (1983, 2000), Gould and Lewontin (1979), and Stanley 
(1979; Eldredge and Stanley 1984), for example, were quite active in reinstating 
ecology, ontogeny, and biophysics as valid sub-branches of the Neo-Darwinian 
framework. I return to this later in the text.
Today, the movements evolved into, on the one hand, the new sociocultural 
evolutionary sciences, including evolutionary psychology, evolutionary linguistics, 
and evolutionary anthropology (for a review, see Gontier 2012a) and, on the other 
hand, the schools that associate with eco–evo–devo research. Eco–evo–devo today 
reinstates a mesolevel analysis between the biomolecular (micro) and ecological 
and systematic (macro) sciences. Within the sociocultural sciences, especially the 
work of Jablonka and Lamb (1989) and Oyama (1985) was foundational. Typical 
of the eco–evo–devo approach is that scholars try to define and map actual life 
history, by, e.g., correlating genes with organismal phenotypes and sociocultural, 
biotic, and abiotic environments. On the other hand, work on symbiosis and sym-
biogenesis and reticulate evolution in general remains poorly integrated in Neo-
Darwinian theory.
2.2  Universalizing Selection
One of the reasons why the microevolutionary tradition has been so successful is 
that it has been able to “universalize” (Cziko 1995; Dawkins 1982a; Dennett 1995) 
natural selection theory into a common scientific language, not by searching for 
the law that natural selection can be (as Eigen had demonstrated), but the pattern 
that natural selection produces as well as the parameters that need to be present for 
natural selection to work. These parameters and patterns have been mostly formu-
lated in the form of heuristics. Starting with the units and levels of selection debate 
(Brandon and Burian 1984), evolutionary epistemologists (Bradie 1986) and evo-
lutionary biologists have identified “universal” units of selection such as the repli-
cator (Dawkins 1982a), the interactor (Hull 1981), and the reproducer (Griesemer 
2000), and they have been engaged in identifying the levels where selection occurs 
(Brandon 1982; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Okasha 2005). Such research relates to 
hierarchy theory and the quest for the major transitions, or patterns and trends of 
life that especially natural selection, understood as the selection of information, 
has brought forth in all domains of life (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1995; see 
Brandon and McShea 2010 for a critique).
Overall, the universalization of selection is characterized by abstracting a gen-
eral template from natural selection that provides information on how the mech-
anism works (Gontier 2006a, b). This template can then be used as a heuristic 
to study the evolution of genes, organisms, culture, cognition, and language. In 
biology, Lewontin (1970: 1) has defined such a template or “logical skeleton” of 
natural selection as “phenotypic variation, differential fitness, and heritability of 
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that fitness.” And ten years earlier, Campbell (1960), the founder of evolutionary 
epistemology, argued that such a general formula of natural selection is “blind 
variation and selective retention.” This means that as soon as one can identify 
something that varies blindly and is selectively retained, that something evolves 
by means of natural selection. In sum, the work by scholars engaged in universal 
selectionism has led to finding (1) more units and levels of selection and (2) the 
conditions under which natural selection operates, conditions they formulate in the 
form of a heuristic, logical skeleton, or formula.
Both approaches are today somewhat being synthesized into the new and rising 
field of Biosemiotics (Barbieri 2008a, b; Favereau 2005; Hoffmeyer 2008), where, 
as the name implies, the evolution of informational codes serves as a new means 
to delineate the major transitions of life from within a more historical perspective.
3  Macroevolution
In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1962) characterized scientific 
practice as a paradigm, defined in his preface as “scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practition-
ers.” Scientific development goes through distinct phases from preparadigm and 
paradigm formation phases, to phases of paradigm execution, and paradigm ref-
ormation or scientific revolutions. The latter result from how well scientific 
frameworks deal with anomalies that challenge the tenets of an accepted para-
digm. Anomalies cause paradigm instability and scientific crisis. Either scientists 
are able to solve the anomalies from within the standard epistemic framework, or 
they develop another paradigm that either solves the issues or gives hope that it 
eventually will.
The historical developments of Darwinian and Neo-Darwinian evolution-
ary theories follow Kuhn’s description of scientific revolutions quite accurately. 
Darwin (1859) did not find evidence for the fixity of species, which was a tenet 
in the standard paradigm of his time. Instead, his voyages had made him come 
to believe that species evolve. He knew that if true, his ideas would cause for a 
scientific revolution. Calling his Origin of Species “one long argument,” Darwin 
(1859: 495) recognized that he had merely provided a hypothesis based upon gen-
eralizations of observable artificial selection in animal and plant breeding. For 
such a generalization to become a theory, rigorous scientific testing and proof was 
needed. In Chaps. 6 and 9, Darwin also pointed out anomalies or objections to his 
arguments. One of them was the lack of evidence for intermediate forms (“insen-
sibly graded series,” Eldredge 1995: 95) in the fossil record. Darwin countered the 
objection by arguing that not his hypothesis, but the fossil record was incomplete.
During the “eclipse of Darwinism,” other anomalies were found (see Bowler 
2003 for an overview). The rediscovery of Mendelian genetics and the intro-
duction of mutation theory questioned Darwin’s gemmules theory and his ideas 
on genetic blending. More discontinuous and saltational views emerged as a 
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consequence (see Gould 1977, 2002 for an overview). These anomalies were 
solved from within the evolutionary paradigm by the theoretical population geneti-
cists who synthesized natural selection theory with Mendelian heredity laws and 
who advanced a more gradual and continuous interpretation of genetic mutations 
(see Schwartz 1999 for an overview). The scholars provided mathematical and 
experimental proof for the theory of evolution and turned the hypothesis into a sci-
entific theory, Neo-Darwinism, that formed the basis for paradigm selection by the 
founders of the Modern Synthesis.
Neo-Darwinist population geneticists are best regarded as executers of the pro-
gram. They have been solving anomalies that phenomena such as altruistic and 
sociocultural behavior and eukaryotic sex pose to the Neo-Darwinian framework. 
By incorporating below and above organismal phenomena, they have had to make 
compromises to both Darwin’s original theory of natural selection and the syn-
thetic framework, but at the same time, they have been able to expand its scope 
and application range.
The macroevolutionary perspective as we know it today has been introduced 
from within the field of paleontology by Niles Eldredge and Stephen J. Gould in 
the early 1970s when the Modern Synthesis was well formed and on the expand-
ing. Eldredge and Gould started out as executers of that particular program, but in 
so doing, they found anomalies that lead to crisis. Scholars in this tradition accept 
the lack of intermediates in the fossil record as a fact, they find evidence for peri-
ods of stasis, and they demonstrate that speciation and extinction are events that 
often occur rapidly. Scholars on both sides of the scale are currently investigating 
whether the Neo-Darwinian framework can overcome this crisis that research on 
stasis, speciation/extinction, and the lack of intermediates introduces, or whether 
the findings necessitate a scientific revolution.
When studying the evolution of trilobites, Phacops rana and Phacops iowensis 
which Eldredge (1971: 162) called “true biospecies,” he did not find intermedi-
ate species. Instead, he encountered long periods of morphological stasis within 
the trilobites, and when variation in eye lenses did come along, older forms were 
rapidly replaced. Speciation was a rare event rather than a natural outcome of 
incessant and continuous anagenetic evolving which would imply intermedi-
ates (for a detailed description, see Eldredge 1985a). The speciation events that 
occurred appeared to have been driven by the spatiotemporal distributions of the 
species; geography, group size, and how ecological regions are populated by real 
individuals as opposed to how genes map onto genetic landscapes. New traits 
become fixed in marginal groups isolated from their parental species, and they 
split and rapidly replace the older population. In other words, Eldredge explained 
morphological change of trilobites by making use of Mayr’s model of allopatric 
speciation by peripheral isolates and saw it as an anomaly to “phyletic gradual-
ism” that endorsed speciation to occur through anagenesis where species “gradu-
ally and systematically evolve themselves out of existence” (Eldredge 1995: 69). 
For Eldredge, Mayr’s model explained the gaps he found in successive strata. But 
he went further, by arguing that such a model annihilates the necessity to postu-
late intermediates, and furthermore encourages the idea that most species evolve 
through cladogenesis.
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The majority of species preserved in epeiric sediments show no change in species-spe-
cific characters throughout the interval of their stratigraphic occurrence, and the phyletic 
model is inapplicable to most of these elements of the fossil record. Instead, change in, or 
development of, species-specific characters are envisioned as occurring relatively rapidly 
in peripheral isolates. Morphological stability of epeiric species is attributed to stabilizing 
selection. (Eldredge 1971: 166)
At first, Eldredge explained morphological stasis as a form of stabilizing selection, 
and later and inspired by Vrba (1980, 1985a, b), Lieberman (2000; Lieberman 
et al. 1993, 1995, 2005, 2007), Lieberman and Dudgeon (1996), Lieberman et al. 
(1995, 2007), Eldredge et al. (2005) would understand it as an outcome of drift 
and habitat tracking. A parallel with Sewall Wright’s shifting balance theory was 
first made by Thomas Schopf in the introduction to the first punctuated equilibria 
paper (Eldredge and Gould 1972). By denying that genetic selection plays suffi-
cient role, drift and habitat tracking are recognized as independent mechanisms, 
not merely the result of a genetic level in evolution; rather, they add an  ecological 
level, very much in the same way as Hubbel (2001) applies ecological drift to 
describe biodiversity and biogeography (Rosindell et al. 2011).
Returning to the 1970s, around the American Museum of Natural History and 
Columbia University, a group had been developing where Eldredge would become 
part of. Together with Stephen J. Gould, who found the same results in land snails, 
Eldredge published the consequences of their findings a year later (Eldredge and 
Gould 1972). Their conclusions can be summarized as follows:
1. Gaps in the fossil record are real, and when no intermediates are found, then 
there is no “insensibly graded fossil sequence” (Eldredge and Gould 1972: 87);
2. Inspired by Hennigian cladistics of genealogical or ancestral–descent relation-
ships (Eldredge 1971: 157); in anticipation of Ghiselin’s (1974) notion of spe-
cies as biological individuals, they claimed that “biospecies” are real because 
they have stratigraphic and thus historical existence (a beginning, life span, and 
ending in time p. 92), and species demonstrate a type of stasis or “homeosta-
sis” that surpasses “genetic revolution” (a term coined by Mayr, p. 114)—they 
never denied the occurrence of genetic mutations or the importance of genetic 
selection, what they claimed was that neither suffice to cause speciation;
3. Speciation is rare, but when it occurs, it occurs rapidly and species evolve by 
splitting because of allopatric speciation by peripheral isolates (p. 96);
4. The history of life is characterized by punctuated equilibria rather than by phy-
letic gradualism, and the former is a consequence of “the theory of allopatric 
speciation” and “implies that a lineage’s history includes long periods of mor-
phological stability, punctuated here and there by rapid events of speciation in 
isolated subpopulations” (pp. 108–10);
5. Trends are real (p. 110);
6. The Modern Synthesis is biased toward phyletic gradualism, but macroevolu-
tion (understood as the evolution of species or speciation) and also stasis of 
species cannot be fully explained by microevolutionary theory by which they 
meant genetic selection theory—the critique goes out to microevolutionary 
schools of thought much more than it goes out to Darwinism or general evolu-
tionary theory as some creationists have falsely claimed.
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In a Popperian sense, one anomaly rightfully disproves all, but it would only be 
the beginning of a long series of publications where scholars would confirm both 
their results and the pattern of stasis and rapid speciation in numerous lineages 
(reviewed in Gould and Eldredge 1977, 1993), including our own (Eldredge and 
Tattersall 1982; Gabrowski and Wood this volume). In a way, it was neither the 
trilobites or the snails, nor their theory of punctuated equilibria that made the dif-
ference. The major conclusion was that an exclusive focus on genetic distributions 
and population levels so typical of the microevolutionary perspective did not fully 
explain speciation and large-scale trends. Their work marked a beginning of a 
fresh breath of air for paleontologists who, ever since Darwin, were treated like 
the stepchildren of evolution. Eldredge and Gould’s work justified other scholars 
to speak up against the claims of the Synthesis, in favor of what the data and the 
fossil record actually said. It marked a beginning of macroevolutionary thought as 
distinct from microevolution and a celebration of the work performed by paleon-
tologists, systematists, and ecologists which had been eclipsed.
3.1  “Evolutionizing the Dead” by Means of Organicism
Like microevolutionary scholars, macroevolutionary scholars have also intro-
duced an inclusion of “the dead” by emphasizing the evolutionary impact that 
phenomena traditionally not conceived as living have. Macroevolutionary schol-
ars recognize species and higher taxa such as genera and phyla as historically real 
entities that occupy space and time. The species–genera distinction was introduced 
by Aristotle. In Judeo-Christian tradition, which was more influenced by Plato, 
it was believed that species were created by God according to fixed prototypes. 
Taxonomic classification, including Linnaean systematics, was nonetheless under-
stood as a theoretical and logical discipline, where universals and particulars were 
distinguished based upon logical dichotomies. As theoretical frameworks, they 
showed the order of the universe, but like any universalia (theoretical concepts), 
their independent existence was questioned by nominalists and accepted by  realists 
(for a discussion, see Gontier 2011). Darwin adhered to a nominalistic species 
concept, thereby claiming that species are not real, but Mayr (1942) introduced 
his biological species concept that defines species based upon sexual exclusion. 
He did so out of necessity because the gene population point of view annihilates 
the living sexual individual. And his theory of allopatric speciation due to periph-
eral isolates equally demarcated species in ecological terms. With Mayr, species 
become understood as bounded in space and time, due to sexual compatibility and 
geographical accessibility requirements. Eldredge and Gould took the reasoning 
further by “evolutionizing” and “geneologizing” not only species but also higher 
taxa. I give two examples, one from Eldredge’s work and one from Gould’s.
For Eldredge (1999: 22–3), species are “real entities, ‘individuals’ with births, 
histories, and deaths.” They are real genealogical entities that occupy an equally 
real ecological space in the history of life. When Ghiselin (1974) introduced his 
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ideas of species as biological individuals, an approach Eldredge adopted, Ghiselin 
quite literally, revitalized the organic notion of beings that was so typical of pre-
synthetic evolutionary and historical thinkers of the nineteenth century. Back then, 
languages and cultures were considered real organic and organismic beings or nat-
ural kinds as philosophers call it. All have a birth, life history, and ending in time 
from which linguistic, cultural, and sociopolitical genealogies could be inferred. 
Because they were beings, they even reproduced, though not by replication, but by 
splitting (diffusion) or merging (cultural blending or acculturation, Gontier 2006c; 
Kressing et al. 2014). Inspired by linguistics and language genealogies, Darwin 
argued that all biological organisms are also genealogically related through what 
we call genetics and what he called the blood line (discussed in Gontier 2011). 
The discovery of genetic material and Weismann’s barrier blocked such continu-
ity, and anthropological fields would introduce notions of historical particular-
ism instead, claiming that no genealogy of sociocultural knowledge can be drawn 
because every culture has its unique and particular history. The unique and par-
ticular history of biological species, in turn, was genealogized by Hennig who 
revitalized the idea of natural kinds, and this work was foundational for Ghiselin 
when he argued that species are biological individuals.
By building on both Hennig’s cladistics that are a “truly ‘scientific’ way of 
deriving evolutionary histories and taxonomies” (Eldredge 1999: 8) and Ghiselin’s 
work, Eldredge understands species as real historical entities, beings or  individuals 
that occupy space and time. Species genealogies are more stable in time than the 
individual organisms that make them up. His research studies on stasis (Eldredge 
et al. 2005), living fossils (Eldredge and Stanley 1984), extinctions (Eldredge 
1991a, b), and biodiversity (1992, 1997; Casetta and Marques da Silva this volume) 
are investigations into the geological life span, the actual natural history of species, 
both in what regards their origin, genealogy and ending, as well as in what regards 
their relation to the natural environment. As an ardent environmentalist, much of 
Eldredge’s career has also focused on “biologizing” and “evolutionizing” the abi-
otic environment. The abiotic environment is relevant for understanding biological 
evolution, not as a level where genetic selection occurs, but as an evolutionary and 
causal factor that impacts the evolution of life.
Echoing some of Darwin’s strongest themes and denials, modern evolutionary biology 
emphasizes genes and biotic interactions at the expense of explicit links to the physical 
world. Ecology plays a muted role in evolutionary theory. And patterns in the history of 
life – patterns strongly linked with the physical history of the earth – still await full inte-
gration with evolutionary theory. (Eldredge 1999: 95)
That ecology is real becomes most clear in his distinction between an ecologi-
cal/economic and genealogical hierarchy (a distinction he first made in 1985, 
but for an overview, see Eldredge 2008). That surely was not part of the Modern 
Synthesis, but it can be incorporated into a reworked version, in so far as Darwin 
himself attributed more causality to the environment than his predecessors did.
We also find this idea with Gould (1989: 228) who argued that “Evolutionary 
change (as opposed to mere variation) is produced by forces of natural selection aris-
ing from the external environment (both physical conditions and interactions with 
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other organisms).” Nonetheless, Gould (1977) was more inspired by developmental 
and genetic studies. Contrary to Eldredge, who explained stasis as the outcome of sta-
bilizing selection and later drift, Gould investigated the “homeostatic” life span of spe-
cies as a possible consequence of ontogenetic constraints (Gould 1977) and genetic 
aging (Gould et al. 1987). By understanding eukaryotic genera and clades as real 
historical individuals, that have a beginning, life span, and ending in time, he studied 
that life span or genealogy by looking for trends in eukaryotic multicellular evolution 
that indicate a “new arrow of time to specify the direction of evolution” (Gould et al. 
1987: 1437). In association with the MBL group (for overviews, see Sepkoski and 
Ruse 2009), Gould investigated clade typology and concluded that the evolution of 
marine invertebrates and terrestrial mammals, among others, portrays a maximal dis-
parity (rather than adaptive radiation which he rejected as a notion, Gould et al. 1987: 
1438) or “bottom-heaviness” at the beginning of the clade. This bottom-heaviness 
is followed by rapid decimation and subsequent species diversification within a few 
remaining lineages. Gould (1989: 304) interpreted this bottom-heaviness as:
early experimentation and later standardization. Major lineages seem able to generate 
remarkable disparity of anatomical design at the outset of their history – early experimen-
tation. Few of these designs survive an initial decimation, and later diversification occurs 
only within the restricted anatomical boundaries of these survivors – later standardization.
Dawkins had launched the notion that genes are the ultimate survivors of selec-
tion. Inspired by Lerner and Valentine, Gould asked whether genetic systems 
do age. By believing that “organisms as well as environments were different in 
Cambrian times, […] the explosion and later quiescence owes as much to a 
change in organic potential as to an altered ecological status” (Gould 1989: 230). 
He assumed that early multicellular life, though morphologically different, had 
a “shared genetic heritage, now dissipated” (Ibid.: 231–2). Since the Middle 
Cambrian, a period in life that is well preserved in the Burgess Shale Formation 
currently in the Canadian Rockies of British Columbia, no new phyla or “body 
plans,” as he called them, have evolved, for which he raised the possibility that the 
genetic systems had aged. Gould was a true visionary of the evo–devo schools that 
emerged with the discovery of the homeobox gene complex (Gehring 1992) and 
regulatory, homeotic genes in general (Davidson and Erwin 2009), when he wrote:
I have no profound suggestions about the potential nature of this genetic ‘aging’, but sim-
ply ask that we consider such an alternative. Our exploding knowledge of development 
and the mechanisms of genetic action should provide, within a decade, the facts and ideas 
to flesh out this conception. […] We cannot, for now, go beyond such crude and prelimi-
nary suggestions. (Gould 1989: 231)
Gould found the anomalies less commensurable with Neo-Darwinian theory, 
though he too emphasized repeatedly that he himself was a Darwinist, because 
Darwin himself was a pluralist. For Gould (1982: 383):
The non-Darwinian implications of punctuated equilibrium lie in its suggestions for the 
explanation of evolutionary trends […] not in the tempo of individual speciation events. 
Although punctuated equilibrium is a theory for a higher level of evolutionary change, 
and must therefore be agonistic with respect to the role of natural selection in speciation, 
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the world that it proposes is quite different from that traditionally viewed by palaeon-
tologists (and by Darwin himself) as the proper geological extension of Darwinism. The 
“gradualist-punctuationalist debate”, the general label often applied to this disparate series 
of claims, may not be directed at the heart of natural selection, but it remains an important 
critique of the Darwinian tradition.
Because both Eldredge and Gould understand higher taxa as real, (mass) extinc-
tion and origination/speciation are equally real phenomena, and their history in 
time and space can become documented. Another logical outcome is research on 
both biological/genealogical and ecological hierarchies (Tëmkin and Eldredge this 
volume). In that regard, and as a part-time historian of science, Gould (1981) was 
more interested in debunking cultural biases of the scale, while Eldredge has been 
actively engaged in developing new hierarchical frameworks.
Finally, if species are real, it raises questions on species sorting. In fact, if all higher 
taxa, such as kingdoms or phyla, are real because they demarcate actual historical 
groups in space and time that can be delineated based upon ecological niches, geo-
logical strata, morphological layout, and mechanisms according to which they evolve, 
one could in principle ask whether there exists some type of sorting from Woese and 
Fox (1977) three domains downward. Eldredge and Gould kept it to questions of spe-
cies sorting and developed the ideas further in collaboration with Vrba (1989), Vrba 
and Eldredge (1984), Vrba and Gould (1986). The rationale is that in so far as natural 
selection in combination with drift and abiotic factors causally influences speciation, it 
becomes natural to ask whether any or all somehow influence speciation to be differ-
ential and thus to show trends or arrows in time. Eldredge (1999: 23):
If species are construed as real historical entities – with the aforementioned births, histo-
ries, and deaths – that in itself suggests the very real possibility that there are factors that 
bias those births and deaths. And that means that there very probably is a higher-level ana-
logue to natural selection – species selection, or, as I have come to prefer, species sorting. 
The apparent directionality of trends, we suggested, might be the result of, say, differen-
tial species survival …
Species, as biological beings, reproduce, not by replication, but by splitting or 
cladogenesis, and as such also introduce a pattern of descent with modification 
that is in turn characterized by punctuated equilibria rather than phyletic gradu-
alism. For Gould, the importance of punctuated equilibria had been that it lent 
insight into such trends:
At the macroevolutionary level of trends, the theory of punctuated equilibrium proposes 
that established species generally do not change substantially in phenotype over a life-
time that may encompass many million years (stasis), and that most evolutionary change 
is concentrated in geologically instantaneous events of branching speciation. […] (Gould 
1982: 383)
Returning to Kuhn, does macroevolutionary research call for a revolution? Gould 
was more revolutionary than Eldredge. For Eldredge (1985b), the Synthesis is 
merely “unfinished,” and he takes: “… being called anti-Darwinian very personally. 
… I have always thought of myself as more or less a knee-jerk Neo-Darwinian” 
who has “felt that, with one or two major exceptions, my version of how the evolu-
tionary process works lines up very well with Darwin’s” (Eldredge 2006: 36).
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He accepts, as Thomas Huxley did, that the theory of natural selection does 
not necessitate gradualness, and he understands his ideas as a geological exten-
sion of Darwinian theory, which is why he has tried to time speciation based upon 
geological strata. But the fact of the matter is that by understanding speciation 
as an outcome of ecological and geographical factors, much more so than as a 
consequence of genetic selection, he attributes causation to the abiotic environ-
ment rather than understanding it as the mere scene or level where genetic selec-
tion occurs.
Migration was one of the four elements of the Modern Synthesis, but if habi-
tat tracking or niche construction have causal influence on the future course of 
evolution, then, as Lewontin (2000) pointed out, such selective behavior goes 
out from active organisms rather than selective environments that weed out pas-
sive individuals (also see Stigall this volume). The field of ecology was not part 
of the Modern Synthesis and became introduced post-synthetically, in both the 
micro- and macroevolutionary schools. Ecologically oriented scholars have done 
excellent work in finding causal factors that explain stasis, evolution, and extinc-
tion (Futuyma this volume; Bokma this volume) that go beyond genetic selection. 
These include drift, habitat-tracking, abiotic environmental changes, developmen-
tal constraints, and biophysical constraints as well as affordances. Such research 
has created a scientific necessity to integrate environmentalist and  ecological 
approaches into the evolutionary discipline. Quite often, the environment  provides 
causal non-genetic factors that influence how species originate, evolve, and die. 
Climate change, meteor impacts, soil, and atmosphere composition all can influ-
ence the evolutionary faith of species and higher taxa. Thermodynamic and other 
physical laws (Bohm 1980; Kauffman 1995; Prigogine 1980; Stanley 1979; 
Stanley this volume; Thompson 1917; von Bertalanffy 1928, 1940, 1950) also 
play crucial roles, as enablers as well as constrainers in both the formation of bio-
chemical and anatomical form and its development and extinction. Ecology, sys-
tematics, and biophysics today are on the rise, and macroevolutionary scholars 
have most certainly contributed to their recognition by averring for a wider recog-
nition of the importance of development, biophysics, and ecology in providing a 
fuller view on the evolution of life.
These ideas find their origin in the period designated as the eclipse of 
Darwinism and associate with presynthetic ideas, and these ideas also form 
part of the credo of scholars who call out for an extended evolutionary syn-
thesis (Gontier 2010b; Pigliucci 2009; Pigliucci and Müller 2010). It is prob-
ably also the main reason why topics such as stasis and eco–evo–devo ranged 
so high at the 2009 Chicago bicentennial. As an audience participant, I found it 
nothing less than amazing how ideas associated with the “eclipse of Darwin,” 
characterized as heretic by the founders of the Synthesis, and first reintroduced 
from within macroevolutionary streams of thought were presented as basic sub-
ject areas of Neo-Darwinism and approached from within universal Darwinian 
(Dawkins 1983; Dennett 1995) and universal selectionist (Czicko 1995) 
accounts.
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3.2  Universalizing Punctuated Equilibria
The study of actual scientific practice teaches us that hypotheses and theories 
are tested for their use, not merely for their truth or corroboration to the truth, as 
Popper (1957) or logical empiricists assumed. Universal Darwinism and Universal 
Selection theory have proven to be useful to understand certain aspects of behav-
ior. Punctuated equilibria theory has equally proven its use by designating a shared 
theoretical framework by which we can understand the history and evolution of 
natural kinds such as species and higher taxa. It is safe to say that many of its 
claims, including that species, extinctions, speciation, stasis, and gaps are real, are 
not only accepted as part of scientific language, but they are intensely studied as 
phenomena in need of explanation by scholars on both micro- and macrosides.
Punctuated equilibria theory and macroevolutionary research in general, and 
cladistic analysis in particular, have furthermore provided a universal methodolog-
ical toolkit that is used to comprehend non-gradual vertical descent.
Just as the tenets of natural selection theory have been universalized across dis-
ciplinary boundaries and across the cosmic scale, so too the basic tenets of macro-
evolutionary outlooks in general and punctuated equilibria in particular have been 
universalized. Punctuated equilibria theory describes a pattern of evolution: Long 
periods of stasis are intermitted by short periods of rapid change (Eldredge and 
Gould 1972). Eldredge and Gould were among the first scholars within the field 
of paleontology to adopt cladistics which is an intrinsic genealogical method, and 
as such, they have been exemplar for macroevolutionary research of the living as 
well as the dead, both sub- and superorganically. Darwin argued that species share 
common genealogical descent, and as Eldredge rightfully notes, Hennig’s cladis-
tics method is the best scientific method available today to infer such genealogy or 
actual life history, because it is through such cladistic analysis that one can infer 
the patterns of evolution.
Cladistics, in keeping with the original search for natural kinds, but imbued with an evo-
lutionary perspective, boils down to a search for the actual distribution of the features, or 
‘characters’, of organisms. It turns out that such characters are complexly, hierarchically 
nested just as are the taxa they define. (Eldredge 1999: 70)
The major breakthrough cladistics has brought forth is that it enables to infer 
genealogies of the actual life history of populations and species. But one can just 
as well use them to study the actual genealogy or “half-life” of chemical sub-
stances such as proteins or genes, as well as particular morphological and behav-
ioral traits. These genealogies of natural kinds enable the building of phylogenetic 
taxonomies and hierarchies of the evolution of these specific phenomena. In short, 
traits can be morphological, but also genetic, behavioral, or cultural, and their ori-
gin, history, and ending can be mapped across time and space.
With the rise of whole-genome-sequencing techniques and our growing 
possibility to compute and study large data sets across time and space, fields 
such as meta- and comparative genomics are introducing macroevolutionary 
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reconstructions of various aspects of life’s history. The application of phylogenetic 
reconstruction methods that map the spread and distribution of genes has con-
firmed the pattern of punctuated equilibria in both extinct and extant taxa (Bokma 
2002; Bokma and Monroe 2010; Pagel et al. 2006; Venditti and Pagel 2008, 2010).
Historical linguists have from the nineteenth century onward and in close 
parallel with evolutionary biologists attempted to reconstruct the natural gene-
alogies of languages (Gontier 2011; Kressing et al. 2014). When Lorenz (1958) 
and Tinbergen (1963) first defined ethology, they wanted nothing less than to 
build a taxonomy of behavior and thus give the natural history or the genealogy 
of different behavioral traits by mapping when they first arose in time and how 
they evolved, spread, went extinct, or transitioned into something new. Equally, 
Nietzsche (1874) wanted nothing less than to launch the study of the genealogy of 
intellectual thought in our species, and when Campbell (1960, 1974) introduced 
the field of evolutionary epistemology, he wanted to map the evolution of knowl-
edge from bacteria to humans. These ideas are now finally entering the sociocul-
tural sciences. Today, anthropologists and archeologists are increasingly mapping 
the evolution of material culture by making use of phylogenetic and cladistics 
analyses. From within sub-branches of anthropology that are increasingly desig-
nated as macroarcheology and macroanthropology, scholars are reconstructing the 
beginning, evolution, and ending of “superorganic” traits across space and time.
Any and all such mappings by necessity take on a macroevolutionary approach, 
because we have to go beyond individual organisms, groups, and species, and 
focus on the genealogy or life history of the specific traits, i.e., genes, languages, 
or cultural artifacts themselves, beyond and across the beings that house them. 
And such research necessitates an investigation into their biogeography or how 
they populate the evolutionary landscape. Beyond gene pools, scholars are just 
beginning to map morphological, proteomic, viriomic, genetic, linguistic, and 
material culture pools. It are eventually such tree and network analyses that enable 
us to infer patterns of evolution, patterns that include stasis, branching, and merg-
ing. These patterns in turn give clues to the pace of evolution as well as the mecha-
nisms that underlie the natural history or evolution of these phenomena.
Today, phylogenetic methodologies are applied to model macroevolution-
ary, ancestral–descent relationships of our kind (Eldredge and Tattersall 1982; 
Schwartz and Tattersall 2001; Wood this volume) as well as the cultural historical 
dispersal of material artifacts (Currie et al. 2010; Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2006; 
Eldredge 2011; Eldredge and Tëmkin 2007; Lipo et al. 2006; O’Brien et al. 2002; 
Pagel and Meade 2006; Steele and Kandler 2010) and languages (Atkinson et al. 
2008; Mace and Jordan 2011; Pagel et al. 2007). These phylogenetic models pro-
vide rigorous evidence for the pattern of punctuated equilibria in strands of lin-
guistic and cultural evolution, as well as patterns of merging. Such research also 
necessitates new hierarchical thinking on cultural traits and behavioral phenom-
ena, how they relate to their inventors, and how they transcend them. In sum:
The macroevolutionary approach in archeology represents the most recent example in a 
long tradition of applying principles of biological evolution to the study of cultural change. 
Archeologists working within this paradigm see macroevolutionary theory as an effective 
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response to the shortcomings of Neo-Darwinian biological evolution for studying cultural 
evolution. Rather than operating at the level of individual traits, macroevolutionary arche-
ologists emphasize the role of hierarchical processes in cultural change. … Major cultural 
change, when it happens, is likely to be rapid, even revolutionary, with periods of rapid 
change separated by periods of relative stasis of actively maintained stability. (Zeder 2008: 1)
Concepts such as stasis, rapid turnovers, and constraints, or exaptations (Gould 
1991; Gould and Vrba 1982) that form part of the technical language introduced 
by macroevolutionary scholars are also applied on a metaphorical level in the soci-
ocultural sciences to describe certain aspects of linguistic and cultural evolution 
that cannot be accounted for by universal selectionism (d’Errico 2003; d’Errico 
and Stringer 2011; Tattersall 2014).
Universalizing punctuated equilibria, and thus developing a universal heuristic of 
the pattern, implies that we identify the mechanisms that underlie both the long periods 
of stasis and the short periods of rapid change. Several mechanisms can lead to sta-
sis, including overall developmental, genetic, or epigenetic constraints (Carroll 2005; 
Davidson and Erwin 2006; Futuyma 2005, 2010 this volume; Gehring 1999; Gould 
1977, 1989; Jablonka and Lamb 1995), stabilizing selection (Lieberman et al. 2005; 
Lieberman and Dudgeon 1996; Schmalhausen 1949) or drift (Bentley and O’Brien 
2011; Bentley et al. 2004; Eldredge et al. 2005; Hubbel 2001; Kimura 1968, 1983; 
Masel et al. 2007). Numerous mechanisms can explain rapid change or speciation, 
such as symbiogenesis (Margulis 1970, 1999; Gontier 2007, 2012b), hybridization 
(Arnold 2006, 2008), lateral gene transfer (Gogarten et al. 2009), and virolution (Ryan 
2006, 2009), the Baldwin effect (Baldwin 1896), or the Ratchet effect.
4  A Clash of Scientific Cultures
Natural selection is not the beginning, as a physical force that stands above and beyond 
time, it is the fallout, the record of history. (Eldredge 1998: 96)
In the 1980s, Maynard Smith (1983, 1984) invited paleontologists to join the high 
table of evolutionary theory. The invitation was followed by polemic debates in 
various articles and books. One of those responses came from Niles Eldredge in 
his book Reinventing Darwin: The Great Debate at the High Table of Evolutionary 
Theory. In it, he characterized John Maynard Smith, Richard Dawkins, and 
George Williams as ultra-Darwinists sitting at one side of the table, and on the 
opposite side, he positioned Stephen Jay Gould, Elisabeth Vrba, Stanley Salthe, 
and himself, whom he characterized as naturalists.
Ultra-Darwinists were those scholars who adhered to a microevolutionary per-
spective by reducing the theory of evolution by means of natural selection to the 
mechanical study of how genes underlie evolutionary change at a population level. 
In other words, they had taken genetic change at a population level as normative 
and causal for evolutionary change at all ranks of life. Naturalists, on the other 
hand, studied evolutionary history from within a macroevolutionary perspective 
and endorsed more holistic epistemic stances that included paleontological, bioge-
ographical, ecological, physical, and systematic areas of research. Their research 
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had been descriptive and had focused on finding recurring patterns and trends in 
various ranks of life that surpass the population level.
The problem for the naturalists was that the actual history of how life changes 
does not converge with the normative framework of how life should change. At the 
heart of the debate lie radically opposing views on how evolutionary research has 
to be conducted, and whose epistemic stance, the microreductionist or macrohol-
istic perspective was more scientific. While the ultra-Darwinists were concerned 
with detailing the underlying mechanism of evolution (which they associated 
exclusively with genetic selection), paleontologists were concerned with describ-
ing life’s history. In other words, it was a clash of scientific cultures where differ-
ent epistemic practices had evolved. Eldredge (1995: 2):
What is really at stake is diametrically opposed suppositions of how evolutionary biol-
ogy should be conducted. Maynard Smith put the geneticist’s position succinctly: pale-
ontology is about history. It is the paleontologist’s job to elucidate what the evolutionary 
process has wrought over the last 3.5 billion years. But evolutionary theory is about how 
the evolutionary process works. And that, to a geneticist, means how genetic information, 
underlying the production of the physical appearance (and physiologies and behaviors) 
or organisms, comes to be modified over the course of time. What can a paleontologist, 
trapped under the dead hand of history, possibly have to say about the mechanics of 
genetic change? After all, science is supposed to concern itself with how things work.
Eldredge (1995: 5) blamed ultra-Darwinists a form of “physics envy,” because 
“they seek to transform natural selection from a simple form of record-keeping, a 
filter that biases the distribution of genes between generations, to a more dynamic, 
active force that molds and shapes organic form as time goes by.” By wanting 
to turn natural selection into a constant physical force, they endorsed a form of 
“extrapolationism” because they assumed that evolution by means of natural selec-
tion was a steady-state, lawlike phenomenon where gradual changes in gene fre-
quencies suffice to explain evolution at all time and in all ranks of life. For the 
naturalists, the steady-state, lawlike theory of evolution by means of natural selec-
tion that had been developing did not converge with the actual history of life, and 
the geneticists’ point of view could not simply be extrapolated to large-scale sys-
tems defined as populations, species, and ecosystems.
But on the other side of the table (Dawkins 1982b, 1983; Maynard Smith 
1983), it was argued that natural history is merely descriptive and that an evolu-
tionary theory should aspire to transcend narration of singular, non-repetitive, and 
unobservable events, by finding the laws or mechanisms, the underlying causes 
that bring forth evolution. For ultra-Darwinists, natural history research or the nar-
ration of actual historical origination and extinction events, in and of itself, cannot 
explain the causes and effects of evolution.
4.1  Delineating the Scientific
These debates are not unique to evolutionary biology. All sciences at one point or 
another have developed debates about whether their science should be primarily 
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“descriptive” or “normative,” for example, as philosophers of science, in turn 
inspired by moral philosophers, call it. Inspired by de Saussure, linguists, anthro-
pologists, and sociologists, for example, know the debates as diachronic (histori-
cal and descriptive) over synchronic (structural and functional) research, and in 
physics, we find debates on Newtonian mechanics versus the new theoretical (bio)
physics associated with relativity theory, quantum mechanics, chaos theory, and 
thermodynamics. The reason these debates are similar is they share common intel-
lectual roots to which I turn in this section.
Should evolutionary science describe history or find its causes? And can sci-
ence tackle origin questions (or extinction questions for that matter) in a scientific 
manner, or should science reduce itself to the study of repeatable and observable 
events? These questions associate with five basic and inter-related problems.
1. The problem of causality: Should science be historical and observational and 
perform a kind of record-keeping, or instead be aetiological, and focus on find-
ing the underlying causes, the reasons why things are the way they are? The 
ultimate question here is: Can we go beyond record-keeping and find constancy 
in underlying mechanisms?
2. The problem of predictability: Should science explain what is (either mechani-
cally or historically), or should it be able to explain what ought to be? In other 
words, can science make predictions on the future and inferences from the 
past?
3. The problem of uniformity or constancy over time: Does observation enable 
prediction and inferences on causality? Does what happens in the present 
immediately set the norm for the past as well as the future?
4. The problem of determinism or relativity: Is the universe determined by 
fixed laws, or is evolutionary change relative and dependable upon changing 
variables?
5. The problem of knowing: Can we, human observers and theoreticians, come to 
everlasting and objective truths, or merely develop temporary, local knowledge 
perspectives, from within a variety of epistemic stances?
The problems are indeed interrelated, because mechanisms can only be invoked 
when change, and that what causes it, is constant through time, or, in other words, 
determined by everlasting and unchanging laws. Predictability also depends upon 
the constancy of the mechanism over time. Favoring a normative view therefore 
implies a uniformitarian epistemic stance.
So a connection has to be forged between uniformitarianism, gradualism, and reduction-
ism: extrapolationism, the projection of commonly observed rates and processes as a pre-
diction of what history ought to look like. (Eldredge 1999: 40)
In 1965, Gould wrote a paper titled Is uniformitarian necessary? wherein he dis-
tinguished between two types of uniformitarianism: substantive uniformitarian-
ism that endorses “uniformity of rates of geological change” and methodological 
uniformitarianism that assumes “time and space invariance of natural laws.” The 
pattern of punctuated equilibria proves that substantive uniformitarianism is false, 
and according to Gould (1965), methodological uniformitarianism, which assumes 
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constancy of natural laws, is obsolete, most of all because laws are interspersed 
by other, often random events that function as disturbances to these laws. In other 
words, catastrophism, or the acceptance that abiotic random events such as meteor 
impacts can influence extinction and the future course of evolution of remaining 
life (e.g., Alverez et al. 1980), is valid.
Both Eldredge (1985b) and Gould (1987) spent a significant amount of their 
career fleshing out the origin of uniformitarian views and the notions on time that 
it brings forth. Uniformitarianism was introduced by Hutton, popularized by Lyell 
(1830, 1832, 1833), and endorsed by Whewell (1833). Uniformitarianists assume 
that adequate observational knowledge of the present should suffice to induc-
tively infer the past and predict the future. But, these early scholars did so because 
they endorsed a lawlike physical view of nature in line with Newtonian mechan-
ics that was inspired by Cartesian philosophy, where space, matter, and therefore 
also time are absolute and thus a priori determined, linear, constant, and irrevers-
ible. Such a stance enables uniformity and predictability toward the past as well as 
the future because laws are real, steady, and constant. These scholars started from 
the assumption that the universe, its laws, and our knowledge of them were the 
result of a benign God. As such, scientists became objective viewers that transcend 
nature and take on a God’s-eye view (Pinxten 1997). This brings us right back to 
cosmology or better yet, the transition from studies on cosmogony (the origin of 
the cosmos) to cosmology (the scientific study of its underlying causes, or aitia).
Newtonian physics is best known among philosophers and physicists for 
validating only Aristotle’s causa efficiens which associates with the how ques-
tion: how does matter move and how do phenomena function? It calls out for a 
mechanical approach, but it nonetheless assumes perfect, eternal, and harmonious 
functionality in the best of all possible worlds. In short, all these scholars, as firm 
believers of Judeo-Christian genesis so beautifully depicted in the scala naturae 
of their time, assumed that the cosmos followed perfect and constant, clocklike 
mechanical laws because they were, in deistic worldviews, the “hand of God” so 
to say. God did not have to intervene, like was the case in theistic worldviews, 
because nature follows predictable and teleological perfection.
Such views no longer form part of our worldview. As Eldredge put it:
Most laws are descriptions of what happens given the existence of a set of conditions. 
Thus, while we might tend to think of gravity as some sort of process (gravity is one 
of the four basic ‘forces’ physicists investigate), Newton’s and all subsequent ‘laws’ of 
gravity are simply generalizations about just what will happen given the existence of two 
hunks of matter of specified mass and distance apart. (Eldredge 1985b: 174)
With the rise of relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory, we are 
necessitated to acknowledge that our cosmologies or epistemic frameworks are 
bounded by observational stances and probabilistic analyses, as well as colored by 
our cultural and theoretical frameworks. In our cosmologies, there is no God’s-eye 
view, and there are no reifiable constant physical forces, or if there are, we do not 
know them. The best we can do is define the conditions of change of current and 
past events, generalize from there, and compare the generalizations, which brings 
forth a statistical analysis.
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Philosophers and scientists alike are fond of the idea that an evolutionary theory 
 pertaining to any sort of system is unlikely to be established without a convincing 
mechanism, a well-articulated and corroborated process of change. … Darwin is still 
commonly supposed to have succeeded where all others before him had failed in estab-
lishing the credibility of evolution because he supplied a process that could plausibly 
account for the history of life: natural selection. … the contention involves whether pat-
tern is preeminent over process in establishing credibility of an evolutionary theory.’ 
(Eldredge 1998: 98)
The naturalists, mostly because of the importance they give to biophysics (Bohm 
1980; Kauffman 1995; Prigogine 1980; Stanley this volume), have made the cosmo-
logical transition from a teleological to a relativist worldview and have allowed it to 
enter evolutionary science, while microevolutionary scholars endorse a more ambiv-
alent view that tries to fit the old cosmologies into the new. I give two examples to 
explain this transition: the rise of natural history research and the clock metaphor.
Evolutionary science is an outgrowth of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
research on the natural history of the cosmos. Advances in physics had caused for 
a transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric worldview, which in turn had raised 
doubts about the divine order of the world which scholars had for centuries been 
depicting in scala naturae where the earth was traditionally placed in the center of 
the universe. From the Renaissance onward and culminating in the Enlightenment, 
scholars sought out the natural history of the universe (for an overview, see Duhem 
1969, 1985).
Natural history research started in an age when travel stories of colonizers, 
gentleman scientists, and missionaries reported on foreign cultures, languages, 
political systems, and fauna and flora; when historical linguists were mapping the 
natural genealogies of the world’s languages; when anthropologists avant la let-
tre were providing the first narrations of foreign cultures; and when moral phi-
losophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Hume, Smith, and Mill debated the natural 
as opposed to divine condition of man as well as the status of “common goods,” 
in “primordial” (which they associated with non-Western) as well as sociopoliti-
cal societies. In short, natural history research was characterized by encompassing 
attempts to narrate the natural history of the world and everything in it by referring 
to its natural “generation” or “development” in opposition to its divine origin.
The term evolution comes from the Latin noun ēvolūtio- (the act of reading, or 
unrolling a script, or narrating a history) and the verb ēvolvo- (ex—out of and volvo-—
roll) and denotes development or unfolding. In this context, it was used in teleo-
logical, preformationist circles where especially medics and to some extent natural 
history students studied the growth of organismal form by trying to narrate its histori-
cal development through time. But it was equally used in this context, by cultural and 
linguistic scientists such as Auguste Schleicher or Max Müller; sociopolitical scien-
tists such Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx, or Kropotkin; philoso-
phers of history such as Hegel, Herder, and Nietzsche; or geologists such as Hutton, 
Lyell, or Bronn. In these circles, the study of the development of natural beings (lan-
guages, cultures, societies, political structures, or biological species) was therefore, 
more than anything, the study of natural, chronological sequences of change that 
beings go through, or stated differently, it is the study of historical change through 
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time. From within the major languages used to develop the scientific worldview, i.e., 
ancient Greek, neo-Latin, English, German, and French, scholars first used terms 
such as “development,” “entwicklung,” and “dévelopmement,” to refer to processes 
of historical change of sociopolitical, biological, or earthly form through time, and 
this development eventually became denoted as evolution.
These investigations into the natural history of the earth and its inhabitants 
raised doubts on the age of the globe, the fixity of natural kinds (languages, cul-
tures, societies, and species), and whether or not we live in the best of all possible 
worlds. In sum, it questioned the traditional assumptions there existed on matter, 
space, and time. In particular, the latter gave way to two types of “conservation eth-
ics”: musealisierung, the nineteenth century is typified by the rise of the great natu-
ral history museums of France, London, Vienna, Brussels, and New York (see, e.g., 
Lübbe 1990); and patriotism and nationalism, the encounter of “the other” made 
especially European scholars emphasize and favor their own natural history. In 
particular in Prussia, works by Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Herder, and eventually Marx, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger would take on the question of time in relation to history.
Before, the act of conducting historical research involved a narration of past 
events, and such narration was often biased toward Western history and cosmol-
ogy. But the natural history students went further and wanted to find the patterns 
and deeper lying meaning of historical change as well as the ultimate nature of 
time. In short, they wanted to “scientify” history, which they did by postulating 
equally biased developmental and vitalist laws of generation and decay so typical 
of the nineteenth century. They understood time as directional. More specifically, 
time was directed toward a given end state, and development was understood as 
progression toward that end state. Such a view entails a continuation of teleologi-
cal thinking.
Comte and Spencer, for example, assumed a steady progress from nomad to 
shepherd to industrialized and civilized man. Their analyses of time were inspired 
by religious and philosophical ideas on the world’s beginning, duration, and escha-
tological ending. By adhering to a non-cyclical, linear, and teleological worldview, 
they assumed that form necessarily develops according to a given and fixed plan, if 
not of divine origin then through natural cause by means of natural (physical and 
developmental) laws. Social Darwinists eventually understood natural selection, 
interpreted as the survival of the fittest, as one such law. Natural history research 
induced a first attempt to find a deeper and higher pattern or order in history which 
brought forth the stadial, unilineal, orthogenic, and racial theories that eventually 
became used and abused to justify racism, imperialism, and hegemony, as well as 
the two world wars.
This type of historical research is today called historicism (Popper 1957), 
and after the havoc it had caused in the wars, and for good reason, such research 
became condemned. Instead of “morphologically” comparing cultures and plac-
ing them on a developmental scale, sociocultural and linguistic scientists averred 
for historical particularism and the incommensurability of cultures and languages, 
which brought forth synchronic instead of diachronic investigations. This means 
that comparative research became redefined, not as a historical discipline, but as a 
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functionalist/structuralist discipline where cultural and linguistic “universals” are 
examined in their particular form in the variety of cultures, languages, and soci-
etal structures that exist. de Saussure (2006) in linguistics, Malinowski (1944) in 
anthropology, and Durkheim (1895) or Talcott Parsons (1975) in sociology averred 
for a synchronization of the sociocultural sciences where the organic and develop-
ing natural kinds of before became reinterpreted as closed systems underlain by 
functional operationalist, universal and determining dead structures that, in their 
operations, work similar to natural clocks and in accordance with steady laws. In 
philosophy, science was equally argued to progress and advance toward the truth, 
which is why they assumed that older theoretical frameworks could be reformu-
lated in “more advanced,” later-developed scientific frameworks through “bridge 
laws” that enable a harmonious synchronization of human thought toward knowl-
edge. Such “synchronization” also entered the biological sciences, where mechan-
ical, functionalist, and structuralist explanations of underlying causes became 
favored over historical narrations.
When the early natural history and evolutionary scholars were developing their 
ideas, they neither foresaw nor planned the havoc it would bring forth. It would 
be foolish to think that the terrors of colonialism and the world wars were brought 
forth by such research instead of economic, political, and religious reasons. 
Nonetheless, it would be equally foolish to deny that it contributed to the general 
Zeitgeist of the time and served as a justification for the crimes against humanity. 
We, who know the consequences of the early attempts to scientify the study of 
natural history, therefore have an obligation to investigate and try to understand 
what could have caused this early historical research to have gone so wrong. One 
of the reasons why historical research in the nineteenth century was typified by 
orthogenic views is that they lacked an evolutionary concept of time and instead 
continued to adhere to a teleological notion of time. Time is absolute, irreversi-
ble, lineal, progressive, and directed toward a final goal. And the reason matter 
attained its goal was because it was subjected to natural laws that gave directional-
ity toward the end state. Eternal forces actualize inherent potential. That is why 
the missionaries, for example, did what they did. They assumed a favored position 
by claiming to have insight into the eschatological end state of the universe, and 
the “civilization” of “barbaric men,” for them, was an act of charity wherein they 
helped actualize the potential of “underdeveloped” cultures.
To make this point more explicit, let us look into the second example, the meta-
phor of a clock. Hume (1739) really did hit the sore spot by treating matters of 
morality and matters of causality in the same way because both go from what is 
to what ought to be. We have seen the sun come up today, yesterday, and all the 
days of our lives as far as we can remember. Our ancestors who lived before us 
also saw the sun coming up on a daily basis, and we have scientific evidence that 
she did so from the moment earth was formed and started its orbit around it. We 
have good scientific theories today that explain why we perceive the sun as com-
ing up and going down, and these theories predict that the orbits of the earth and 
sun will undergo no significant change for many ages to come. But in the end, 
the prediction that the sun will come up tomorrow is not 100 % guaranteed, and 
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however probable the prediction is today, based upon the parameters available 
to us, it is our expectation that she will. And that expectation in the end is based 
upon uniformitarian, teleological, and clockwork notions of the universe. Hume on 
the other hand explained all predictions as well as moral prescriptions as human 
expectations and considered them the dominion of what we today call psychology.
Throughout the years, the problem has only intensified. The logical positivists 
held firm beliefs that our languages, be they expressed in logic, mathematics, or 
natural language, somehow relate to the world and that theories can be bridged 
because they are commensurable just because science progresses toward the truth. 
Wittgenstein provided proof based upon logic that we cannot demonstrate that lan-
guage, mathematics included, refers to the world. Moreover, even if we did pos-
sess the perfect language to explain the state of affairs of the world, the mere fact 
of endorsing an evolutionary worldview necessitates that whatever we are able to 
predict today will only happen if the world does not change and if the parameters 
we define in our scientific language as valid and foundational remain so and thus 
do not alter at a different moment in time.
Western science had grown from assumptions that humans lived in a perfect 
world, that filled an absolute space, with an absolute and irreversible time, and 
humans were considered to have insight into the perfect mechanisms of the world, 
which they described in a perfect language that they had received from a perfect 
God. The age of the Renaissance and the age of Enlightenment were a celebration 
of this human capacity, a capacity that enabled to take on a “God’s-eye view,” and 
to become humanistic gods themselves, that know right from wrong, truth from 
falsehood, and future from the past.
Descartes, a firm believer, introduced mechanical thinking within the field of epis-
temology, and he was the first to introduce the idea that the natural world functions 
as a clock. He inspired Newton who inspired Paley, who inspired Dawkins, in think-
ing that we live in the best of all possible worlds because mechanical laws lead to an 
optimal and balanced cosmos. The clock metaphor is an argument for design that is 
based upon teleological arguments. In line with his mind–body distinction, Descartes 
fought animism by arguing that anatomically, organisms function perfectly according 
to physiological mechanisms that make their organs function as parts of a harmo-
nious clock of which the sum of the parts defines the whole. The mechanical laws 
according to which they function so adequately for Descartes proved the existence 
of God. Paley, as an ardent adherent of intelligent design avant la lettre, would build 
upon these ideas, and this argument for optimalization is exactly what we find in 
Dawkins’ (1995) work, who characterizes natural selection as a “blind watchmaker.” 
Inspired by Fisher and the “hill-climbing metaphor” used to describe Sewall Wright's 
landscapes, and by introducing the idea of “accumulative selection,” he has always 
had an ambiguity in what regards the predictive powers of selection:
The theory of natural selection provides a mechanistic, causal account of how living 
things came to look as if they had been designed for a purpose. So overwhelming is the 
appearance of purposeful design that, […] we still find it difficult indeed boringly pedan-
tic, to refrain from teleological language when discussing adaptation. Bird’s wings are 
obviously ‘for’ flying, […]. (Dawkins 1982a: 161)
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For Newton, time and space were absolute and irreversible, and truth was  conceived 
to be singluar. William Whewell, another firm believer, attacked the standard histor-
ical thinking of his time that was characterized by narration and instead reinstated 
aetiology, the Greek study of causes. Whewell endorsed that inductive research ena-
bles generalizations on these causes. But he could only do so by accepting Hutton’s 
and Lyell’s principle of uniformity which is a direct consequence of living in a 
Newtonian steady-state universe where it finds its justification. In such a world, you 
have steady cause and steady effect, under all circumstances according to the same 
final or unchanging teleological forces. Empiricism might be observation based, it 
no less assumes, just like rationalist deductionism, that laws are constant. In fact, that 
was the main contribution scholars like Lyell and Whewell advanced: Insight into 
eternal laws comes from observation, not inborn categories of the mind. As Gould 
(2002: 102) put it:
History presents two special problems: (1) frequent absence of evidence, given imperfec-
tions of preservation; and (2) uniqueness of sequences, unrepeatable in theory contingent 
complexity, and thereby distancing the data of history from such standard concepts as pre-
diction, and experimentalization. We may epitomize the dilemma in the following way: 
many people define science as the study of causal processes. Past processes are, in princi-
ple, unobservable. We must therefore work by inference from results preserved in the his-
torical record. We must study modern results produced by processes that can be directly 
observed and even manipulated by experiment – and we must then infer the causes of past 
results by their “sufficient similarity” … which presents results. This procedure requires, 
as Mill … and other philosophers recognized long ago, a methodological assumption of 
temporal invariance for laws of nature.
When Mayr (1961) was creating a discipline for evolutionary biology, he found 
himself troubled by cause and effect in biology. Ever since Newton, only the how 
question, the question about mechanism, was considered science. Aristotle’s what 
and what for questions were abandoned because they introduce teleology, and 
that is exactly what the organizers of the Darwin centennial and microevolution-
ary biologists were reintroducing. Ernest Nagel, a logical positivist (one of those 
who believed we possess the perfect logical scientific language) and philosopher 
of physics, was a firm believer in reductionism and singular truth. Mayr was hesi-
tant in adopting a genetic reductionist stance and argued instead for the unity of 
the genotype and phenotype. He distinguished between functional/operational 
(synchronic) and evolutionary (diachronic) biologists. The first study operational 
clocks (the physiology of organisms or “programs guaranteeing behavior that 
increases fitness”), and the latter, instead of asking “what for,” ask “how come” 
which is a question directed toward the past that requires historical analysis (for a 
more elaborate discussion, see Gontier 2012a).
As such, Mayr revived the study of natural history and found a scientific way 
to get rid of the teleology. He validated the fact that biologists cannot and in 
fact need not make predictions about the future, in the same way physicists do. 
Because biology is a study of evolutionary history, it is directed toward the past, 
because it explains the present in a historical, sequential manner. Evolutionary 
biology is not a science that needs to predict the future, because the future of 
biological life is itself unpredictable. Mayr did excellent work in delineating 
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biology as a scientific field in and of itself, a discipline that stands on its own 
two feet where physical laws cannot simply be bridged into evolutionary ones. 
Natural selection is a mechanism, not because it explains the future, but because 
it explains the past. Mayr never endorsed either teleology or teleonomy. Similar 
discussions were also held between biophysicists and classic physicists, in what 
regards the second law of thermodynamics, but these go beyond the scope of the 
present paper. For a good analysis, I refer the reader to the 1995 special issue in 
Physicalia Magazine, where Bricmont (1995) and Prigogine debated the problems 
of predictability in relation to matters of indeterminacy as brought forth by chaos 
theory (also in relation to the Sokal–Bricmont affair).
Returning to Eldredge’ naturalists, these scholars conceive the clock to be more 
crooked. Lewontin (2000: 81), for example, in responding to Dawkins, said:
In biology, this “what for” question is not the same as it is in the analysis of the parts of 
a motorcar or a clock. […] In the case of the organism there are, of course, general func-
tions such as motion, respiration and reproduction that are common, but there are many 
particular functions, peculiar to different life forms, that cannot be known in advance. In 
addition it is by no means true that every part serves a function. Many features of organ-
isms are the epiphenomenal consequences of developmental changes or the functionless 
leftovers from remote ancestors.
We can easily see that it is a clash of epistemic cultures, one inspired by the old 
and one by the new. In particular, Lewontin’s latter argument also makes implicit 
reference to Gould and Vrba’s (1982) notion of exaptations, which is another 
means by which uniformitarianism can be fought. Naturalists take on a more rela-
tivistic view. In both science and philosophy, relativism carries bad connotations 
because “anything goes,” but that need not be the case. What a relativist stance 
does most is mark a transition from epistemic monism toward epistemic plural-
ism. Stated differently, it rejects the notion of a single universe and a single truth, 
in favor of multiple explanations, and in the most fascinating scenario, it accepts 
ontological pluralism. What does that mean?
Fill a glass up to its exact middle. That glass is either half-full or half-empty. 
If you call it half-full, you might be an optimist, and if you call it half-empty, that 
might indicate you are a pessimist. Reality is that the glass is both half-full and 
half-empty, and whatever stance you prefer, it eventually lies in the eye of the 
beholder. Quantum mechanics has taught us the exact same thing in what regards 
waves and particles. And the micro–macroevolutionary debate has done the same 
for the study of the evolution of life; one can explain life by its genes, or by its 
natural history. It demonstrates first and foremost that a particular frame of refer-
ence underlies any and all scientific observation as well as theory formation, and 
that frame of reference is brought forth by either instruments or human observ-
ers and therefore also partially bounded by both. Science is human, and in reality, 
truth need not be singular for the glass is both half-full and half-empty.
We no longer live in a Newtonian world where space is absolute, time is irre-
versible, everything works in the form of a mechanical clock, and observers take 
on a God’s-eye view to deduce the everlasting truths about the universe. All we 
have are our frames of reference, and these immediately call out for epistemic 
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pluralism. We can scientifically justify a microstance as well as a macrostance, 
there is scientific proof for both, and we can compare both to one another and 
incorporate them into yet another framework. But we cannot transcend these 
frameworks. All we can do is develop as many frames of reference as possible. 
The latter entails a reconstruction of biorealities, work that was first taken on by 
the early natural history scholars and that today is well on its way to define actual 
scientific practices. I return to this latter point in the following section.
Simpson (1944), for example, when introducing the macroperspective in pale-
ontology, was most of all thinking through the consequences that thermodynam-
ics, relativity theory, and quantum physics have on our notions of evolution. Such 
branches of physics necessitate more pragmatic and operational, instrumental defi-
nitions of causality as well as science, which becomes understood as a practical 
and instrumental attempt to infer the conditions of change. Pragmatism and instru-
mentalism (other words used to denote relativism) were first introduced by scholars 
such as James (1907, 1909) and Duhem (1954). Teggart (1916, 1925), who inspired 
Eldredge in both his definition of punctuated equilibria and the epistemic stance it 
necessitates, was very much inspired by these scholars when he wrote that:
‘As the sciences have developed,’ William James says, ‘the notion has gained ground that 
most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.’ ‘Investigators have become accus-
tomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any of them 
may from some point of view be useful. Their great use is to summarize facts and to lead 
to new ones.’ Obviously, then, it is not the function of science to gratify the desire of men 
to certainty. No scientific ‘law’ is to be regarded otherwise than as a ‘working hypoth-
esis’ which has proved of value in organizing some phase of experience. ‘The conception,’ 
Bertrand Russell says, ‘of the ‘working hypothesis’, provisional, approximate, and merely 
useful, has more and more pushed aside the comfortable eighteenth century conception of 
‘law of nature’. (Teggart 1925: 163)
Take something as simple as the syllogism, if A then B, so if you have A, then it is 
B, at all times and everywhere. It forms the core of cause and effect in Aristotle as 
well as Newton’s world, but it is not part of ours. If the evolutionary sciences have 
taught us anything, it is that if A, that A sometimes evolves by means of natural 
selection, sometimes by drift, sometimes by symbiogenesis, sometimes by lateral 
gene transfer, sometimes due to external events in the abiotic world, sometimes 
just not at all, and most of the time through a combination of all the previous at 
different levels of an all but perfect agglomeration we humans call “organism.” 
The point is that how evolution occurs is conditional upon the parameters, and 
these are not stable. Another way of saying this is that it is a logical necessity, 
within an evolutionary worldview, to assume that the means by which change 
occurs themselves are variable through time, and what caused evolution in the past 
might neither set the conditions for the present, nor for the future. The direction-
ality we sometimes find in life is there because of historical reasons and might 
change in the future. It all depends upon the stability of the initial conditions, 
which themselves change in an evolving world.
Such a view does not at all call out for the end of science because “anything 
goes,” and it merely marks the beginning of a new epistemic stance, one that 
is characterized by epistemic plurality and the reconstruction of biorealities: 
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epistemic referential frameworks of life that describes the genealogy of natural 
kinds, biological individuals. And these genealogies lend insight into the underly-
ing mechanisms or heuristics, i.e., the specific conditions through which phenom-
ena originate, change, and end.
Both the micro- and macroperspectives have, from within their own set of ref-
erences, created new and inspiring referential frameworks, evolution according to 
genes, evolution according to environmental conditions. Others have developed 
evolutionary views according to lateral gene transfer, symbiogenesis, drift, phys-
ics, etc. The frameworks enable us to compare and as such approximate or corrob-
orate not one but multiple biological realities and provide a fuller understanding of 
just how it is that evolution comes about. And such work, most of all, is brought 
about through reconstructions of natural history.
It is no coincidence that both the micro- and macroperspectives reintroduce a 
notion of organicism, by revitalizing the dead and investigating their natural his-
tory, according to genetic shifts in populations over time, or according to external 
factors that define the conditions of change. It is a return to the natural history 
scholars’ epistemic framework, something which can only be celebrated.
5  Conclusion: Reintegrating History by Reconstructing 
Biorealities of the Dead
Patterns in the history of life have been suggesting for at least a half century that there are 
regularly occurring sets of conditions that seem to control evolutionary activity – dampen-
ing it, often for longer periods, and triggering often rapid evolution at other times. Like 
ecological succession, evolution produces, not isolated events, but repeated pattern which 
hold clues to how the process works – specifically, how the physical world of matter-in-
motion impacts the biological realm. (Eldredge 1998: 5)
What was the eclipse of Darwinism, really? Why it was one of the most illumi-
nating periods in the reconstruction of the natural history of life. It marks a time 
that coincides with the introduction of the genies: morphogenesis, ontogenesis, 
phylogenesis, monogenesis, polygenesis, heterogenesis, embryogenesis, epigen-
esis, spermatogenesis, somitogenesis, symbiogenesis, psychogenesis, anthropo-
genesis, biogenesis, abiogenesis, and so on. Any and all terms defined new fields 
that set out to narrate the natural history of various aspects of life, by giving the 
natural genealogy of the parts that make up the wholes and by reconstructing 
their generation and decay through space and time. But, alas, without cladistics at 
their disposal, and still too much inspired by their teleological worldviews, most 
of the researchers, with a fair exception of the symbiologists, endorsed a form of 
orthogenesis, a straight-line evolution toward a predefined end state. There is no 
scientific proof for any of the orthogenic claims that were ever made, and with 
the foundation of the Modern Synthesis, the genies turned into logies where nat-
ural selection was the underlying mechanism that was assumed to explain all. 
Subsequently, synchronization followed.
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Nonetheless, studies on the natural history of life remained an activity performed 
either in the margins or outside the Modern Synthesis. Scholars who studied symbio-
sis were one of the first to accept life’s multilinearity and multidimensionality. The 
theory of symbiogenesis, a term first coined by Merzhkowsky (1905, 1910), from 
its onset, has explained how multicellular life historically evolved through symbi-
otic mergings and has rejected a single common origin from its very beginning. Such 
symbiotic mergings, in a very real sense, entail a form of time travel, where the old 
can merge into the new, but the new can equally merge with the old. Reticulate evo-
lution brings forth multidirectionality and multidimensionality, concepts that also 
formed the hallmark of neo-Lamarckianism, and it defines studies on cytology, where 
scholars investigate the actual processes that occur in cellular life; ecology, which 
studies the natural and actual organism–organism and organism–environmental inter-
actions; embryology, which studies the actual developments of organisms; and pale-
ontology, which studies the actual natural history of species and higher taxa. All these 
fields are first and foremost historically and data driven rather than theory-driven 
sciences. Their scholars aim to explain real-life events and at present that implies a 
narration of past events much more so than it provides explanatory frameworks that 
point out their constant underlying conditions of change. Nonetheless, the patterns 
such researchers found can be applied and generalized outside their context of dis-
covery. Symbiogenesis, for example, is not a unique event in the history of eukary-
otic cells, it is a repeated mechanism whereby multiple life forms speciate (Brucker 
and Bordenstein 2013; Carrapiço and Rodrigues 2005; Carrapiço forthcoming; 
Gontier 2015). Scholars that associate with these fields are therefore increasingly 
calling out for a revision of the Modern Synthesis because their facts do not add up 
with the theorized claims of how life should evolve, while they can explain many 
real-life evolutionary events.
In contrast, the Modern Synthesis developed because of mathematical gen-
eralizations of theoretical rather than actual population genetics and how they 
behave in imaginary adaptive landscapes. Mathematics is also what enabled 
Neo-Darwinians to generalize and “universalize” natural selection theory to all 
domains of life, where prisoner dilemmas and other mathematical models enable 
theoretical scholars to model the evolution of life without so much as looking at its 
actual history. We must not forget that the Modern Synthesis itself was formulated 
before the genetic code was deciphered and before scholars could actually “see” 
or cladistically map the chemical structures and compounds that make up cells, 
organisms, and populations.
Either fields such as exobiology, cytology, epigenetics, paleontology, ecol-
ogy, and embryology were excluded from the general framework of the Modern 
Synthesis, or their theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence only accumu-
lated after the Modern Synthesis was formed. What unites all these diverse fields 
is that they have developed diverse techniques to enable better insight into the 
actual natural history that life has undergone and the various paths it has chosen. 
Large genome-sequencing techniques, proteomics, the viriome, the microbiome, 
metabolic pathways, behavior, and material culture, today, are studied phylogenet-
ically, by mapping their actual historical and geographical dispersals across space 
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and time. Equally, in fields such as biophysics, scholars are just beginning to map 
the natural history of the earth, by documenting the genealogy, the beginning, “life 
span,” and ending of chemical cycles such as the nitrogen and water cycle (Volk 
1995, 1998). Doolittle (1999, 2010) together with Dawkins one of the most fierce 
opponents of the Gaia hypothesis—that views our planet as a living organism with 
a beginning, life span, and ending in time—is now actively engaged in recon-
structing actual cell histories by understanding them as biological individuals. The 
work indeed is noble, but it nonetheless makes use of the same kind of reasoning 
that scholars such as Margulis and Lovelock (1974) used when they understood 
earth as a natural being.
We currently find ourselves in the midst of a return to natural history, and we 
have finally found the instrumental tools that enable to reconstruct the evolution-
ary lineages of the dead. These reconstructions together shed new light on the evo-
lution of the living. By decomposing the living into various sub- and superunits, 
and investigating the individual history of each and every one of them indepen-
dently, we have reached an age of epistemic plurality (Gontier 2010a). We can 
describe organisms based upon the evolution of their genes, their microbiome, 
their viriome, their morpho- or embryogenesis, etc. And together, that brings forth 
a better understanding of various and distinct biorealities.
Scholars associated with the extended synthesis are today proving that besides 
natural selection, the conditions of change that define other evolutionary mecha-
nisms can also be generalized toward other domains of life and applied beyond 
their original context of discovery. It is hard to think about evolutionary patterns 
without the mechanisms, the conditions of change, by which they are brought 
forth. Natural selection was mainly defined through the study of eukaryotic ani-
mal lineages and first focused on extant species in their natural habitat as well as 
extinct species as they present themselves in the fossil record. Today, when pos-
sible, comparative genetic research (as opposed to morphometric comparisons) 
lends insight into the exact ancestral–descendant relationships of animals in deep 
time, and as described above, natural selection has been “universalized” to non-
biological domains of life. Drift was first defined based upon research on the 
existence of neutral organismal traits (Darwin 1959). Later, it became defined in 
theoretical terms as a statistical property of theoretical population models, first at 
a molecular genetic level (Kimura 1968, 1976, 1983) and then at a species and 
above species as well as environmental level (Hubbel 2001). The mechanisms 
of hybridization (Arnold 2006) (divergence with gene flow or introgression) 
were mostly obtained from the study of plants and, albeit to a lesser extent, ani-
mals. Symbiogenesis (Wallin 1927; Kozo-Polyanski 1924; Margulis 1970, 1981) 
became defined based upon the study of organismal, symbiotic interactions as well 
as investigations into the evolutionary origins of the various organelles present 
in the eukaryotic cell. The mechanisms that underlie lateral gene transfer (trans-
formation, transduction, conjugation) were first obtained from studies into how 
prokaryotes, viruses, protozoa, and fungi underlie infection and disease in organ-
isms (Avery et al. 1944; Lederberg and Tatum 1946; Morse et al. 1956). Today, 
genealogical research enables generalizations of the underlying mechanisms to 
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all domains of life, because whole-genome analyses enable scholars to calculate 
the exact amounts of species-specific and alien (acquired) genes (Doolittle 1999, 
2010; Woese 1998). Both epigenetics and evo–devo investigate how evolution can 
be informed by specific post-genetic (e.g., post-translational changes in protein 
structures) and more general ontogenetically acquired characteristics (Jablonka 
and Lamb 1989).
The history of life is characterized by repeating patterns and trends. 
Evolutionary patterns are hard to describe without making reference to evolution-
ary theories that identify the pattern and seek out to explain the likelihoods or 
necessities by which it occurs. We are still very much in the dark about those con-
ditions, but scholars have made good progress in what regards recurring patterns.
Evolution appears to move across a horizontal, a vertical, and a reticulate axis. 
Not all life forms remain extant, and whole types and all individuals go extinct. 
Not all life forms remain constant. That is as basic as it gets. To give more pat-
terns, we need to refer to evolutionary theories such as natural selection, symbio-
genesis, and lateral gene transfer.
Conditions of change are by and large defined in terms of internal and exter-
nal, biotic and abiotic, and organismal and environmental parameters. The prin-
ciples of conditional change are defined in terms of evolutionary mechanisms. 
Evolutionary mechanisms in turn are theoretical generalizations, working hypoth-
esis on the natural history of various life strands through time. In other words, 
they are generalizations of how conditional change appears to have occurred in the 
past, and they can be tested for how well they are generalizable toward other phe-
nomena beyond their context of discovery.
Evolution by drift, for example, gives a random or non-directional pattern. The 
outcome of natural selection is vertical descent with modification, and the emerg-
ing pattern can be either unilineal or bifurcating. Symbiogenesis or LGT gives 
reticulate, multidirectional patterns of horizontal mergings.
Based upon how widespread and persistent the evolutionary mechanism is across 
lineages, the emerging pattern can be argued to be stable if not permanent in time. 
Selection will always lead to diversification, drift will always be random, and sym-
biogenesis or reticulate evolution in general will always involve mergings. If either 
pattern seizes to emerge in time, the mechanism seizes to be active, or better yet, the 
conditions for that particular kind of change are not met. Patterns are thus causally 
explained by referring to postulated parameters that define conditional change. And 
that is eventually what an evolutionary mechanism is, it is not a constant force.
Moreover, these reconstructions again necessitate us to acknowledge that truth 
need not be singular. At one point in time, eukaryotes evolved according to sym-
biogenesis, at another point in time, they did so by means of natural selection, and 
at yet another period in time, they evolved by drift. Most of the time, they do not 
evolve at all, and when they do, they evolve by a combination of these means, sim-
ply because the organisms themselves are compositional structures. As such, we 
also need to investigate whether there is some higher-order sorting of mechanisms, 
and what would define the parameters of such sorting.
Evolutionary mechanisms are theoretical frameworks that define the parame-
ters and conditions of change under well-defined circumstances. Genes evolve by 
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means of natural selection if certain conditions are met, and symbiogenesis and 
drift equally occurs when certain well-defined conditions are met. When these 
conditions are not met, life does not evolve according to that pattern. What we 
need to do is find the conditions of change.
Evolution is spontaneous, random, and selective, and species come into being 
through splitting and merging, which can occur slow or fast. We can use a lot of 
fancy words to say things differently, but that is basically it. These are the heuris-
tics or working hypotheses scholars have been working with, and the fancy words 
used to describe them imply a scientification of the problems. All have proven 
their use, in so far as all have been put into scientific theories and mathematical 
models that explain the data they aim to describe.
If time is relative because it is a measurement of movement of matter through 
space, and if how matter “moves” is variable, then it is more relative to repe-
tition of initial conditions and thus more uncertain. Most of all, these theories 
are awaiting an epistemic framework that enables us to deal with the multiple 
dimensions of the evolutionary biorealities they have opened, not in the least by 
an evolutionary reconceptualization of our notion of time. Never has a generation 
of natural history scholars been studying actual historical material phenomena in 
time and space without a solid concept of either. Time is a hallmark of evolution-
ary science. Without time, there would be no origin or evolution of life, where 
through time living organisms change. Nonetheless, as natural and real as time 
appears to us, much of how we conceptualize time is the result of sociocultural 
constructs.
For the ancient Greeks and the Vedic Indians, time was cyclical and repetitive. 
Earth, fire, water, wind, and void/aether, the periodic table avant la lettre, made 
up the micro-, meso-, and macrocosmos, which were considered embedded struc-
tures. Much like Russian dolls, they made up inanimate, animate, and divine mat-
ter (a fire hearth, language, and the God Prometheus, for example). These beings 
underwent generation and decay, but eventually, time was cyclical, because with-
out a second law of thermodynamics, the elements themselves did not undergo 
decay, but rather they kept their integrity which is why the world could cyclically 
start over and reincarnate. For the Vedic Indian as well as ancient Greek philoso-
phers, time is not real. Aristotle, for example, defined time in terms of the motion 
of matter, and this concept was also foundational for Newton and the whole of 
Western science. Although time is absolute, because space and matter are, time 
itself is a derivative of matter in motion, which is why we use different "calen-
dars" and time scales, such as geological time, sidereal or tropical zodiac time, or 
heat. Our switch from a geocentric to a heliocentric worldview did not affect our 
watches in any way. Nonetheless, if we or any other living species travel a couple 
of thousand miles, we most certainly experience a change in time, and biological 
individuals have evolved circadian rhythms that enable them to deal with them. 
Time, whatever it is, is most certainly real for the living.
Equally, an organismal body is made up of different moving elements, which 
each follows their own pace. The cells of our body form complex and differen-
tiated structures such as bones, vascular systems, organs, neurons, and a brain. 
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These structures as well as the cells and the genes they are composed of differ in 
how they occupy space and time. Your skin cells rejuvenate at a monthly basis. 
The cells undergo mitosis, and the older ones die. Every 6 weeks, your lung cells 
do the same. Your organelles and the genetic material they contain replicate and 
regenerate at different time intervals than the cell’s nucleus. All have a different 
life span, a different beginning, and ending in time. In so far as the structures that 
compose you have come into existence before, in previously existing generations, 
they are more constant in time than you. The compositional structure that is “you” 
only exists once in so far as your specific compositions never come into exist-
ence twice. You have a clear beginning, life span, and ending in time. But it takes 
numerous generations of living cells to repeat the structures that form your exist-
ence over a longer period in time. Equally, it takes a couple of days before all cells 
that make up your body die, and the microbial communities that inhabit you live 
on for quite some time.
Current research is evolutionizing all. We are evolving toward a recognition of 
the existence of multiple units, levels, mechanisms, and kinds of evolution, and 
it is the challenge of our and future generations to investigate how they together 
make up the multilinear and multidimensional biological realities that have 
evolved (Gontier 2010a).
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rise of species, mass extinctions, and evolutionary trends. Microevolution describes 
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over short time periods. The separation of the two processes is somewhat arbitrary 
however,  as macroevolution is the accumulation of a number of microevolutionary 
changes leading over time to large-scale changes. As a consequence, understanding 
macroevolution requires understanding microevolutionary processes. In this chap-
ter we discuss this link between macro- and micro-evolution using the example of 
the evolution of sexual reproduction. Explaining the evolution of sexual reproduc-
tion is one of the most puzzling problems in evolutionary biology and despite ongo-
ing research a general explanation for the evolution and maintenance of sex has not 
yet been widely confirmed. Sexual reproduction has been suggested to have evolved 
only once from asexual reproduction during the early stages of the eukaryote evolu-
tion. Today, we find that almost all animals and plants reproduce sexually rather than 
asexually, suggesting that sex is advantageous. There are, however, exemptions from 
the macroevolutionary observation of the ubiquity of sexual reproduction: asexual 
taxa are found across almost the whole phylogenetic tree in a twig-like pattern, and 
these asexual taxa are found in habitats where related sexual taxa are often absent. 
The evolution of sex, with all its superlatives such as ‘the queen of evolutionary 
problems’ and the ‘evolutionary scandals’ of the ancient asexuals, is probably one of 
the fields in evolutionary biology, where already early on macroevolutionary patterns 
were directly related to microevolutionary processes. Examples of the literature are 
reviewed here with an emphasis on the link between macro- and microevolution.
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1  Sexual Versus Asexual Reproduction: The Big Mystery
Going back in evolutionary history, all taxa reproduced asexually. This probably 
changed  around the time of the evolution of eukaryotes  when sexual reproduc-
tion originated and became the dominant mode of reproduction (Cavalier-Smith 
2002). Today, the vast majority of eukaryotes reproduce sexually, suggesting that 
sexual reproduction has a fitness advantage over asexual reproduction (Williams 
1975; Smith 1978; Bell 1982). Asexuals among eukaryotes are few and tend to 
have a twig-like phylogenetic distribution: out of all ~42.000 vertebrates, there are 
only 74 asexual species described, and in some classes, as for example in birds 
and mammals, asexuals are absent. 20 % of fungi, less than 1 % of seed plants 
and ~10 % of ferns are asexual. Interestingly, these asexual taxa are often found 
in habitats where sexual-related taxa are not found: asexual reproduction is found 
in variable and unpredictable habitats, e.g., high altitudes and latitudes, xeric con-
ditions and islands in contrast to sexual reproduction, which is more often asso-
ciated with less variable habitats (Suomalainen 1950; Ghiselin 1974; Williams 
1975; Glesener and Tilman 1978; Bell 1982). We discuss below mechanisms and 
processes, related to microevolution, that may create these patterns and how they 
might be used to explain the origin and maintenance of sex.
Before we start discussing the macroevolutionary observations and their connec-
tion to microevolutionary processes, we need to define what we mean by sexual and 
asexual reproduction as these terms are used differently throughout the literature and 
various intermediate modes exist combining aspects of asexual and sexual reproduc-
tion. Here, we use sexual reproduction (hereafter sex or sexuals) only when there 
is true sex including meiosis, syngamy (i.e., gamete fusion from different parents), 
followed by zygote formation and embryogenesis, resulting in a new generation con-
taining a unique mix of parental genes (amphimixis and outcrossing). In our defi-
nition of sex, we therefore include  two steps: segregation and/or recombination of 
alleles at each locus and the combination of genome information from two different 
parents. Automixis (or ‘selfing’) is a common mode of reproduction and represents 
a special case of sexual reproduction. Similar to amphimixis, meiosis and gamete 
fusion occurs, but both gametes come from the same individual (also referred to as 
uniparental sex) with differences in genetic and demographic consequences com-
pared to amphimixis. In contrast, we  refer to asexual reproduction (hereafter asex 
or asexuals) when meiotic divisions are absent or repressed (apomixis). While this 
distinction is probably true for many animals and plants as they are obligatory sexual 
(or asexual), there are other taxa that are able to switch between sexual and asex-
ual reproduction (facultatively sexual). We exclude in our discussion parasexual 
mechanisms (or asymmetric sex) such as gene exchange in, e.g., bacteria through 
plasmid conjugation, transduction (exchange of genetic material mediated via phage 
or virus) and transformation (uptake of DNA from the environment), which usu-
ally do not result in reproduction. Our definition of sex and asex is thus focused on 
eukaryotes and reproduction. In the rest of this chapter, we  refer to obligate sexuals 
(amphimixis) and obligate asexuals (apomixis) when not stated differently.
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Sexual and asexual reproduction differ in respect of the cellular processes that 
are involved as well as  their genetic consequences. Understanding these differ-
ences and the role they play in the shift from asexual to sexual reproduction in 
eukaryotes as well as the maintenance of sex (or less often asex) has proven to 
be difficult (Agrawal 2006; Otto 2009; Hartfield and Keightley 2012). This 
leaves us in the situation where we have some clear observations (e.g., that sex 
is dominant among eukaryotes), but no conclusive explanation general enough to 
explain these observations. Figure 1 shows the fundamental differences in terms 
of changes in ploidy levels, the cellular processes involved in sexual and asexual 
reproduction, and also indicates  some further major distinctions between the two 
modes of reproduction. Asexual reproduction always produces clones through 
mitotic divisions, where the level of ploidy (number of chromosome sets, usu-
ally haploid or diploid, as well as polyploid) does not change between genera-
tions. In an asexually reproducing population, each individual produces offspring. 
Daughters are genetically identical to their mother, inheriting her unrecombined 
genome (with a low level of potential mutations) without changes of intra- and 
interlocus interactions (dominance and epistasis). This means any level of zygo-
sity (which describes the genotype of a diploid organism at a single locus on the 
DNA; homozygosity and heterozygosity) is maintained in diploids and loci are in 
complete linkage (a measure for the association of alleles at two or more loci on 
a chromosome). Mutations are the only source of novelty with asexual reproduc-
tion. In contrast, sexual reproduction always involves meiosis, a reduction divi-
sion causing a halved level of ploidy, which is restored by syngamy. In a sexually 
reproducing population, males and females are produced (or two different mating 
Fig. 1  Difference between asexual reproduction and sexual reproduction. Asexual reproduction 
(a) and sexual reproduction (b) differ in the cellular processes involved (mitosis, meiosis, syn-
gamy) and whether the level of ploidy changes. Asexual reproduction: no change (stays haploid 
or diploid); sexual reproduction: alternation of diploid and haploid phase through meiosis and 
syngamy. Some sexual taxa stay in the haploid phase for most of their life cycle (e.g., the green 
alga Chlamydomonas reinhardtii), while others are most of their life at the diploid state (e.g., 
humans)
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types) and sexually produced offspring are genetically different from their parents, 
getting half of their genome from one, the other half frowm the other parent (for 
automixis both gametes are produced by the same individual). With sexual repro-
duction novelty can be gained by creating new intra- and interloci associations 
through recombination and segregation (however, this is only true, when the moth-
er’s and father’s genomes differ). A disadvantage is that with sexual reproduction, 
only half of the genome is passed on to the next generation (the so-called cost of 
meiosis (c.f., Lehtonen et al. 2012)).
If one difference between sex and asex is genetic mixing at the genetic level 
(through recombination and segregation) and the majority of eukaryotes reproduce 
sexually, can we than assume that sex is the dominant mode of reproduction because 
mixing is advantageous as it increases genetic variation? ‘Depends,’ as shuffling the 
genome can be detrimental or beneficial (Fig. 2). If for example previous rounds of 
selection created high-fitness genotypes, breaking up these advantageous gene asso-
ciations through sex can result in low-fitness genotypes of the offspring (Lynch and 
Deng 1994; Pfrender and Lynch 2000) (Fig. 2b). This ‘sex load’ (or ‘recombination 
load’) has been demonstrated for example in facultative sexual rotifer populations 
(monogonont rotifers are cyclic parthenogens, switching between asexual and sex-
ual reproduction) that were well adapted to two different conditions in the labora-
tory (Becks and Agrawal 2012). Sexually produced offspring in these populations 
had  average fitness levels  up to 3 times lower  than that of asexually produced off-
spring. On the other hand, creating new genetic associations might be beneficial by 
increasing genetic variation, thus giving natural selection the possibility to be more 
effective (Fig. 2a). For example sex can  combine beneficial alleles that arose inde-
pendently in different genetic backgrounds through mutations and create new high-
fitness genotypes (Fisher 1930 (reprinted by Dover, 1958); Muller 1932). These 
high-fitness genotypes will initially be  rare, but increase disproportionally over 
time. In the same rotifer study mentioned above (Becks and Agrawal 2012), but in 
populations that adapted to novel environmental conditions, sexual reproduction did 
result  in higher variance of fitness compared to asexual reproduction. Sex produced 
significantly more high-fitness genotypes whereas asexuals had a lower potential to 
adapt to environmental changes, resulting in a 1.5 times higher fitness of sexuals. 
This and other studies (Wolf et al. 1987; DaSilva and Bell 1996; Colegrave et al. 
2002; Kaltz and Bell 2002) suggest that sex might be beneficial in changing environ-
ments where populations have to adapt to novel conditions. Note that our discus-
sion here and in the rest of this chapter is on variation at the genetic level, and not 
the genomic level (e.g., variation in ploidy level). For the latter, Gorelick and Heng 
(2011) argue that sexual reproduction reduces genetic variation (always restores the 
level of ploidy).
Does this mean that asexual reproduction is better in constant environments? 
Probably not, as the absence of genetic mixing eventually results in the accumu-
lation of deleterious mutations. Assuming a finite population and no back muta-
tion, a fitness decline is irreversible without sex and the lack of purging deleterious 
mutations will eventually lead to extinction of the population through clonal decay 
(Muller 1964). Evidence for higher number of mutations accumulating in 
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asexuals (also referred to as Muller’s Ratchet) is not clear; many studies dem-
onstrated results confirming lower rates of mutation accumulation with genetic 
mixing (Normark and Moran 2000; Bruggeman et al. 2003; Paland and Lynch 
2006). Other studies, however, failed to find such correlations between mutation 
accumulation and genetic mixing (e.g., Cutter and Payseur 2003). It appears that 
measuring and comparing the accumulation of deleterious mutations is difficult. 
One reason is probably that genotypes with deleterious mutations are too quickly 
removed from natural populations to be found in studies. Furthermore, even 
small amounts of sex (i.e., rare or unconventional meiosis) might be enough to 
Fig. 2  Genetic effects of sexual (a, b) and asexual (c) reproduction shown for a population 
consisting of individuals (represented by two horizontal lines) carrying different combinations 
of beneficial (black diamonds) and deleterious mutations (gray diamonds). Distributions of indi-
viduals before and after reproduction are shown below a fitness curve: lower fitness at the left 
end and higher fitness at the right end of the curve. a The population reproduced sexually and 
the next generation (below the arrow) consist of individuals with new genetic associations due to 
recombination and segregation. Because the initial population has negative genetic associations 
(beneficial and deleterious mutations are more often found together than expected by chance), the 
new generation has a higher fitness variance than the parent generation (i.e., a greater distribution 
under fitness curve). In particular, sex results in high-fitness genotypes. In b the initial population 
has positive genetic associations (beneficial are more often found together with beneficial muta-
tions and deleterious with deleterious mutations) and reproducing sexually will create an excess 
of the intermediate types, lowering the variance (the high- and low-fitness genotypes are lost). 
c No change in the genetic associations occurs with asexual reproduction. Figure modified from 
(Roze 2012)
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eliminate high numbers of mutations (Charlesworth et al. 1993; Som and Reyer 
2007). However, for many taxa that are currently considered to be asexual, the 
cellular mechanisms during reproduction and thus the genomic consequences are 
unknown. More studies aiming to discover the exact mechanisms will hopefully 
help to identify the extent and role of clonal decay in asexuals.
Is sex  the better strategy in stable and varying environments because it pre-
vents clonal decay? Most often not, as sex is costly in terms of sex load (see 
above) and other costs. Based on the notion that in asexually reproducing popula-
tions every individual (female) produces offspring and that in sexual population 
only half as many offspring per individual are produced (as males do not contrib-
ute to population growth), an asexually reproducing clone would outcompete and 
replace sexuals within a few generations (Smith 1978). Sexual reproduction pays 
this so-called twofold cost of males however only when we can make the assump-
tion that everything else is equal besides the reproduction mode (i.e., the number 
of offspring produced per sexual and asexual female is equal and there is no other 
phenotypic difference between sexually and asexually produced offspring), males 
only contribute half of their genome and no other resources, and the population 
is outbred. The all-else-being-equal assumption for the twofold cost of sex makes 
it difficult to provide evidence for. Support comes from an experiment by Stelzer 
(2011) with obligate parthenogenetic and facultative parthenogenetic rotifers with 
the same genetic backgrounds (being ‘equal’). In this experiment, the obligate 
asexuals outcompeted and successfully invaded a population of cyclic partheno-
genes within a few generations (Stelzer 2011). While the genetic background of 
sexuals and asexuals was equal in these experiments, sexually and asexually pro-
duced offspring differed in at least one important way: sexual reproduction results 
in the formation of resting eggs from which new females hatch with some delay. 
Under the experimental conditions, sexually produced offspring did not hatch 
from these eggs and thus did not contribute to the population growth. Here, sexu-
ally reproducing individuals had to pay an even larger cost: producing males and 
resting eggs (note that the formation of resting eggs is essential for the survival 
of the species in nature as this is how they overwinter). Comparing population 
growth rates of obligate sexual and related obligate asexual snails (Potamopyrgus 
antipodarum) showed that the asexual snails indeed grew  faster than their sexual 
counterparts (Jokela et al. 1997) but sexual and asexual snails differed in many 
other ways. Other studies failed to find differences in growth rates between sex-
ual and asexuals (Kumpulainen et al. 2004). Besides these obvious demographic 
and genetic effects of sexual and asexual reproduction, other ‘costs’ of sex have 
been identified (Lehtonen et al. 2012). Sex is costly for example in terms of 
time needed to complete a sexual cycle compared to an asexual cycle. Sex can 
also be costly in terms of energy and risks (predation, transmission of diseases) 
and the highest cost obligate sexuals have to pay is when they do not find a mate. 
Although  sexuals and asexuals  probably always differ in some respect (besides 
the genetic mixing and the production of males), it is clear that the demographic 
differences and the other costs of sex might play a major role for the outcome of 
competition between sexuals and asexuals.
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To summarize, sexual and asexual reproduction differ in many ways. Sex seems 
to be in most situations a bad choice, considering the immediate demographic 
and potential genetic costs. At the same time, sex might provide an opportunity to 
deal with long-term consequences such as eliminating deleterious mutations and a 
higher adaptability under changing conditions. The opposite seems to be the case 
when looking at asexual reproduction: asexuals have a higher extinction risk due 
to accumulations of deleterious mutations and clonal decay, as well as a lack of 
potential for adaptation to novel environmental conditions and speciation due to 
limited novelty. On shorter time scales, asexual reproduction appears to provide a 
clear demographic advantage. Most of the differences between sexual and asexual 
reproduction described above have effects on a microevolutionary scale  (evolution 
within populations) and probably require  population genetic explanations. How 
can we link these microevolutionary processes to observations on the macroevolu-
tionary scale, i.e., between species and on a phylogenetic scale?
2  Phylogenetic Distribution
One of the macroevolutionary observations for the evolution of sex is its ori-
gin. Smith and Szathmary (1995) suggest in their book ‘The major transitions in 
Evolution’ several different stages for the evolution of eukaryotic sex: the evolu-
tion of a haploid–diploid cycle with endomitosis (mitosis taking place without 
dissolution of the nuclear membrane, and not followed by cytoplasmic division, 
resulting in doubling of the number of chromosomes within the nucleus), then a 
one-step meiosis followed by syngamy, and finally sex with syngamy and a two-
step meiosis. One hypothesis for the origin of sex and this series of (micro-) evo-
lutionary changes is based on the idea that sex increases fitness directly through 
DNA repair. Using an undamaged copy of the gene as a template, damaged dou-
ble-stranded DNA can be repaired and the genome regenerated (Bernstein et al. 
1985; Bernstein et al. 1987). Whilst appealing, this hypothesis does not necessar-
ily apply to asexual diploids or polyploids. They already carry  two or more copies 
of each gene (Otto and Lenormand 2002), and the evidence from experiments with 
prokaryotes provides only weak support for the DNA repair hypothesis (Redfield 
1993; Engelmoer and Rozen 2011). However, conclusive evidence is still want-
ing for or against this hypothesis (see also the discussion in Smith and Szathmary 
1995; Gorelick and Heng 2011).
Another direct hypothesis for sex is the transposable element mechanism, which 
suggest that sex facilitates transmission of selfish genes (Hickey 1982) that integrate 
randomly and often as several copies into the genome, potentially affecting the func-
tion of genes (e.g., Doolittle and Sapienza 1980; Finnegan 1989, 1992; McDonald 
1993). Sex results in mixing of genes, thus allowing transposable elements to 
spread throughout the population while the ‘selfish’ transposable elements will be 
eliminated by selection in asexuals. At the same time, the host benefits from sexual 
reproduction by eliminating deleterious mutations/changes caused by the random 
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integration of the elements. Hickey (1982) was the first to suggest that transposable 
elements drove the evolution of sex (origin) of their hosts. Evidence for this comes 
for example from screens for transposable elements across animal phyla (Arkhipova 
and Meselson 2000). While transposable elements were present in all tested sexual 
taxa, they could not be found in bdelloid rotifers, for which meiosis has not been 
described and are considered to be ancient asexuals (Hsu 1956; Welch and Meselson 
2000). On the contrary, transposable elements have been found in higher numbers in 
mitotic parthenogenetic nematodes compared to their sexual relatives (Castagnone-
Sereno and Danchin 2014). Here, the high number of transposable elements has 
been suggested to be beneficial as transposable elements allow overcoming the low 
adaptability of asexuals. However, it is not currently clear what role transposable 
elements have played in the origin of sexual reproduction.
The evolution back to asexual reproduction occurred several times indepen-
dently (Fig. 3). There are several potential mechanisms for the origin of asexu-
ality in eukaryotes. Asexual reproduction can result from disruption and/or 
rearrangement of genomes through hybridization (Vellend et al. 2007), deleterious 
mutations (Simon et al. 2003), or symbiotic microorganisms such as Wolbachia 
(Koivisto and Braig 2003). The shifts back to asexual reproduction must have 
happened recently, as the asexual taxa we find today usually have  short lineages 
and are at the terminal branches in the tree of life, and they are also rare. The 
small number of asexual taxa appear to be young, not older than the Pleistocene 
(Williams 1975; Smith 1978; Bell 1982; Moritz and Heideman 1993; Howard 
and Lively 1998; Johnson and Bragg 1999; Pongratz et al. 2003), except for some 
‘ancient asexuals’. Ancient asexuals are defined to be without sex for more than 
500,000 generations (Agren and Ericson 1996) and have been called an evolution-
ary scandal as they should not exist. Microevolutionary mechanisms (clonal decay 
and low adaptability of asexuals) can explain the young age of asexuals, point-
ing to the benefits of sexual reproduction. An important observation that supports 
the idea that sex prevents clonal decay and/or increases adaptability comes from 
recent studies on asexuals. Studying the genomics of ancient asexuals has revealed 
that they evolved different ways to avoid clonal decay, for example, through 
increased ploidy and higher number of gene copies  (Welch and Meselson 2000) 
and horizontal gene transfer (Flot et al. 2013).
These patterns are intriguing and have often been discussed as a means of 
understanding the evolutionary mystery of the evolution of sex. Looking at  evo-
lutionary history and  phylogenetic distribution, we see the large-scale pattern of 
sexual reproduction being almost ubiquitous among eukaryotes. Both processes, 
from asex to sex either due to transposable elements or the repair mechanism and 
back to asexual reproduction are evolutionary processes within populations and 
thus on microevolutionary scales. In recent years, alternative microevolutionary 
explanations have been postulated for the phylogenetic distribution of asexuals 
(Janko et al. 2008; Neiman et al. 2009; Schwander and Crespi 2009; Janko et al. 
2011). These do not use higher extinction rates of asexuals due to mutational melt-
down or low adaptability to explain the young age of asexuals but rather (i) low 
transition rates from sexuals to asexuals, (ii) asexual lineage turnover (i.e., parental 
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sexual species continuously generate asexual lineages that replace older asexual 
lineages) and (iii)  the fact that asexuals are often found in harsh environments and 
are more prone to become extinct in these environments (Fig. 3). Support for the 
traditional view (clonal decay, low adaptability)  comes from studies that showed 
the accumulation of deleterious mutations with negative fitness effects in obligate 
asexual populations (Neiman et al. 2010; Henry et al. 2012). There is however 
also some evidence supporting alternative explanations. For example the asexual 
linage turnover hypothesis predicts that younger asexual lineages should be geo-
graphically closer to sexual lineages (Neiman et al. 2009; Schwander and Crespi 
2009) and several studies support this prediction (Quattro et al. 1991; Law and 
Crespi 2002; Johnson 2006). As there are quantitative differences for the predic-
tions made by the different models (clonal turnover and clonal decay), future work 
using phylogenetic and genomic data could help to identify the underlying reason 
Fig. 3  Schematic of the twig-like distribution and young age of asexual lineages (a) and the sug-
gested (micro)-evolutionary mechanism creating this distribution shown on adaptive landscapes 
(b–c). The potential underlying mechanisms are depicted on an adaptive landscape with fitness as 
a function of two different phenotypic traits (right) in a) and the differences in fitness indicated 
by different shades of gray representing higher fitness. Populations are shown as s (sexual) and a 
(asexual), and subscripts indicate changes over time. Initially, only one fitness peak is occupied. 
a Asexual lineages (gray dashed lines) evolved independently several times from sexual ances-
tors (black lines) and got eventually extinct (wide gray dashed line). b The traditional view is that 
the young age of asexuals results from clonal decay and thus high extinction rates. Over time, the 
accumulation of deleterious mutations moves the population from a fitness peak till the popu-
lation goes extinct. Alternative hypothesis explain the young age and twig-like distribution of 
asexuals with c low transition rates from sexual to asexual reproduction: The open fitness peak is 
more likely to be occupied by a sexual species (s, wide arrow) than by an asexual species (a, nar-
row arrow). d A high lineage turnover of asexuals results in young ages of asexuals, because new 
asexual lineages (a2) are recurrently created from related sexuals and the new lineages replace 
already existing asexual lineages (a1) that got extinct by chance
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and microevolutionary mechanisms for the macroevolutionary observation of the 
distribution of asexuals and sexuals.
3  Geographic Distribution
Another important macroevolutionary observation is the fact that asexual taxa are 
often found in habitats where related sexual taxa are missing. The term geographic 
parthenogenesis was introduced by Vandel (1928) and the general phylogeo-
graphic pattern has been described by several authors and for different taxonomic 
groups (Bell 1982; Bierzychudek 1985; Kearney 2003; van Dijk 2003; Haag and 
Ebert 2004; Hörandl 2009): Asexuals have a larger distributional range compared 
to sexuals, while asexuals tend to range to higher latitudes and altitudes, and asex-
uals tend to colonize previously glaciated and devastated areas. As with the phy-
logenetic pattern of asexuals, there are several microevolutionary explanations for 
these patterns (Fig. 4).
Geographic parthenogenesis seems to support the theories for the maintenance 
of sex that are based on species interactions and density dependency (see sect. 
4 below). Species interactions are thought to be less and weaker in extreme envi-
ronments such as higher altitudes and latitudes where sexuals are often missing. 
The absence of sexuals might result from the fact that costs of sex are not balanced 
when for example coevolving parasites are missing in the extreme habitats, sug-
gesting that the benefits of sex derive from species interactions. Such mechanisms 
might be in action during interactions between antagonistic species such as host–
parasite interactions (Hamilton 1980). The “Red Queen” hypothesis (Bell 1982), 
one of the most prominent models, suggests that species must constantly run away 
from coevolving parasites to keep their fitness constant. Coevolution of species 
imposes negative frequency-dependent selection, which can drive the evolution 
of sex (Jaenike 1978; Hamilton 1980). Hosts involved in coevolutionary interac-
tions with parasites benefit from sexual reproduction by producing genetically het-
erogeneous offspring (e.g., Decaestecker et al. 2007; Morran et al. 2011). This is 
advantageous because rare genotypes might be resistant to the common parasite 
genotype. Consequently, the parasites are under selective pressure to overcome the 
common resistance strategies. Other explanations for the lack of sexuals in more 
extreme habitats are based on the differences in the costs of sex, which are consid-
ered to be greater in more variable habitats. The twofold cost of sex resulting from 
producing males may be reduced in constant environments such as low altitudes 
and latitudes. These stable environments might favor slower development, greater 
competitive ability, delayed reproduction, higher survival rates, and lower resource 
thresholds leading to efficiency. More variable environments such as high altitude 
and latitude habitats might favor rapid development, higher maximal growth rates, 
lower survival rates, and early reproduction leading to productivity. Because off-
spring quantity is relatively less important than offspring quality in stable environ-
ments than in more variable habitats, several authors have argued that the cost of 
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Fig. 4  Schematic of the geographic parthenogenesis (top panel) and (micro)-evolutionary pro-
cesses (bottom panel) that have been suggested explaining the distribution of asexuals, which 
tend to inhabit extreme habitats, e.g., high altitudes and sexuals, which are often missing in the 
extreme habitats. Traditional explanations link the geographic distribution to benefits and costs 
of sex: sex can provide an advantage when coevolving with other species, e.g., parasites and 
because species interactions are less/weaker in extreme habitats, the costs of sex are not balanced 
under these conditions. Because the costs of sex are more easily balanced in stable habitats (here 
low altitudes), sexuals are less often found in the unstable high altitude habitats. Other explana-
tions (reproduction mode independent)  are based on higher levels of polyploidy and hybridiza-
tion and the time after deglaciation (see text)
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sex is reduced in stable environments or that the reproductive costs of sex can be 
more easily balanced by increases in quality, which have greater selective value 
(Abugov 1986; Lomnicki 2001; Doncaster et al. 2003; Olofsson and Lundberg 
2007; Lively 2010). Similarly, other costs of sex, such as the longer time needed 
for completion of a sexual cycle, are most likely reduced in stable environments.
On the other hand, these explanations may be incorrect or even unnecessary. 
The observation that asexuals live in a boarder range of habitats might be inde-
pendent from the benefits and costs of sexual reproduction but rather the result 
of higher ploidy and rates of hybridization found in these habitats. For example 
polyploidy in animals shows  a similar pattern to the geographic parthenogene-
sis (Dufresne and Hebert 1995; Barata et al. 1996) and this factor may underlay 
the real reason for this pattern as higher ploidy often results in higher tolerances 
to environmental stressors compared to the diploid ancestors (e.g., Levin 1983). 
Kearny (2005) puts forward a similar argument. Hybrid advantages in new and 
open environments could be the primary reason for the geographic parthenogene-
sis (hybridization often involves a shift to asexual reproduction (Mallet 2007)) and 
asexual reproduction could play an important role in stabilizing selected hybrid 
genotypes (Kearney and Shine 2004). Because asexual reproduction is uniparen-
tal, it has also been suggested that the lower cost of dispersal of asexuals might 
explain their larger range . One asexual individual should be sufficient in theory to 
start a new population while one female and one male would be needed in sexuals 
(Baker and Stebbins 1965; van Dijk 2007; Hörandl 2008). The single individual 
advantage of asexuals would also apply to hermaphrodites (and facultative sexu-
als) but there is no evidence that hermaphrodites follow the pattern of geographic 
parthenogenesis. It has also been argued that asexuals can maintain heterozygo-
sity of founder population while heterozygosity would be lost with every round 
of sexual reproduction (Beukeboom and Vrijenhoek 1998). Geographic parthe-
nogenesis has also been linked to deglaciation. Because the ice retracted more 
recently from high altitude and latitude habitats and asexuals have lower dispersal 
costs, they might inhabit these areas faster, but might be replaced by sexuals in 
the future. Evidence for alternative explanations of the geographic parthenogen-
esis such as higher ploidy and/or hybridization (see references in Kearney 2003; 
Haag and Ebert 2004; Hörandl 2009) has been presented. Overall, the explanations 
dependent or independent of the consequences of sex consider microevolutionary 
processes and dynamics. From the different mechanisms discussed in this section, 
there is presently no clear proof, and future work testing the different mechanisms 
is needed.
4  The Maintenance of Sex
The maintenance of sex is another observation at the macroevolutionary level 
where in order to undrestand it, we need to look into microevolutionary mecha-
nisms to understand this observation. The question, why sexual populations or 
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taxa are not invaded and replaced by asexual taxa when sex comes at high costs is 
one of the central questions in the field on the evolution of sex. An enormous body 
of studies have presented various theoretical models and hypotheses. Most modern 
theories for the maintenance of sex are based on benefits of genetic mixing for 
the individual rather than for a group as some of the earlier explanations relied 
on. Intriguingly, all suggested theories depend on microevolutionary mechanisms, 
i.e., changes in allele or genotype frequencies within a population. Because sex 
affects genetic associations and it can be both beneficial and detrimental (see 1), 
it is necessary to find the conditions which constantly create genetic associations, 
and the conditions under which it is beneficial to break such associations apart. 
Most theories assume that the investment into sex is determined by a so-called 
modifier locus which determines the investment into sexual or asexual reproduc-
tion but has no direct effect on fitness (Nei 1967). Under this assumption, selection 
for (more) sex cannot work directly on the modifier and changes in the modifier 
frequencies are the result of hitchhiking with alleles at other loci that are posi-
tively selected; i.e., the fitness gain is greater than the costs of sex. Early theories 
suggested indirect advantages of sex because sex increases variability, which is 
required for selection (Weismann 1889, 1904), later confirmed by mathematical 
models (Felsenstein 1965, 1974; Smith 1988; Charlesworth 1993). Further pro-
gress revealed that genetic mixing does not always increase genetic variability, and 
when it does, it is not necessarily advantageous (Kondrashov 1993; Otto 2009). 
For sex to be beneficial in terms of increased genetic variation, the genetic associa-
tions need to be negative (negative linkage disequilibrium, LD) prior to sex such 
that beneficial and detrimental alleles are more often found together than expected 
by chance. In this case, breaking apart the associations will allow selection to act 
more efficiently in removing deleterious mutations (Mullers Ratchet) and/or cre-
ating beneficial gene combinations (Muller Fisher hypothesis; e.g., Fig. 2a). Two 
main forces, drift (stochastic changes in allele frequencies due to nonheritable 
variation in offspring number) and epistasis (intralocus interactions), can gener-
ate such associations (Felsenstein 1965, 1974; Kondrashov 1992). In presence of 
directional selection, drift can maintain negative LD in the population (stochastic 
effect). Negative epistasis also creates negative LD by creating a negative curva-
ture in the fitness function (deterministic effects) (de Visser and Elena 2007; Otto 
2009). The Fisher–Muller hypothesis, Muller’s Ratchet (see 1, Fig. 3), and Hill–
Robertson interference rely on drift coupled with directional selection to create 
negative associations and therefore benefits to sex by breaking up these associa-
tions. The Hill-Robertson model (Hill and Robertson 1966) shows that selection 
on one locus can interfere with selection on a second locus assuming linkage 
between the loci in a finite population.
Other hypotheses consider varying selection over time or space (Otto 2009). 
With constant change in the environment over time, previous genetic associa-
tions become unfavorable and breaking these associations down is beneficial 
(Salathe et al. 2009). However, for sex to be maintained under these conditions, 
fluctuations in epistasis should be high (Peters and Lively 1999; Gandon and Otto 
2007; Peters and Lively 2007; Otto 2009). Such mechanisms might be in action 
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during interactions between antagonistic species such as host–parasite interactions 
(Hamilton 1980; Bell 1982; Hamilton et al. 1990). Similarly, when selection varies 
over space through migration, the genetic associations may be unfavorable in the 
new environment and need to be broken down. In a spatially heterogeneous envi-
ronment, sex will immediately increase the fitness of offspring (short-term benefit) 
and should be selected for (Pylkov et al. 1998; Agrawal 2009).
Previous empirical studies have, either directly or indirectly, tested the dif-
ferent conditions under which sex can be maintained. Most of these studies fall 
into one of the three general categories of correlative approaches, short- and long-
term effects, and experimental evolution studies. All of these approaches have in 
common that they test microevolutionary mechanisms. The first group includes 
studies that correlate reproductive modes (sexual or asexual, selfing or outcross-
ing, recombinant or non-recombinant) with mutation accumulation (Normark and 
Moran 2000; Bruggeman et al. 2003; Cutter and Payseur 2003; Paland and Lynch 
2006), or parasite/pathogen prevalence (Lively 1987; Jokela and Lively 1995; 
Killick et al. 2006; King et al. 2009; Elzinga et al. 2012; Verhoeven and Biere 
2013). Empirical tests showed for example correlations between the prevalence of 
sex and the presence of parasites or pathogens, in line with the Red Queen hypoth-
esis. One important study system examined in the recent years is the common 
freshwater snail Potamopyrgus antipodarum where phenotypically similar sexual 
and asexual forms coexist, allowing comparisons between sexuals and asexuals 
(Lively et al. 1998; Koskella and Lively 2009). In one study, King et al. (2009) 
cross-infected snails collected from shallow and deep water habitats with sympa-
tric and allopatric parasites. They found evidence of local adaptation to parasites 
and showed that shallow waters are coevolutionary ‘hot spots.’ Most importantly, 
sexuals are more common in these ‘hot spots’ in comparison with the coevolution-
ary ‘cold spots’ where asexuals dominate. Again, other studies failed to show such 
correlations (Killick et al. 2006; Elzinga et al. 2012). In general, these kinds of 
studies are important because they inform us about some of the consequences of 
sexual and asexual reproduction even though they are not testing the microevolu-
tionary mechanisms that maintain sex.
The second category includes studies that compare mean fitness and vari-
ance of fitness of sexually and asexually derived offspring to test for short- and 
long-term effects of sex (Barton 1995; Agrawal 2006). Since Nick Barton pub-
lished his landmark paper on short- and long-term effects of sexual reproduction, 
it has become clear that the different theories for sex can be studied under this 
common population genetic framework. Both short- and long-term effects result 
from breaking up allele associations built by previous selection. In the presence of 
non-additive gene interactions (dominance or epistasis), sexual reproduction will 
have an immediate effect on the offspring (the mean fitness of the offspring). For 
example if selection favors  heterozygotes, we will end up with an excess of het-
erozygotes. Sex will create less fit homozygotes and thus the average fitness of 
sexually produced offspring will be lower than that of the parents and asexually 
derived offspring. Whether sex has a long-term advantage, i.e., whether sex creates 
variation for selection to act on depends on the type of linkage disequilibrium. The 
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balance between the sum of short- and long-term effects and the costs of sex deter-
mines whether sex is beneficial or not. Experimentally, we can measure short-term 
effects of sex by comparing the mean fitness of the sexual and asexually produced 
offspring when we can assume mating is random in the population. Comparing 
the variance in fitness between the two offspring types will give us the long-term 
effects of sex (Agrawal 2006). Several studies measured the effects of sex on 
adaptation over several generations (Zeyl and Bell 1997; Colegrave 2002; Kaltz 
and Bell 2002; Poon and Chao 2004; Cooper et al. 2005; Goddard et al. 2005; 
Becks and Agrawal 2012). The result of these studies suggest that sex could accel-
erate adaptation to new environments by increasing genetic variation and/or mean 
fitness of sexual offspring depending on population size (Colegrave 2002; Poon 
and Chao 2004) and the strength of selection (Kaltz and Bell 2002; Goddard et al. 
2005; Becks and Agrawal 2012). One study using the green alga Chlamydomonas 
reinhardtii (Kaltz and Bell 2002) showed an increase in standardized varia-
tion in fitness after a few sexual episodes, supporting the Fisher-Muller hypoth-
esis. Other studies measured mean and variance in fitness of sexuals and asexuals 
over one or a few generations using the general framework introduced by Barton 
(1995). Such studies have only been performed in a limited number of taxa, 
using Drosophila (Charlesworth and Charlesworth 1975), the monogonot roti-
fer Brachoinus calyciforus (Becks and Agrawal 2011), the planktonic crustacean 
Daphnia pulicaria (Lynch and Deng 1994; Pfrender and Lynch 2000; Allen and 
Lynch 2008), and the grass Anthoxanthum odoratum (Kelley et al. 1988). Both 
increases and decreases in mean fitness and/or fitness variance were reported in 
these studies. However, only the latter study was performed in the field, i.e., in 
the natural environment with all of the biotic and abiotic players. Thus, only the 
last offspring were produced in the same complex environment where genetic 
associations were built up before sex reshuffled them. This category of studies is 
particularly useful because it allows us to investigate the effect of different mecha-
nisms involved in the maintenance of sex. It is, nevertheless, important to realize 
that the population genetic approach towards studying short- and long-term effects 
assumes that sexually and asexually produced offspring differ only in the repro-
ductive mode, which might often not be valid (Meirmans et al. 2012).
The last category includes important studies aiming to test the mechanis-
tic causes for the evolution of sex mainly through experimental evolution. Here, 
we consider those studies in which sexual and asexual individuals were in direct 
competition or studies that followed the evolution of the rates of sex (outcrossing 
or recombination) within populations. The role of sex in parasite resistance has 
been tested in Tribolium castaneum beetles (Kerstes et al. 2012), the nematode 
Caenorhabditis elegans (Morran et al. 2011), and a fresh water snail Potamopyrgu 
antipodarum (Koskella and Lively 2009). Morran et al. (2011) found that C. 
elegans populations benefited from outcrossing compared to selfing in the pres-
ence of coevolving pathogens, supporting the Red Queen hypothesis. One study 
tested and supported the hypothesis that higher rates of sex evolve in heteroge-
neous environments using B. calyciflorus (Becks and Agrawal 2010). Two exper-
imental evolution studies on yeast found advantages to sex during adaptation to 
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new environments by following the rate of recombination (Wolf et al. 1987) and 
competing sexual strain against asexual strains (Greig et al. 1998). However, the 
number of studies testing these mechanisms directly is limited and some of these 
studies use model systems where sexuals and asexuals do not coexist under natural 
conditions (e.g., Poon and Chao 2004).
In summary, all currently discussed mechanisms explaining the maintenance of 
sex are microevolutionary processes and rely on short- and long-term effects of 
sex that balance the costs of sex. The strength of the benefits and costs might differ 
depending on the environment and thus also explain the geographic pattern dis-
cussed above (see 3). Identifying the relevant mechanism or combination of mech-
anisms (West et al. 1999a, b) will need additional work.
5  Conclusion
Observations showing that sex is the dominant mode of reproduction but that there 
are phylogenetic and geographic exemptions have puzzled biologists since Charles 
Darwin, but we still struggle to explain them. It is intriguing that the origin and 
the maintenance of sexual (and asexual reproduction) in eukaryotes as well as the 
distributions of asexuals and sexuals are explained by microevolutionary mecha-
nisms, while the observations are made on the macroevolutionary level. As a con-
sequence, we can often derive predictions that are testable through theory and 
experiments. This will  be important especially when using the macroevolutionary 
observations (such as the geographic parthenogenesis and the twig-like distribu-
tion of asexuals) to explain the general benefits of sex. In particular, one can use 
the microevolutionary predictions to test whether the general patterns observed in 
nature can be recreated under manipulated laboratory/field conditions. For exam-
ple, in experiments with the green alga Chlamydomonas reinhardtii, obligate 
sexuality (and high genetic diversity) has been shown to be most effective when 
adapting to detrimental environments in comparison with facultative sexual and 
asexual populations (and low genetic diversity) (Lachapelle and Bell 2012). These 
results corroborate the lower adaptability of asexuals and their higher extinction 
risk in changing environments. Similarly, the general pattern of the geographic 
parthenogenesis could be recreated in rotifer populations; higher rates of sex 
evolved in populations in stable environments, while the rates of sex evolved to 
lower levels within populations from unstable environments (environments were 
manipulated in terms of population size; Becks and Agrawal 2013). However, fur-
ther investigations are needed to (i) to test the different mechanisms explaining the 
macroevolutionary observations, (ii) to further develop clear predictions for mod-
els independent of the demographic and genetic consequences of sex and how they 
differ from the traditional models used to explain the geographic and phylogenetic 
distribution of asexuals and (iii) to understand the long-term effects of asexuality. 
This includes the consequences for the genome with rare or unconventional meio-
sis (Melters et al. 2012; Flot et al. 2013). With this information, we are starting 
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to understand why sexual and asexual reproduction exist and why they follow 
the macroevolutionary patterns described above. Despite the challenges involved 
in studying evolutionary processes as complex as the evolution of sex, the field 
has and will continue linking microevolutionary processes to macroevolutionary 
observations.
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Abstract Understanding the processes that control speciation is critical to build-
ing a comprehensive macroevolutionary synthesis. A variety of theoretical con-
structs have been proposed to explain various differential speciation patterns 
observed in the fossil record, such as higher rates of speciation among specialist 
versus generalist taxa. Most of these explanations, however, rely on only one or 
two explanatory variables and may be overly simplistic. Developing a more com-
plete understanding of speciation processes requires a broader synthesis of multi-
ple explanatory factors including the role of external factors such as climatic and 
tectonics, impact of ecosystem-level processes, relative niche breadth, and relative 
stability of species’ niches during environmental change (biotic and abiotic). This 
chapter explores the relationship between biogeography, ecological niches, and 
speciation in a series of case studies focused on Paleozoic (Late Ordovician and 
Late Devonian) shallow marine brachiopods and bivalves and Cenozoic (Neogene) 
horses of North America.
Keywords Ecological niche model · Phylogeny · Paleontology · Invasion · Ecology
1  Introduction
Macroevolution is typically defined as evolutionary change at or above the species 
level. Thus, speciation, the process by which new species evolve, could be consid-
ered a cornerstone of macroevolutionary theory. Developments in evolutionary the-
ory over the past 60 years, including those detailed in this volume, indicate that an 
expansion of the classic Modern Synthesis is necessary to develop a more compre-
hensive and coherent macroevolutionary theory. In this contribution, I examine the 
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impact of biogeographic processes and evolution of species niches on species for-
mation using several examples of faunal turnover events in the fossil record. These 
examples highlight the importance of abiotic environmental factors, contingency, 
and the hierarchical structure of nature on speciation and emphasize need for these 
areas to be more explicitly included within a synthetic macroevolutionary theory.
1.1  Speciation in the Modern Synthesis
Architects of the Modern Synthesis, notably Ernst Mayr, considered the complex-
ities of the speciation process, such as the importance of geographic barriers in 
promoting genetic isolation (e.g., Mayr 1942). However, the stated equivalence of 
macroevolution with microevolutionary processes in the original formulation of 
the Modern Synthesis (e.g., Dobzhansky 1937) has resulted in an overly simplistic 
conception of speciation; wherein, speciation is typically viewed as an outcome of 
population genetics processes with direct adaptive benefits that is divorced from 
external drivers (Coyne and Orr 2004; Allmon 2013). A consequence is that the 
importance of speciation has been diminished in modern evolutionary theory.
Speciation lies at the intersection of microevolution and macroevolution, because 
incipient species are reduced to single populations at the time of speciation. In fact, 
it is this reduction to a single population that makes speciation such a critical process 
to understand from a macroevolutionary perspective because incipient species inter-
act simultaneously within both the genealogical and economic hierarchies. Indeed, 
the initial papers describing punctuated equilibria focused on this point explicitly. 
Eldredge and Gould (1972) applied Mayr’s (1942) conceptual framework for geo-
graphic isolation to identify a process, distinct from the microevolutionary expla-
nations inherent in the Modern Synthesis, from which macroevolutionary patterns 
could derive. Furthermore, macroevolution provides the unique opportunity to study 
speciation patterns and mechanisms across multiple clades in deep time, which stud-
ying snapshots of the speciation in modern organisms cannot accomplish.
Within this context, species are defined as groups of organisms that maintain 
genetic continuity by interbreeding among members of the group but that are dis-
tinct from other reproductive groups. The genetic integrity of a species persists 
through geologic time, and thus, species have temporal as well as spatial attrib-
utes (cf. Evolutionary Species Concept of Wiley 1978). Speciation is the separa-
tion of a set of organisms into a newly isolated reproductive unit that is discrete 
from the ancestral species (Coyne and Orr 2004). Speciation, therefore, relates to 
a unique event in geologic time that transpired at a specific location within a spe-
cific lineage of organisms. Speciation is a process, as discussed in Chaps. 1 and 4 
(Emanuele: Update as appropriate based on final chapter structure), which typi-
cally occurs over some interval of time, usually less than 10,000 years (Eldredge 
and Gould 1972; Coyne and Orr 2004; Eldredge et al. 2005). During this inter-
val, the ancestral and incipient species accumulate increasing amounts of genetic, 
morphological, behavioral, etc., differences. Eventually, the two entities may be 
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considered distinct species under a variety of species definitions (cf. De Queiroz 
2007). In the fossil record, species are recognized on the basis of morphological 
differences, but these morphological characters are epistemological tools to recog-
nize the genetically independent entities inherent in ontological species definitions 
(Allmon 2013). Indeed, it is the process and causes of reproductive isolation that 
are important to examine when attempting to elucidate the process of speciation 
itself (Stigall 2013).
1.2  Speciation in Time and Space
The reproductive isolation that initiates speciation can occur when populations 
have allopatric (separated in geographic space), sympatric (have overlapping geo-
graphic ranges), or parapatric (overlap only along a border) distributions. Among 
modern taxa, allopatric speciation is considered to be much more common than 
the other styles (Brooks and McLennan 2002). Fortunately, because allopatric spe-
ciation results from populations becoming differently adapted to separated envi-
ronments, it has high potential to result in structural morphological changes that 
could be fossilized (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Gould and Eldredge 1977; Coyne 
and Orr 2004). In contrast, sympatric and parapatric speciation typically result 
from behavioral or rapid genetic changes (e.g., host race switching, chromosomal 
duplication) (Coyne and Orr 2004) which are less likely to generate morphological 
changes perceivable in the fossil record. Certainly, notably instances of sympatric 
speciation involving fossilizable structural changes exist, such as cichlid fishes of 
African rift lakes, but the prevalence of such examples in modern taxa is contro-
versial (Gavrilets and Losos 2009). Consequently, the discussion of speciation in 
this chapter addresses only allopatric speciation.
Allopatric speciation occurs via two primary mechanisms: (1) vicariance, 
in which the ancestral population is passively divided by the formation of a bar-
rier into two or more large subpopulations, all of which may diverge to form new 
species, and (2) dispersal, in which a subpopulation actively moves away from 
the ancestral population and establishes a geographically isolated population 
that subsequently diverges from the ancestral population (Fig. 1) (Stigall 2010a; 
also referred to as Allopatry Model I and Model II by Wiley and Mayden 1985). 
Because vicariance and dispersal are characterized by discrete biogeographic pat-
terns relative to the geographic ranges of daughter and ancestral species, it is pos-
sible to identify vicariance and dispersal events in fossil taxa where evolutionary 
relationships are known (Fig. 1) (Lieberman 2000).
Like every species, every individual speciation event is unique. Each specia-
tion event occurred at a particular geographic location during a discrete interval of 
time within a specific evolutionary lineage. Therefore, by analyzing the pattern of 
speciation within and across taxa, it is possible to constrain the role of biogeogra-
phy, ecology, and phylogenetic history on the development of macroevolutionary 
patterns (Stigall 2008). The three case studies presented in this chapter provide a 
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framework to examine the controls on speciation dynamics during three very dif-
ferent intervals of geologic time: the shallow marine seas of the Ordovician and 
Devonian periods and the grassy plains of the Neogene.
2  Case Studies: Speciation in Action
2.1  Late Devonian Biodiversity Crisis
The first case study examines speciation dynamics of shallow marine organ-
isms, mainly brachiopods and bivalves that inhabited the epicontinental seas of 
Laurentia (modern North America) between 390 and 360 million years ago. This 
interval included the Late Devonian biodiversity crisis (~375 Ma), which has 
been ranked as the third largest interval of ecosystem collapse in Earth history 
(McGhee et al. 2004, 2013). During the crisis interval, the stromatoporoid sponge/ 
tabulate coral reef ecosystem was obliterated and many previously domi-











































Fig. 1  Schematic representation of the relationship between geographic distribution, phylogenetic 
relationships, and speciation processes. Species distribution panel illustrates the observed distribution 
of three species (Species B, C, and D) among three areas (Areas 1, 2, and 3) which are separated by 
barriers indicated by dotted lines. Phylogeny panel indicates the evolutionary relationships among 
these three species and the hypothetical ancestor, Species A. In the area cladogram panel, the names 
of the terminal species are replaced with their areas of occurrence. Ancestral distributions are deter-
mined using the Fitch optimization outlined in Lieberman (2000). Speciation mode is identified as 
dispersal (D) when the daughter species occupies an area different or additional to the ancestral dis-
tribution, whereas vicariance speciation (V) is identified when the daughter species occupies a subset 
of the ancestral range. Evolutionary sequence panel illustrates the geographic steps through which 
evolution proceeded in this clade
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environment (McGhee 2013). Although extinction rate was somewhat elevated 
during the crisis interval, extinction rate did not statistically rise to the level of 
“mass extinction” (Bambach et al. 2004). Instead, the biodiversity crisis was 
caused by a dramatic reduction in speciation rates which, when combined with 
moderately elevated extinction levels, caused fundamental restructuring of the eco-
system (Fig. 2a) (McGhee et al. 2013; McGhee 1996; Stigall 2012b). Examining 
the reasons for speciation decline during the Late Devonian, therefore, can provide 
insight into macroevolutionary controls on speciation.
2.1.1  Speciation Mode and Rate
Late Devonian speciation dynamics have been assessed using a series of phylo-
genetically informed analyses to examine rate and mode of speciation across a 
range of Devonian marine taxa. Four genera from three phyla were subjected to 
species-level phylogenetic analysis: two rhynchonelliform brachiopods, Floweria 
Fig. 2  Comparison of 
extinction versus origination/
speciation during the Middle 
to Late Devonian interval. 
Late Devonian biodiversity 
crisis interval is indicated 
in gray. a Proportion of 
global generic extinction 
or origination per interval. 
Modified from Bambach 
et al. (2004). b Average 
instantaneous rates of species 
extinction and speciation 
for the brachiopod genera 
Schizophoria and Floweria 
and the bivalve Leptodesma 
(Leiopteria). Modified from 
Stigall (2010a). Similar 
patterns occur at both 
taxonomic levels: during 
the crisis interval, extinction 
rates are lower than occurs 
during the Middle Devonian 



















and Schizophoria (Schizophoria) (see Stigall Rode 2005); a bivalve, Leptodesma 
(Leiopteria) (see Rode 2004); and a predatory crustacean order, Archaeostraca 
(see Rode and Lieberman 2002). This represents a combined dataset of 89 species 
and 148 cladogenetic events available for speciation analysis. Phylogenetically 
constrained speciation rates were calculated for the brachiopod and bivalve lin-
eages (Fig. 2b), which confirms the dramatic decline in speciation rate in these 
clades before and during the biodiversity crisis interval (Stigall 2010a). Statistical 
analyses further demonstrated that both speciation and extinction rates observed 
in these clades during the biodiversity crisis interval are lower than the average 
rate during the duration of each clade (Stigall 2010a), which further indicates that 
depressed speciation rates, not elevated extinction rates, were the primary case of 
biodiversity loss in these lineages.
Among these taxa, the prevalence of speciation by vicariance and dispersal 
varied (Table 1) (Stigall 2010a). Within Floweria, dispersal and vicariance were 
equally common; each comprised 50 % of speciation events. However, the three 
other clades all exhibited higher levels of speciation by dispersal, ranging from 68 
to 89 % of all identifiable speciation events. Combined only 28 % of all speciation 
events were attributable to vicariance versus 72 % to dispersal (standard devia-
tion = 16 %) (Stigall 2012b). These values are almost diametrically opposed to 
those observed from analyses of the modern fauna; Brooks and McLellan (2002) 
recovered a value of 74 % (sd = 35 %) speciation by vicariance in a review of spe-
ciation analyses of modern taxa. Vicariance has also been the more common mode 
of speciation throughout geologic time based on comparative studies of Paleozoic 
trilobites (e.g., Congreve and Lieberman 2008, 2010; Lieberman 1997, 2003; 
Lieberman and Eldredge 1996), which exhibit an average of 54 % (sd = 16 %) 
speciation by vicariance (Stigall 2010a).
Therefore, the rates of vicariant speciation in the Late Devonian clades are anom-
alously low compared to other intervals in Earth history. Because speciation by 
vicariance typically occurs with a higher frequency than dispersal, the near elimina-
tion of this mode of speciation has the potential to reduce the total speciation rate 
by 50 % or more. The substantial reduction in frequency of vicariant speciation dur-
ing this interval is certainly a causal factor in the biodiversity crisis (Stigall 2012b). 
Reduced vicariance explains the precipitous decline in total speciation rate that char-
acterized the Frasnian Stage—both in these taxa and the fauna as a whole (Fig. 2). 
Consequently, speciation depression in the Late Devonian can only be understood by 
considering which factors would preferentially suppress speciation by vicariance, or 
fragmenting of ancestral populations to form new species.
2.1.2  Cause of Speciation Depression
Because the factors that prevented vicariance did so across the entire fauna, inter-
nal microevolutionary factors alone cannot explain this pattern; however, a series 
of external factors, most notably sea level changes and the global spread of inva-
sive species, provide mechanisms for vicariance reduction (Stigall 2012b). During 
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the Frasnian Stage of the Late Devonian, a series of sea level rises facilitated the 
colonization of previously isolated tectonic basins by a new set of species, in a 
manner analogous to modern invasive species (Rode and Lieberman 2004). Using 
geographic information systems (GIS) to generate temporally restricted geo-
graphic range maps, Rode and Lieberman (2004), were able to characterize the 
geographic expansion and contraction of 341 species of the most common brachi-
opod and bivalve genera. In this study, they were able to identify discrete events 
of interbasinal species invasion (Fig. 3), characterize the distribution of invasion 
events within the fauna through time (Fig. 4), and calculate geographic range size 
for species through time (Fig. 4). Peaks in invasion intensity corresponded to epi-
sodes of sea level rise and were moderated by regional tectonic processes (Rode 
and Lieberman 2004). Mean geographic range size increased, and aggregate num-
ber of species invasion events increased during the study interval, in clear contrast 
with the monotonic decline in speciation rates (compare Figs. 2 and 4).
The observed spread of Devonian invasive species facilitated a shift in ecosys-
tem dynamics and depressed speciation. The combination of overall range expan-
sion and frequent invasive events prohibited sustained geographic isolation, thereby 
impeding the primary requirement for vicariant speciation. In addition, there was 
preferential extinction of narrowly distributed species and preferential survival of 
broadly ranging or invasive species across the biodiversity crisis interval (Rode and 
Lieberman 2004). Furthermore, species that had participated in interbasinal inva-
sions preferentially survived the crisis interval. Analysis of paleoenvironmental dis-
tribution of these species indicates that the narrowly ranging species were typically 
ecological specialists, whereas the surviving broadly ranging and invasive species 
were ecological generalists (Rode and Lieberman 2004). This pattern of larger geo-
graphic ranges or invasive success of generalist taxa is well-documented among 
modern organisms (e.g., Fernández and Vrba 2005; Botts et al. 2013; Thuiller et al. 
2005; Brown et al. 1996; Lockwood et al. 2009).
The preferential survival of generalist species is an important observation from 
a macroevolutionary perspective. Ecological niche breadth has been an impor-
tant character on which species sorting may occur (Vrba 1984; Jablonski 2008). 
Specifically, lineages of ecological specialists tend to have higher diversification 
rates than generalist clades (Stanley 1990; Jablonski 2008; Vrba 1987; Jackson 
1974; Kammer et al. 1997); therefore, their preferential loss from the Devonian eco-
system would have further exacerbated speciation depression. Ultimately, the series 
of species invasions and the subsequent differential survivorship patterns produced a 
fauna that was dominated by broadly ranging ecological generalist taxa, producing 
the notably cosmopolitan fauna (cf. McGhee 1996) of the latest Devonian.
Fig. 3  Example of interbasinal species invasion events in the Late Devonian brachiopod species, 
Pseudatrypa devoniana (a), 0.75×. (b) During the earliest Late Devonian, P. devoniana occupied 
its ancestral basin in the Appalachian region; (c) this species invaded the Iowa basin during the 
early Late Devonian; (d) and subsequently invaded the New Mexico basin during the middle Late 
Devonian. The invasions depicted in (b) and (c) correspond to the sea level rises indicated by the 




2.1.3  Late Devonian Synthesis
The depression in speciation that defined the Late Devonian biodiversity crisis 
resulted from a combination of biogeographic, environmental, and ecological fac-
tors (Table 2). The primary elements of geographic range expansion and widespread 
interbasinal species invasions, and the dominance of generalist over specialist spe-
cies produced an environment that essentially prohibited successful formation of 
new species via vicariant speciation. A combination of overall range expansion 
and frequent invasive events would have prohibited sustained geographic isolation, 
thereby impeding the primary requirement for vicariant speciation. The initial phase 
Fig. 4  Middle through Late 
Devonian species geographic 
range sizes and invasion 
intensity. Arrows indicate 
episodes of sea level rise. 
Both the mean geographic 
range size for brachiopod 
and bivalve species and 
interbasinal invasion 
intensity increase during 
Late Devonian crisis interval 
(shaded gray) compared with 
Middle Devonian background 














































Table 2  Comparison of speciation mode in marine invertebrates through the Phanerozoic
Modified from Stigall (2010a)




Late Devonian crustaceans 32 68
Late Devonian brachiopods and bivalves 27 73
Cambrian and Ordovician trilobites 54 46
Early to Middle Devonian trilobites 54 46
Modern fauna 74 26
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of vicariant speciation, in which the ancestral species is fragmented into incipient 
species with smaller populations, was unsustainable during the invasive regime and 
incipient species became extinct rather than developing into viable new species.
The suppression of Late Devonian speciation is not attributable to microev-
olutionary processes alone. Competition or other biotic interactions may have 
played a role in promoting extinction of incipient species. However, the over-
arching controls on the aggregate pattern of speciation reduction occurred at 
higher hierarchical scales. Fluctuations in sea level that facilitated species inva-
sions occurred on timescales exceeding the life span of individual organisms. 
The frequency of species invasions and the greater relative abundance of gen-
eralist species in the environment relate to ecosystem and community structure, 
both entities in economic hierarchies (cf. O’Neill et al. 1986; Eldredge 1996) 
that are outside the scope typically considered in the standard Modern Synthesis. 
It is only by integrating the disparate areas of biogeography, ecology, and envi-
ronmental change that a synthetic understanding of Late Devonian speciation 
dynamics can be achieved.
2.2  Late Ordovician Richmondian Invasion
The second case study also focuses on macroevolutionary patterns of marine ben-
thos (mainly brachiopods) in Paleozoic seas during an interval characterized by 
species invasions and fluctuating sea levels. However, this example focuses on 
species-level responses to a regional invasion event, the Richmondian Invasion, 
during an interval of community-level ecological overturn in the Late Ordovician 
strata (Cincinnatian Series; ~450 mya) deposited in a shallow marine basin cen-
tered on what is today Cincinnati, Ohio, USA. Strata of the Cincinnatian Series 
have been divided into six depositional sequences (C1 to C6), each of which rep-
resents a cycle of sea level rise and fall (Holland and Patzkowsky 1996) (Fig. 5). 
The preserved record of these sequences includes a shallowing upward succession 
that indicates relative infilling of the basin through time. These cyclical sea level 
changes are overprinted by the onset of the Richmondian Invasion during the C4 
sequence. This regional invasion event introduced more than 50 genera into the 
basin, which included members of all major marine clades and trophic groups 
(Holland 1997). Notably, some invaders belonged to major clades of animals that 
had been absent from the region for up to 5 million years prior (e.g., rugose corals, 
rhynchonellid brachiopods) (Stigall 2010b).
The Richmondian introductions substantially impacted the established com-
munity structure, species survivorship, and speciation patterns (Meyer and 
Davis 2009; Stigall 2010b). Detailed gradient ecology and biofacies analyses by 
Holland and Patzkowsky (2007) indicated that the pre-invasion communities (C1 
to C3 sequences) exhibited highly similar community structure, but the onshore– 
offshore gradient was reduced and faunal differentiation became diminished 
during the invasive regime (C4 sequence). Furthermore, well-defined biofacies 
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were re-established during the C5 sequence, but these biofacies differed signifi-
cantly from the pre-invasion structure due to increased habitat partitioning and 
the ecological dominance of many invader taxa (Holland and Patzkowsky 2007; 
Patzkowsky and Holland 2007). These community analyses focused on the genus 
level and form the framework for the detailed investigation of species-level 
responses discussed below.
2.2.1  Range Size, Survivorship, and Speciation Mode
The ecological changes that occurred across the Richmondian Invasion have clear 
biogeographic and macroevolutionary correlates. Stigall (2010b) examined bio-
geographic and survivorship patterns in Cincinnatian brachiopod species using GIS 
methods. In this study, species were divided into four groups: species that were 
native to the region and became extinct before or during the invasion, native species 
that persisted through the invasion interval, species that evolved from native ances-
tors during or after the invasion interval, and extrabasinal invaders. The emergent 
patterns resemble those discussed in the Devonian case study as: (1) broadly ranging 
species preferentially survived the invasive interval, whereas narrowly ranging spe-
























































































Fig. 5  Geologic framework of the Late Ordovician case study. a Location of the Cincinnati 
region (star) within Laurentia. Arrows indicate established pathways of migration during the 
Richmondian Invasion following Wright and Stigall (2013a); additional migration routes may 
have operated. b Ecological changes within a chrono-, litho- and sequence-stratigraphic frame-
work of the Cincinnatian series, modified from Malizia and Stigall (2011). The Richmondian 
invasion occurred primarily during the C4 sequence. The case study examines the C3, C4, and 
C5 sequences. Modified from Stigall and Brame (2014)
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invaders occupied large geographic areas; (3) formation of new species was severely 
depressed during the invasion interval (Fig. 6) (Stigall 2010a).
Phylogenetic biogeographic analysis of speciation mode in three genera of 
Late Ordovician rhynchonelliform brachiopods, Glyptorthis, Hebertella, and 
Plaesiomys, provides additional insight into speciation dynamics during the 
invasion interval (Fig. 7). Speciation by vicariance was rare in Plaesiomys and 
Hebertella (0 and 29 %, respectively) but was more common in Glyptorthis 
(74 %) (Wright and Stigall 2013a). When placed in a stratigraphic context, it is 
apparent that the primary interval of vicariance predates the invasive regime; only 
two of the twenty-two vicariance events occurred after the C4 sequence (Fig. 7) 
(Wright and Stigall 2013a). Notably, the extremely low level of vicariance during 
the Richmondian Invasion parallels that of the Late Devonian (Stigall 2012a).
The similarity of speciation mode and biogeographic patterns suggests that 
the underlying mechanism—differential survival of specialist and generalist taxa 
across the invasion—driving diversity dynamics is similar during the Devonian 
and Ordovician case studies. Specifically, species sorting based on niche breadth 
exerted a primary control on speciation rates and outcomes. In the case of the 
Richmondian Invasion, however, the ecological dominance of generalist taxa 
persisted for only about 1 million years (throughout the C5 sequence) (Stigall 
2010b). Even during the interval of adjustment, community diversity remained 
high due to niche partitioning (Patzkowsky and Holland 2007; Tyler and Leighton 
2011; Brame and Stigall 2014). Once speciation resumed in the post-invasion C6 
sequence, new specialist taxa were formed (Fig. 6) (Stigall 2010b), which pro-
moted a biodiversity recovery rather than the decline of the Late Devonian. The 
different outcomes of the Late Devonian and Late Ordovician case studies likely 
derive from the global versus regional scope of the invasion impacts.
Mean geographic range size








Fig. 6  Comparison of geographic range sizes Cincinnatian brachiopods by species group. Extra-
basinal invaders and native species that carryover between the pre-invasion to post-invasion inter-
vals have statistically larger ranges than either the native species that do not survive through the 
invasion (Maysvillian restricted) or those new species that form post-invasion from native ances-
tors (Native descendants). Individual 95 % confidence intervals for mean geographic range are 











Fig. 7  Distribution of speciation events by mode within of the brachiopod genera Glyptorthis, 
Hebertella, and Plaesiomys mapped onto species-level phylograms from Wright and Stigall 
(2013b, 2014) at the level of depositional sequence. The Richmondian invasion occurred during 
the C4 sequence (shaded gray). Modified from Wright and Stigall (2013a)
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2.2.2  Niche Stability Analyses
To fully characterize the impact of invasive species on the speciation process, it 
is important to more fully constrain aspects of population-level change that occur 
within populations and how the changes impact the propensity of populations to 
persist, go extinct, or subdivide to produce incipient species. Accordingly, ecologi-
cal niche models were developed to assess whether native species responded to 
the influx of invaders by maintaining the parameters of their ecological niches and 
tracking their preferred habitats laterally (= niche conservatism or habitat track-
ing) or by undergoing shifts in dimensions their ecological niches (= niche evolu-
tion) (overview in Stigall 2012c). In this technique, species’ ecological niches are 
estimated from a suite of environmental parameters associated with a set of known 
species occurrence points (Peterson et al. 2011). From these data, an equation is 
generated to describe the species’ niche. This equation is then projected back into 
geographic space to generate potential geographic distribution map for the spe-
cies (Peterson et al. 2011). To assess Late Ordovician niche stability in geographic 
space, the niche model created for a taxon in one time slice was projected onto the 
environmental parameters of the following time slice to generate a model of the 
geographic distribution that would be occupied by that taxon if it had conserved its 
niche completely between time slices (Fig. 8) (Stigall 2012c). This forward projec-
tion model was overlain on the geographic distribution model generated from the 
data collected for the second time slice, and the relative degree of spatial similarity 
was calculated (Brame and Stigall 2014; Malizia and Stigall 2011) (Fig. 8). Niche 
stability was also assessed by calculating the similarity of the percent contribu-
tions of each environmental variable to niche model equations for a taxon in con-
secutive time slices (Brame and Stigall 2014; Stigall 2011, 2012c).
A series of niche stability studies of this type have been undertaken to exam-
ine niche stability within brachiopod species (i.e., Stigall 2011, 2012c; Malizia 
and Stigall 2011; Walls and Stigall 2011, 2012; Dudei and Stigall 2010) as well as 
mollusk, trilobite, coral, and crinoid genera (Brame and Stigall 2014). The primary 
results are statistically similar for all taxa, regardless of autecology, clade member-
ship, or taxonomic rank (Stigall and Brame 2014). Niche stability in geographic 
space is highest in the pre-invasion interval and becomes statistically reduced fol-
lowing the onset of the Richmondian Invasion (Fig. 9) (Stigall 2012c, 2014), 
which indicates that although species are able to track their preferred habitat later-
ally during the gradual sea level fluctuations of the pre-invasion interval, this abil-
ity is diminished in the presence of the extrabasinal invaders. Intriguingly, there is 
a concomitant statistical increase in stability of the contribution of the environmen-
tal parameters of species’ niches through time (Brame and Stigall 2014; Stigall and 
Brame 2014; Stigall 2011). The increase in parameter similarity contrasts with the 
contemporaneous decrease in overall geographic niche stability (Fig. 9).
Shifting niche expression in geographic space concurrent with increasing 
parameter similarity requires a reduction of the initial ecological niche that resulted 
in reduced variability of niche parameters (Fig. 10) (Brame and Stigall 2014). 
Reduction in environmental niche parameters could occur through a variety of 
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processes: direct product of natural selection (= adaptation), byproduct of selec-
tion (= exaptation) (Gould 2002), spatial sorting (Shine et al. 2011), or plastic 
ecophenotypic expression (cf. Levin 2003). Because the focal taxa exhibited niche 
stability across a depositional sequence that included changes in sea level and geo-
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Fig. 8  Geographic-distribution models representative of typical patterns during the pre-invasion, 
invasion, and post-invasion intervals. On distribution maps, dark gray indicates high probability/
agreement, and light gray indicates low probability/agreement. From the pre-invasion interval to the 
post-invasion interval, weighted percent geographic overlap decreases and model parameter similar-
ity increases, a pattern also present within the entire fauna. Modified from Brame and Stigall (2014)
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Fig. 9  Summary of the weighted percent geographic overlap and environmental parameter sim-
ilarity data through time. Patterns are congruent between the species-level brachiopod data of 
Malizia and Stigall (2011) and the cross-faunal genus-level data of Brame and Stigall (2014). 
The geographic overlap percentage declines significantly between the pre-invasion and invasion 
intervals, whereas environmental parameter similarity statistically increases between the pre-
invasion and invasion intervals. Modified from Stigall (2014)
Fig. 10  Relationship 
between niche evolution in 
environmental parameter and 
geographic space. The left 
column displays the initial 
environmental tolerance of a 
species along environmental 
gradient (dark to light gray) 
and the resulting geographic 
distribution. The column 
on the right indicates how 
contraction of the initial 
niche can result in high niche 
similarity but low geographic 
similarity. Modified from 
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niche evolution can be attributed to changes produced within the environment 
related to the introduction of the invasive species rather than other environmen-
tal factors. Although the Richmondian invaders included a set of species from 
all trophic levels, there were no substantial changes in predation or mutualis-
tic structures in the pre- and post-invasion communities; however, evidence for 
increased competition and habitat partitioning has been documented (Tyler and 
Leighton 2011; Patzkowsky and Holland 2007). Consequently, the primary driver 
for niche evolution is interpreted as resulting from adaptive response to the biotic 
changes, principally increased competition, that occurred during and following the 
Richmondian Invasions. Notably, species interpreted as ecological generalists (e.g., 
Rafinesquina alternata) were those most able to successfully habitat track initially 
and maintain their niche parameters through time (Malizia and Stigall 2011; Brame 
and Stigall 2014). The enhanced stability of generalist taxa within the invasion and 
post-invasion intervals supports the conclusions from the speciation analyses that 
eurytopy confers an adaptive advantage during invasive regimes.
2.2.3  Late Ordovician Synthesis
External factors (relative sea level and extrabasinal species invasions) exerted fun-
damental control over the macroevolutionary patterns that developed among the 
Late Ordovician fauna of the Cincinnati basin (Table 2). Primary aspects of com-
munity restructuring included differential loss of specialist taxa, 1 million year 
speciation gap, reduced vicariance, and shift to ecosystems dominated by extra-
basinal taxa. This suite of characteristics indicates that species selection, notably 
preferential survival of generalist species and loss of ecological specialists, was 
a substantial component of the observed faunal change. Niche modeling analy-
ses suggest that one fundamental key to the persistence of the generalist taxa in 
this ecosystem was that they initially could utilize a broad suite of environmen-
tal conditions. Due to this, generalist taxa were able to constrict their ranges and 
still maintain viable population sizes participate while partitioning habitat with the 
invasive species. Ecological specialists with narrowly defined niches could not do 
this effectively, resulting in very small population sizes, and ultimately extinction.
Like the Late Devonian, the speciation and diversity patterns of the Cincinnatian 
taxa could not be predicted by simple extrapolation within a neo-darwinian 
framework. The impact of contingent factors that facilitated the Richmondian 
Invasion exerted a primary control on Cincinnatian niche evolution and speciation. 
Competition does appear to have been important in determining the structure of the 
post-extinction community; however, this impact lessened once the new community 
structure was established. After that point, speciation resumed and the development 
of these new species promoted a return to a balanced ecosystem with a blend of gen-
eralist and specialist species, not merely the ecological generalists that dominated 
during the invasive regime.
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2.3  Neogene Radiation of the Equinae
The third case study contrasts with the first two by examining speciation patterns and 
processes during a radiation, rather than a crisis interval, and by focusing on a clade of 
terrestrial mammals instead of marine invertebrates. Specifically, this case study exam-
ines the Miocene to Early Pliocene radiation of horse species (subfamily Equinae) in 
North America. The diversification of this clade has classically been referred to as an 
adaptive radiation under the interpretation that the rapid speciation occurred via adap-
tive response to the contemporaneous climatic and vegetation changes (Simpson 1944; 
MacFadden 1984; Hulbert 1993). Historically, the major Miocene radiation of the 
Equinae has been attributed to morphological changes (e.g., increased hypsodonty, 
reduction of digits) considered to be adaptations to the coincident emergence of grass-
lands (Simpson 1951; Stebbins 1981). However, other studies have demonstrated that 
the dentition of a horse species is not always conclusive evidence for the type of veg-
etation in their diet (Eronen et al. 2010; Fortelius 1985), and Strömberg (2006) advised 
against using tooth morphology alone to reconstruct habitat change due to inconclusive 
evidence regarding whether hypsodonty was an adaptive characteristic. Consequently, 
the extent that speciation in this clade represents an adaptive rather than exaptive radia-
tion has been questioned (Lieberman 2012). Because detailed phylogenetic hypotheses 
and a dense fossil record exist for Miocene horses of North America, this radiation can 
be analyzed in detail to identify whether internal (adaptive) or external (e.g., climatic, 
tectonic) factors were more influential in promoting diversification.
2.3.1  Speciation Mode
The evolutionary relationships between equinid species have been examined repeat-
edly (e.g., Hulbert 1993; MacFadden 1984; Prado and Alberdi 1996), and well-sup-
ported phylogenetic hypotheses exist for members of this clade. Analysis of speciation 
mode in this clade by Maguire and Stigall (2008) recovered 81 % of inter-regional 
speciation events were attributable to dispersal. Contrary to the previous case stud-
ies, frequent dispersal in horses coincided with high diversification rates (e.g., Hulbert 
1993). The link between dispersal and diversification stems from the biology and 
behavioral ecology of horses; these animals were vagile, migrational herbivores. 
Consequently, dispersal events were frequent and could have generated isolated popu-
lations and subsequent speciation events. Notably, ecological niche modeling analyses 
of this clade demonstrated a correlation between increased geographic discontinuity 
within species ranges and higher speciation rates (Maguire and Stigall 2009). This 
pattern suggests that vicariance was operating at the basinal, rather than regional, level 
within this clade. Because the analysis of Maguire and Stigall (2008) analyzed large 
geographic regions, basin-scale vicariant speciation would appear as no change in 
geographic region between ancestor and descendant nodes, a condition that character-
izes most of the internal nodes on the optimized area cladogram (Fig. 11).
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Although organismal biology may have predisposed species to dispersal-based 
speciation, external processes, notably climatic and tectonic changes—both exter-
nal, continent factors—have been shown to have substantial impact on the overall 
radiation of this clade (Maguire and Stigall 2008). A Lieberman-modified Brooks 
Parsimony Analysis of equinid species generated general area cladograms topologies 
consistent with geological events, such as uplift of the Rocky Mountains, and climatic 
conditions, such as the change from a warm and moist to cool and arid climate dur-
ing the Miocene (Maguire and Stigall 2008). Congruence between the geodispersal 
and vicariance area cladograms indicates that the cyclical processes, notably climatic 
changes during the Miocene, were important in structuring diversification patterns 
and area relationships during the equinid radiation (Maguire and Stigall 2008).
2.3.2  Habitat Patchiness and Speciation
Reconstruction of species geographic ranges using ecological niche modeling 
indicated that the relative patchiness of habitats within regions provided an addi-
tional control on speciation (Maguire and Stigall 2009). Habitat patchiness devel-
oped as the previously widespread forests became fragmented due to the spread of 
grasslands during the Middle Miocene, but declined once grasslands were wide-
spread in the Late Miocene and Early Pliocene (Fig. 12). Speciation was highest 
during intervals of environmental change. In particular, early to Middle Miocene 
climatic and tectonic events promoted the development of a landscape charac-
terized by patchy environmental distribution. During this interval, horse species 
comprised several isolated populations and exhibited frequent speciation events, 
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Fig. 11  Distribution of speciation events by mode within the subfamily Equinae mapped onto 
species-level area cladogram. Modified from Maguire and Stigall (2008)
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and habitats became more homogenous, speciation rate in horses declined 
(Maguire and Stigall 2009). Consequently, speciation was promoted by environ-
mental change and habitat patchiness but retarded by environmental uniformity 
and climatic stability.
2.3.3  Neogene Synthesis
The Neogene radiation of the horses provides insight into some factors that pro-
mote speciation (Table 2). Speciation was highest during early to Middle Miocene 
climatic and tectonic events that promoted the development of a landscape charac-
terized by patchy environmental distribution. Once climate stabilized and habitats 
became more homogenous, speciation rate in horses declined. Consequently, spe-
ciation was promoted by environmental change and habitat patchiness but retarded 
by environmental uniformity and climatic stability. Finally, although dispersal 
was common in this clade, it did not result in the speciation depression observed 
during the Late Ordovician or Late Devonian. This may suggest that speciation 





Fig. 12  Example of fragmented and continuous geographic ranges derived from ecological 
niche models of Neogene horses. Fragmented predicted range for Pseudhipparion gratum in the 
early to Middle Miocene (a) and continuous predicted range for Nannippus lenticularis in the 
late Miocene (b). Light gray indicates low probability of occurrence, and dark gray indicates 
high probability of occurrence. Modified from Maguire and Stigall (2009)
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
322 A.L. Stigall
isolation) does not negatively impact biodiversity in the same way as interbasi-
nal invasions involving dispersal without new speciation events (i.e., dispersal and 
colonization of a new environment without concomitant speciation).
One of the key aspects of this case study is the importance of environmental 
factors operating at multiple hierarchical levels. At the regional level, speciation 
by dispersal was common and factors that facilitated species movement between 
continental regions (eg., Southwest versus Gulf Coast), such as similar vegeta-
tion along dispersal corridors, promoted speciation. However, habitat patchiness 
and vicariance were primary drivers of speciation at the ecosystem or community 
level. The disparity between the primary speciation style (vicariance vs. dispersal) 
and ecological entity (community vs. regional biota) reinforces the importance of 
hierarchical perspective to macroevolutionary phenomena.
3  Combined Synthesis
Speciation is a complex process involving multiple contributory factors, including 
drivers both internal and external to the species under consideration. Comparison 
of speciation dynamics among the three case studies indicates that critical determi-
nants of speciation processes can include biotic and abiotic influences (Table 2). 
Although the details of each case study are unique, these examples share several 
broad features. Significantly, the primary controls on speciation in all three case 
studies were external, environmental factors (Table 3). Abiotic factors (tectonics, 
sea level, climate change) were the dominant controls on speciation, but external 
biotic factors (species invasions, ecosystem turnover, habitat patchiness vs. conti-
nuity) were also prominent. Notably, these external biotic factors relate to entities 
in the economic hierarchy that occur at higher levels than the organismal/popu-
lation level where microevolutionary influences occur. Due to the discrete nature 
of information flow in the genealogical and economic hierarchies, the impacts of 
ecosystem or community-level change must be filtered to the genealogical hier-
archy via organisms or populations (where deme = avatar) before resulting in the 
gene flow breakdown required for speciation. This process termed the “sloshing 
Table 3  Summary of the impacts of internal and external parameters on speciation
Modified from Stigall (2013)
Promote Inhibit
Internal Populations spatially isolated Populations spatially continuous
Specialist ecology Generalist ecology
Vagile or high organismal mobility (dis-
persal potential)
Sessile or limited movement within 
organism life span (low dispersal 
potential)
External Rapid or abrupt environmental changes Slow and gradual environmental change
Tectonic factors or sea level changes that 
cyclically join and separate of basins
Widespread species invasions of eco-
logical generalists
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bucket” by Eldredge (2003, 2007) is an important theoretical construct in macro-
evolutionary theory (Pievani and Serrelli 2013), but has been less widely explored 
within case studies, such as those herein. The consistent role of external environ-
mental parameters evident form these examples, however, suggests that the slosh-
ing bucket may represent a fundamental control on biodiversity dynamics.
The secondary controls on speciation across the three case studies also have 
commonalities. The relative breadth of a species’ niche impacts species survival 
and adaptability during intervals of environmental change. Species with broad 
ecological niches display reduced level of niche evolution and higher levels of 
persistence across disturbance intervals. This indicates that species-level emergent 
characters may play a key role in speciation dynamics and argues for the impor-
tance of species selection in determining diversity patterns through time.
The Modern Synthesis primarily emphasized evolutionary patterns and 
processes affected by gene flow and its interruption over short timelines. 
Consequently, the Modern Synthesis cannot incorporate the fundamental ecologi-
cal and spatial attributes of species and their environments completely. The three 
case studies presented herein emphasize the centrality of large-scale environmen-
tal changes acting over long time scales in driving speciation and thus major pat-
tern in biodiversity and thereby relegating microevolutionary processes to a more 
limited role in speciation initiation. The explicit incorporation of additional hierar-
chical levels and the interplay between the economic and genealogical hierarchies 
provides a dynamic perspective to analyze speciation. In particular, incorporation 
of a broader evolutionary theory with explicit consideration of abiotic environ-
mental changes, species selection, details of species geographic ranges and niche 
breadth, and migration of species will provide a robust framework to assess cross-
faunal speciation dynamics.
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Appendix
Biofacies: A body of sediment characterized by a particular suite of fossils
Chronostratigraphy: Correlation of rock units based on intervals of equivalent 
time
Depositional or stratigraphic sequence: A cohesive cycle of sedimentary deposi-
tion; including a cycle from low sea level (lowstand systems tract), to rising sea 
level (transgressive systems tract), to high sea level (highstand systems tract), to 
falling sea level (falling stage systems tract). Depositional sequences are separated 
by unconformities (often erosional surfaces) or correlative conformities.
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Ecological niche modeling (ENM): A computational method for estimating the 
boundaries of a species’ ecological niche based on the correspondence of a set of 
known species occurrence points with a series of environmental variables.
Gradient ecology: An empirical analytical method used to relate abundances of 
species in a community to environmental gradients by ordination techniques
Hyspodonty: Development of high-crowned teeth with enamel that extends 
beyond the gum line. This type of dentition provides extra tooth material for 
extensive wear of siliceous grasses.
Lithostratigraphy: Correlation of rock units based on intervals of similar rock 
properties
Sequence stratigraphy: Correlation of rock units based on equivalent cycles of 
sedimentary deposition, i.e., depositional sequences.
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Abstract Morphological misfits can be defined as a miscellaneous class of 
numerically marginal, often lately discovered taxa, deviating in one or more 
dramatic aspects from the structural organization of their closest relatives. 
Morphological misfits are a widely diverse set of taxa which according to their 
anatomical, ontogenetic and phylogenetic nature may offer the opportunity for a 
multiplicity of case studies in evolutionary developmental biology. Anatomically, 
there are modular misfits such as the paussinae beetles, with their extravagant 
antennae borne on a quite usual beetle body, and systemic misfits such as Wolffia 
among the flowering plants, reduced to a minute blob of green matter, and the also 
bloblike parasitic crustacean Sacculina among the animals. The former, but not the 
latter, are suggestive of developmental modularity. Ontogenetically, there are one-
phase only misfits, such as blepharicerid midges (aberrant larvae but conventional 
midge-shaped adults), and whole-life-cycle misfits such as cycliophorans. The 
former, but not the latter, would suggest an evolutionary independence of devel-
opmental stages. Some misfits have diverged recently from their morphologically 
conservative closest relatives (e.g. the duckweeds (Lemnoideae) from conventional 
Araceae), while others, such as chaetognaths and Welwitschia, are the sole mem-
bers of lineages which diverged very deeply in time from their closest known or 
putative relatives. The former, but not the latter, can provide obvious opportunities 
for investigating character evolvability.
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The history of exploration of organism’s diversity on Earth is punctuated by an 
unceasing series of discoveries of ‘odd’ creatures that have repeatedly defeated 
our efforts to establish a satisfactory and stable classification of the living world. 
Exemplary, in this respect, was the discovery of the platypus (Eco 1999), whose 
duck bill appeared as an unnatural oddity in a fur-covered quadruped, not to men-
tion the later ascertained oviparity of an animal feeding the newborn with milk. 
Two hundred years later, zoologists have been confronted with a diversity of 
newly dredged carnivorous sponges, including the extraordinary Chondrocladia 
lyra (Lee et al. 2012) whose body—vaguely similar to a stemless crinoid—com-
prises five threadlike horizontal arms radiating from a clump of rhizoids, each arm 
bearing a series of long vertical branches, each of which bears, in turn, a blob of 
sperm on the tip, apparently used as a lure for tiny prey. Eventually, in the last 
two decades of the XX century, three new ‘phyla’ (Loricifera: Kristensen 1983; 
Cycliophora: Funch and Kristensen 1995; Micrognathozoa: Kristensen and Funch 
2000) were erected to accommodate newly discovered animals that could not fit 
into any of the major animal groups known at the date.
Bell (1991, 2008) introduced the term morphological misfit to denote those 
plant forms “that cannot as yet sensibly be accommodated in traditional descrip-
tions … that is, misfits, for the moment, to botanical discipline, not misfits for a 
successful existence” (Bell 2008, p. 247). This colloquial term can be used also in 
zoology, as many examples in this chapter will show.
A major reason for our embarrassment in the face of these unusual organisms 
is their numerical marginality, as in the case of the few carnivorous sponges sum-
ming up to little more than one thousandth of the total diversity of Porifera or the 
duckweeds (Lemnaceae), common water plants well known to layperson in sev-
eral parts of the world, but just 34 species, i.e. 0.01 % of the flowering plants, 
and the monotremes, i.e. the platypus and the echidnas, just four species, less than 
0.1 % of living mammal species.
Morphological uniqueness is frequently a symptom of peculiar adaptations, 
which may in turn suggest adaptive dead ends, such as the mandible of the extinct 
cartilagineous fish Helicoprion, prolonged into a spirally coiled saw with impres-
sively large teeth (Lebedev 2009), or the only two leaves of the gymnosperm 
Welwitschia mirabilis, which continue growing at the base while the distal end pro-
gressively withers, all along the individual’s life, which may last a century or more.
Less obvious is the adaptive significance of the unique (although inconspicu-
ous) flowers of Lacandonia (Márquez-Guzmán et al. 1989) and Trithuria, which 
apparently bear female parts external to the male ones, opposite to all other flow-
ers with distinct floral whorls, unless they should be interpreted as compact, min-
iaturized inflorescences, with unisexual male flowers surrounded by unisexual 
female ones (Rudall et al. 2009).
The discovery (or rediscovery and reinterpretation) of plant and animal misfits 
makes often breaking news and even finds a space in popular collections of illus-
trations, e.g. in stamps, as in the case of Helicoprion in an improbable stamp of 
Equatorial Guinea or the tiny ‘worm’ Limnognathia maerskii, the only known spe-
cies of the Micrognathozoa, in a stamp of its homeland Greenland. As biodiversity 
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is currently a fashionable issue in the media, many spectacular discoveries are pres-
ently flagged in popular websites, e.g. those of the Natural History Museum, London, 
although only a fraction of the species appearing there deserves to be called a misfit.
The characterization of a living species as a morphological misfit translates gen-
erally into difficulties with its placement in the classification, at least in so far as 
the latter is based on morphological characters. Morphological oddity means that 
we acknowledge problems in establishing homologies between the newly discov-
ered misfit and the ‘normal’ animals or plants for which we have already provided 
accommodation in the system of living beings. To some extent, these circumstances 
re-open an old case. During the first season of comparative anatomy, in the early 
decades of the XIX century, Cuvier (1816) divided the animal kingdom into four 
major groups (embranchments)—the vertebrates, the molluscs, the articulates and 
the radiates. Cuvier placed in the same embranchment those animals among which 
he was able to trace correspondences (we would say, homologies) between ana-
tomical parts, whereas he placed in separate embranchments those forms between 
which he failed to recognize obviously corresponding parts. Although very sel-
dom explicitly acknowledged (but see Minelli 1993; Conway Morris 1995), the 
phyla of modern classifications (for instance, the 30+ phyla currently recognized in 
most classifications of the Metazoa) are similarly based on the difficulty in tracing 
homologies between the representatives of different phyla, compared to the much 
higher number of homologies confidently recognized among the members of the 
same phylum. No wonder, therefore, that the first description of Nanaloricus mys-
ticus, Symbion pandora and Limnognathia maerskii corresponded to the proposal of 
three new phylum-level taxa—Loricifera, Cycliophora and Micrognathozoa, respec-
tively. In other cases, lesser degrees of morphological oddity did not suggest estab-
lishing new phyla; nevertheless, a number of newly discovered misfits have been 
placed, initially at least, in new classes or orders specifically created for them. For 
example, a new echinoderm class, Concentricycloidea, was created for Xyloplax 
medusiformis, an unusual disc-shaped animal discovered in the 80s in the seas of 
New Zealand (Baker et al. 1986; its real affinities, placing it within the sea stars, 
were ascertained later, cf. Janies and Mooi 1998; Janies et al. 2011), and several new 
orders or classes of crustaceans (Remipedia: Yaeger 1981; Tantulocarida: Boxshall 
and Lincoln 1983; Mictacea: Bowman et al. 1985) were established in the last half 
of the XX century for newly discovered species.
Eventually, however, most of these misfits turn out not to deserve such a special 
taxonomic treatment. In other words, their morphological oddity is not necessarily 
a proof of a long separation of their lineage from the closest extant relatives. The 
advent of molecular systematics has dramatically improved our chances of tracing 
these organisms’ affinities. Most interesting, the consequences of this reallocation 
are not limited to phylogeny and classification, but create a comparative context 
within which interesting questions concerning the evolution of morphology, and the 
underlying developmental processes, can be addressed. This is the main intended 
message of this chapter. However, before coming to that, I must fix two points.
The first is that some little groups whose unusual morphology has character-
istically caused big problems to taxonomists relying on morphological evidence 
nlgontier@fc.ul.pt
332 A. Minelli
are still largely groups incertae sedis, despite the application of the modern tools 
of molecular phylogenetics. Within the Metazoa, the most critical example is pro-
vided by the mainly planktonic arrow worms (Chaetognatha), about which we can 
only say that they likely belong to the protostomians, but no further precision can 
be safely added as to their affinities (e.g. Marlétaz et al. 2006; Matus et al. 2006; 
Harzsch and Müller 2007; Helmkampf et al. 2008; Edgecombe et al. 2011).
The second point is that the oddities of morphological misfits, although extremely 
diverse and in principle unpredictable in terms of both taxonomic distribution and 
anatomical extent, allow nevertheless a classification into three main classes.
A first class is represented by misfits by reduction. These are organisms whose 
bodily organization is very simple, lacking many of the specialized parts or organs 
otherwise found in the ‘normal’ members of the group to which they belong. In many 
cases, their reduction appears to be the effect of progenesis, that is, of reproduc-
tive maturity reached at a stage morphologically similar to an embryonic or larval 
stage of their relatives (e.g. Gould 1977; Westheide 1987). Reduction, however, is 
often accompanied by the expression of novel traits, for which there is no equivalent 
among the close relatives of the misfit. These are the cases where the contribution 
of molecular systematics is most important in establishing the correct phylogenetic 
placement of the morphological misfits. Three extraordinary examples of strong mor-
phological simplification accompanied by the development of unusual specializations 
have been revealed among the Cnidaria. All members of the phylum, as traditionally 
circumscribed, are either medusae or polyps (solitary such as the hydra and the sea 
anemones or colonial such as the corals), the two forms often alternating within a 
species’ life cycle. Recently, three different kinds of misfits have been recognized 
as strongly modified cnidarians. One is the wormlike Buddenbrockia, a parasite of 
freshwater bryozoans (see Jiménez-Guri et al. 2007), another is Polypodium, a para-
site of sturgeon’s eggs, which is reduced to an irregular blob of jelly with a num-
ber of threadlike projections (see Siddall et al. 1995; Zrzavý et al. 1998; Siddall and 
Whiting 1999), and the third is the Myxozoa, a whole group (more than one thousand 
species) of organisms classified in the past within the protozoans, with a complex life 
cycle including two forms that are so different as to be classified in the past in two 
different protozoan classes (see Wolf and Markiw 1984; Siddall et al. 1995).
A second class of misfits is characterized by peculiarities in the building blocks 
by which they are formed. This is the case of the Loricifera. These little marine 
animals have unusually small size (adults are in the order of a quarter of milli-
metre); nevertheless, their anatomical complexity is very high. Indeed, they are 
formed by a high number of cells, but these are extremely small, more in the range 
of bacterial cell sizes than in the range of animal cell sizes. The cells of loricif-
erans can be regarded as truly miniaturized (Kristensen 1991), to the extent that 
they have lost the organelles of which they could dispose: loriciferans are the only 
metazoans whose cells lack mitochondria (Danovaro et al. 2010).
A third class includes misfits by synorganization. Here, body parts that are well 
recognizable in ‘normal’ animals or plants appear instead indistinctly separated, 
be this because of primary lack of separation, or because of secondary fusion. An 
example is provided by the extraordinary antennae of many paussine beetles, where 
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the majority of articles (completely separated and reciprocally articulated in all other 
beetles, including the less specialized among the paussines) are fused to form a leaf-
like blade. No wonder that these beetles have been long separated into a distinct 
family Paussidae, before being recognized as a specialized subclade of the ground 
beetles (Carabidae); their precise relationships within this larger clade, however, are 
still unclear (Di Giulio et al. 2003; Beutel et al. 2007).
This tentative classification of misfits is far from being a futile exercise. 
Classifications are often a necessary step in organizing knowledge, at a time when a 
theory-based approach is not yet at hand (Wilkins and Ebach 2013). A corresponding 
exercise proved useful in animal and human teratology, especially under the conse-
quently systematic approach of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1832–1837). In his case, the 
very possibility to offer a classification of monsters was a proof of their lawfulness. 
Eventually, the criteria used in diagnosing monster ‘taxa’ would turn into as many 
windows into developmental processes, each kind of anomaly pointing to a specific 
developmental step that, in the monster, has been somehow perturbed or bypassed. 
Eventually, this proved to be a ‘teratological dissection’ of development. This has not 
changed with the advent of developmental genetics, except for the level of analysis 
and the corresponding experimental tools that can be employed nowadays.
In the case of morphological misfits, a classification such as the one suggested 
above indicates some pathways (or, at least, some scenarios) along which devel-
opmental schedules may have evolved, eventually resulting in the unusual pheno-
types I am discussing here.
I will briefly present in the following some evo-devo perspectives on morpho-
logical misfits, in terms of some of the main concepts of this discipline, namely 
modularity (structural as well as ontogenetic), heterochrony, heterotopy, heterom-
etry and evolvability.
1  Morphological Misfits and Structural Modularity
Departure of morphological misfits from the conventional structural plan of a 
major clade of which they represent an offshoot is sometimes systemic, sometimes 
limited to one or a few body parts. These two types of misfits open very different 
views on developmental events.
Among the flowering plants, classic examples of systemic misfits are the river-
weeds and the duckweeds. The riverweeds (family Podostemaceae) are aquatic 
plants of tropical regions, whose flowers clearly suggest affinities to, e.g., the St. 
John’s wort family, Hypericaceae, whereas the vegetative structures deviate—con-
spicuously to exceptionally—not only in relation to their closest relatives, but also 
in comparison with all other flowering plants. In the most derived forms, none of 
the conventional vegetative parts of angiosperms is recognizable and the whole 
takes a form more reminiscent of an alga than of a plant articulated into roots, stem, 
branches and leaves. Gene expression patterns studied by Katayama et al. (2010, 
2013) in two Podostemoideae reveal an indeterminate stem capped by something 
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like a determinate “leaf”, with new leaves/branches developing endogenously from 
the base of the “leaf”.
In the case of duckweeds, which belong to a completely different plant group, 
currently regarded as a basally splitting lineage within the arum family, Araceae 
(Cusimano et al. 2011; Henriquez et al. 2014), the whole photosynthetic structure 
is reduced to an irregular lens- or disc-shaped body, or a small cluster of simi-
lar, floating bodies, out of which one or more roots sprout out inferiorly, while 
the flowers, absolutely inconspicuous and only rarely occurring, are reduced to the 
essential reproductive parts, a tiny ovary in the female flowers and a rudimentary 
stamen in the male one. The final stage of this trend is Wolffia arrhiza, a subspher-
ical grain of green matter without any root or other projection, perhaps 1 mm in 
diameter.
Systemic misfits defy our efforts to dissect the complexity of an organism’s 
structure into morphological, developmental or evolutionary modules, at least to 
the extent that we are guided by the conventional vocabulary we have produced 
to describe features and behaviour of ‘normal’ organisms’. In the duckweeds and 
in the most derived riverweeds, we would search in vain for parts strictly homol-
ogous to branches or leaves. These morphological misfits are indeed textbook 
examples of continuum morphology, a view of plant morphology championed 
by Sattler and Rutishauser (see Rutishauser and Sattler 1985, 1987, 1989, 1997; 
Sattler 1988, 1992, 1996; Sattler and Jeune 1992; Rutishauser 1995; Sattler and 
Rutishauser 1997; Rutishauser et al. 2008).
In other misfits, however, most of the body is structurally comparable to the 
organization in typical representatives of higher clades to which the misfit belongs, 
the strongly divergent features being limited to one or a few body parts. This cir-
cumstance reveals an evolutionary modularity which may rest on a similarly artic-
ulated developmental modularity. This hypothetical co-extension of evolutionary 
and developmental modules should encourage detailed study from either point of 
view, because it represents a far from common occurrence. Usually, in fact, the 
mapping of evolutionary modules onto developmental ones is far from straightfor-
ward. Consider, for example, the giraffe. In this lineage, we can identify several 
body units that have been quite obviously targets of directional selection: the neck 
with its unusually elongated cervical vertebrae and the associated musculature, 
the correspondingly long blood vessels serving the brain, the elongated trachea 
and oesophagus, etc.; the circulatory system, with a powerful heart and special-
ized arterial valves; and the legs, among which the anterior pair is now longer than 
the posterior pair, contrary to a nearly universal trend in the whole of mammals. 
The adaptive significance of these peculiar features of the giraffe neck, circulatory 
system and limbs marks these body parts as fairly well-circumscribed evolution-
ary modules. None of them, however, can be considered as a largely independent 
developmental module.
Things are possibly different in the case of structurally modular misfits, for 
example the paussine beetles mentioned above, whose peculiar antennae, borne on 
an otherwise ‘normal’ body, are suggestive of a developmental evolution driven 
by changes in the genetic control of the developmental processes patterning the 
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antenna. Insect antennae, indeed, are prone to extraordinary diversification that 
remains strictly circumscribed to this modular unit. This should perhaps not be 
that surprising: each pair of appendages of the arthropod head, that is, the anten-
nae as well as the mandibles, maxillae, chelicerae, pedipalps, etc., has its precise 
identity, consequent to the evolution of a differential genetic control (partly due 
to the combinatorial Hox code; cf., e.g. Carroll 1995); thus, it should not be a 
surprise that any of these pairs of appendages evolves quite independently from 
the others, provided that its function and the function of other appendages are not 
impaired. In particular, we should expect—as in fact we find—more ‘evolutionary 
freedom’ in the antenna than in the mouthparts, as the antenna is not controlled 
by the Hox genes, as all the following appendages are instead. Right for the same 
reason, we should not expect that just one pair of appendages within a series of 
usually identical limbs will start evolving in a strongly diverging way, without 
any visible correlative change in all other limb pairs, those in front of it and those 
behind it. However, this is exactly what we observe in a peculiar class of morpho-
logical misfits, the males of the vast majority of millipede species, those classified 
as the Helminthomorpha.
The number of walking legs in helminthomorph millipedes varies from 32 to as 
many as 375 pairs (Fusco 2005). Basically, all leg pairs are morphologically identi-
cal, except for the smaller size of the first pair or the first few pairs. This is also true 
of male juveniles, the segment number of which increases with each moult, together 
with the number of completely articulated leg pairs. At later stages, however, one or 
two pairs of legs will undergo a unique metamorphosis. This deep structural modifi-
cation is very strictly and precisely localized and does not affect the other leg pairs, 
both those in front and those posterior to the affected zone, this feature being cap-
tured by the term non-systemic metamorphosis (Drago et al. 2008, 2011). In these 
arthropods, one or two pairs of legs are replaced in the adult by specialized sexual 
appendages, the gonopods, used by males as claspers or to transfer sperm.
In two major subgroups of millipedes, the Polydesmida and the Callipodida, only 
the leg pair 8 is replaced by gonopods, as in most Spirostreptida, but in the latter, 
the leg pair 9 is completely atrophied, or nearly so (Demange 1967). In the remain-
ing clades, two pairs of legs (8 and 9) are eventually transformed into gonopods; in 
many Chordeumatida, less dramatic modifications may additionally affect legs 7 and 
10 (Blower 1985). Only in Colobognatha the leg pairs modified into gonopods are 
pairs 9 and 10 (Hoffman 1982). With few exceptions, gonopods differ dramatically 
from walking legs, being articulated only at the joint with the corresponding body 
ring and presenting a fantastic diversity of shapes, very often branched, coiled, spiny 
and mostly too complex to be adequately described in words.
Transformation of walking legs into gonopod is often abrupt, although accom-
plished in steps across several moults. As an example, I summarize here the events 
as recently described by Drago et al. (2011) in Nopoiulus kochii. During stadia III 
and IV, leg pairs 8 and 9 are identical to ordinary walking legs, but at stadium V, 
these legs are usually replaced by two pairs of inconspicuous gonopod primordia, to 
be subsequently changed into two pairs of complex and bulky gonopods following 
another moult. This non-systemic metamorphosis is not strictly fixed in time with 
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respect to the progression of post-embryonic stadia: in some males, changes are 
delayed by one stadium in relation to the just described schedule (Kheirallah et al. 
2000; Drago et al. 2011). The dramatic changes seen externally in the shape of these 
appendages are accompanied by not less dramatic changes in the internal structure 
of the ring to which these appendages belong. The gonopod apodemes, that is the 
skeletal elements to which the gonopods articulate, are much bulkier than those of 
the walking legs, and the corresponding muscles are also much more conspicuous. 
As a consequence, much less space is locally available to accommodate the other 
organs. This affects the ventral nerve cord and the digestive tract especially: at the 
level of the gonopods, these organs are displaced dorsally, with a consequent dra-
matic reduction in the lumen of the gut.
From the point of view of morphological misfits, male millipedes, with their 
fantastic diversity of gonopods, are non-systemic misfits. The non-systemic met-
amorphosis they undergo reveals the existence of developmental modules, only 
one of which is the theatre of this dramatic change. Due to the segmental archi-
tecture of arthropods and, specifically, to the articulation of the millipede trunk in 
a series of morphological units (diplosegments), each of which bears two pairs of 
legs (except for the legless collum and the following 3, rarely 4 rings, with one 
leg pair each), one might expect the gonopodal module to correspond to one ring, 
but this is a wrong expectation, for two distinct reasons. First, as said before, in 
Polydesmida and Callipodida, only one leg pair is eventually transformed into 
gonopods. As a consequence, in these millipedes, only the anterior half of trunk 
ring VII corresponds to the gonopodal module, whereas the posterior half belongs 
to the post-gonopodal module with appendages all in the form of walking legs. 
Second, and more compelling, in the Colobognatha, the two pairs of gonopods 
belong to two distinct rings, i.e. to the posterior half of ring VII and the anterior 
half of ring VIII, respectively. Thus, the ‘misfit module’ in the millipede trunk 
does not correspond to a segmental (or diplosegmental) module, but to a short 
bit of trunk length marked by other than segment-specifying genes. It has been 
suggested indeed that this marker could be one of the Hox genes, Abdominal-B 
(Drago et al. 2008). What matters in the present context, anyway, is that the posi-
tion at which legs will be transformed into gonopods, often only after several 
months of post-embryonic development, must have been specified during embry-
onic development and, most likely, before full segmentation of the relevant trunk 
region has been fully specified. This is suggested indeed by the segmental posi-
tioning of extra pairs of gonopods in recently described teratological specimens 
(Akkari et al. 2014).
One more unusual phenomenon stressing the modularity of the millipede 
trunk, in respect to the differentiation of these unique appendages, is periodomor-
phosis, a developmental schedule during which gonopod differentiation is tem-
porarily reversed. This phenomenon has been recorded in a few species where a 
mature male, following a reproductive season, moults to an ‘intercalary’ stadium 
with dedifferentiated gonopods, only eventually to moult again, to give rise to a 
second reproductive stadium with newly differentiated gonopods (Verhoeff 1923; 
Sahli 1990).
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2  Ontogenetic (Stage) Modularity
In the case of some morphological misfits, the whole life cycle is represented by 
oddly shaped stages, and the sequence of stages can also strongly depart from 
the norm. This is the case of the Cycliophora. In reconstructing the still imper-
fectly known, but obviously very complex life cycle of these tiny animals that live 
epizoically on the appendages of the Norwegian lobster, zoologists were forced to 
introduce new terms such as the Pandora larva and the Prometheus larva, because 
the terminology available for the other animals seemed not to offer adequate labels 
for their unique stages (Obst and Funch 2003).
In other cases, however, strong morphological singularities are limited to 
a phase, mainly one stage only, within a life cycle. For example, the adults of 
the blepharocerids do not deviate significantly from the midgelike organiza-
tion of most ‘primitive’ dipterans despite the fact that this family split quite long 
ago (Early Jurassic, ca. 200 million years BP) from their closest extant relatives 
(Tanyderidae + Psychodidae) (Bertone et al. 2008). In contrast to the broadly 
conservative aspect of the adults, however, the larvae of blepharicerids are among 
the oddest among the dipterans, and insects generally. Their body is divided by 
well-marked constrictions into six ‘macrosegments’—each of which bears a large 
sucker ventrally—plus a less well-marked terminal division devoid of sucker, rep-
resenting the abdominal segments 7–10, virtually fused together. Macrosegments 
II–VI correspond to conventional abdominal segments 2–6, respectively, whereas 
macrosegment I results from the fusion of all head and thorax segments plus 
abdominal segment 1 (Hogue 1981).
Opposite is the case of cirripeds such as true barnacles (Balanus) and goose 
barnacles (Lepas). Here, the larval stages—the nauplius, in particular—have the 
general morphology of conventional crustacean larvae, whereas the adult devi-
ates so conspicuously from the crustacean body plan, that the real affinities of 
these animals were discovered only when their metamorphosis was observed and 
described (Thompson 1830, 1835). Similar is the history of Sacculina carcini. The 
early suggestion by Cavolini (1787), based on observing typical crustacean larvae 
being apparently generated by the non-descript, saclike parasitic adult, only gained 
substance one full century later, when Delage (1884) reconstructed this animal’s 
life cycle in satisfactory detail and eventually recognized Sacculina as a crusta-
cean, although deserving placement in a new order of its own (Kentrogonida) due 
to its being an extremely specialized morphological misfit.
From an evo-devo perspective, stage misfits such as blepharocerids and cir-
ripeds offer food for thought in addressing the question whether individual life 
stages should be regarded as homologues, i.e. as temporal (developmental) mod-
ules subjected to autonomous evolution. This thesis has been defended, in recent 
years, by Scholtz (2005, 2008). Prima facie, the circumstantial evidence pro-
vided by the stage misfits discussed here seems to support this view, but a word 
of caution is needed. Ontogenetic stages, and body parts alike, are likely to be, in 
the vast majority of cases, the compound outcome of only partially overlapping 
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developmental modules and functional/evolutionary modules. We cannot deter-
mine a priori how far a developmental unit (a stage) or an anatomical unit (an 
organ, or a body part such as a body segment) is to be interpreted in terms of mod-
ularity of developmental processes, or in terms of modularity of the phenotype as 
target of natural selection. The combined effects of ontogeny and evolution are 
clearly shown by all those patterns of change that Arthur (2011) has chosen to pre-
sent collectively under the suggestive term of developmental repatterning. These 
patterns are the subject of the next section.
3  Heterochrony, Heterotopy and Heterometry
Heterochrony, heterotopy and heterometry are three of the four kinds of develop-
mental repatterning (=developmental reprogramming sensu Arthur 2000, 2002) 
denoting evolutionary changes that have occurred through modifications in the tem-
poral, positional and quantitative (metric or meristic) aspects, respectively, of the 
ontogenetic production of individual body parts. A fourth kind, heterotypy, would 
encompass those changes where a body part is eventually replaced by a radically 
different structure. Of course, such a change can produce obvious morphological 
misfits, as in the case of millipede walking legs replaced by gonopods, but I prefer 
to keep such radical changes—of which we have already seen examples—under a 
separate heading. On a first sight at least, the other three kinds of change seem to 
result from a minor, purely quantitative tuning of developmental process; neverthe-
less, their outcome is often so conspicuous that the resulting phenotypes may easily 
fall into the broad class of the morphological misfits. This is most obvious when the 
‘reprogramming’ is pushed to such an extreme that a structural or functional limit is 
reached, beyond which a major reorganization is eventually required.
An extreme example of heterometry is offered by the female of the nematode 
Sphaerularia bombi, a parasite of bumblebees. In this tiny worm, up to 3 mm long, 
the mature reproductive system is monstrously hypertrophic, eventually becoming 
much bigger than the worm itself. The latter’s epidermis, and especially the tough 
cuticle, cannot be extended to adapt to the rapidly increasing volume of the repro-
ductive organs; therefore, a prolapse of the huge uterus occurs, and the uterus con-
tinues growing outside the worm’s body, until the latter ends up as a tiny external 
appendage of its own reproductive organs (Poinar and van der Laan 1972).
Heterochrony as a source of morphological novelty has been studied exten-
sively. Gould’s (1977) book on Ontogeny and Phylogeny provided both a detailed 
overview of previous work on this subject and a stimulus to further research, as 
witnessed by major works such as McNamara (1986, 1995), McKinney (1988), 
McKinney and McNamara (1991), followed by a more diversified approach, so 
diversified indeed that Gould (2000) felt eventually obliged to take distance from 
what he regarded as an unjustified application of the term to phenomena, or pat-
terns, other than those which he exclusively wanted to call heterochrony. Gould’s 
criticisms notwithstanding, the study of heterochrony has gained new momentum 
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since then, especially through the sequence heterochrony approach of Smith 
(2001, 2002, 2003), Jeffery et al. (2002a, b, 2005) and others. These modern 
approaches have not simply demonstrated the developmental modularity of ani-
mals with high structural complexity such as the vertebrates, but have additionally 
stimulated the development of quantitative tools for analysing it.
Heterotopy, that is, a change in the spatial localization of a body part in relation 
to the remaining of the body, is best illustrated by an example, the marine worm 
Sipunculus. This is a free-living creature with robust, nearly cylindrical body. Prior 
to closer inspection, we would expect it to have mouth and anus, respectively, 
at either end of the body; however, while the mouth is actually apical, the anus 
opens laterally, in the proximity of the mouth. This external oddity is the visible 
aspect of an internal feature, the unusual spatial arrangement of the digestive tube. 
The gut of Sipunculus is much longer than the body; thus, following a first seg-
ment running straight from the mouth towards the opposite body end, it coils onto 
itself in the anterior direction and then moves again in the posterior direction, to 
finally move back again, with further coils, until it eventually opens to the exte-
rior through the anteriorly localized anus. This arrangement shows the existence of 
two independently patterned modules: the external, strongly muscular body sack, 
with its obvious anteroposterior polarity corresponding to its cylindrical shape, 
and the internal gut, whose spatial arrangement is simply constrained by the space 
provided by the body cavity, within which it follows a spatial pattern independent 
from the geometry of the body sack (Minelli 2003).
4  Concluding Remarks: the Evolvability of Misfits
A correct phylogenetic positioning of morphological misfits is the first obligate 
step towards a tentative interpretation of their evolution. An important, further 
step is estimating how old is their divergence from their ‘normal’ relatives. The 
isolated phylogenetic position of chaetognaths and, to a lesser degree, of a plant-
like Welwitschia does not seem to offer interesting insights about the evolvability 
of their unique structures. Many other misfits, however, are certainly much more 
recent. Detailed studies are mostly lacking, but a guess is often possible about the 
age of their origin, considering the phylogenetic position of these taxa. Recently 
evolved misfits deserve to be the target of detailed studies, aimed at determin-
ing how major, but eventually successful, departures from ‘normal’ phenotypes 
can be accomplished in relatively few steps. There are perhaps so many ways to 
become a viable misfit as there are misfits around us, but this expectation, perhaps, 
will be demolished after a careful study of several cases. This study will be any-
way a rewarding contribution to our understanding of the intricacies of the geno-
type → phenotype map.
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Abstract In this review, we discuss the criteria for recognizing species and genera 
within the fossil record in general, and within the hominin clade in particular. We 
review the grade concept, suggest how taxa within the hominin clade can be divided 
into grades, and define the grade categories. We discuss the difficulties with study-
ing macroevolution in the hominin clade but suggest that at least one trait, brain 
size, may provide insight into the tempo and mode of evolution. We also review 
evidence suggesting that stasis is the dominant signal in two early hominin taxa that 
have substantial and well-dated fossil records. We discuss the role of evolutionary 
forces in forming macroevolutionary patterns and find that while natural selection 
appears to be the dominant force, some well-known interspecific and intraspecific 
differences in hominins may have been the result of random genetic drift. Lastly, 
we suggest that homoplasy makes generating reliable hypotheses about relation-
ships among early hominins more difficult than most researchers are willing to 
admit.
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Tempo
1  Preamble
In his 1944 book Tempo and mode in evolution, Simpson uses the criterion of 
 population continuity to distinguish micro- and macroevolution (Simpson 1944). He 
suggests that microevolution refers to “changes within potentially continuous popu-
lations” whose details can be revealed by “genetic experimentation” (ibid, p. 97). 
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In contrast, he suggests that macroevolution involves the “rise and divergence 
of taxonomic groups that are at or near the minimum level of genetic discontinu-
ity (species and genera)” (ibid, p. 98). Simpson (1953) later simplifies this by sug-
gesting that macroevolution involves historical changes “from species upwards,” 
whereas microevolution refers to historical change “within species” (ibid, p. 338).
Simpson credits Goldschmidt with introducing the term macroevolution 
(Simpson 1944, p. 97), but this is not correct. While it is true that Goldschmidt 
(1940) uses microevolution and macroevolution as the two major subheadings for 
his book The material basis of evolution, it seems that Dobzhansky (1937) intro-
duced macroevolution into the English language 3 years before Goldschmidt’s 
book was published. Dobzhansky, however, did not coin the term macroevolu-
tion. That distinction apparently rests with his teacher, the Russian geneticist, 
Filipčenko (aka Filipchenko or Philiptchenko) who used the Russian equivalent of 
macroevolution in 1934 in a text entitled Genetics of soft wheats.
Whereas Simpson (1944) had focused on genetic continuity as a criterion to 
distinguish micro- and macroevolution, Dobzhansky (1937) stressed the impor-
tance of temporal distinctions. Specifically, he referred to the differences between 
longer-term “macroevolutionary changes that require time on a geological scale” 
and shorter-term “microevolutionary processes” that are observable “within the 
span of a human lifetime” (ibid, p. 12). Levinton (2001) suggests that macroev-
olution is the sum of the processes that generate the “character-state transitions 
that diagnose evolutionary differences of major taxonomic rank” (ibid, p. 2), but 
Hallam’s (1989) “evolution at and above the species level” (ibid, p. 59) is a more 
typical contemporary definition of macroevolution.
If the species category is used as the definition of what is, or is not, macroevo-
lution, it raises problems for anyone reviewing that topic in the context of human 
evolution. This is because taxonomic hypotheses about the hominin clade run 
the gamut from those that recognize relatively few species (e.g., Wolpoff 1994) 
to those that are much more speciose (e.g., Wood 2010). Irrespective of their 
strengths and weaknesses, if the species is the rubicon that divides macroevolution 
from microevolution, then the type of taxonomic hypothesis that is adopted will 
have profound implications for what is included in a review of macroevolution 
in the hominin clade. This is because more inclusive interpretations of hominin 
species (i.e., “lumping” hypotheses) will result in substantial amounts of pheno-
typic evolution (e.g., an increase in brain size from c.600 cm3 to c.>1,300 cm3) 
being regarded as intraspecific, and if the definition of macroevolution is “evo-
lution at and above the species level,” then these changes would be regarded as 
microevolutionary and would be outside the purview of a review of macroevolu-
tion. In contrast, more exclusive interpretations of hominin species (i.e., “splitting” 
hypotheses) suggest that most phenotypic evolution within the hominin clade took 
place at the time of speciation, and thus, its discussion would be within the baili-
wick of a review that focuses on macroevolution.
Thus, instead of using “evolution at and above the species level” as the defini-
tion of macroevolution, we follow Dobzhansky (1937), and especially Eldredge 
(1989), who suggested that macroevolution always connotes “large-scale phenotypic 
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evolutionary change” (ibid, p. vii). We assume the following “broad-brush” distinc-
tion that macroevolution is what you can learn about evolution from the fossil record. 
So with respect to macroevolution in the hominin clade, we interpreted our remit as 
“what can be learned about human evolution from the hominin fossil record.”
In this review, we focus on the hominin clade and consider the following ques-
tions. What is its comparative context? What are the criteria for recognizing spe-
cies and genera within the hominin clade? Can the taxa within the hominin clade 
be usefully divided into grades, and if so how should they be defined? What evi-
dence is there about the tempo and mode of evolution within the hominin clade? 
Are morphological trends in the hominin clade the result of selection, or can they 
be explained by random drift? Lastly, we consider what is known about the rela-
tionships among its constituent taxa. Inevitably, there is overlap between these 
questions, but they provide a structure for the task allotted to us of reviewing mac-
roevolution in the hominin clade. Some of the topics included in the questions set 
out above have been addressed in our publications, so where appropriate, we point 
the reader to those publications rather than simply repeating arguments made else-
where. We do not cite references listed in those publications.
2  Context
Recent attempts to use gross morphological evidence to generate hypotheses 
about higher primate relationships (e.g., Gibbs et al. 2002; Diogo and Wood 
2011) have confirmed the close relationship between modern humans and the 
African apes suggested just over 150 years ago by Huxley (1863). During the first 
half of the twentieth century, the focus of the search for evidence about higher 
primate relationships shifted from evidence about gross morphology to evidence 
about the morphology of molecules (e.g., Grünbaum 1902; Nuttall et al. 1904). 
In the 1960s, two molecules, hemoglobin (Zuckerkandl et al. 1960) and albumin 
(Goodman 1963), were used to investigate the relationships among higher pri-
mates, and these studies concluded that chimpanzees were more closely related to 
modern humans than to gorillas. Sarich and Wilson (1967) came to a similar con-
clusion, and later, King and Wilson (1975) suggested that 99 % of the amino acid 
sequences of chimpanzee and modern human proteins were identical.
Initial attempts to compare the DNA of higher primates were crude 
(e.g., Caccone and Powell 1989); however, sequencing methods rapidly replaced 
hybridization as the preferred method for generating hypotheses about the rela-
tionships among extant hominoid taxa, and the number of sequence-based studies 
increases year by year (see Bradley 2008; Arnold et al. 2010; Perelman et al. 2011 
and Prado-Martinez et al. 2014 for reviews). When DNA differences were calibrated 
using what was then the best paleontological evidence for the split between apes 
and Old World monkeys, it was predicted that the hypothetical ancestor of mod-
ern humans and chimpanzees/bonobos lived between c.8 and c.5 million years ago 
(Ma) (Bradley 2008). However, these predictions are likely to yield different results 
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in light of the recent discovery of the Oligocene catarrhine Rukwapithecus fleaglei 
that may be a basal hominoid (Stevens et al. 2014). Langergraber et al. (2012) used 
comparative data about generation times and estimates of mutation rates and con-
cluded that the date of the Pan–Homo split is probably closer to 8 than to 5 Ma, but 
the results of a recent analysis of a larger data set (Prado-Martinez et al. 2014) that 
used different assumptions suggest that it is closer to 5 Ma.
Whole genomes can now be sequenced with acceptable levels of coverage, and 
in the last few years, researchers have published good-quality draft sequences of 
the genomes of the chimpanzee (TCSAC 2005), orangutan (Locke et al. 2011), 
gorilla (Scally et al. 2012), and bonobo. Scally et al. (2012) sampled two western 
lowland and one eastern lowland gorillas and showed that when considering the 
entire genome, the greatest number of similarities is between modern humans and 
chimpanzees, but in 30 % of the genome, gorillas are closer to modern humans 
and chimpanzees than they are to each other. This phenomenon is known as 
incomplete lineage sorting (ILS). The Prüfer et al. (2012) study showed that bono-
bos and common chimpanzees are 99.7 % alike, yet 98.7 % of the bonobo genome 
resembles that of modern humans. Prüfer et al. (2012) also found evidence of 
ILS in their study to the extent that c.3 % of the modern human genome is more 
closely related to bonobos or to common chimpanzees than bonobos and common 
chimpanzees are to each other, and they suggest that 25 % of all genes contain 
evidence of ILS. That said, a recent comparative study of 79 great ape genomes 
representing all six species emphasized that the presence of genetically distinct 
populations within each great ape species (Prado-Martinez et al. 2014) confirms 
that despite the effects of ILS, chimpanzees and bonobos are more closely related 
to modern humans than they are to gorillas. Thus, the comparative context of the 
hominin clade is the one set out in Fig. 1.
3  Criteria for Including Taxa Within the Hominin Clade
The reasons for including the c.7 Ma remains assigned to Sahelanthropus 
 tchadensis (Brunet et al. 2002; Guy et al. 2005), the c.6 Ma remains assigned 
to Orrorin tugenensis (Senut et al. 2001), the c.5.8–5.2 Ma remains assigned 
to Ardipithecus kaddaba (Haile-Selassie 2001, 2004), and the c.4.5–4.4 Ma 
remains assigned to Ardipithecus ramidus (White et al. 1994, 2009; White 
2010) in the hominin clade, differ according to what anatomical regions are 
represented. However, three common lines of evidence run through the claims 
for the hominin status of these taxa. The first involves a reduction in size and a 
change in morphology of the canines, which is linked with the partial or com-
plete loss of upper canine/P3 honing and reduced canine sexual dimorphism. The 
second involves the location and orientation of the foramen magnum and infer-
ences about posture and gait. The third involves features of the pelvis and other 
preserved postcranial elements that imply a dependence on bipedalism. In each 
case, the assumption is that these character complexes and their inferred behav-
iors are only seen in the hominin clade.
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The canine morphology that Ar. ramidus and S. tchadensis share with later 
hominins is the most convincing evidence to support their hominin status. But it is 
important to recognize that during the Late Miocene, a number of Eurasian homi-
nids (e.g., Oreopithecus, Ouranopithecus, and Gigantopithecus) also developed 
smaller canines and a reduction in canine–premolar honing. Presumably, these 
were parallel responses linked to analogous shifts in dietary behavior and there is 
no a priori reason to exclude the possibility that a similar behavioral and pheno-
typic response could have occurred in at least one extinct African hominid clade.
The anteriorly positioned and more horizontal foramen magnum seen in 
modern humans and later hominins compared to the extant great apes has been 
assumed to relate to the upright posture and bipedal locomotion of the former. 
However, comparisons with other primates suggest that these features may also be 
linked with differences in head carriage and relative brain size rather than uniquely 
with bipedalism (Strait 2001) and the differences in the position and orientation of 
the foramen magnum seen in bonobos and chimpanzees, and the overlap between 
the morphology of bonobos and that of Sahelanthropus and Ardipithecus sug-
gests that we should exercise caution before assuming that a relatively anteriorly 
Fig. 1  Current consensus of the phylogenetic relationships and splitting times within the great ape 
clade. The only Asian great ape, the orangutan (Pongo), which is likely to have split off from the 
African great apes c.11 million years, diverged into the Bornean (Pongo pygmaeus) and Sumatran 
(Pongo abelii) orangs c.1 million years ago. There have been two major and two minor splits in 
the African ape clade. The first major splitting event, the one leading to gorillas, occurred c.8 mil-
lion years ago. The second, leading to modern humans, occurred c.6 million years ago. The split 
within gorillas, into mountain (Gorilla beringei) and lowland (Gorilla gorilla), occurred c.2.5 mil-
lion years ago. The split within chimpanzees occurred c.2 million years ago when the Congo River 
divided the ancestral chimpanzee population into bonobos (Pan paniscus) to the south and common 
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to the north. The details of the subspecies, along with the timing of 
any splits, are more conjectural. Figure courtesy of Adam Gordon. Evidence for the phylogenetic 
relationships within the extant great ape genera is drawn from a variety of sources (Pan: Groves 
2005; Gonder et al. 2011; Gorilla: Groves 2001; Scally et al. 2012; Pongo: Brandon-Jones et al. 
2004; Singleton et al. 2004; Locke et al. 2011; Prado-Martinez et al. 2014)
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positioned and more horizontal foramen magnum is linked exclusively with the 
adoption of habitual bipedalism.
The postcranial evidence for bipedalism in Ardipithecus kadabba mainly 
involves the morphology of a proximal pedal phalanx (presumed to belong to Ar. 
kadabba, but from an older geological horizon and with no associated craniodental 
remains), whereas in O. tugenensis, the evidence mainly involves the morphology 
of the proximal femur. The case for the femur being that of a committed biped 
is much stronger than the case for the pedal phalanx. The claim that Ar. ramidus 
was a biped is mainly based on highly speculative inferences about the presence 
of lumbar lordosis and on a few features of the pelvis and foot, but the claims 
are either based on questionable reconstructions, or they involve characters whose 
link to habitual bipedalism has yet to be convincingly demonstrated.
Researchers that support hominin status for S. tchadensis, O. tugenensis, Ar. 
kaddaba, and Ar. ramidus do so on the assumption that within the great apes, canine 
honing and bipedalism are confined to the hominin clade. We believe that their 
assumption is a logical fallacy. For even if all hominins are bipedal and lack canine 
honing, the converse proposition–that among the great apes bipedalism and the loss 
of canine honing are confined to the hominin clade–is not a logical corollary.
How strong are the cases for each of the four taxa being hominins? The argu-
ment for including Ar. kaddaba in the hominin clade at the present time is a par-
ticularly weak one. Its teeth are apelike, and because of the sparse fossil record, 
there is not enough evidence to be sure it is a committed biped. As for O. tugenen-
sis, although the external morphology of the proximal femur is consistent with it 
being bipedal, the evidence from the internal morphology of the femoral neck is 
equivocal. The morphological evidence that S. tchadensis and Ar. ramidus should 
be included in the hominin clade is stronger, but is not compelling for either taxon. 
In addition, their age is against them being hominins. In the case of S. tchadensis, 
if the more recent splitting c.5 Ma times are correct, then if it is c.7 Ma it is too 
early for it to be the stem hominin. In the case of Ar. ramidus, if both it and the 
c.4.2 Ma Australopithecus anamensis are lineal ancestors of later hominins, as its 
discoverers claim, then there is simply too little time for the cranial and postcranial 
morphology of the former to evolve into the latter. Also, if the 3.4 Ma foot with an 
abducted hallux from the Burtele locality at Woranso-Mille belongs to Ar. ramidus, 
then the “ancestral” scenario is even less likely. Thus, for these reasons, one of us 
has referred to S. tchadensis, O. tugenensis, Ar. kaddaba, and Ar. ramidus as “pos-
sible hominins” (e.g., Wood 2010) and this is how we refer to them in this review.
4  Hominin Alpha Taxonomy
The definition of taxonomic categories is a vexed issue. With respect to the spe-
cies category, Smith (2009) usefully divides contemporary species concepts into 
process related and pattern related, with the former emphasizing the processes 
involved in the generation and maintenance of species, while the latter empha-
sizes the methods used for recognizing species in the fossil record. The three main 
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concepts in the process category are the biological species concept (BSC), the 
evolutionary species concept (ESC), and the recognition species concept (RSC). 
The ESC was an attempt by Simpson (1961) to add a temporal dimension to the 
BSC; thus, he suggested that under the ESC, a species is “an ancestral-descendant 
sequence of populations evolving separately from others and with its own evolu-
tionary role and tendencies.” Some use the term chronospecies to refer to a seg-
ment of the type of evolving lineage implied in the ESC definition of a species. 
Such segments are considered separate species because the fossil sample across 
time is deemed to exceed the degree or the pattern of variation that it would be 
reasonable to find within closely related, living species. The third concept in the 
process-related category, the recognition species concept, instead of emphasiz-
ing reproductive isolation, emphasizes the process that promotes interbreed-
ing. Paterson (1985) refers to this as the “specific mate recognition system” (or 
SMRS), and as long as a species’ SMRS signal fossilizes, the RSC can potentially 
be applied to the fossil record.
Given the twin impediments of having no direct evidence about  interbreeding, 
and with only fragments of the hard tissue skeleton and the dentition as 
evidence, how are species recognized in the hominin fossil record? There are 
two main pattern-based species concepts, the phenetic species concept (PeSC) 
and the phylogenetic species concept (PySC). The PeSC gives equal weight 
to all aspects of the phenotype by assembling a matrix of characters and then 
uses multivariate analysis to detect clusters of individual specimens that share 
similar phenotypes. The PySC differs from the PeSC by emphasizing only the 
 diagnostic aspects of the phenotype. According to Nixon and Wheeler (1990), 
a species defined under the PySC is “the smallest aggregation of populations 
diagnosable by a unique combination of character states.”
In practice, most human evolution researchers use a version of the PySC in the 
sense that they search for the smallest cluster of individual organisms that is “diag-
nosable” on the basis of the preserved morphology. Because the hominin fossil 
record consists primarily of craniodental remains, most diagnoses of early homi-
nin taxa inevitably emphasize craniodental morphology. Thus, using this evidence, 
paleoanthropologists must decide whether a collection of hominin fossils spanning 
several hundred thousand years consists of several samples of the same taxon, or 
samples of different taxa. When making these judgments, researchers should strive 
to neither grossly underestimate, nor extravagantly overestimate, the actual num-
ber of species represented in the hominin fossil record.
One of the many factors that paleoanthropologists must take into account in 
addition to the time represented in their sample is that the fossil record is pre-
dominantly confined to remains of hard tissues (i.e., bones and teeth). We know 
from living animals that many uncontested species are difficult to distinguish 
using bones and teeth (e.g., Cercopithecus species—see Manaster 1979); thus, 
there are sound, logical reasons to suspect that a hard tissue-bound fossil record 
is always likely to underestimate the number of species. Furthermore, if a punctu-
ated equilibrium model of evolution is adopted along with a branching or cladoge-
netic interpretation of the fossil record (see below), then researchers will tend to 
divide the hominin fossil record into more rather than fewer species. Conversely, 
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researchers who favor a phyletic gradualism model, which implies an anagenetic 
interpretation of evolution and emphasizes morphological continuity, will tend to 
resolve the hominin fossil record into fewer, more inclusive, longer-lived species 
that are more likely to show substantial changes in morphology through time.
Eldredge (1993) made a proposal about how to view the species category that is 
both intuitive and appealing. He suggested that species, like individuals, have a history. 
The history of any species begins at the point of speciation when it and its sister taxon 
(or taxa) arise from a common ancestor and ends when it becomes extinct or becomes 
the common ancestor of daughter taxa. Eldredge also acknowledges the reality that 
the morphological characteristics of a living species or of an evolutionary lineage are 
never uniformly distributed across its range, and like Sewall Wright, Eldredge is pre-
pared to recognize the existence of distinctive local populations or demes. Related 
demes would share the same SMRS, but Eldredge suggests that their morphological 
distinctiveness could in some cases justify them being regarded as separate species. 
He also acknowledges that the same logic could be applied to lineage chronospecies 
on the basis that the number of cladogenetic events during evolutionary history is more 
likely to be underestimated than overestimated. Thus, within the fossil record, it may 
be possible to identify several paleospecies (sensu Cain, 1954) within the equivalent of 
a neontological BSC/RSC-type species. For many reasons, some of which are set out 
above, in this review, we use a relatively speciose taxonomic hypothesis (Table 1).
The genus is even more an elusive taxonomic category than the species, but for 
various reasons, we accept the proposal that a genus should be both a clade and a 
grade. To qualify as a clade, the prospective genus must consist of all the mem-
bers of a monophyletic group, no more and no less. But not all of the species in 
the same grade have to be in the same genus, for a grade may contain species 
belonging to more than one monophyletic group. We have divided the species we 
recognize in the hominin fossil record into genera, but because we are generally 
skeptical about our ability to recognize subclades within the hominin clade, our 
genus-level distinctions are based more on evidence about grade distinctions (see 
below) than on hypotheses about relationships.
5  Differences Between Modern Humans and 
Chimpanzees/Bonobos
The features that set modern humans apart from chimpanzees and bonobos, and 
which can be tracked using a hard tissue-bound fossil record, are to do with crani-
odental morphology, axial and postcranial morphology, and life history.
With respect to dental morphology, chimpanzees and bonobos have larger canine 
and incisor teeth than modern humans, but if the size of the premolar and molar 
teeth is related to body mass, then the chewing teeth of chimpanzees/bonobos and 
modern humans are similar in relative size. However, the jaws of a modern human 
skull are generally, but not in all cases, smaller and lighter than those of chimpan-
zees and bonobos.
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Table 1  The “old” taxonomy below reflects the pre-molecular consensus that chimpanzees and 




     Genus Hylobates
Family Pongidae (pongids)
     Genus Pongo
     Genus Gorilla
     Genus Pan
Family Hominidae (hominids)
  Subfamily Australopithecinae (possible and archaic hominins)
     Genus Ardipithecus
     Genus Australopithecus
     Genus Kenyanthropus
     Genus Orrorin
     Genus Paranthropus
     Genus Sahelanthropus
  Subfamily Homininae (hominines)




     Genus Hylobates
Family Hominidae (hominids)
  Subfamily Ponginae
     Genus Pongo (pongines)
  Subfamily Gorillinae
     Genus Gorilla (gorillines)
  Subfamily Homininae (hominines)
   Tribe Panini
     Genus Pan (panins)
   Tribe Hominini (hominins)
    Subtribe Australopithecina (possible and archaic hominins)
     Genus Ardipithecus
      Ardipithecus ramidus (White et al., 1994) White et al., 1995
Ardipithecus kaddaba HaileSelassie, 2001
     Genus Australopithecus
      Australopithecus africanus Dart, 1925
      Australopithecus afarensis Johanson, 1978
      Australopithecus anamensis Leakey et al., 1995
      Australopithecus bahrelghazali Brunet et al., 1996
      Australopithecus garhi Asfaw et al., 1999
      Australopithecus sediba Berger et al., 2010
     Genus Kenyanthropus
(continued)
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With respect to the cranium, modern human brains are not just absolutely larger 
than those of chimpanzees/bonobos, but they are also larger relative to body mass. 
The modern human cranium has a relatively smaller face, and the cranium is more 
evenly balanced on the vertebral column. The foramen magnum is close to the 
middle of the cranial base in modern humans, whereas in common chimpanzees, it 
is situated more posteriorly, although bonobos have a more anterior foramen mag-
num than do common chimpanzees.
With regard to the axial skeleton, the chest is differently shaped in modern 
humans and in chimpanzees/bonobos. The thorax of chimpanzees/bonobos wid-
ens toward the base to accommodate their relatively large gut. The thorax of 
modern humans is uniform in width from top to bottom, and flatter from front to 
back, with the shoulder blades rotated around to the back so that they lie closer to 
the vertebral column. With respect to the vertebral column, there is a difference 
between modern humans and chimpanzees/bonobos in how thoracic and lum-
bar vertebrae contribute to trunk length. In modern humans, the dominant modal 
pattern for thoracic and lumbar vertebrae is 12:5, whereas in P. troglodytes and 
In this taxonomy, modern humans, and all of the taxa thought to be more closely related to mod-
ern humans than to any other living taxon, are distinguished at the level of the family as the 
Hominidae. The “new” taxonomic hypothesis set out above is one of several ways that research-
ers reflect the overwhelming molecular and morphological evidence that modern humans and 
chimpanzees and bonobos are more closely related to each other than chimpanzees and bonobos 
are to gorillas. In this taxonomy, modern humans, and all of the taxa thought to be more closely 
related to modern humans than to any other living taxon, are distinguished at the level of the 
tribe as the Hominini. Some researchers consider even this level of distinction too much and they 
prefer to reduce hominins to a subtribe as the Hominina. In this second, “new” taxonomy, we list 
fossil hominin species under each genus in the order they were established
Table 1  (continued)
      Kenyanthropus platyops Leakey et al., 2001
     Genus Orrorin
Orrorin tugenensis Senut et al., 2001
     Genus Paranthropus
      Paranthropus robustus Broom, 1938
      Paranthropus boisei Leakey, 1959; Robinson, 1960
      Paranthropus aethiopicus Arambourg, 1968
     Genus Sahelanthropus
      Sahelanthropus tchadensis Brunet et al., 2002
    Subtribe Hominina (hominans)
     Genus Homo
      Homo sapiens Linnaeus, 1745
      Homo neanderthalensis King, 1864
      Homo erectus Dubois, 1893; Weidenreich, 1940
      Homo heidelbergensis Schoetensack, 1908
      Homo habilis Leakey, Tobias and Napier, 1964
      Homo rudolfensis (Alexeev, 1986) sensu Wood, 1992
      Homo antecessor Bermúdez de Castro et al., 1997
      Homo floresiensis Brown et al., 2004
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P. paniscus, it is 13:4, with P. troglodytes averaging 13.1 thoracic and 3.6 lumbar 
vertebrae and P. paniscus averaging 13.4 thoracic and 3.8 lumbar vertebrae.
Postcranially, the longer and more mobile modern human thumb enables it 
to meet the tips of the fingers to make a precise “pinch” grip. In addition to the 
 evident differences in the structure of the hand, it is likely that a neurological control 
component (e.g., motor unit size) accounts for the differences in dexterity between 
 modern humans and chimpanzees/bonobos. Modern human adult locomotion is 
almost exclusively bipedal and thus contrasts with the predominantly quadrupedal 
locomotion of chimpanzees and bonobos. These differences are reflected in the 
morphology of the pelvic girdle and lower back, knee, ankle, and foot and in 
the disposition of the muscles connecting the lower limb to the pelvis and trunk. 
The modern human pelvis is arranged so that the body can be held upright with the 
body mass being supported on the hind limbs alone. The upper limbs of modern 
humans are relatively shorter than those of chimpanzees and bonobos, whereas the 
legs of modern humans are relatively longer than those of chimpanzees/bonobos. 
There are also differences in the foot, with the modern human foot creating a more 
stable platform than it does in chimpanzees and bonobos.
In addition, there are differences in the rate that the body grows and in the order 
in which structures appear. Modern humans reach maturity more slowly than do 
chimpanzees and bonobos, they erupt their teeth in a different order, and in mod-
ern humans, the milk, or deciduous, molars wear out before the adult molars have 
erupted.
6  Reconstructing Hypothetical Common Ancestors
The task of paleoanthropologists is to use the fossil record to try and trace the evolu-
tionary history of the differences reviewed above back into the tree of life. This task 
is made more difficult because we can be sure that the differences between the earli-
est hominins and the Late Miocene ancestors of chimpanzees and bonobos are likely 
to have been more subtle and difficult to discern than the differences between mod-
ern humans and chimpanzees/bonobos. Some of the distinctive features of modern 
humans, such as those linked with obligate bipedalism, can be traced back a long 
way. Others, such as the relatively diminutive jaws and chewing teeth of modern 
humans, were acquired more recently and thus cannot be used to tell the difference 
between early hominins and potential ape ancestors. There is also reasonably sound 
evidence that at least two early hominin genera, Australopithecus and Paranthropus, 
had absolutely and relatively larger chewing teeth than did pre-modern Homo. Thus, 
even though absolutely and relatively larger chewing teeth (known as postcanine 
megadontia) may have been an important derived feature of early hominins, this trait 
has been reversed in the later stages of human evolution. Presently, we do not have 
sufficient information about the earliest stages of hominin evolution, or about fossil 
apes, to tell whether postcanine megadontia is confined to hominins.
So, given all of these caveats, how do we go about telling a c.5-6 million 
years old hominin from an early panin, or from a taxon that belongs to a closely 
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related clade that has no living representative? The presumption based on par-
simony is that taxa at the base of the panin clade (stem panins) would show little 
change from the presumed morphology of the hypothetical common ancestor of 
chimpanzees/bonobos and modern humans. Thus, they would have had projecting 
faces, jaws with relatively small chewing teeth, large, sexually dimorphic, honed 
canine teeth, and a locomotor system adapted for arboreal quadrupedalism. In con-
trast, taxa at the base of the hominin clade (stem hominins) would have been distin-
guished by cranial and other skeletal adaptations to a predominantly upright posture, 
and skeletal and other adaptations for a locomotor strategy that includes substantial 
bouts of bipedalism. These features would be combined with a masticatory appara-
tus that combines relatively large chewing teeth and modest-sized canines.
7  The Case for Grades Within the Hominin Clade
The reconstructions of the hypothetical common ancestors set out above are all 
working hypotheses that need to be reviewed and tested as appropriate evidence 
is uncovered and new methods for reconstructing ancestral states are developed. 
In the meantime, can we detect any trends in cranial, dental, and postcranial mor-
phology that allow the extinct hominin taxa to be sorted into informal groupings 
that reflect their adaptation? In other words, can we sort them into grades?
Taxa, including extinct hominins, are put in the same grade if they share morphol-
ogy that suggests they eat the same sorts of foods and share the same posture and 
mode of locomotion; no store is set by how they came by those behaviors. The judg-
ment about how different two diets or two locomotor strategies have to be before the 
taxa being scrutinized are considered to belong to different grades is a subjective one, 
but until we can be sure we have access to ways of generating reliable hypotheses 
about the relationships among hominin taxa (i.e., about the nature of the subclades 
within the hominin clade), the grade concept helps sort taxa into broad functional cat-
egories. We use five grades in this review, “anatomically modern Homo” (the grade 
that includes modern humans), “pre-modern Homo,” “transitional hominins,” “archaic 
hominins,” and “megadont and hyper-megadont archaic hominins” (Fig. 2). In the 
following sections, we describe each grade in terms of its characteristic regional mor-
phology (e.g., brain volume, tooth morphology, limb proportions, and postcranial 
morphology). Within each grade, we describe the species in the historical order the 
taxa were recognized, not according to their estimated first appearance datum.
7.1  Anatomically Modern Homo 
This grade includes hominin fossil evidence that is not significantly differ-
ent from the morphology found in at least one regional population of mod-
ern humans. Presently, the earliest evidence of anatomically modern human 
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morphology in the fossil record comes from Omo Kibish in Ethiopia. Elsewhere 
in Africa, there is evidence of crania (e.g., Jebel Irhoud from North Africa, 
Laetoli 18 from East Africa, and Florisbad and the Cave of Hearths from southern 
Africa) that are generally more robust and archaic looking than those of anatomi-
cally modern humans, yet they are not archaic or derived enough to justify being 
allocated to Homo heidelbergensis or to Homo neanderthalensis. The gradual and 
incremental nature of the morphological change between Homo heidelbergensis 
and anatomically modern humans makes setting the boundary between these two 
taxa challenging, but variation in the later Homo fossil record is too great to be 
accommodated in a single taxon (Mounier et al. 2009). Researchers who make 
a distinction between subrecent and living modern humans and fossils such as 
Florisbad and Laetoli 18 do so by formally by referring the latter specimens to a 
separate species, Homo helmei Dreyer, 1935, or informally by referring to them 
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Fig. 2  Taxa recognized in a speciose hominin taxonomy sorted into six grades. In the case of 
taxa where there are well-dated horizons at several sites, the height of the column reflects cur-
rent evidence about the earliest and the most recent fossil evidence of that taxon. For taxa known 
from a well-dated horizon at a single site, the height of the column reflects the age of that hori-
zon. For some taxa, the height of the column is a reflection of uncertainty about the age of that 
taxon. The height of the column for the Denisovans reflects the age of the only known fossil 
evidence
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7.2  Pre-Modern Homo
This very broad grade grouping includes Pleistocene Homo taxa that lack the 
distinctive size and shape of the modern human cranium and the gracility of the 
modern human postcranial skeleton, but all of the included taxa have postcranial 
morphology that is consistent with obligate bipedalism. The teeth are generally 
larger and the jaws more robust than those of anatomically modern Homo. What 
makes this a particularly broad grouping is the wide range of absolute brain size 
(c.600–c.>1,300 cm3).
The first fossil taxon to be recognized in the pre-modern Homo grade is Homo 
neanderthalensis King 1864, whose temporal range is c.200–28 ka (but if the 
Sima de los Huesos material is included, then it is c.>400–28 ka). The type speci-
men, the Neanderthal 1 skeleton, was found in 1856 at the Kleine Feldhofer Grotte 
in Elberfeld, Germany, and fossil evidence for H. neanderthalensis has since been 
found in Europe as well as in the Near East, the Levant and Western and Central 
Asia. The distinctive features of the cranium of H. neanderthalensis include thick, 
double-arched brow ridges, a face that projects anteriorly in the midline, a large 
nose, laterally projecting and rounded parietal bones, and a rounded, posteriorly pro-
jecting occipital bone. Mandibular and dental features include a retromolar space, 
distinctively high incidences of some non-metrical mandibular and dental traits, 
and thinner tooth enamel than in modern humans. The average endocranial volume 
of H. neanderthalensis is larger than that of living modern humans. Postcranially, 
H. neanderthalensis individuals were stout with a broad rib cage, a long clavicle, a 
wide pelvis, and limb bones that are generally robust, with large joint surface areas. 
The distal extremities tend to be short compared to most modern Homo sapiens, and 
the generally well-marked muscle attachments and robust long bone shafts point to 
a strenuous lifestyle. Some researchers restrict the H. neanderthalensis hypodigm 
to fossils from Europe and the Near East that used to be referred to as “Classic” 
Neanderthals, but others interpret the taxon more inclusively and include fossil evi-
dence that is generally older and less distinctive (e.g., Steinheim, Swanscombe and 
from the Sima de los Huesos). The first DNA recovered from a fossil hominin was 
from the type specimen of H. neanderthalensis.
The next fossil hominin taxon in the pre-modern Homo grade to be discov-
ered was Homo erectus (Dubois 1893) Weidenreich 1940. Its temporal range is 
c.1.8 Ma–c.30 ka. The initial discovery at Kedung Brubus was made in 1890, but 
the type specimen was recovered in 1891 from Trinil. Homo erectus is known 
from sites in Indonesia (e.g., Trinil, Sangiran, Sambungmachan), China (e.g., 
Zhoukoudian, Lantian), Africa (e.g., Olduvai Gorge, Melka-Kunturé), and pos-
sibly the Caucasus (Dmanisi). The fossil record of H. erectus is dominated by 
cranial remains, and while there is some postcranial evidence (mainly femora), 
there are very few hand and foot fossils. Homo erectus crania have a low vault, a 
continuous supraorbital torus, a sharply angulated occipital region, and relatively 
thick inner and outer tables of the cranial vault. The body of the mandible is more 
robust than that of H. sapiens, it lacks a chin, and the mandibular tooth crowns 
are generally larger and the roots of the premolars more complex than those of 
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modern humans. The limb proportions of H. erectus are similar to those of mod-
ern humans, but the shafts of the long bones of the lower limb are flatter (the 
femur from front to back and the tibia from side to side) relative to those of mod-
ern humans. Overall, the cortical bone of H. erectus is thicker than that in modern 
humans. All of the dental and cranial evidence points to a modern humanlike diet 
for H. erectus, and the postcranial elements are consistent with an upright posture 
and obligate bipedalism. Those who support Homo ergaster Groves and Mazák 
1975 as a separate species point to features that are more primitive (e.g., mandibu-
lar premolar root and crown morphology and, vault and cranial base morphology) 
than H. erectus. However, most researchers are not convinced that there are suf-
ficient consistent differences between the hypodigms of H. ergaster and H. erectus 
to justify the former being a separate species.
After H. erectus, the next taxon recognized within the pre-modern Homo grade 
was Homo heidelbergensis Schoetensack 1908. Although the type specimen, 
Mauer 1, was an adult mandible found in 1907 in a sand quarry near Heidelberg, 
Germany, c.600–100 ka fossils from sites in Europe (e.g., Petralona), the Near 
East (e.g., Zuttiyeh), Africa (e.g., Kabwe, Bodo), China (e.g., Dali, Jinniushan, 
Xujiayao, Yunxian), and possibly India (Hathnora) have been included in H. hei-
delbergensis. What sets this material apart from H. sapiens and H. neandertha-
lensis is its cranial morphology and robusticity of the postcranial skeleton. Some 
H. heidelbergensis specimens have endocranial volumes as large as those of 
modern humans, but they are always more robustly built with a thickened occipi-
tal region and a projecting face and with large separate ridges above the orbits. 
Researchers who see the African part of this hypodigm as distinctive refer it to 
a separate species, Homo rhodesiensis. Researchers who interpret the European 
component of the H. heidelbergensis hypodigm (e.g., Sima de los Huesos) as 
already showing signs of H. neanderthalensis autapomorphies would sink it into 
the latter taxon.
The taxon Homo antecessor Bermúdez de Castro et al. 1997 was introduced for 
hominins recovered from the Gran Dolina site at Atapuerca, Spain. The research-
ers who found the remains claim that the combination of a modern humanlike 
facial morphology with large and relatively primitive tooth crowns and roots is not 
seen in H. heidelbergensis, and they see H. antecessor and not H. heidelbergensis 
as the likely recent common ancestor of H. neanderthalensis and H. sapiens.
The most recent taxon to be added to pre-modern Homo is Homo floresiensis 
Brown et al. 2004. It is currently only known from Liang Bua, a cave in Flores. 
Its published temporal range is c.74–17 ka, but it may be closer to 100 ka. The 
initial discovery and type specimen is LB1, an associated partial adult skeleton, 
but a second associated skeleton, and close to a hundred separate fossils represent-
ing up to 10 individuals have subsequently been recovered. This hominin displays 
a unique combination of early Homo-like cranial and dental morphology, a hith-
erto unknown suite of pelvic and femoral features, a small brain (c.417 cm3), a 
small body mass (25–30 kg), and small stature (1 m). When it was first described, 
researchers interpreted it as Homo erectus, or a Homo erectus-like taxon that had 
undergone endemic dwarfing; however, more recently, researchers have suggested 
that it could be a dwarfed Homo habilis-like transitional hominin.
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7.3  Transitional Hominins
For the purposes of this review, H. habilis and H. rudolfensis are retained within 
Homo, but they are treated separately from the pre-modern Homo grade. This is 
because the fossils assigned to these taxa show a mix of morphology, some of 
which is seen in pre-modern Homo and some in archaic hominins.
The taxon Homo habilis Leakey, Tobias and Napier 1964 was introduced for 
fossils recovered from Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania. The rest of the H. habilis hypod-
igm consists of other fossils found at Olduvai Gorge and of fossils from Ethiopia 
(Omo Shungura and Hadar) and Kenya (Koobi Fora and perhaps Chemeron), 
and researchers have claimed that there is also evidence of H. habilis in southern 
Africa at Sterkfontein, Swartkrans, and Drimolen. The H. habilis hypodigm con-
sists of mostly cranial and dental evidence. The endocranial volume of H. habilis 
ranges from c.500 cm3 to c.700 cm3—but a reassessment of the endocranial vol-
ume of OH 7 suggests that it may be closer to 800 cm3. All H. habilis crania are 
wider at the base than across the vault, but the face is broadest in its upper part. 
The only postcranial fossils that can be assigned to H. habilis with confidence are 
the postcranial bones associated with the type specimen, OH 7, and the associated 
skeleton, OH 62: isolated postcranial bones from Olduvai Gorge assigned to H. 
habilis (e.g., OH 10) could also belong to P. boisei. If OH 62 is representative of 
H. habilis, the skeletal evidence suggests that its limb proportions and locomotion 
and carpal bones were archaic hominin-like, and the curvature and well-developed 
muscle markings on the phalanges of OH 7 indicate that H. habilis was capable of 
powerful grasping. The size of the mandible and postcanine teeth suggests that the 
diet of H. habilis was as mechanically demanding as that of archaic hominins. The 
inference that H. habilis used spoken language is based on links between endocra-
nial morphology and language comprehension and production that are no longer 
supported by comparative evidence.The temporal range of H. habilis would be 
c.2.4–1.6 Ma.
Some researchers suggest that the transitional hominin grade contains a second 
taxon, Homo rudolfensis (Alexeev, 1986) sensu Wood 1992, but not all researchers 
are convinced that the scale and nature of the variation within early Homo justifies 
the recognition of two taxa. The temporal range of H. rudolfensis would be c.2.0-
1.8 Ma., and members of the proposed hypodigm include the lectotype, the KNM-
ER 1470 cranium from Koobi Fora, and other fossils recovered from Koobi Fora 
(e.g., KNM-ER 1482, 1801, 1590, 3732, 60000, 62000, 62003). Compared to H. 
habilis, the absolute size of the brain case in H. rudolfensis is a little greater, and 
its face is widest in its mid-part, whereas the face of H. habilis is widest superiorly, 
and the dental arcades are differently shaped. Despite the mean absolute size of the 
H. rudolfensis brain (c.725 cm3), when it is related to estimates of body mass based 
on orbit size, the brain is not substantially larger than that of the archaic hominins. 
At present, no postcranial remains can be reliably linked with H. rudolfensis. As 
with H. habilis, the size of the mandible and postcanine teeth suggests that its diet 
made similar mechanical demands as that of the archaic hominins.
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7.4  Archaic Hominins
This grade includes all the unambiguously hominin taxa not included in Homo 
and Paranthropus. All archaic hominins, no matter what their absolute size is, 
have relatively larger chewing teeth and a more primitive postcranial skeleton than 
pre-modern Homo. They were all likely to be predominantly bipedal, but unlike 
pre-modern Homo, the anatomy of their upper limb suggests that they were still 
effective and regular climbers. What is known of the life history of archaic homi-
nins suggests that it is more like that of the extant apes than modern humans.
The first taxon to be recognized in this grade was Australopithecus africanus 
Dart 1925. The type specimen, Taung 1, a juvenile skull with a partial natural 
endocast, was recovered in 1924 from the limeworks at Taung (formerly Taungs), 
now in South Africa. Most of the other fossil evidence for Au. africanus comes 
from two caves, Sterkfontein and Makapansgat, with other evidence coming from 
Gladysvale cave. Its temporal range is c.3–2.4 Ma. The cranium, mandible, and 
the dentition are well sampled, but the postcranial skeleton, and particularly the 
axial skeleton, is less well represented in the fossil record, and many of the fossils 
that do exist have been crushed and deformed by rocks falling on the bones before 
they were fully fossilized. The picture that has emerged from morphological and 
functional analyses suggests that although Au. africanus was capable of walking 
bipedally, it was probably more arboreally adapted (i.e., it was a facultative and 
not an obligate biped) than other archaic hominin taxa such as Australopithecus 
afarensis. It had relatively large chewing teeth, and apart from the reduced 
canines, the skull is relatively apelike. Its mean endocranial volume is c.460 cm3. 
The Sterkfontein evidence suggests that males and females of Au. africanus dif-
fered substantially in body size, but probably not to the degree they did in Au. 
afarensis.
The taxon Australopithecus afarensis Johanson et al. 1978 is only known 
from East Africa, unless Australopithecus bahrelghazali from Chad proves to be 
a conspecific. The type specimen is an adult mandible, LH 4, recovered in 1974 
from Laetoli, Tanzania, but the largest contribution to the Au. afarensis hypod-
igm comes from Hadar in Ethiopia and from other Ethiopian (Belohdelie, Brown 
Sands, Dikika, Fejej, Maka, White Sands, and Woranso-Mille) and Kenyan (Allia 
Bay, Koobi Fora, Tabarin and West Turkana) sites. The temporal range of Au. 
afarensis is c.3.8–3 Ma (c.4 -3 Ma if the presence of Au. afarensis is confirmed 
at Belohdelie and Fejej). The Au. afarensis hypodigm includes a well-preserved 
skull, other skulls, partial and fragmented crania, many lower jaws, sufficient 
limb bones to be able to estimate stature and body mass, and a specimen, A.L.-
288, that preserves just less than half of the skeleton of a small adult female. 
Most body mass estimates range from c.30 to 45 kg, and the endocranial volume 
of Au. afarensis is c.400–550 cm3. It has smaller incisors than those of extant 
chimps/bonobos, but its premolars and molars are relatively larger. Comparative 
evidence suggests that the forelimbs of A.L.-288 are substantially longer than 
those of a modern human of similar stature. The discovery at Laetoli of several 
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trails of fossil footprints provided very graphic direct evidence that at least one 
contemporary hominin, presumably Au. afarensis, but possibly Kenyanthropus 
platyops, was capable of bipedal locomotion, but the Laetoli prints are less mod-
ern humanlike than c.1.5 Ma footprints from Koobi Fora presumed to be made by 
a pre-modern Homo. The upper limb of Au. afarensis, especially the hand and the 
shoulder girdle, retains morphology that most likely reflects a significant element 
of climbing. Although a recent study argues that sexual dimorphism in this taxon 
is relatively poorly developed, most researchers interpret it as showing substantial 
sexual dimorphism.
The taxon Au. anamensis (Leakey et al. 1995) is presently restricted to East 
Africa. The type specimen, KNM-KP 29281, was recovered in 1994 from 
Kanapoi, Kenya. Other sites contributing to the hypodigm are Allia Bay, also in 
Kenya, and the Middle Awash study area, Ethiopia. The temporal range of Au. 
anamensis is c.4.2–3.9 Ma. The fossil evidence consists of jaws, teeth, and post-
cranial elements from the upper and lower limbs. Most of the differences between 
Au. anamensis and Au. afarensis relate to details of the dentition. In some respects, 
the teeth of Au. anamensis are more primitive than those of Au. afarensis (e.g., 
the asymmetry of the premolar crowns and the relatively simple crowns of the 
deciduous first mandibular molars), but in others (e.g., the low cross-sectional 
profiles and bulging sides of the molar crowns), they show some similarities to 
Paranthropus. The upper limb remains are similar to those of Au. afarensis, and a 
tibia attributed to Au. anamensis has features associated with bipedality.
The taxon Australopithecus bahrelghazali Brunet et al. 1996 is most likely a 
regional variant of Au. afarensis, but the Chad discovery is significant because it 
substantially extends the geographical range of early hominins and reminds us 
that important events in human evolution (e.g., speciation, extinction) may have 
been taking place well away from the very small (relative to the size of the African 
continent) percentage of the land surface of Africa that is sampled by the existing 
early hominin sites.
The penultimate archaic hominin taxon to be recognized is Kenyanthropus 
platyops Leakey et al. 2001. The type specimen, KNM-WT 40000, a c.3.5–3.3 Ma 
relatively complete but distorted cranium, was found in 1999 at Lomekwi, West 
Turkana, Kenya. The main reasons Meave Leakey and her colleagues did not 
assign this material to Au. afarensis are its reduced subnasal prognathism, anteri-
orly situated zygomatic root, flat and vertically orientated malar region, relatively 
small but thick-enameled molars, and the unusually small M1 compared to the 
size of the P4 and M3. Despite this unique combination of facial and dental mor-
phology, some suggest that the new taxon is not justified because they claim that 
KNM-WT 40000 is a distorted Au. afarensis cranium, but this explanation is not 
consistent with the shape of the face and the small size of the postcanine teeth.
The most recent archaic hominin taxon to be recognized is Australopithecus 
sediba Berger et al. 2010 which was recovered from Malapa cave in the 
Blaauwbank Valley in southern Africa. The initial discoveries consisted of two 
associated skeletons: MH1, a juvenile, was made the holotype and MH2, an adult, 
the paratype. Although the lower limb of Au. sediba is like that of other archaic 
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hominins, Berger et al. (2010) claim that aspects of its cranial (e.g., more globu-
lar neurocranium, gracile face), mandibular (e.g., more vertical symphyseal pro-
file, a weak mentum osseum), dental (e.g., simple canine crown, small anterior and 
postcanine tooth crowns), and pelvic morphology (e.g., acetabulocristal buttress, 
expanded ilium and short ischium) are only shared with early and later Homo 
taxa. But the immaturity of one of the skeletons (MH1) plus many overall simi-
larities to Au. africanus suggests that the Malapa hominins may sample Au. afri-
canus at a later stage of its evolution than the existing samples from Sterkfontein 
and Makapansgat. The demonstration that the Malapa sample differs from the 
Sterkfontein and Makapansgat samples does not exclude the possibility that the 
three samples were drawn from the same fossil taxon, but the finding that its stable 
carbon isotope and phytolith signatures are predominantly C3 does suggest that the 
diet of the Malapa hominins was not like that of Au. africanus (Henry et al. 2012).
7.5  Megadont and Hyper-Megadont Archaic Hominins
This grade includes hominin taxa conventionally included in the genus 
Paranthropus, plus Australopithecus garhi. As the term megadont suggests, the 
criterion for inclusion in this grade is large tooth size, specifically the size of 
the postcanine dentition. This increase is both in absolute and in relative (e.g., 
in relation to the anterior dentition and to estimates of body mass) terms. The 
genus Paranthropus, into which Zinjanthropus and Paraustralopithecus are sub-
sumed, was reintroduced when cladistic analyses suggested that the first three spe-
cies discussed in this section most likely formed a clade. The postcanine teeth of 
Paranthropus robustus are not much larger than those of Au. africanus, but those 
of the East African taxa in this grade are substantially larger; hence, they are 
referred to as hyper-megadont. The enamel of all of the taxa in this grade is thick; 
the enamel of the two Paranthropus taxa from East Africa is exceptionally thick.
The taxon Paranthropus robustus Broom 1938 was established to accom-
modate an associated skeleton, TM 1517, recovered in 1938 from the southern 
African site of Kromdraai B. The other sites that contribute to the P. robustus 
hypodigm, Swartkrans, Gondolin, Drimolen, and Cooper’s caves, are all situated 
in the Blaauwbank Valley near Johannesburg, South Africa. The dentition is well 
represented in the hypodigm of P. robustus, but many of the cranial remains are 
crushed or distorted and the postcranial skeleton is not well represented. Research 
at Drimolen was only initiated in 1992, yet already more than 80 hominin speci-
mens (many of them otherwise rare juvenile specimens) have been recovered and 
it promises to be a rich source of evidence about P. robustus. The temporal range 
of the taxon is c.2.0–1.5 Ma. The brain, face, and chewing teeth of P. robustus 
are on average larger than those of Au. africanus, yet the incisor teeth are smaller. 
The morphology of the pelvis and the hip joint is much like that of Au. africanus; 
Paranthropus robustus was most likely capable of bipedal walking, but it was 
probably not an obligate biped. It has been suggested that the thumb of P. robustus 
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would have been capable of the type of grip necessary for the manufacture of sim-
ple stone tool, but this claim has not been accepted by all researchers.
In 1959, Louis Leakey suggested that a new genus and species, Zinjanthropus 
boisei Leakey, 1959, was needed to accommodate OH 5, a subadult cranium 
recovered in 1959 from Bed I, Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania. A year later, John 
Robinson suggested that Z. boisei be subsumed into the genus Paranthropus as 
Paranthropus boisei, and in 1967, Phillip Tobias suggested that it should be sub-
sumed into Australopithecus, as Australopithecus boisei; in this review, we refer to 
it as Paranthropus boisei (Leakey, 1959) Robinson, 1960. Additional fossils from 
Olduvai Gorge were subsequently added to the hypodigm, plus fossil evidence 
from Peninj, Omo Shungura, Konso, Koobi Fora, Chesowanja, and West Turkana, 
all of which are in East Africa. The temporal range of the taxon is c.2.3–c.1.4 Ma. 
Paranthropus boisei has a comprehensive craniodental fossil record, compris-
ing several skulls and well-preserved crania, many mandibles, and isolated teeth. 
There is evidence of both large- and small-bodied individuals, and the range of 
the size difference suggests a substantial degree of body size sexual dimorphism, 
despite the evidence for modest canine sexual dimorphism. Paranthropus boisei 
is the only hominin to combine a wide, flat face, massive premolars and molars, 
small anterior teeth, and a modest endocranial volume (c.480 cm3). The body of 
the mandibles of P. boisei is larger and wider than that of any other hominin, and 
the tooth crowns grow at a faster rate than has been recorded for any other early 
hominin. For a long time, there was no postcranial evidence that could, with cer-
tainty, be attributed to P. boisei, but a fragmentary associated upper limb skeleton 
from Olduvai Gorge (Domínguez-Rodrigo et al. 2013) and a better preserved asso-
ciated upper limb skeleton from Koobi Fora (Richmond et al. 2011) almost cer-
tainly belong to that taxon. Some of the postcranial fossils from Bed I at Olduvai 
Gorge currently attributed to Homo habilis may belong to P. boisei.
The taxon Paranthropus aethiopicus (Arambourg and Coppens, 1968) 
Chamberlain and Wood 1985 was introduced as Paraustralopithecus aethiopi-
cus to accommodate Omo 18.18 (or 18.1967.18), an edentulous adult mandible 
recovered in 1967 from Omo Shungura in Ethiopia. The hypodigm is small, but 
it includes a well-preserved adult cranium from West Turkana (KNM-WT 17000) 
together with mandibles (e.g., KNM-WT 16005) and isolated teeth from Omo 
Shungura (some also assign the Omo 338y-6 cranium to this taxon). No published 
postcranial fossils have been assigned to P. aethiopicus, but a proximal tibia from 
Laetoli may belong to it. The temporal range of P. aethiopicus is c.2.5–2.3 Ma. 
Paranthropus aethiopicus is similar to P. boisei except that the face is more prog-
nathic, the cranial base is less flexed, the anterior teeth are larger, and the postca-
nine teeth are not so large or morphologically specialized.
The most recent addition to the hyper-megadont archaic hominin hypodigm is 
Australopithecus garhi Asfaw et al. 1999. It was introduced to accommodate spec-
imens recovered in 1997 from Aramis in the Middle Awash study area, Ethiopia. 
The hypodigm is presently restricted to fossils recovered from the Hata Member 
in the Middle Awash study area, Ethiopia. The type specimen, the c.2.5 Ma 
BOU-VP-12/130, combines a primitive cranium with large-crowned postcanine 
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teeth, and particularly large premolars. However, unlike Paranthropus boisei, the 
incisors are small and the canines are large and the enamel apparently lacks the 
extreme thickness seen in the latter taxon. A partial skeleton with a long femur 
and forearm was found nearby, but it is not associated with the type cranium and it 
has not been formerly assigned to Au. garhi. If the type specimen of P. aethiopicus 
(Omo 18.18) belongs to the same hypodigm as the mandibles that appear to match 
the Au. garhi cranium, then P. aethiopicus would have priority.
8  Tempo and Mode
The study of macroevolution in hominin evolution is complicated by a number 
of factors unrelated to taxonomy. First, hominin remains are extremely rare in 
the fossil record, most fossils are frustratingly incomplete, and because of these 
factors, the same morphological regions are not well enough represented in the 
fossil records of some taxa to allow meaningful comparisons to be made among 
taxa. Second, the evolutionary sequence for the majority of hominin lineages is 
unknown. Most hominin taxa, particularly early hominins, have no obvious ances-
tors, and in most cases, ancestor-descendent sequences (fossil time series) can-
not be reliably constructed—two possible exceptions are mentioned below. Third, 
error from many sources—measurement, reconstruction, sampling, and dating—
can lead to spurious conclusions about evolutionary patterns. Finally, differences 
in scale can lead to differences in interpretation of tempo and mode of macroev-
olutionary change. Depending on the time separating recovered fossils, gradual 
steady-rate evolutionary changes can appear to be punctuated, and punctuated 
changes can appear to be gradual. None of these complications are limited to stud-
ying evolution within the hominin clade, but many of these issues are exacerbated 
in paleoanthropology given the intense scrutiny that our own lineage receives.
At one time, or another, every early hominin discussed above has been pre-
sented as “the” ancestor of later hominins, but in our opinion, only two pairs of 
taxa, Au. anamensis and Au. afarensis (Kimbel et al. 2006), and P. aethiopicus and 
P. boisei (Wood and Schroer 2013), are plausible examples of ancestor/descend-
ant relationships (i.e., are examples of anagenesis). In the case of the former pair, 
Au. anamensis and Au. afarensis are most likely time-successive taxa within a sin-
gle lineage with the Laetoli hypodigm of the former taxon intermediate between 
Au. anamensis and the Hadar hypodigm of Au. afarensis. This hypothesis has been 
given support by the discovery of fossil evidence from Woranso-Mille in Ethiopia 
that is both temporally and morphologically intermediate between Au. anamensis 
and Au. afarensis (Haile-Selassie et al. 2010). As for P. aethiopicus and P. boisei, 
although there are differences between the taxa (Suwa 1988; Wood et al. 1994), 
they are consistent with the older, less derived taxon being the ancestor of the 
younger more derived taxon. Indeed, some researchers have taken the view that 
the hypodigms of the two taxa are so similar they should both be included in P. 
boisei (Walker and Leakey 1988).
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Another complicating factor is the history and current status of the punc-
tuated equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Gould and Eldredge 1977; 
reviewed in Sepkoski 2012) model that has provided the context for many past 
discussions of tempo and mode in the hominin clade. This model suggests that 
while stasis (i.e., lack of morphological change) is the predominant pattern 
of evolution within species, bursts of rapid change occur at speciation events. 
Further, these events occur in small isolated populations where new selec-
tion pressures and genetic drift can have a more dramatic effect than in larger 
populations (e.g., as in Mayr’s allopatric model of speciation) (Mayr 1942). In 
fact, Gould and Eldredge’s (1977) classic paper on punctuated equilibrium used 
hominin evolution as one of the primary supporting examples (see also Eldredge 
and Tattersall 1975). Based on the known fossil record at the time, the authors 
argued that stasis was predominant within hominin taxa, with each species 
looking much the same at the beginning and at the end of its fossil record. This 
interpretation stimulated a rebuttal by Cronin et al. (1981), who suggested that 
the apparent evidence of stasis within hominins was the result of poor samples 
and uncertainties about dating and taxonomy. In a recent review of the status of 
current evolutionary biological thought on the punctuated equilibrium hypoth-
esis, Pennell et al. (2014) argued that current thinking on punctuated equilib-
rium conflates four key questions that should be addressed independently for any 
group such as the hominins. First, what is the relative importance of gradualistic 
versus punctuated evolution? Second, what is the role of speciation events ver-
sus within-lineage evolution in the group? Third, when change is due to spe-
ciation, are these changes adaptive or driven by neutral processes? Finally, how 
important is species selection in shaping patterns of diversity? Lieberman and 
Eldredge (2014) countered by suggesting that Pennell et al. (2014) did not cor-
rectly define punctuated equilibrium (or define macroevolution at all, though 
this is included in the glossary on their first page). Lieberman and Eldredge also 
suggested that Pennell et al.’s four questions were about patterns of evolution 
rather than processes, or conflated the two, or do not directly relate to Lieberman 
and Eldredge’s understanding of the punctuated equilibrium hypothesis. While 
we do not wish to get into a debate on the merits of the punctuated equilibrium 
model, or the views of either set of authors, we view Pennell et al. (2014) as 
an attempt to show that regardless of the original intentions of its authors (see 
Sepkoski 2012 for the history of this idea), all four questions are ways research-
ers have attempted to test the validity of the punctuated equilibrium model of 
evolution.
The dearth of unambiguous evidence for ancestor-descendent lineages within 
the hominin clade means that the hominin fossil record currently does not permit 
useful insights into Pennell et al.’s (2014) questions two, three, and four. However, 
a number of studies have addressed whether within hominin taxa, the dominant 
signal is one of stasis or gradual change, and most have done so with reference to 
testing a punctuated model of evolution. In order to investigate the tempo of evolu-
tion within an early hominin taxon, (a) the taxon needs to be distinctive; (b) it must 
have a good, well-dated fossil record, and (c) the sample needs to span enough 
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time (at least several hundred thousand years) for any temporal trends to mani-
fest. One, or more, of these criteria rules out most early hominin taxa, especially 
those only found in the southern African cave sites, and the only early hominin 
taxa that comply with these criteria are Au. afarensis and P. boisei. In both cases, 
when researchers tracked morphology that is well represented in the fossil record 
[Lockwood et al. (2000) for Au. afarensis and Wood et al. (1994) for P. boisei], the 
predominant signal across approximately a million years was stasis. In the case of 
a third taxon, H. erectus, researchers have reached different conclusions about the 
likelihood of stasis (Tobias 1985; Wood et al. 1994; Ruff et al. 1997; Lockwood 
et al. 2000), with Rightmire (1981), suggesting that there was no consistent evi-
dence of directional change in skull and tooth dimensions, whereas when Wolpoff 
(1984) analyzed a more narrowly defined sample of H. erectus’s mandibular, cra-
nial, and dental features, he suggested that there was evidence for evolutionary 
change within that taxon.
Only a few traits are known from a wide enough range of fossil hominins to 
allow for quantitative, rather than qualitative, comparisons to be made across long 
periods of time. One of them, endocranial volume, has been regularly pointed out 
as a classic example of a macroevolutionary trend (Haldane 1949; Tobias 1971; 
Jerison 1973). Though current evidence on hominin brain size evolution points 
to an general increase over time (Holloway et al. 2004) and numerous hypothe-
ses have been suggested as to the factors that caused this increase (e.g., Clutton-
Brock and Harvey 1980; Martin 1996; Dunbar 1998), there is debate as to the 
tempo of brain size increase during hominin evolution. Some have argued for a 
gradual increase in hominin brain size over time (Lestrel and Read 1973; Lestrel 
1976; but see Godfrey and Jacobs 1981; Lee and Wolpoff 2003) and others for an 
increasing rate of change (Tobias 1971; Holloway et al. 2004), and yet another 
sees evidence of stasis, followed by more rapid change (Ruff et al. 1997). A con-
sistent theme of these interpretations is that there was a grade shift in endocranial 
volume c.1.8 Ma. One problem with past studies is that they present endocranial 
volume values as if they had neither dating nor measurement error. When Du 
et al. (in prep) analyzed a comprehensive data set on hominin brain size that took 
account of dating and measurement error, and which spanned the period from 3.5 
to 0.5 Ma, they found that a gradual model of brain size received the strongest 
support.
9  Evolutionary Forces and Macroevolutionary Patterns
During the 1980s, there was a sizable backlash against portions of the punctuated 
equilibrium model of evolution (e.g., Lande 1980; Charlesworth et al. 1982). One 
of the chief reasons was because some versions of the model suggested that the 
causes of macroevolution are distinct from those leading to microevolution, thus 
suggesting that one of the central tenets of the modern synthesis is incorrect (e.g., 
Gould 1980). In a series of papers, population geneticists dissected various parts 
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of the model, arguing that punctuated evolution was merely one end of a spec-
trum of evolutionary possibilities and likely did not play a major role in produc-
ing the patterns seen in the fossil record (Lande 1980; Charlesworth et al. 1982; 
Barton and Charlesworth 1984). While macroevolutionary patterns of evolution 
differ from microevolutionary patterns for some traits such as body mass (Uyeda 
et al. 2011), it is widely accepted that the idea that separate evolutionary pro-
cesses are required to produce most macroevolutionary change is not supported 
by the evidence (reviewed in Charlesworth et al. 1982). The geological timescale 
is long enough that any variation in a trait, whether the result of many genes or 
a few, that increases fitness is likely to have been selected for and macromuta-
tions are extremely likely to be deleterious due to either their main effect or pleio-
tropic effects on other traits (Fisher 1930; Lande 1980; Charlesworth et al. 1982). 
Likewise, the recent suggestions that large morphological changes in hominin evo-
lution were the result of a few simple changes in growth gradients or developmen-
tal fields (Lovejoy et al. 1999, 2003; Lovejoy and McCollum 2010) do not mean 
that one or just a few genes are at play (Lande 1980). Experimental attempts to 
identify the genes that control morphological changes suggest that variation in the 
vast majority of traits is controlled by multiple loci (i.e., it is polygenic) (Lynch 
and Walsh 1998).
Evolutionary forces—natural selection, random genetic drift, gene flow, and 
mutation—acting on heritable variation within populations, account for the 
majority of evolutionary change, but be that as it may, in paleoanthropology, it 
is nearly always assumed that macroevolutionary changes seen across the fos-
sil record are the result of natural selection. While this is undoubtedly true for 
changes such as substantial increases in brain size between taxa, changes in mor-
phology may also be due to the other three evolutionary forces, in addition to 
selection on other traits. Quantitative genetics (QG), which provides a mecha-
nistic understanding of these evolutionary processes, began as an attempt to 
understand the inheritance of quantitative traits (height, weight, measurement 
of skeletal traits, etc.) (Provine 1971; Lynch and Walsh 1998), but its scope has 
expanded to include goals that range from understanding the nature of quanti-
tative trait variation, the consequences of inbreeding, to developing predictive 
models for evolutionary change. Evolutionary quantitative genetics (EQG) takes 
concepts that were originally intended to look at changes in quantitative traits 
between generations, usually in association with livestock and crop improve-
ment, and applies them to look at changes over evolutionary time (Roff 1997). 
A number of recent studies (Ackermann and Cheverud 2004; Rolian et al. 2010; 
Grabowski et al. 2011) have applied the theories and ideas of evolutionary quan-
titative genetics to the hominin fossil record in an attempt to provide insight into 
evolutionary forces that resulted in the patterns observed. In the next section, we 
focus on the first two forces, selection and drift, as these are likely the most rel-
evant when applying evolutionary quantitative genetic methods to paleoanthro-
pology. The results from these studies lead to the conclusion that morphological 
changes were likely due to a complex relationship between natural selection and 
random genetic drift.
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9.1  Natural Selection
Most fossil analyses atomize the phenotype into a set of traits, observe how 
much a given trait differs between species, and then ascribe selection for a par-
ticular function as the cause of that change. But we know that organisms are inte-
grated units, with many traits sharing some portion of their genetic background 
due to pleiotropy (i.e., the traits are integrated), and thus, natural selection on 
one trait leads to correlated responses in others (Olson and Miller 1958; Lande 
1979; Gould and Lewontin 1979). This means that any change in morphology 
between fossil taxa may not be the result of direct selection for a particular trait 
or function, but is instead the result of a correlated response to selection on other 
integrated traits. Though this point is now generally accepted across much of biol-
ogy, and some acceptance has occurred (Lovejoy et al. 1999, 2002, 2003; Strait 
2001, Ackermann and Cheverud 2004), within paleoanthropology, atomization 
still reigns. Based on the work of Lande (1979), Lande and Arnold (1983), stud-
ies have reconstructed selection pressures that led to difference in morphology 
between species (Cheverud 1996, Marroig and Cheverud 2004, Rolian et al. 2010), 
including between fossil hominins (Ackermann and Cheverud 2004). The results 
of these studies suggest that at least some of these changes that were thought to 
be the result of natural selection driven by functional considerations were actu-
ally a correlated response to selection on other traits. For example, Rolian et al. 
(2010) found that the reduction in finger length seen during hominin evolution was 
likely a correlated response to selection to reduce toe length. In other words, the 
relatively short fingers that enable much of the manual dexterity that sets modern 
humans apart from other primates may not have been the result of selection on fin-
ger length. Instead, selection for shorter toes to permit habitual bipedalism led to 
changes in both homologous structures. Grabowski and Roseman (in press) tested 
the hypothesis that strong directional selection on many individual aspects of mor-
phology was responsible for the large differences observed across a sample of fos-
sil hominin hips spanning the Plio-Pleistocene. Their findings showed a complex 
and changing pattern of natural selection drove hominin hip evolution, and many, 
but not all, traits hypothesized to play functional roles in bipedalism evolved as a 
result of natural selection.
9.2  Random Genetic Drift
Tests for the roles of selection versus drift in producing the morphological diver-
sity seen between worldwide modern human populations have become relatively 
common. For example, Betti et al. (2010) found that drift was much more impor-
tant in shaping cranial diversity than selection due to climatic differences, with 
the exception of populations from extremely cold regions. Similarly, Betti et al. 
(2013) found that a combination of selection and drift explained variations in 
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pelvic dimensions in modern human populations. With regard to fossil hominins, 
Ackermann and Cheverud (2004) tested whether random evolutionary processes 
alone could account for the morphological diversity seen in early hominin fos-
sil crania. They also tested adaptive hypotheses about hominin facial diversity by 
estimating past selection pressures required to produce observed morphological 
change. Their results showed that though early hominin facial diversity exceeds 
levels expected if it had originated through random processes, diversity seen in 
early Homo did not. Weaver et al. (2007) tested the null hypothesis that morpho-
logical differences in the crania of Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans 
were the result of genetic drift. The researchers found that the null model could 
not be rejected, and thus, morphological differences between Neanderthals and 
modern humans could have been the result of genetic drift rather than selection.
10  Phylogenetic Relationships
For much of its history, hominin systematics was predicated on the assumption 
that there is a direct relationship between morphological similarity and genetic 
relatedness; the more hard tissue morphology two hominin taxa share, the closer 
their relationship. For extant taxa, this hypothesis can be tested against relation-
ships based on molecular evidence. Such data, either on their own, or in combi-
nation with morphological evidence, have been used in efforts to try to resolve 
relationships among taxa, including those within large clades of medium- to large-
sized mammals. But even at this “macro”-scale, it is apparent that a substantially 
similar skeletal phenotype does not always mean a shared recent evolutionary 
history. Long ago, Lankester (1870) suggested that the term homoplasy be used 
for morphology that is seen in what we now call sister taxa, but not in their most 
recent common ancestor. Such morphology gives the impression that the two taxa 
are more closely related than they really are. Because homoplasy can be mistaken 
for shared derived similarity (or synapomorphy), it complicates attempts to recon-
struct phylogenetic relationships.
The confounding effects of homoplasy could be coped with if the “noise” gen-
erated by the latter was trivial compared to the strength of the phylogenetic “sig-
nal.” But in some attempts to infer relationships among extant higher primates 
using skeletal data (in the form of either traditional non-metrical characters or 
characters generated from metrical data), the ratio of “noise” to “signal” was in the 
order of 1:2. The results of these analyses were not only frustratingly inconclusive, 
but when they were compared with the pattern of relationships generated using 
molecular data, some were misleading (Collard and Wood 2000). Other research-
ers suggested that this dismal performance was due to the exclusion of charac-
ter-state data from fossil taxa (Strait and Grine 2004), but this argument is moot 
because soft tissue characters (for which there are no fossil data) are capable of 
recovering a pattern of relationships among extant higher primates that is consist-
ent with the molecular evidence (Gibbs et al. 2000, 2002; Diogo and Wood 2011). 
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Therefore, something about the nature of hard tissue evidence may be problematic. 
Thankfully, hard tissue evidence can produce results congruent with the relation-
ships generated from molecular data (e.g., Lockwood et al. 2004), as long as the 
anatomical regions targeted have a high enough signal-to-noise ratio. The research 
reviewed above suggests that the problem is with either, or both, the nature of the 
data or the scale of the enquiry, and not with cladistic methodology. However, that 
the type of data the fossil record provides (i.e., mostly craniodental hard tissue 
morphology) seems to be particularly prone to homoplasy when used at this rela-
tively fine taxonomic level is not the best context for paleoanthropologists attempt-
ing to reconstruct phylogenies based on fossilized hard tissue remains.
There is also comparative evidence that homoplasy needs to be taken into 
account when generating hypotheses about the relationships among the taxa in 
the higher primate part of the tree of life. Although there is overwhelming molec-
ular and morphological evidence for a (((Pan, Homo) Gorilla) Pongo) pattern of 
relationships among the extant hominids, selected morphological character states 
can be used to infer a (((Pongo, Homo) Pan) Gorilla) pattern of relationships, but 
these are almost certainly homoplasies. Similarly, homoplasy complicates attempts 
to resolve the relationships of fossil apes such as Sivapithecus (Young 2003), 
Morotopithecus (Nakatsukasa 2008), and Chororapithecus (Suwa et al. 2007). 
Moreover, studies of other mammalian clades evolving in Africa during the same 
time period as hominins and in similar paleoenvironments point to substantial and 
recurrent homoplasy [e.g., bovids (Gatesy et al. 1997), equids (Bernor et al. 2010), 
elephantids (Todd 2010), carnivores (Van Valkenburgh 2007), and Old World mon-
keys (Jablonski and Leakey 2008)]. There is no reason to assume that higher pri-
mate lineages were immune from the tendency to adapt morphologically in similar, 
and therefore phylogenetically confounding, ways to shared ecological challenges.
The important point is that shared similarities can only take one so far in deter-
mining phylogenetic relationships because homoplasy, as well as uncertainties in 
determining the polarity of character transformation, has the potential to generate 
substantial noise that serves to confound attempts to generate reliable hypotheses 
about phylogenetic relationships. These considerations have clear implications for 
generating hypotheses about phylogenetic relationships within the hominin clade 
and especially for the relationships of Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and Ardipithecus. 
Even if these taxa share some derived features with later Pliocene hominins, it 
would be rash to simply presume that those features are immune from homoplasy, 
especially when other aspects of their respective phenotypes are consistent with a 
more distant relationship with the hominin clade.
11  Conclusions
It is difficult to believe, but the second, 1964, edition of Le Gros Clark’s “Fossil 
evidence for Human Evolution” was the last time a review looked at the whole of 
what we now call the hominin fossil record (Clark 1964). Much has happened in 
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the ensuing half century. We now have the advantage of new dating methods, new 
fossil evidence, new methods for capturing (e.g., 3D landmark data) and analyz-
ing morphology (e.g., geometric morphometrics), and new methods for extracting 
data from fossils (e.g., imaging, molecular evidence). We also have the advan-
tage of quantitative methods for alpha taxonomy, methods for generating hypoth-
eses about relationships, and the emergence of functional morphological analysis. 
However, we need to test many of the assumptions (e.g., selection drives observed 
change, morphology is homologous, climate drives evolution, and all taxa are 
ancestors until proved otherwise) that underly attempts to improve our understand-
ing of macroevolution within the hominin clade.
Much progress has been made, but many of the questions raised by Le Gros 
Clark are still with us. More fossil evidence is crucial, but an order of magnitude 
increase in the fossil evidence in the absence of equivalent progress in how we 
analyze the fossil record would not constitute an advance. Real progress will come 
when evidence and analysis move forward in tandem.
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Abstract This chapter deals with biodiversity conservation efforts aimed at facing 
“the Big Sixth”—the new mass extinction we could be entering, the first one 
involving our own species as a primary cause. Following Michael Soulé (1985), 
we characterize conservation biology as a form of biodiversity surgery and illus-
trate the main difficulties that this very special kind of surgery has to meet. First 
of all, we briefly discuss the difficulties that arise in declaring the extinction of a 
species. We then focus on three challenges that facing extinction requires to take 
up: How to prioritize species; which conservation targets to focus on; and how 
to ethically justify species conservation. As we show, matters are complicated by 
the fact that although species continue to play a central role in policies aimed at 
preserving the variety of life, biodiversity is not just a matter of species pres-
ervation. Finally, based on the analysis of such challenges, we compare two 
 legislations currently in force, namely the Endangered Species Act (the primary 
legislation providing federal legal protection to endangered species in the United 
States) and the Habitats Directive (which, together with the Birds Directive, 
forms the cornerstone of the European Union’s nature conservation policy). We 
 conclude that neither legislation is fully adequate for biodiversity conservation: 
The Endangered Species Act was not designed to preserve habitats, which consti-
tute the higher level of biodiversity, and the Habitats Directive misses the objective 
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of preserving genes, which constitute the lower level of biodiversity and thereby 
the evolutionary potential of populations. We therefore suggest that reforms are 
needed both in North American and European biodiversity conservation policies.
Keywords Conservation biology · Endangered Species Act · Evolutionary potential · 
Habitat Directive · Natura 2000
1  Introduction
Two macroevolutionary phenomena—speciation and extinction—govern the 
increase and decrease of biodiversity on the evolutionary timescale. Background 
extinction, namely the extinction that occurs naturally in the evolution process, just 
like speciation, is an evolutionary process that shapes life on Earth. Speciation and 
extinction can be considered two sides of the same biodiversity coin: New species 
are always on the rise, while others are on the way out. In anagenesis, an ancestral 
species—or, more generally, a single phylogenetic ancestral lineage—ceases to 
exist because after accumulating enough mutations, it becomes a “new” species. In 
cladogenesis, an ancestral species gives rise to more than one descendant species 
and the branching process involves, at least according to certain models, the extinc-
tion of the ancestral species. Background extinction, then, is mostly1 compensated 
by speciation, and it is just part and parcel of the production of new diversity.
The way in which speciation and extinction have shaped biodiversity along the 
evolutionary timescale is particularly apparent in two peculiar phenomena, namely 
mass extinction and adaptive radiation. Adaptive radiations are ecological 
 differentiations among a group of related populations that can lead to speciation 
(by cladogenesis). Since in adaptive radiations a taxon made of a small number of 
ancestral species diversifies into a larger number of descendant species, they help 
to account for the increase of diversity over time, in spite of mass extinctions. 
From the initial absence of life, the Earth runs up toward 5–10 million species,2 
notwithstanding setbacks. Fossil evidences suggest that five mass extinctions, 
known as “the Big Five,” have punctuated the history of life on Earth: the 
Ordovician–Silurian, the Late Devonian, the Permian–Triassic, the End Triassic, 
and the Cretaceous–Tertiary.3 Ninety-nine percent of the species that have 
 inhabited Earth are now extinct and have been replaced by other species 
1 Not all background extinctions are compensated by speciation. In “ultimate extinction” a  species 
becomes extinct when the last individual dies and no new species originate from it. Not unlike 
extinction by speciation, ultimate extinction is a process that naturally shapes life. A species 
usually becomes extinct when it is no more adapted (and not able to adapt) to a changed environment.
2 For a discussion on the number of species, see May and Beverton (1990).
3 Mass extinctions take place when extinction rates appear to be exceptionally high compared to 
background extinction rates. Notice that the number of mass extinctions is open to doubt, since 
the definition of what a mass extinction is and the criteria to classify an extinction event as a 
mass extinction are under discussion (Hallam and Wignall 1997).
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(Barnosky et al. 2011). The historical relevance of mass extinctions (as well as the 
evolutionary recoveries which follow them) and the tenability of the distinction 
between background and mass extinction are subjects of heated controversy. 
According to one view, mass extinctions have far-reaching historical significance, 
mainly for two reasons. First, mass extinctions alter the normal rules of the evolu-
tionary game, since species go extinct for reasons that are independent of their his-
tories of selection. For example, if a meteorite is the cause of the extinction of a 
species, that species becomes extinct no matter how well adapted it is to its envi-
ronment and clearly its extinction will not be compensated by a speciation. 
Second, mass extinctions usually corresponded to the extirpation of dominant 
groups and such extirpation allowed the variety of life to increase. For instance, it 
has been hypothesized that without the extinction of the dinosaurs at the end of the 
Cretaceous period, mammals would not have diversified. Still, the tenability of the 
categorical distinction between mass and background extinctions has been ques-
tioned since it could jeopardize theoretical extrapolationism, that is, the explana-
tion of macroevolutionary results by means of microevolutionary causes only 
(Gould 2002, Chaps. 2 and 12; Jablonski 2005). 
According to a different view, mass extinctions did not alter the course of evolu-
tion but rather just intensified its normal course, accelerating a process that was 
already under way and that was mainly due to factors internal to lineages. 
Paleontologist Jack Sepkoski4 hypothesized that both the replacement of the 
Cambrian by the Paleozoic fauna and the replacement of the Paleozoic by the Modern 
fauna were accelerated by the mass extinction but not caused by it. The “new” faunas 
were already on their way, and they were becoming dominant before the mass extinc-
tion intervened. This chapter takes a perspective of this second type, in line with the 
approach outlined by Sterelny and Griffiths (1999). According to this approach, mass 
extinctions have historical importance since they fundamentally shape the diversity of 
life on Earth, but they do not do so by putting in place mechanisms other than micro-
evolutionary ones. Rather, 
they do so by the operation of normal mechanisms in an abnormal world. So conceived, 
extrapolationism is consistent with the idea that mass extinctions fundamentally reshape 
the tree of life (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999: 306).
On the basis of projected extinctions for the next 50 years, it has been suggested 
that we could be experiencing a new mass extinction, the so-called “Big 
Sixth”, which would also be the first one caused by our own species and its activi-
ties (Rosa 2004). The primary causes of this extinction include pollution, habitat 
alteration and transformation of the landscape, climate change resulting from 
greenhouse gas emissions, introduction of invasive species, and overexploitation 
of species (Wilson 1988; Pimm et al. 1995; Barnosky et al. 2011). The Big Sixth 
can be divided into two discrete phases. Phase one commenced about 
100,000 years ago when our species began to disperse out of Africa to different 
parts of the world. Fossils attest that in this phase Neanderthals became extinct, 
4 See Sterelny and Griffiths (1999: 304).
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surviving for less than 10,000 years leading up to our arrival. Phase two began 
about 10,000 years ago, with the starting of agriculture and the resulting increase 
of human population size.5 As of today, the available evidence indicates that from 
1970 to 2010 biodiversity has continued to decline, with eight out of ten of the rel-
evant indicators showing declines in population trends. Decreases of the emblem-
atic coral reefs, mangroves, and sea grass beds, as well as reductions in 
populations of several species of vertebrates, such as habitats specialist birds and 
shorebirds, have been documented (Butchart et al. 2010: 1165).
As stated, from the point of view of general diversity, species that are lost in 
extinction get replaced by new species, or because from an old species one or 
more “new” species originate (extinction by speciation), or because the extinc-
tion of a species opens ecological niches (ultimate extinction). The same holds 
for mass extinction, at least according to the perspective taken in this chapter. 
Unfortunately, with anthropogenic extinction, things go differently. Anthropogenic 
pressure over the ecosystems has endured since the Paleolithic era, and we cannot 
foresee an end to it. Thereby, the loss of hundreds of thousands of species caused 
by anthropogenic extinction is not—and cannot be—compensated for by specia-
tion, not even, probably, by radiation (Rolston 1985: 724–725).
In this light, it seems plausible to claim that even though humans may have no 
duty toward avoiding natural extinctions, they do have duties toward mitigating 
anthropogenic extinctions—not only because of the potentially unprecedented 
magnitude of the Big Sixth, but also because mankind is its main propagator. 
Indeed, this is probably one of the reasons why the extinction of species and 
higher taxa is becoming more and more of a concern for conservation biologists 
and ecologists as well as stakeholders such as governments, decision makers, man-
agers, and society at large. Biodiversity6 is widely conceived as something to be 
protected, and this means, first of all, facing the present-day anthropogenic 
increase of the extinction rate. As conservation biologist Michael Soulé puts it in 
his foundational paper (1985), conservation biology is a mission- or crisis-oriented 
discipline, and its relation to biology can be compared to that of surgery to physi-
ology, or of war to political science. How is this “biodiversity surgery” to be per-
formed? After some preliminary remarks on the problems raised by declaring 
extinction, Sect. 2 focuses on three different challenges that facing extinction 
requires us to take up, viz., how to prioritize species, which conservation targets to 
focus on, and how to ethically justify biodiversity conservation. Then, in Sect. 3, 
based on the analysis of these three difficulties, we compare two concrete legisla-
tive acts currently in force, the Endangered Species Act (the primary legislation 
providing federal legal protections to endangered species in the United States) and 
the Habitats Directive (which, together with the Birds Directive, forms the corner-
stone of European Union’s nature conservation policy) arguing that reforms are 
needed in both legislative Acts and in conservation practices related to them.
5 For this recontrustruction see Eldredge (2001).
6 We make reference to a very broad definition of ‘biodiversity’ as the diversity of life on Earth. 
On the difficulties of defining biodiversity, see DeLong (1996).
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2  Biodiversity Surgery
2.1  Declaring Extinction
When can a species be declared extinct? At a first glance, defining extinction and 
putting forward the criteria to establish when a species can be declared extinct 
may seem quite uncontroversial. Who would question that extinction is the end of 
a lineage and who would deny that dinosaurs are extinct? But things are not so 
easy.7 In order to see why, we consider the following example—which, notice, 
does not involve controversial species concepts, or “nonstandard” organisms such 
as asexually reproducing ones, or the like.8 
Assume Mayr’s (1970) biological species concept, according to which a species 
is a group of interbreeding organisms producing fertile offspring. Assume, more-
over, that the extinction of a sexual species amounts to its disappearance, or the 
ending of the reproductive lineage. It may seem quite natural to assume that the 
criterion for determining whether a species has become extinct is the death of its 
last member. Now, consider the Amur leopard subspecies,9 which today, mainly 
due to habitat alterations caused by the exploitation of forests, only consists of 
about twenty individuals living in the southwestern Primorye region of Russia 
(IUCN 2012). Clearly, the Amur leopard is not extinct at present, since at least 
twenty Amur leopards inhabit the world. Equally clearly, in millions of years (to 
be optimistic), no Amur leopards will inhabit the world any longer—they will be 
extinct. But consider the time between today and that moment. When exactly will 
the Amur leopard be extinct? “With the death of the last individual” does not seem 
to be a thorough answer for at least two reasons. 
1. Let us say that there is just one individual remaining. In order to declare the 
Amur leopard extinct, should we take into consideration its death, or rather its 
complete disappearance? Such a question is not simply a matter of splitting 
hairs. For instance, imagine that after the death of the last individual, a labora-
tory takes some genetic material from it and succeeds in cloning a new popula-
tion of Amur leopards, or that a fertilized egg was present in the last 
individual.10 
2. Let us suppose that there are two individuals remaining, both of them male (or 
female). In such a scenario, it would seem reasonable to declare the species 
extinct before the death of the last individual. Or maybe it should be said that 
a sexual species goes extinct after the disappearance of the last couple, even 
7 On the nature of extinction see also Delord (2007).
8 Cf. Casetta (2013).
9 As we will see shortly, from the point of view of conservation policy, there is no substantial 
difference between conserving species and subspecies.
10 On this view of extinction and the scenarios that the age of biotechnologies can arise, see 
Gunn (1991).
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if individuals of the same sex are still alive (Delord 2007). Yet, we know that 
 several animals may hybridize, either spontaneously or by human interven-
tion and that hybridizing becomes more likely as selective pressures increase. 
Thus, it would not be implausible to think that the Amur leopard, in a critical 
situation, might crossbreed with, say, the North Chinese leopard and produce 
fertile offspring. In this case, the genetic make-up of the Amur leopard would 
 prosecute in a new lineage. Should we conclude, then, that it is extinct or not?
Declaring extinction is not a trivial matter11; decisions have to be made, and such 
decisions can have consequences on prioritization and, more generally, on conserva-
tion policies. Notice, moreover, that often there is no biological fact that could settle 
the issue. Conventions and procedures have to be agreed upon and established, and 
as mentioned above, facing the Big Sixth is not a matter for biologists only.
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List of 
Threatened Species, widely recognized as the most comprehensive inventory for 
evaluating the conservation status of plant and animal species, tries to set upon 
 precise criteria to evaluate the extinction risk. According to the system of categories 
and criteria adopted by the IUCN for including and classifying species at risk of 
extinction into the Red List, a species or other taxon has to be declared extinct when 
there is no reasonable doubt that the last individual has died. A taxon is presumed Extinct 
when exhaustive surveys in known and/or expected habitat, at appropriate times (diur-
nal, seasonal, annual), throughout its historic range have failed to record an individual. 
Surveys should be over a time frame appropriate to the taxon’s life cycle and life form 
(IUCN 2012: 14).
As mentioned in the Introduction, extinction concerns not only species, but also 
subspecies and higher taxa as well. More generally, extinction concerns evolution-
ary lineages. Nonetheless, from the point of view of conservation, the extinction 
of a subspecies can be treated as a species’ extinction. This seems confirmed by 
the fact that IUCN explicitly states that its criteria “can be applied to any taxo-
nomic unit at or below the species level” (IUCN 2012: 4).
“Mere” extinction has to be distinguished from extinction in the wild. A species 
(or a higher taxon) is declared extinct in the wild when 
it is known only to survive in cultivation, in captivity or as a naturalized population (or 
populations) well outside the past range. A taxon is presumed Extinct in the Wild when 
exhaustive surveys in known and/or expected habitat, at appropriate times (diurnal, sea-
sonal, annual), throughout its historic range have failed to record an individual. Surveys 
should be over a time frame appropriate to the taxon’s life cycle and life form (IUCN 
2012: 14).
It is worthwhile to note that the survival of naturalized populations of a species 
“well outside the past range” is not a criterion of exemption from being classi-
fied as “extinct in the wild,” although such species (their individual organisms) 
can thrive without the support of any anthropogenic action. In fact, naturalized 
11 An additional problem, which will be addressed in a short while, is whether species surviving 
ex situ only (for instance, in zoos) are to be considered extinct or not.
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populations are populations of non-native organisms that in most cases are able to 
sustain themselves reproductively and that may even become invasive.
Moreover, the distinction between “extinct” and “extinct in the wild” correlates 
with a view of biodiversity that distinguishes between native and introduced 
 species (NRE 1997). Introduced species may increase species diversity, as they 
increase species richness, and thereby may increase the mathematical indices 
broadly known as “diversity indices” (Hamilton 2005). However, introduced 
 species can hardly be seen as positive elements in biodiversity evaluation and are 
often considered as a menace to native species. This is partly due to the potential 
invasive role of introduced species, which can decrease the population of native 
species and therefore decrease species abundance, negatively impacting diversity 
indices. According to Eldredge (2001), for instance, invasive species have contrib-
uted to 42 % of all threatened and endangered species in the USA. Even when 
competition with native species does not occur, however, introduced species are 
often seen as less valuable components of biodiversity. This is probably due 
mainly to the widespread positive connotation associated with the concept of wil-
derness. In spite of all the attempts to clearly distinguish between biodiversity 
conservation and wilderness preservation (Sarkar 2005: 14), the idea of wilderness 
plays a foundational role in environmental ethics and is therefore largely embed-
ded in the scientific ecology community. Thus, extinction in the wild is considered 
as a major loss, with (full) extinction only adding a minor incremental loss.12 
Within such a traditional approach to biodiversity, we are usually led to con-
sider in situ conservation as a better conservation strategy than ex situ conserva-
tion.13 But, of course, in situ conservation requires more structured strategies. This 
raises some obvious, but difficult questions: What should our first and primary 
conservation target be if we want to conserve species in their environment? Does 
conserving biodiversity reduce to stopping extinction? Is there a hierarchy of spe-
cies importance? An attempt to address such questions will be presented below.
2.2  Prioritizing Species
Since the material impossibility (because of the scarcity of time and financial 
resources) of saving all endangered species, to proceed in conservation efforts, one 
needs to place priorities among species that will benefit from conservation 
measures.14
12 Besides this “reverence for wilderness,” the fact that extinction in the wild terminates the 
 ecological role of a species is also of key importance in its being considered a major loss.
13 In situ conservation is usually defined as the conservation of species in their natural 
 surroundings, while ex situ conservation is conservation of species outside their natural habitats, 
in  captive breeding programs. For a discussion of the dichotomy see Braverman (2014).
14 See also Casetta, Marques da Silva (2014).
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IUCN, for instance, distinguishes three categories of threatened species: 
Vulnerable (V), Endangered (E), and critically endangered (CE). Such categories 
are nested: Critically Endangered species are also Endangered and Vulnerable, 
but not vice versa. Clearly, the main priority is the category including Critically 
Endangered species. A species (or a subspecies, or a higher taxon) is CE “when 
the best available evidence indicates that it is … facing an extremely high risk of 
extinction in the wild” (IUCN 2012: 14).
A range of tentatively quantitative criteria, mainly directly or indirectly con-
cerning the size of populations, is used to include a taxon in one of the above cat-
egories. Examples are the population size itself, the reduction rate in population 
size, the geographic range in the form of extent of occurrence or the area of occu-
pancy, or both.
The number of remaining individuals in a species, however, is only a prima 
facie thermometer to establish the urgency of first aid intervention. The assessment 
of species relative to differential urgency is not enough for at least two reasons. 
First, stopping extinction is probably not sufficient to conserve biodiversity. As 
will become clear in the remaining chapter, biodiversity cannot be reduced to a 
mere list of species. Second, as we will see shortly and as the IUCN recognizes, 
is because the category of threat is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
to determine priorities for conservation actions. Rather, it provides a mere assess-
ment of the extinction risk based on criteria that are as quantitative as possible.
Nevertheless, within IUCN criteria, it is possible to discern a path for proceed-
ing from prioritization to conservation. In biodiversity conservation, the aim is not 
just to save endangered species, but also to allow the continued production of novel 
diversity, i.e., to improve the conditions and mechanisms that help the diversity to 
be generated. To put it differently, although conservation biologists usually focus 
on the effects of biodiversity and of their decline—namely the differing entities and 
their loss—a new approach is being promoted. In the new approach, the perspec-
tives of conservation biology and evolutionary biology would converge and become 
integrated (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008: 20 ff.; Forest et al. 2007). This approach 
would be centered on the processes that cause biodiversity and on how to maintain 
and improve them. Within such an integrated perspective, we suggest evolution-
ary potential should take a central role in conservation efforts, starting from spe-
cies prioritization. Evolutionary potential can be broadly defined as the short-term 
ability of a species or a lineage to respond to selection without going extinct in the 
process. The significance of a short-term capability can hardly be underestimated, 
in particular in dealing with anthropogenic extinction caused by the consequences 
of climate change and ongoing habitat fragmentation. Indeed, evidence is already 
available which suggests that many short-lived species’ organisms have the ability 
to evolve rapidly in response to climate change, fisheries, hunting, and other anthro-
pogenic pressures (Reusch and Wood 2007; Santamaría and Méndez 2012).
That evolutionary potential should take a central role in conservation efforts is not 
a new idea, of course, nor an original one. Unfortunately, managers and policy mak-
ers tend to neglect evolutionary potential and evolutionary processes more generally, 
in developing criteria for prioritization and conservation (Mace and Purvis 2008). 
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Also IUCN prioritization criteria do not explicitly mention evolutionary processes 
or evolutionary potential. Nonetheless, their taking not only the size of the remaining 
population of a species but also its reduction rate into account can be seen as a step 
in the direction of the integrated perspective that we advocate here. As the popula-
tion ecologist and conservationist Graeme Caughley argued, the “small population 
paradigm,” which considers smallness as a cause when it should rather be considered 
as an effect, “provides an answer only to a trivial question: how long will the popula-
tion persist if nothing unusual happens?” On the contrary, the “declining population 
paradigm,” albeit in need of more theoretical elaboration, “summons an investigation 
to discover the cause of the decline and to prescribe its antidote” (1994: 215).
2.3  From Species to Biodiversity
While it is apparent that species are the currency of biodiversity, biodiversity is not 
just a matter of species. Accordingly, conserving biodiversity is probably not just 
a matter of stopping extinction. Keeping an eye to the importance of conserving 
evolutionary potential, which objects are and/or should be targets of our conserva-
tion policies?
Although the term “biodiversity” has a well-known history, it is useful to sketch 
it very briefly in order to trace the main phases the concept passed through and the 
corresponding differences in conservation targeting. The term “biodiversity” is of 
rather recent coinage. Biologist Walter G. Rosen blended the expression “biological 
diversity” to label the National Forum on BioDiversity organized in 1986 by the 
National Research Council under the patronage of the Smithsonian Institution and 
the National Academy of Sciences (Takacs 1996). The name was intended as a slo-
gan to draw attention and financial support to combat the rapid decrease in the num-
ber of species and to raise political and academic awareness of species loss and 
decline caused by human activities. When it made its appearance, the term “biodi-
versity” was, implicitly or explicitly, intended to refer to the variety of species. In his 
contribution to the proceedings of the National Forum, Wilson (1988) explicitly 
equated the amount of biological diversity with the number of species and the loss 
of diversity with their extinction. It therefore comes as no surprise that during this 
early phase the targets of biodiversity conservation were first and mainly the species. 
Assessing biodiversity was considered as one and the same thing as inventorying 
species, and conserving biodiversity consisted in maintaining—and perhaps improv-
ing—the inventory. Hotspots prioritization and efforts to produce species catalogs 
such as the IUCN Red List, or the EOL (the Encyclopedia of Life, an online species 
database started by E.O. Wilson in 2007)15 are emblematic of this approach.
Besides historical considerations, targeting species seems to be a good move for 
several reasons. Even though they are affected by the so-called Species Problem 
15 http://eol.org.
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(addressed below), species are nonetheless theoretically well-founded entities. In fact, 
there is a widespread agreement that the concept of species is well entrenched in the 
framework of evolutionary biology. Moreover, we already possess good—even if not 
complete or fully coherent—species inventories, such as species collections in natural 
museums, or online species databases such as the previously mentioned EOL. These 
inventories are accompanied by some fairly reliable ways to delimit and recognize 
species in practice, by means of both traditional taxonomic tools and molecular tech-
niques such as DNA barcoding (Barberousse and Samadi 2014; Hebert et al. 2003). 
Finally, phrasing the biodiversity crisis issue in terms of species has the advantage of 
making it understandable for the general public, which is important given that public 
concern has a great influence over the allocation of resources for conservation.
Although the number of species played a leading role, at least during this 
first historical phase, it soon became clear that biodiversity could not simply be 
reduced to a mere inventory of species and that several other aspects must be taken 
into account as well.
Criticisms of conservation policies strictly based on species diversity have 
appeared since the late 1980s. In particular, three types of criticisms have been 
advanced. The first is that mainly because of the Species Problem16—that is the con-
nected issues of defining, delimiting, and identifying species—species are not good 
conservation targets. At present, more than twenty different concepts of species are 
in circulation (Richards 2010) and the argument over how a species should be 
defined appears to be an endless story. One cause of disagreement can be traced 
back (Mayr 1996) to the opposition between a static view of species and an evolu-
tionary one. According to what Mayr (1959) calls “typological thinking,” species are 
classes of organisms which share one or more essential properties—like in Linnaeus’ 
Systema naturae. Such a view has been challenged and defeated during the post-
Darwinian era, in which species have come to be viewed as ever-changing evolution-
ary units. Still, the disagreement on how to define and delineate them remains. 
Although no conclusive solution to the Species Problem has thus far been offered, it 
seems that a certain agreement has been reached—at least operationally—on a gen-
eral definition or characterization of a species as a lineage or a segment of a lineage. 
For instance, LaPorte (2007) defines a general concept of species as “the least inclu-
sive salient and stable lineage to which an organism belongs,” and de Queiroz (1998) 
talks of species as “separately evolving metapopulation lineages.”
The second criticism of species-based conservation policies is that focusing on 
species, even though it has been a strategy of great value in protecting them, is too 
narrow a strategy for biodiversity conservation: Taking into account species diver-
sity is simply not representative enough of biodiversity as a whole. 
Biodiversity isn’t species—biodiversity is the whole tree of life … only someone sharing 
the BSC [Biological Species Concept] view that species are fundamental … should think 
that species are the basic units of biodiversity, or that a list of currently named species in 
some way provides an inventory of biodiversity (Mishler 2010: 118).
16 For an overview on the Species Problem see: Stamos (2004), Wilkins (2009), Richards 
(2010). For its cognitive causes, see Hey (2001).
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In the 1987 report on “Technologies to Maintain Biological Diversity,” the Office 
of Technology Assessment argues that, in addition to the diversity of species, the 
diversity of patterns and processes at all levels of living matter organization must 
be taken into account in order to assure the conservation of biological diversity 
(OTA 1987). However, while this need was in principle recognized by federal 
agencies, the bulk of conservation policies still remains centered on what biologist 
Hutto and his colleagues (1987: 3) designated as “the species approach,” based on 
the maintenance of viable populations of selected species.
This leads us to the third type of criticism, which focuses on the alleged objec-
tivity of the quantitative criteria on which the species approach is based. The 
selection of the so-called indicator species may play a role in some applications 
of the species approach. In these cases, populations of those species are chosen 
to be monitored and it is assumed that the populations of the other species of the 
same system will follow the same trend as indicator species. However, “no biolo-
gist would argue that a single species can be chosen to speak for the welfare of all 
others” (Hutto et al. 1987: 1). The idea that a chosen group of species is a reliable 
source of information concerning the welfare of all the other species in the same 
system is debatable. Moreover, it is not at all clear how many indicator species are 
needed in order to monitor the health of a system and it is far from obvious which 
species should be chosen as indicators. Finally, even if these issues could be satis-
factorily handled, the species approach runs the risk of circularity, since 
we must realize that the only species whose welfare will be assured by that of an indicator 
species will be those whose niches are entirely subsumed by, or included within, that of an 
indicator species (Hutto et al. 1987: 1).
The problems with the species approach are not restricted to the selection of indi-
cator species; they also occur when species are chosen on the basis of their risk of 
extinction. In spite of the Fish and Wildlife Service and Forest Service biologists’ 
attempt to make use of objective selection criteria, the choice of species seems to 
be anything but neutral. This is indicated by the fact that many of the species listed 
by both agencies are those that are considered useful for humans as food, for sport, 
or hides, or even mere aesthetic enjoyment, and not necessarily those that are more 
threatened or endangered (Hutto et al. 1987).
More recently, different approaches have emerged which tend to identify con-
servation targets other than species. In particular, a transition from a static to a 
more dynamic view of conservation targets can be traced (Norton 2001) and recent 
conservation policies, focused on evolving systems and ecosystem processes, 
seem to target not only entities but also processes: 
We do know that the full absorption of evolving systems thinking into environmental 
management will have a far-reaching impact on advocated policies, and will almost cer-
tainly require more attention to interspecific relationship and system-level characteristic 
(Norton 2001: 77).
Of course, here we are dealing with an in progress phase, whose features are more 
to be constructed than they are to be described. Nevertheless, it seems that an 
increasing attention to evolutionary processes and evolutionary potential that we 
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mentioned above clearly distinguishes the present phase from the previous ones. 
More generally, it seems that current conservation paradigms—aimed at facing not 
only “traditional” causes of diversity loss, but also the “new” challenges posed by 
climate change, invasive species, GMOs introduction, and rapid urbanization as 
well—are theoretically evolving toward a greater consideration of processes and 
dynamism. To what extent such a theoretical shift is also adequately reflected in 
our conservation practices remains a different matter. It should not be forgotten 
that conservation policies and practices are shaped not only by scientists, but also 
by a wide range of actors, including decision makers, governments, and NGOs, 
besides being constrained by political and economic limits.
Alternatives to the species approach can either focus on entities at a lower (or 
more fine-grained) level than species, or on a higher and more comprehensive level. 
In the first case, conservation will be guided mainly by the aim of preserving the 
inventory. Unlike the species approach, however, the inventory will be made of enti-
ties other than species and preserving the inventory will often be seen as a means 
to an end, namely to conserve processes in which the entities of the inventory are 
involved by preserving the entities themselves. In the second case, conservation 
efforts will take a different, more holistic form and conservation of biodiversity will 
be guided not by the aim of preserving the integrity of the inventory, but rather by 
the aim of maintaining the health of ecosystems’ functions (and services).
An example of the first type of a approach is the evolutionarily significant units 
(ESUs) approach. It targets evolutionary processes, taking into account the evolu-
tionary potential of populations and not only their size. Accordingly, it develops 
“strategies that will ensure that sufficient populations are viable to enable the spe-
cies to survive in the short-term and to diversify in the future” (Moritz 1999: 217). 
The concept of an Evolutionary Significant Unit was originally introduced by 
geneticist Ryder (1986) in order to identify populations with significant genetic 
attributes for present and future generations and was rapidly imported to the 
administrative context (Waples 1991). The basic idea is that rather than preserving 
all phenotypic variants, it would be worthwhile to preserve those populations, or 
sets of populations, which “shows evidence of being genetically separate from 
other populations, and contributes substantially to the ecological or genetic diver-
sity found within the species taxon as a whole” (Hey et al. 2003: 600). The premise 
here is that as long as evolutionary processes are able to operate, their products, in 
particular specific adaptive phenotypes, can be replaced or recreated.17 
A different approach to conservation focuses, as said, on ecosystem functions, 
and in its more recent variants, on the products of those functions, such as ecosystem 
services.18 The enormous efforts expended in carrying out the MEA, Millennium 
17 This perspective can be traced back to Frankel (1974). Unfortunately, however, appealing the ESU’s 
concept may seem, it has to be noticed that the implementation of the concept—whose  formulation has 
evolved over time—has been often inconsistent across different cases (Crandall et al. 2000).
18 Ecosystem services “represent the benefits human population derive, directly or indirectly, 
from ecosystem functions” (Costanza et al. 1997: 253) such as food production, water supply, 
climate regulation, soil formation, pollination, as well as recreation and cultural services.
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Ecosystem Assessment (Pereira et al. 2005; Carpenter et al. 2009), initiated in 2001 
and involving the work of more than 1,360 experts worldwide, can be viewed as 
emblematic of the ecosystem functions approach. The aim of the MEA was to pro-
vide a state-of-the-art appraisal of the conditions and trends in the world’s ecosys-
tems and ecosystem services, to assess the consequences of changes of ecosystems 
for human well-being, and to put forward the scientific basis for action required to 
enhance the conservation and sustainable use of those systems.
Notice that in both the ESUs approach and the ecosystem functions approach, 
which both attempt to go beyond the species approach, the importance of spe-
cies remains fundamental. Though the ESUs approach targets entities other than 
species, thereby enlarging the inventory to the genetic level and including evo-
lutionary potential, it still remains connected, according to some, to the species 
approach. Joseph LaPorte, for instance, writes that ESUs 
provides a finer and more multifaceted gauge than species according to coarser concep-
tions, but it seems either to describe species according to finer conceptions or else to 
incorporate the relevant criteria (2007: 266).
As for the role of species in the Ecosystems Functions approach, things are no less 
problematic. As E.O. Wilson puts it: 
Eliminate one species, and another increases in number to take its place. Eliminate a 
great many species, and the local ecosystem starts to decay visibly. Productivity drops as 
the channels of the nutrient cycles are clogged. More of the biomass is sequestered in 
the form of dead vegetation and slowly metabolizing, oxygen starved mud, or is simply 
washed away … Fewer seeds fall, fewer seedlings sprout. Herbivore decline, and their 
predators die away in close concert (1992: 14).
Although the richness and evenness (relative abundance) of species of an ecologi-
cal system are two fundamental parameters of its structure, the correlation between 
them and the well-being of the system is not trivial, since the relationship between 
species diversity/richness and the stability of the system (its ability to recover to 
an equilibrium state after disturbance, in other words, its resilience) is a contro-
versial one (McCann 2000). According to the diversity–stability hypothesis, the 
richer a system is in species diversity, the higher is its stability. This is because a 
greater diversity means there is a higher probability that after disturbance there will 
be some species able to compensate for the loss of others (MacArthur 1955; Elton 
1958). While fairly intuitive, this hypothesis was challenged as early as the 1970s. 
May (1973), for instance, using mathematical models, found out that diversity 
tends instead to destabilize the dynamics of a system. More precisely, the stability 
of a system increases with the number of its components, but only until a certain 
point, after which the system becomes unstable. Nevertheless, recent empirical evi-
dence, gathered mostly in microorganisms, highlights the positive relation between 
diversity, community stability, and functional resilience after perturbation (e.g., 
Girvan et al. 2005). A different hypothesis that has been proposed to explain the 
relation between the richness of species in an ecosystem and their role in its func-
tioning—the redundancy hypothesis (Walker 1992)—takes into account the dif-
ferential role that species can play. The redundancy hypothesis predicts that, since 
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in most ecosystems several species accomplish very similar functions, the loss of 
some of them will have little impact on the system as a whole.
As we have seen, different approaches to conservation have been espoused. 
Each of them, in prioritizing or targeting some entities or processes at the 
expenses of others, makes choices concerning the entities or processes that are 
deemed worthy of conservation. On the one hand, such choices are the result of 
empirical considerations as well as political and economical constraints. On the 
other hand, they display—or perhaps are partially the result of—our environmen-
tal value commitments. Put differently, our ethical approach to biodiversity and 
species contributes to shape our conservation policies and practices.
2.4  Paving the Way for Action
Imagine the following scenario, again involving our Amur leopards. After a sud-
den, bizarre, climate change, Plasmodium falciparum—a protozoan parasite that 
causes malaria in humans—is almost extinct, and it is now listed among Critically 
Endangered species. The number of Amur leopards, however, has started to 
increase to the point that they are no more listed as CE but just as a Vulnerable 
species. Are you certain that you would like to focus your conservation efforts on 
Plasmodium falciparum? Whatever answer one favors, it should be clear by now 
that mere empirical considerations are not enough to settle such issues. Moreover, 
notice that analogous scenarios can be envisaged for habitats as well as for eco-
systems. Think of the stress that traditional approaches to conservation put on wil-
derness (Sect. 2.1): Why should preserving allegedly “pristine” environments be 
a better choice than focusing the attention on urbanized landscapes? To explore 
such issue—we would like to argue—one has to pay attention to the connection 
between different understandings of the importance of biodiversity and species, on 
the one hand, and conservation practices, on the other hand. The bridge between 
the two, we suggest, is unraveled by environmental ethics.
As already mentioned, conserving biodiversity is a sort of surgery; it is 
always performed in a state of emergency and without knowing all the relevant 
facts. Decisions have to be made before having all the empirical data at hand and 
before a full theoretical analysis of the data is available. In such a situation of 
uncertainty, ethical norms that guide conservation are, at least according to Soulé 
(1985), a genuine part of the discipline, as is always the case with crisis-oriented 
disciplines.
To stress the surgery metaphor, a surgeon cannot just operate on the sickest 
organ in a body; he or she also has to decide whether operating is the most appro-
priate course of action, keeping in mind the general well-being of the patient. The 
surgeon must check whether it is really that organ that should be operated on, or 
maybe that one plus another one which is connected to it, or maybe two unre-
lated organs because surgery would be useless otherwise. In other words, even in a 
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crisis, some questions must be answered in order to put forward the most effective 
conservation policies and practices.
It is clear that we want to protect species—and biodiversity—because we think 
that they have value. Still, admitting that species are valuable, which type of value 
are we dealing with? Is our attitude to favor the Amur leopards to the detriment 
of parasitic protozoans somehow justified, or justifiable? Moreover, as mentioned 
in the Introduction, background extinction as well as the Big Five are caused by 
events that are completely independent of our species. In the case of the Big Sixth 
and the anthropogenic biodiversity crisis, things are different—Homo sapiens 
seem to have a moral responsibility toward other species and biodiversity at large 
in themselves as well as toward its own future generations.
First of all, a distinction can be drawn between something having an instrumen-
tal value, because it fulfills some material or immaterial need of someone/some-
thing else, and something having an intrinsic value—a value per se. Then, among 
instrumental values, we may distinguish between commodity value, amenity value, 
existence value, and option value of a species, or subspecies, or any other biologi-
cal entity.19 A species’ commodity value, if any, is its market value. The Amur 
leopard’s commodity value may be identified, for instance, with the marketplace 
value of the fur coat that can be made from it, or with the price of the zoo ticket 
that people would be willing to pay to view it. A species’ amenity value is gener-
ated by the possible improvement that our intangible life quality can enjoy, thanks 
to it. Think, for instance, of the aesthetic excitement that the view of an Amur 
leopard may elicit in us. Existence value reflects the public’s willingness to con-
tribute to its preservation. Few people will have the opportunity to observe an 
Amur leopard and enjoy its beauty, but many more feel satisfaction from knowing 
that Amur leopards still exist in remote places and therefore might be willing to 
preserve them, contributing with donations and volunteer work for public cam-
paigns. Finally, a species’ option value is a potential value. Some species could 
have no present instrumental value—having no utility at all as a mean to a known 
end. Yet, such species can be a means to a potential, still unknown end and we 
may then decide to conserve some of them because we believe that although we do 
not need them now, we will perhaps need them in the future, for reasons that we 
are currently unable to envisage. Instrumental values such as the ones sketched 
above are the subject matter of environmental economics; intrinsic value is the 
main focus of environmental ethics. A classic example of intrinsic value is happi-
ness: We pursue it because we think it is good in itself, and not in view of its use 
in obtaining something else.
Within environmental ethics, some advocate environmental intrinsic value 
theories, according to which biodiversity and particularly species have a value 
in themselves, for what they are, and not as a means to obtain some other goal. 
Advocates of instrumental value theories claim instead that species have an 
19 Several classifications of species values are available. Here, we follow, at large, the ones 
sketched by Norton (1988) and the comprehensive overview offered by Sandler (2012).
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instrumental value in that they do not have a value per se but only insofar as they 
allow us to reach some other end that we find desirable. The desired end does not 
necessarily need to be for our species, as in the case of commodity or  amenity 
value, it can also be for some other intrinsically valuable entity. Species, for 
instance, are typically considered as instrumental to the end of ecological resil-
ience (species richness is considered important because the richer in species a sys-
tem is, the higher is its integrity—recall, however, that such a claim is a debated 
one, as we have seen in Sect. 2.3). Notice, by the way, that having a value is often 
not a matter of “yes” or “no” but rather a matter of degree and that values are not 
mutually exclusive. It is also for these reasons that prioritization usually requires 
difficult choices.
The idea that species or some other biological entities or processes or even 
overall biodiversity have only an instrumental value typically characterizes anthro-
pocentric environmental ethics theories. Anthropocentrism can be seen as the view 
that the only intrinsically valuable entities are human beings, and therefore, nature 
is instrumentally valuable just to the extent that it fulfills human needs. A strong 
and a weak version of anthropocentrism can also be distinguished. Strong anthro-
pocentrism aims at accounting for the needs of the current generation only—there-
fore, unlimited resource exploitation is admissible. Weak anthropocentrism, on the 
other hand, aims at accounting for the needs of the present generation and future 
human generations. It is thus commonly referred to as intergenerational anthropo-
centrism, and it stands as the ethical foundation of the political concept of sustain-
able development.
Non-anthropocentric environmental ethics theories acknowledge that, besides 
human beings, other natural entities possess intrinsic value. Two perspectives, 
biocentrism and ecocentrism, acknowledge intrinsic value for different types of 
non-human entities: non-human individuals (individual animals, plants, etc.) in 
the case of biocentrism and environmental collective entities (species, ecosys-
tems, etc.) in the case of ecocentrism. (For this reason, ecocentrism is considered 
a holistic environmental ethics theory). The idea that species or some other collec-
tive biological entities or processes—or even biodiversity understood as a prop-
erty—have an intrinsic value typically characterizes ecocentric environmental 
ethic theories. Stenmark (2002) recognizes a strong and a weak version of both 
biocentrism and ecocentrism. Strong biocentrism includes those theories that 
attribute as much or more value to non-human individuals than to human beings, 
while weak biocentrism includes those theories that attribute less value to non-
human individuals than to human beings. Strong ecocentrism includes those theo-
ries that attribute the same or even more value to environmental collectives than to 
individuals, and finally, weak ecocentrism attributes less value to environmental 
collectives than to individuals. Although somehow schematic, this sixfold classi-
fication of environmental ethics theories provides a useful tool for analyzing the 
foundation of environmental policies.
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3  The US Endangered Species Act and the EU Habitats 
Directive: A Functional and Ethical Comparative 
Analysis
Two of the main legislative acts on environment conservation are the 1973 
Endangered Species Act, currently in force in the United States, and the 1992 
Habitats Directive, currently in force in the European Union.20 They are probably 
the most relevant pieces of legislation concerned with biodiversity conservation—
with the only possible exception being the global international treatises: the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). The main objective 
of the Habitats Directive was to institute Natura 2000, a network of natural sites 
within the European Union whose aim is to preserve some of the most representa-
tive habitats and species of Europe’s fauna and flora (European Council 1992). In 
its turn, the Endangered Species Act was designed to give federal protection from 
extinction to all endangered species of fauna and flora (93rd United States 
Congress 1973).
The two legislations and the policies they encompass arose in different histori-
cal moments (the ESA in 1973 and the Habitats Directive in 1992) and were con-
ceived in and for two different political scenarios: the ESA for a more politically 
integrated territory (USA), the Habitats Directive for a recent, in progress, political 
union (the European Union). Do these differences in political context translate into 
fundamental differences in the conservation policies envisaged by the ESA and the 
Habitats directive? In particular, do the two legislations rest on a different ethi-
cal evaluation of biodiversity? Do they target different objects for preservation? 
Do they integrate the evolutionary potential in conservation policies differently? 
To answer these questions, a thorough comparative analysis of the ESA and the 
Habitats Directive is presented in the remaining parts of this work.
3.1  Protecting the Evolutionary Potential
In Sect. 2.2, we suggested that taking the evolutionary potential of species or pop-
ulations into account would help prioritization choices and, more broadly, that in 
order to go beyond the species approach, a consideration of the evolutionary pro-
cess is in order. Do the Habitats Directive and the ESA differ in this respect?
20 The texts of the two legislations to which we make reference in the remainder of this work can 
be downloaded, respectively, from http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/laws/esa.pdfand http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1992:206:0007:0050:EN:PDF.
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Albeit the terms “evolution” and “evolutionary” are absent from the letter of 
the ESA, it is possible to argue that the ESA pays strong attention to the evolu-
tionary potential of species, as witnessed by the presence of the concept of an 
Evolutionary Significant Unit in the implementation—though not in the text—of 
the Act. Let us review this point in more detail.
The concept of an Evolutionary Significant Unit made its appearance in the 
ESA in order to clarify the concept of distinct population segment (DPS) and 
evolved as a practical response to the specific challenges of conservation. Distinct 
population segments are those populations, or groups of populations, that are sig-
nificant in relation to the entire species and discrete from other populations of the 
species. In order to clarify when a certain population has to be considered signifi-
cant and discrete for the purposes of the ESA, looking at whether it represents an 
evolutionarily significant unit or not has been a suggested approach. This approach 
took place in the first petitions for listing the Pacific Northwest salmon among 
endangered species, filed in 1990, that asked to include distinct population seg-
ments. At that time, however, the agencies in charge of implementing the ESA 
lacked any formal guidance for how to interpret the distinct population segments 
provision in the Act because the provision as defined for terrestrial species, such 
as grizzly bears, bald eagles, and alligators, during the 1990s used a wide vari-
ety of criteria. Therefore, Robert Waples (1991), an official of the National Marine 
Fisheries Service, developed a conceptual framework laying down that a salmon 
population (or a group of salmon populations) should be considered a DPS if it 
represents an Evolutionary Significant Unit of that species. 
A vertebrate population will be considered distinct (and hence a ‘species’) for purposes of 
conservation under the Act if the population represents an evolutionarily significant unit 
(ESU) of the biological species. An ESU is a population (or group of populations) that (1) 
is substantially reproductively isolated from other conspecific population units, and (2) 
represents an important component in the evolutionary legacy of the species.
To fulfill the ESU requirements, a population unit should both be under reproduc-
tive isolation and show evolutionary significance. The second condition is preva-
lent, as isolation is not demanded to be complete, but is required only to the extent 
needed to allow evolutionarily important differences to arise in different units. The 
policy based on ESUs has only been applied to the Pacific salmon by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service. The desire for guidelines that would produce more relia-
ble and consistent results motivated the development of a policy, common to the 
US Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, on how 
to interpret the concept of distinct population segments in the ESA, finalized in 
1996. The joint policy is based on two criteria—discreteness and significance—
that closely parallel those in the ESU salmon policy (Waples 2006).21 The two 
21 Alternatives to the ESU worth mentioning are the designatable units (DUs) employed by 
the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada for status assessment of species 
under the Canadian Species at Risk Act. According to (Green 2005), DUs would fulfill “the need 
for a practicable procedure to identify infraspecific entities for status assignment” avoiding at the 
same time “value judgments concerning evolutionary importance”.
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agencies have used the joint policy to make DPS determinations for a number of 
species, including the gray wolf, Sierra Nevada bighorn sheep, cactus ferruginous 
pygmy owl, white marlin, and Puget Sound killer whale (Waples 2006). Therefore, 
albeit the Endangered Species Act does not explicitly mention evolutionary pro-
cesses and potential, if we look at its practical implementation, there are little 
doubts that the preservation of evolutionary processes and potential is of central 
concern.22 
In sharp contrast with ESA, genetic studies of local populations have seldom 
been used to justify the inclusion of new conservation areas in the Natura 2000 
network (Santamaría and Méndez 2012), meaning that evolutionary processes 
and potential are of minor concern. Furthermore, only one reference to genetics 
is made in the text of the Habitats Directive. It is found in a passage in which 
the need to conserve landscape “stepping stones” (such as small woods or ponds) 
essential for dispersal and genetic exchange of wild species is recalled. However, 
Annex III requires that for the assessment of the Natura 2000 sites, the “global 
ecological value of the site for the biogeographical regions concerned” and the 
degree of isolation of priority species be taken into account. This apparently hosts, 
to a certain extent, the conservation status of genetically distinct populations and 
their expected contribution to the species’ evolutionary potential as criteria for 
asserting the conservation status of species and justifying new classified areas. 
Nonetheless, the conservation of genetically distinct populations, races, or subspe-
cies is not specifically required by the Directive.
In sum, the ESA might have the capability of addressing the conservation of 
evolutionary mechanisms and potential in spite of the biases introduced by inter-
est groups, political pressures, and bureaucratic constraints in the selection of 
protected species. However, the historical evidence of the small number of spe-
cies and populations that enhanced their conservation status, thanks to measures 
inspired by the ESA, casts doubts on this possibility (Langpap and Kerkvliet 
2002). In any case, the capability of the Natura 2000 network to address the con-
servation of evolutionary potential seems even lower: Even though some ref-
erences to the conservation of genetic diversity are traceable in the Habitats 
Directive (mainly in Annex III), they are not mandatory and, in practice, there is 
an almost total absence of compliance of member states with these aims. Neither 
of the two legislative acts adequately targets the objective of conserving evolution-
ary potential—even though the ESA seems closer to achieving this objective.
This remains, however, a central goal. On the one hand, at large, biodiversity is 
the product of evolution and thereby its long-term maintenance is dependent on 
evolutionary processes and on conserving and improving evolutionary potential. 
On the other hand, there is compelling evidence of an acceleration of microevolu-
tionary changes in contemporary populations due to human disturbance or activity, 
22 To identify and characterize ESUs and DPSs, ESA increasingly relies on the use of molecular 
and population genetics, which have raised concerns regarding the limitation of lay public par-
ticipation in listing decisions (Kelly 2010).
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including, somehow ironically, changes elicited by the application of conservation 
programs (Santamaría and Méndez 2012). Those anthropogenic microevolutionary 
changes play a crucial role in allowing the populations of threatened species to 
adapt to rapidly changing environments and can eventually lead, in the long term, 
to macroevolutionary speciation. Protecting evolutionary processes is, therefore, of 
critical importance.23 
3.2  Biodiversity Concepts and Conservation Targets
In Sect. 2.3, we argued that the different views of biodiversity underlying dis-
tinct conservation policies might influence the choice of conservation targets. 
Now, we ask whether this is the case with the two legislative acts under review. 
Ideally biodiversity conservation policies should recognize the importance of the 
different levels of biodiversity and be designed and implemented to conserve the 
entire spectrum that goes from genes to ecosystems, going beyond a mere species- 
centered approach. But, do they do it?
The network based on Habitats Directive—Natura 2000—is probably the most 
ambitious supranational policy measure aiming at preserving biodiversity through 
land use regulation. In comparison with nature conservation policies targeting only 
species, Natura 2000 goes one step further by protecting not only endangered spe-
cies, but also natural and semi-natural habitats. The network is therefore concerned 
with biodiversity at the level of both species and ecosystems (Rosa and Marques 
da Silva 2005). Furthermore, the explicit reference to semi-natural habitats denotes 
that the concept of wilderness does not play a core role, suggesting a conception of 
biodiversity quite different from the one embraced by IUCN (see Sect. 2.1).
Albeit the main modus operandi of the ESA is also based on the classification of 
protected areas, these are not taken as ends in themselves but rather as instruments 
to the ultimate goal of endangered species preservation. Protected areas are declared 
to be such because they encompass habitats that are critical for the in situ conserva-
tion of endangered species. The value that the ESA accords to habitats is, therefore, 
just an instrumental value. This claim is further confirmed by the transitory charac-
ter of the protection measures prescribed by the ESA, among which we mention the 
rule that established that protected areas shall be declassified if the species they con-
tain are no longer threatened (93rd United States Congress 1973).24 
The Secretary shall implement a system in cooperation with the States to monitor effec-
tively for not less than 5 years the status of all species which have recovered to the point 
at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer necessary and which, in 
accordance with the provisions of this section, have been removed from either of the lists 
published under subsection.
23 Ashley et al. (2003) called, for instance, for an “Evolutionary Enlightened Management”.
24 Notice also that Natura 2000 contemplates the possibility of classified sites being delisted 
once recovered, but the entire network was conceived as a permanent structure.
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It should be noted, however, that although the ESA’s measures were conceived 
more as an emergency surgery than as long-term therapy, the emergency usu-
ally turns out to be longer than expected. For example, by 1999, of 1,746 species 
listed (FWS 1999), only 27 had been delisted [8 because they actually recovered, 7 
because they went extinct, and 11 because additional information revealed that the 
listing was unwarranted (Abbitt and Scott 2001)]. Such a focus on species seems 
to show that the ESA is mainly concerned with biodiversity conservation at the 
level of species, with minor or no interest in the conservation of biological diver-
sity at the ecosystems level. So, what about genetic diversity?
The complete absence of the terms “genetic” and “genetics” in the text of the 
ESA could lead the reader to conclude that biodiversity at the level of genes is also 
of minor or no interest to the ESA. That would, however, be an inaccurate conclu-
sion. Genetic information is commonly used by the two federal agencies in charge 
of implementing the ESA: the Fish and Wildlife Services, under the Department of 
the Interior, and the National Marine Fisheries Services, within the Department of 
Commerce. Both agencies allow for three classes of entities to be listed as endan-
gered or threatened: species, subspecies, and DPSs [and, for the purposes of the 
ESA, an entity, once listed, “becomes” a species, regardless of whether it was 
originally listed as a species, a subspecies, or a DPS (Kelly 2010)].
Subspecies and species are common taxonomic concepts, although not without 
difficulties, as the Species Problem attests (Sect. 2.3). For instance, regarding the 
absence of a shared definition of species, the ESA adopted the previously men-
tioned Mayr’s biological species concept—one of the most commonly used in the 
scientific community, in particular by zoologists. Indeed, in the text of the ESA, 
it is specified that “The term ‘species’ includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife 
or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or 
wildlife which interbreeds when mature.”
By contrast, the notion of a “distinct population segment” is a less standard bio-
logical concept. Although it may be applied to any species—and it seems particu-
larly fitted to sessile organisms like vascular plants—under the ESA, the concept 
is currently restricted to vertebrates. Though a certain species as a whole may not 
be in danger of extinction, designation as DPS offers protection to imperilled, iso-
lated populations of a species (Kelly 2010). Population genetics operates both as 
a tool to identify DPSs and as the motivation to protect them. DPSs are preserved 
due to their unique gene pool, implicitly assumed (when no genetic studies have 
been performed and classification is based, for instance, on geographic analysis 
only) or explicitly demonstrated (by means of molecular biology techniques) to be 
significantly different from the gene pools of other populations of the same spe-
cies. Thereby, the designation of DPSs as protected species highlights the concern 
of the ESA with the genetic level of biodiversity.
In contrast, as mentioned in Sect. 3.1, the term “genetic” is present in the text 
of the Habitats Directive, in a reference to the importance of preserving land-
scape features such as ponds or small woods that, by virtue of their role as “step-
ping stones,” are essential for the migration, dispersal, and genetic exchange of 
wild species. However, there are no explicit references to genetic evaluation and 
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preservation in the process of selecting sites to be listed. Therefore, the genetic 
level of biodiversity seems to be of minor concern in the Habitat Directive—and, 
accordingly, in the Natura 2000 network—compared to the ESA. In summary, 
both the ESA and the Habitats Directive are concerned with conserving biodiver-
sity at the species level, but their interests diverge regarding other organizational 
levels of biodiversity. Whereas the ESA has a strong focus on the conservation 
of genetic diversity, the emphasis of the Habitats Directive is, as its designation 
explicitly recalls, is on the higher organizational level of habitats.
3.3  Ethical Frameworks
Identifying the reasons for conserving biodiversity is not only valuable from a 
theoretical perspective but is also useful from a practical point of view. A correct 
assessment of the value system is essential to designing conservation policies that 
adequately cope with the trade-off between biodiversity and other societal values. 
Is the ethical motivation underlying the ESA and the Habitats Directive the same? 
Do they share an anthropocentric, biocentric, or ecocentric view of biodiversity 
(see Sect. 2.4)? An abundant literature on the ethics of biodiversity is available, 
but, to our knowledge, no one has offered any comparison of the ethical frame-
works of the ESA and the Habitats Directive. In what follows, we will provide 
some remarks on this issue.
The ESA does not explicitly explain its motivations for biodiversity conserva-
tion. Nevertheless, some insights into the ethical framework underlying it can be 
traced. First of all, there is a commitment to comply with the international obli-
gations of the United States. Indeed, the ESA expresses that “develop[ing] and 
maintain[ing] conservation programs which meet national and international stand-
ards is a key to meeting the Nation’s international commitments.”
This concern can be seen as expressing both indirect duties toward biodiversity and 
an anthropocentric perspective on its value given that the value of biodiversity rests in 
its potential to fulfill international agreements. It should be noted, however, that this 
is only a provisional evaluation of the ethical framework of the ESA, since the ethi-
cal motivations for engaging in the international agreements will ultimately define the 
ethical perspective of this legislative act. Still, in the same sentence, the ESA presents 
other motivations for biodiversity conservation, such as “better safeguarding, for the 
benefit of all citizens, the Nation’s heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.”
This reinforces the anthropocentric perspective, explicitly addressing “the ben-
efit for all citizens.” There are no direct and explicit references to future genera-
tions suggesting a strong anthropocentric position. However, the term “heritage” 
denotes a temporal perspective, something that was received from ancestors and 
(presumably) should be given to the forthcoming generations, thus revealing a 
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position characteristic of weak or intergenerational anthropocentrism. The biocentric 
 perspective, as expected, can be ruled out, since the ESA explicitly admits the killing 
of individual organisms when required to spare collective entities.
Interestingly, the ESA recurrently refers to “the well-being” of species (and to 
the need to preserve them), since these collective entities could share the subjec-
tive feeling of their constituent individual organisms—but no references to the 
well-being of the latter are made. In summary, the scarce indications available 
regarding the values behind the ESA suggest a strong anthropocentric ethics, miti-
gated with some intergenerational elements.
Let us move now to the Habitats Directive. Prima facie reasons allow us to pre-
sume that its underlying ethics may align it with an ecocentric paradigm since it 
targets species and habitats which are central entities to holistic environmental 
ethics systems (Rosa and Marques da Silva 2005). Furthermore, Natura 2000 is 
supported by environmental NGOs whose members, or at least part of them, pre-
sumably hold non-anthropocentric ethical assumptions (Dobson 2000). However, 
the Habitats Directive’s preamble explicitly states that Natura 2000 was conceived 
as a contribution to sustainable development: 
Whereas, the main aim of this Directive being to promote the maintenance of biodiver-
sity, taking account of economic, social, cultural and regional requirements, this Directive 
makes a contribution to the general objective of sustainable development; whereas the 
maintenance of such biodiversity may in certain cases require the maintenance, or indeed 
the encouragement, of human activities.
In its current definition and understanding, sustainable development is a paradig-
matic mark of weak (i.e., intergenerational) anthropocentrism. In fact, the Habitats 
Directive deals directly or indirectly with many of the concepts typically associ-
ated with weak anthropocentrism. It refers, for example, to asset value, cultural 
values, natural heritage, and natural resources. Furthermore, the Habitats Directive 
admits that many human activities (implicitly including productive and economic 
activities such as forestry and agriculture) need not be prohibited in order to 
conserve biodiversity. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to connect the ethical 
background of the Habitats Directive with strong anthropocentrism because the 
relevance given to sustainability and stewardship points elsewhere. Furthermore, 
the greater importance explicitly conferred by the Habitats Directive to biological 
over socioeconomic criteria in the selection, management, and protection of con-
servation sites would be barely allowable under typical strong anthropocentrism 
(Rosa and Marques da Silva 2005). Also, like in the case of the ESA, no direct or 
indirect reference to values connected to a biocentric or ecocentric ethical system 
is present in the Habitats Directive. Thus, it seems that the underlying ethics of 
the Habitats Directive and the corresponding Natura 2000 network is that of weak 
(intergenerational) ethics. In summary, the underlying ethics of both the ESA and 
the Habitats Directive are anthropocentric, clearly intergenerational in the case of 
the latter, and closer to the strong version in the case of the former. 
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4  Concluding Remarks
Abundant evidence shows that we may be entering a new mass extinction, the first 
one to be anthropogenic. Since our species and its activities are the principal cause 
of the alleged Big Sixth, it seems reasonable to think that, insofar as we are moral 
agents, we have responsibilities toward other people and future generations (if not 
directly toward species other than ours). These responsibilities include preserving 
biodiversity as a source of well-being. Current conservation policies, such the 
North American ESA and the European Habitats Directive, were created and are 
still running under an anthropocentric ethical paradigm, in line with the dominant 
political concept of sustainable development. In spite of the many criticisms that 
have been raised against both legislations, and the difficulties in comparing their 
effectiveness,25 the anthropocentric ethical framework, per se, is not hindering 
their conservation effectiveness. On the contrary, the prevalence of a static view of 
species, characteristic of typological thinking, is of greater concern. Preserving 
biodiversity is not only a matter of stopping species extinction: conservation of all 
levels of biodiversity, under (genes) and above (habitats) species, should be 
directly addressed. Furthermore, conserving the evolutionary processes is of focal 
importance. The conceptual architecture of both the ESA and the Habitats 
Directive is not fully capable of fulfilling these needs: Whereas the ESA was not 
designed to preserve the higher level of biodiversity (habitats), the Habitats 
Directive misses the objective of preserving the lower level (genes), and thereby 
the evolutionary potential of populations. Therefore, reforms in both North 
American and European biodiversity conservation policies are needed.
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